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This thesis uses documentary and interview data to advance a new
interpretation of the development policies of the Tanzanian state. These
policies are not a function of the interests of bureaucratic or other
social classes acting in a context of national 'dependence', but rather
the product of political-institutional factors which encourage beliefs
that development problems are fundamentally 'political' and that external
constraints are the principal causes of policy failures. ,
The new explanation combines an analysis of Tanzania's political
institutions in terms of a tripartite system of policy-making (Party,
Government and Presidency) with an analysis of the policy-makers'
conceptions of development.
	 Three themes are investigated: -the
relationship between Party and Government, the views of development held
in the three organs of the state, and the consequences of a 'political'
approach for the development process.
Part One examines the emergence of two opposing views of development
and the changing arrangements for policy formulation and policy imple-
mentation during the period 1962-66.
	 It is argued that the division of
labour created by the 1965 Constitution introduced great uncertainties
into the development process.
Part Two analyses the complex and changing relations between the
three elements of the tripartite system during the years since 1967. In
one sub-period (1969-74) the three organs of the state adopted views of
development which had a common underlying theme, giving greater emphasis
to political goals than to present economic constraints.
Part Three investigates three major policy-areas: private
capital, internal trade, and agriculture and rural development. The
findings illustrate various ways in which Government and Party operated
at cross-purposes with the Presidency alternating its support from one
organ to the other. The practice of formulating policies without
reference to economic considerations is shown to be a frequent cause
of policy failure.
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TANZANIA 1962 - 1982: RISE AND DECLINE OF AN
AFRICAN MECCA
In the 1960s 'African Socialism' emerged as the most popular
political philosophy of the newly independent African countries.
Though interpreted in diverse and contradictory ways, it was adopted
by the governments of countries as far apart as Senegal, the Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Guinea, the Congo and Tanzania. 	 As Ahmed Mohidden
aptly states:
To be an African Socialist or to espouse
'African Socialism' during that period was
one of the most respectable things for any
African leader to do.
(Mohidden, 1981: 13)
Nyerere's Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism, written in 1962, can
be seen as part of this early post-independence euphoria.
It was not until 1967, when Nyerere proclaimed the policy of
Socialism and Self-Reliance in the form of the Arusha Declaration,
that Tanzania's socialist policies began to be taken seriously by the
outside world.	 The policies of the Arusha Declaration (AD) excited
both the interest and the imagination of Western radicals. 	 Various
reasons account for this Tanzaniophilia.
First, the Arusha Declaration was followed by the immediate
nationalisation of the major sectors of foreign capital in the country.
Secondly, its egalitarian ideals were implemented in the Leadership Code
which aimed to reduce the gap between the leaders and the led. 	 This
showed that the Tanzanian leadership was serious about socialism. Thirdly,
Tanzania's expressions of self-reliance and its elaboration in the policy
of Ujamaa Vijijini (rural socialism) stressed the need for a type of
development that was rural-based and derived its dynamism from internal
sources and communal production by peasants.
	 Development would be
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spearheaded by changes in the rural areas, the most impoverished sector
of the country.	 This rural emphasis was a revolutionary idea in the
mid-1960s.	 Its novelty lay in its timing.	 There was disillusionment
with both conventional and Marxist ideas of development which had
emphasised heavy industrialisation (Killick, 1978).	 China's success
in rural-based development indicated that Tanzania's own attempt was
not a practical impossibility; indeed, it was the logical solution for
a poor country to adopt given extreme shortages of capital, technology
and trained manpower.
Other elements of the international context help us to understand
why Tanzania became an 'African Mecca' for the western intellectual left.
Mao's China was an inspiration to many intellectuals the world over, and
Ho Chi Minh's struggle against the USA showed that poor Third World
countries could win against imperialism. 	 The 1968 student 'revolution'
which swept western Europe was a further product of the radical wave
which was sweeping the world.	 The interest that has been focussed on
Tanzania by the left can be seen as part of this 'radical' wind of
change.	 It was an age of idealism and optimism in which it was natural
to believe that poor countries could break their chains by their own
efforts.
The adoption of the Arusha Declaration also coincided internation-
ally with a revolution in the theories of the left about development.
In the mid-1960s theories of development shifted from their concern with
'internal' economic and social obstacles towards a greater preoccupation
with externally-imposed constraints and the operation of the international
economic system (Streeten, 1977).
	
Within this broad shift in interest,
the dependency theory of underdevelopment argued that dependency on
international capitalism actively 'underdeveloped' the peripheral
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countries - that is, progressively impoverished their economies. As
far as the left was concerned, Gunder Frank (1967) was the principal
exponent of the new paradigm of dependency.
There were certain broad similarities between the ideas expressed
in the Arusha Declaration and those of the dependency school. 	 Both put
forward socialism as a means of developing Third World economies. Both
emphasised social objectives in development such as the need to reduce
inequality, to increase social services and to bring about even and
internally-orientated development.	 Finally, both called for reliance
on national as opposed to 'foreign' resources. 	 The similarities of
these ideas may explain why a neo-Marxist dependency framework came to
dominate the analysis of Tanzania's development after the Arusha
Declaration (Coulson, 1979; Saul, 1973; Rweyemamu, 1973; Shivji, 1976;
Von Freyhold, 1979).
It was not only the radical left that was attracted by Tanzania's
new development path.	 Despite its relatively economic and strategic
insignificance within the global economy, Tanzania's development since
1967 has generated immense interest with a wide and diverse audience
ranging from liberal and radical academics, to social democratic and
Communist governments, as well as with multilateral aid agencies such
as the World Bank.	 However, this interest grew from extreme optimism
to progressive disillusionment within a time-span of less than 10 years.
There were various distinguishing elements in the Tanzania's
'development experience'. 	 First, the Arusha Declaration had empha-
sised agricultural development, stressing self-sufficiency in food and
socialist rural development; and second, it had adopted a policy of
self-reliance, social equality and socialism. 	 Between 1969 and 1973
more and more radical policies were passed which appeared to extend the
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'revolution'.	 In the agricultural sector, the policy of promoting
voluntary ujamaa villages was replaced by the collectivist principles
of ujamaa established by the Presidential Circular 1/69; this policy
stated that 'kulak' farmers were to be discriminated against so as to
give poor peasants a chance to organise and develop themselves under
communal production.	 In 1971 the policy of Mwongozo (Guidelines) was
passed which gave workers powers to control their production processes
and gave them security of employment.	 In addition, various redistri-
butive measures were passed to alleviate the poverty of the masses.
These policies were accompanied by a strengthening of the Party,
which became the main agent for implementing socialism. 	 A vast campaign
of mobilisation was undertaken by Party leaders in the regions, in the
districts and in the villages to implement the policy of Ujamaa Vijijini.
Party branches were established in factories and other work-places to
mobilise workers to produce more. 	 Meanwhile various research projects
and seminars were conducted by the University of Dar es Salaam and other
colleges to see how best the policies of socialism and self-reliance
could be implemented and schools began to experiment with the policy of
education for self-reliance. 	 The period ushered in a new hope that
the problems of poverty might be solved through political education,
ideological development and mobilisation.
However, Tanzanian socialism did not live up to all the expect-
ations of its supporters inside and outside the country.
	 By the mid-
1970s it became obvious that the class structure had not been radically
transformed.	 A society that was class-less and based on the rural
sector had not emerged.	 The very policies creating socialism had led,
instead, to the creation of a huge bureaucratic apparatus. 	 The poor
were still weak and the strong were even more powerful.	 Furthermore,
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Tanzania was still dependent on international capitalism both for her
export outlets and aid.	 In fact, Tanzania was more dependent on aid
for her internal development in 1975 than she had been prior to the
Arusha Declaration.
	 Thus, the aid component was 24.4% of total
development expenditure in 1967, but 32.5% in 1970/71, and 62% in 1975/6
(Hartmann, 1977).
	 These features in the Tanzanian development process
began to create serious doubts in the minds of academics and other
interested parties.
	 Further events appeared to confirm these doubts
and led to increasing disillusionment.
Between the mid-1970s and 1980 the Tanzanian economy was gripped
by two very severe economic crises (1974/75 and 1979/80) manifested in
severe balance of payment problems.
	
During the same period there were
reversals of major policies, usually followed by counter-reversals within
a short period.
In agriculture ujamaa was replaced by a policy of Villagisation
in 1974, and around five-and-a-half million people were physically
resettled in the space of three years.	 Force was not excluded
(Mwapachu, 1976; Coulson, 1977; Nyerere, 1977: 42).
	 Tanzania did not
achieve her aim of self-sufficiency of food and in 1974/5 she was struck
by a drought, which forced her to import food grains. High world prices
of oil during the mid-1970s and imports of food grains led to a balance
of payment crisis.	 A massive mobilisation campaign, 'Kilimo cha kufa na 
kupona', was spearheaded by the Party to increase production and avert
starvation.	 The food situation improved and so did foreign exchange
availability thanks largely to the coffee boom of 1976. 	 During 1976-
1978 there were moves to encourage foreign as well as local private
investments in Tanzania. 	 Mwongozo was brought to a halt and modified
by a Bill, introduced in 1979, designed to restore managerial authority
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and labour discipline, and improve productivity in the factories.
Radical academics viewed these policies as a sell-out; Raikes (1975),
Mihyo (1975), Saul (1974).
But two years later Tanzania was gripped by another severe
balance of payment crisis. 	 The 'liberalisation' policies of 1976-78
which had favoured private capital were revised between 1979 and
1980/81 in favour of greater control by the state of the tottering
economy.	 Another drought, the collapse of the East African Community
and the invasion by Idi Amin all contributed to a depletion of foreign
exchange reserves.	 The net level of reserves fell from US$234 million
at the end of 1973 to minus US$286 million at the end of 1980 (World
Bank, 1981: 55).	 The effect of the balance of payment crisis was both
total and devastating, as the following quotations taken from the Daily
News (Tanzania) illustrate. 	 The economy was slowly grinding to a halt:
Muhimbili faces water shortages (the national teaching hospital at
Dar es Salaam)
The hospital was also experiencing a serious shortage of electric
bulbs.	 Special batteries for vital services including the
operating theatre had long since gone defective.
(Daily News, 17 July 1980)
Projects lag behind 
The Parliamentary Committee which toured 11 regions to inspect
development projects, found that many projects were delayed -
because of financial backing from the Government, parastatal
and regional authorities.
(Daily News, 24 July 1980)
Motex lays off 600 workers 
The Moshi Textile Mill (Motex) has laid off its 600 workers
after it failed to secure an import licence from the Bank of
Tanzania to order thread, the major input into production.
(Daily News, 3 October, 1980)
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4,000 tonnes of Coffee pileup in Mbinga
(Daily News, 25 June, 1979)
TFC halts production 
The Tanzania Fertilizer Company stopped
production last month due to scarcity of raw
materials.
(Daily News, 14 June, 1979)
Drastic Cuts on Imports Imposed 
(Daily News, 22 June 1979)
This situation was summarised by the Minister of Finance in the
following manner:
For the oil importing developing countries
the issue is survival itself. They face
collapse if their minimal needs are not
met urgently (Daily News, 2 October 1980)
Economic problems aggravated by inflation and higher prices as a
result of chronic shortages of basic consumer goods have led corruption,
demoralisation and an 'informal economy' to develop, thus rendering
ineffective the mechanisms of control of the economy by the 'state'.
While central authority has become increasingly ineffective (Pratt, 1979:
229) and the economy has collapsed under the strains of the economic
crises, life continues.	 But different forms of economic activity,
new relationships and new values and norms are being formed, creating
a society which is very different from Nyerere's dream.
What has happened and how can we account for such drastic changes
within the time-span of less than a generation? 	 A first step towards
answering this awesome question is to examine the various interpretations
that have been offered to explain the Tanzania development experience.
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SOME LEADING INTERPRETATIONS
We can distinguish three main types of academic explanations of •
the Tanzania experience.	 First are those of the radical left, who
have written most profusely on Tanzania's experience. 	 The most
important of these writers are Cliffe and Saul (1972, 1973), Saul (1979),
Shivji (1976), Raikes (1975) and Von Freyhold (1979). 	 Their explanations
of the rise and failure of socialist policies typically focus on class
structure and the inability of those in power to eliminate Tanzania's
dependency on international capitalism. 	 These writers have been greatly
influenced by the neo-Marxist dependency approach towards development
as well as by generic Marxist ideas about the state. 	 Although they come
from different professional backgrounds and mostly are not trained
sociologists, nevertheless their approach could be considered 'socio-
logical' in the sense that political and even economic issues are
analysed in terms of social structure.
The second type of analysis that has emerged is what may be called
the 'pragmatic dependency' approach. 	 Particularly associated with the
writings of Reginald Green, it involves taking a dependency view of
Tanzania without, however, embracing class analysis, Green (1974a, 1974b, 1970,
1977a, 1979).
The third type of approach is distinguished by a focus on political
institutions and is dominated by political scientists. 	 Most prominent
has been Pratt's Critical Phase (1976), which explains policies largely
in terms of Nyerere's moral values.
	
But other political scientists
such as Samoff (1970), Hopkins (1968, 1971), Tordoff (1967) and Bienen
(1967) have focussed more closely on political structures. These writings
are extremely useful in illuminating Tanzanian political structures, but
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typically stop short of investigating their effects on development.
One political scientist, Hyden (1980), is to some extent an exception
in that he has gone on to examine policies of development in relation
to political arrangements.
The major weakness of the approach of the radical left is the
tendency to study the Tanzanian experience through an imposed class-
analysis framework, while both the radicals and the approach of Green
share weaknesses derived from the dependency approach.	 The studies by
political scientists are more useful but their findings about political
institutions need to be 're-interpreted' in relation to development
problems following the lead of Hyden. 	 After reviewing at greater
length the contribution of the three approaches identified here, I shall
explain further the argument that they all suffer from significant
weaknesses.
In the light of this critical review, the thesis will propose that
it is essential to study the Tanzanian experience in terms of the process
of policy-making itself.	 Policy-making in Tanzania has been shaped
fundamentally not by the interests of social class forces but by
political-institutional arrangements, particularly the emerging division
of labour between Party and Government.
	 Given this institutional
framework, the competing conceptions of development held by those involved
in policy formation play a significant role in their own right.
Development as class struggle under conditions of dependency 
Unlike many African Universities, Dar es Salaam University in the
mid-1960s attracted a core of young and dedicated intellectuals who
supported socialism.
	 They built up a much needed literature on Tanzania's
socio-economic development. They viewed the policies of the Arusha
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Declaration as a serious attempt by the 'state' to initiate a socialist
development process.	 For instance, Saul (1968: 168) stated, "Tanzania
is increasingly carrying on the debate about socialism at a high level of
sophistication".	 Their analysis was characterised by two major elements.
They saw development in terms of the politics of the class struggle, and
they conceived the latter in terms much influenced by dependency theory.
These early radicals placed great emphasis on the role of ideology
and political action as instruments of socialist construction (Cliffe
& Saul, 1972a:1: 323).	 Their work was partly concerned with 'charting'
out possibilities for political action.	 Idealism and a belief in the
role of sheer political will in solving development problems were central
features of their approach. 	 This was the case, for example, in relation
to planning.	 According to Saul, socialist planning required a 'political'
strategy, because it involved 'political economy'.	 Planning under these
conditions could not be viewed as simply technical or administrative.
It should involve three factors.
	
First, it should represent an ideolo-
gical challenge to vested interests; secondly, if meaningful policies
were to be undertaken it should establish a popular base (political
challenge); and thirdly, it should be given sustained and progressive
institutional expression (organisational challenge).	 Before such
planning was undertaken, political changes were necessary to enable power
to be allocated in such a manner that it supported the necessary changes
(Saul 1971: 24).
Development problems were analysed mainly in class terms: the
key questions were to identify which forces were likely to hinder
socialist development.	 Such an approach was necessary because it enabled
writers to work out strategies and tactics for socialist transformation.
In relation to the implementation of the policy of Ujamaa, for example,
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Cliffe (1973: 2: 209) stated quite explicitly that: 	 "a vast army
of cadres will have to be recruited and trained and put into action".
Cliffe argued that Ujamaa should be promoted throughout the country;
that the villages should in particular be a focal point around which
to mobilise poorer peasants against wealthier ones; and that coercion
would be required against wealthier peasants if the policy was to succeed:
Specifically, confrontation of the emerging
class structure may involve the identification
of any large farmers who may have to be expropriated,
prevented from employing a regular labour force,
temporarily excluded from ujamaa groups, or at
least eliminated from decision making.
(Cliffe1 1973: 2: 203)
As a result of this approach towards the analysis of the policy of Ujamaa,
most of the radical academic research conducted during this early period
was orientated towards uncovering the exploitative role of the 'kulak'
farmers.
Thus Attems (1968) showed that in parts of Usambara 20% of work
was provided by hired labour.	 In Bukoba, Friedrich (1968) showed that
6% of such work was provided by hired labour. John Sender (1974) writing
on the Usambara and Awiti (1973) showed the existence of classes of
wealthy African farmers based on the employment of wage labour. 	 Most
of these authors argued that the existence of these wealthier farmers
showed that capitalist social relations of production were operating in
Tanzania.	 As a result of this, Ujamaa could not be implemented
voluntarily; as Cliffe states, "some elements in the rural population
might be fundamentally opposed to the ujamaa policy, and so work against
it or try to distort it to their own ends ... because their interests
are threatened"	 (Cliffe,1973: 2: 198).
Most of the early radicals were clearly influenced by dependency
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ideas which had argued that in order to develop it would be necessary
to opt out of international capitalism.	 Saul's criticism of the
Dar es Salaam School of History illustrates the role of dependency ideas:
This means that as economic growth takes
place its cumulative effect will be the further
sub-ordination of the colony to the requirements
of metropolitan Europe and the creation of an
increasing dependent economy.
(Saul, 1972: Vol. 1: 66)
Rweyemamu (1973: 91) argued that during the colonial period political
power was used to create a dependent economy:
These developments created a dependency
relationship between the colonies and their
mother-countries: dependency on their markets,
... dependency on imports of capital goods, ...
dependency on foreign entrepreneurs....
These conditions, Rweyemamu argued, led to the creation of perverse
capitalist development.
Dependency theory argued that it was only through the elimination
of links with metropolitan countries that development could occur in
countries like Tanzania:
The logical policy for Tanzania is to make
herself as independent as possible from the
rest of the world, to develop her own internal
industries, her own internal market, and her own
internal transportation and distribution system.
(Yaffey,1972: 81)
In order to attain socialism Rweyemamu argued that:
First and foremost it is necessary to eliminate
Tanzania's present underdevelopment in order
to establish an internally integrated and
self-reliant economy.
(Rweyemamu,1973: 1976)
The influence of the dependency approach on the analysis of Tanzania
development is found not only in these writers, but also in Shivji.
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It is not surprising that the first challenge to Cliffe & Saul's
idealisation of Tanzania's socialist development came from a Tanzanian,
Shivji.	 Using a similar dependency theoretical framework Shivji argued
that the Arusha Declaration, far from representing a step towards social-
ism, incorporated the Tanzanian economy even more into international
capitalism.	 The petite bourgeoisie, through the policies of the Arusha
Declaration, had created and strengthened its own class base (Shivji 1976:
79).
The appearance of this explanation at Dar es Salaam University only
three years after the Arusha Declaration had a major impact on explanations
of Tanzania's socialism.	 A major part of the Provisional Council for
Social Science Conference of East Africa (1970) held at Dar es Salaam was
devoted to answering Shivji's interpretation.
Shivji operated within the same basic theoretical framework as
Cliffe and Saul.	 But Shivji inverted the problem. 	 Cliffe and Saul's
theoretical preoccupation in the mid-1960s was to chart out a path of
socialist construction because they had accepted the policies of the Arusha
Declaration as a serious, if vague, attempt by the state to implement
socialism.
	 The obstacles on the road towards socialism, as they saw
them, were not the state or the social class in power, but the kulaks
and foreign capital.
What Shivji did was to focus attention on the nature of the social
class in power at the national level and, as a result, to question
whether the policies associated with the Arusha Declaration aimed to
create socialism.	 The policies of the Arusha Declaration were
re-examined in a dependency framework.
	
Shivji explained the failure to
achieve the elimination of capitalism in terms of the class interests of
the dominant groups and the nature of the state.
	
After Shivji, most
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radical interpretations were strongly influenced by his basic position.
The influence of dependency ideas on the analysis of Tanzania's
socio-economic development remained strong in the work of Shivji and his
followers:
It appears to me that these theoretical
developments of underdevelopment theory
are fully applicable to the African countries.
(Shivji, 1976: 16)
And:
Liquidation of underdevelopment - poverty,
ignorance and disease - therefore requires
a social-political struggle against existing
relations of production, which are responsible
for throttling the development of productive
forces.
(Shivji,1976: 18)
Von Freyhold argued that it was Tanzania's dependency on the world market
which was the cause of her underdevelopment:
Conditions of stagnation were most obvious in
those regions which had the longest history of
trading with the world market and in those which
had still only marginal links with it.
(Von Freyhold,1979: 6)
Socialism became identified with the establishment of an 'independent
economy', that is, independent from international capitalism.	 Any
policies which fell short of eliminating dependency were implicitly
condemned.	 The very rationale for the idealisation of Tanzania by
early Marxists in the late 1960s was now used by Marxists in the 1970s
to judge and condemn Tanzania's failure to achieve socialism and self-
reliance.	 Disillusionment with Tanzania had begun.
Saul lamented the failure of a self-reliant strategy in the
following terms:
Too often the rhetoric of self-reliance has
not become the reality of a self-centred economy,
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an economy which would be based upon production
for mass needs, upon the development of a locally
based and wholly relevant technological capacity.
Too often the tyranny of the demand concept has
carried the day - the investment of surplus often
being directed first towards such immediately
profitable domestic spheres as luxury consumption
goods and towards immediately effective earners
of foreign exchange as tourism, rather than
towards structural transformation.
(Saul, 1979: 207)
Raikes stated:
Neither need one doubt that nationalisation was
expected, in 1967, to lead to some degree of
dis-engagement from the international economy.
(Raikes1 1976: 19)
Shivji's main argument was that the Arusha Declaration policies
did not disengage Tanzania from capitalism: rather they increased her
integration into capitalism.	 The policy of Ujamaa attempted to make
peasants produce cash crops, thus integrating them with the world
capitalist system (IbidC.106) while nationalisation led to new forms
of relationships with multinational capital (Ibid: 165).	 Raikes
(1975: 35) argued that Tanzania's "maintenance of a dependent export-
dominated structure of the economy makes almost impossible the trans-
formation of production within the rural economy".	 Tanzania's
failure to eliminate links with the world market was explained by Shivji
and his followers in relation to the class interests of those in power.
The study of the state was mainly a by-product of this interest in the
nature of the social class in power. 	 According to Shivji, the petty
bourgeoisie (intellectuals, teachers) formed an alliance with peasants
and workers to overthrow colonialism and took power (constitutionally).
They then used state power to expropriate the 'commercial bourgeoisie'.
The Arusha Declaration policies, argued Shivji,
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Constitute the first open attempt on the
part of the bureaucratic sector of the petty
bourgeoisie to carve out an economic base
for itself.
(Shivji, 1976: 79)
It is a dependent bourgeoisie, and it has
created itself an 'internal economic base'.
(Ibid: 85)
Von Freyhold's analysis of the state followed the same approach:
Seen over a longer period the socialism of the
nizers was in practice a set of strategies which
expanded their power vis-a-vis the submerged
classes, gave them the means to build up an
intermediate class which supports them and put
them into a position that made them a viable
partner 6f the metropolitan bourgeoisie.
(Von Freyhold,1975: 17)
Walter Rodney argued:
The petty bourgeoisie intended to maintain
their hegemony over the state apparatus. Indeed
after 1967 they used the new policies as a means
of reproducing themselves as a class.
(Rodney; 1975: 11)
What is of significance is that these writers explained the
'socialist' policies of the Arusha Declaration in terms of the class
interests of the petty bourgeoisie who used state power to create
their class base.	 Thus the 'state' was merely a vehicle for extending
and consolidating their class interests.
0L.
Saul (1975) had seen the state bureaucracy as Auplastic" category,
largely 'petty-bourgeoisie'; by virtue of its role at the junction
between the local economy and foreign capital, it was exposed to contra-
dictory influences - national, working class and peasant class interests
confronting those of foreign and domestic capital in the mode of operation
of the state (also cited in Leys 1976: 40).
For Shivji, however:
-17-
With the Arusha Declaration, the state and
state institutions (including parastatals)
became the dominant actors in the country.
Thus a new and more important wing of the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie was created.
Political power and control over property
had now come to rest in the same class.
(Shivji, 1976: 85)
Von Freyhold took a similar view, emphasising the external aspect:
Having already become a partner with international
capital in this manner, the state in Tanzania
moved one step further and commanded a controlling
share of the enterprise whose profitability it
ensuret6,!) a demand which was easily conceded by
investors who could continue making their profits
on the supply of equipment and intermediate goods,
on management contracts and sales commissions
and on various kinds of loans.
(Von Freyhold ) 1979: 119)
The approach to the Tanzanian experience in terms of dependency,
the social class interests of those in power and the state, provides
one kind of framework for explaining how particular policies came to
be adopted. Thus, Shivji's group saw the change of policy from Ujamaa 
to villagisation as a confirmation of their suspicion that the reality
behind the Arusha Declaration was more complex than had been assumed
by Cliffe and Saul.	 Von Freyhold, for instance, explained the failure
of pjamaa in the following terms:
They (bureaucrats) did not contradict him (Nyerere)
openly, first because they needed him to appease
workers and peasants and secondly, because they
expected that in practice the whole campaign would
look quite different - as indeed it did. Eventually
the bureaucracy managed to turn the slogan of Ujamaa
into a tool which could be used for its own purpose.
(Von Freyhold 1 1979: 120)
Reginald Green: pragmatic dependency 
The view that Tanzania was not a socialist country because of its
failure to eliminate its dependency relationship with international
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capitalism was challenged in the 1970s by writers who may be seen as
members of a more pragmatic school of thought. 	 These writers accepted
the dependency idea that the creation of an independent national economy
was the ultimate goal, but they saw that exports and other links with
the world market were necessary in order to finance development,
especially the creation of manufacturing industry. 	 Green was one of
the main exponents of this view.
Central to Green's conception of development was the notion of an
independent national economy, which was equated with socialist economy.
For Green, government policies were instruments for creating such an
economy:
The creation and maintenance of meaningful
political independence requires the attainment
of national political economies. A state
whose economy is characterized by concentrated
external dependence can hope to have neither a
significant degree of control over the rate of
growth and nature of allocation of domestic
resources nor a high level of external credit-
ability .;,-o n^ o-)\(NAc-\6--k
(Green 1970.: 273)
How does a Third World country achieve a national political economy?
In the above article Green (1970 ) listed the elements of a strategy
to bring about economic independence.	 This strategy presumed that
countries like Tanzania must take the capitalist world market system
as given and operate from there, because exports from agriculture were
necessary to obtain the foreign exchange with which to buy capital and
intermediate goods.
First, national self-reliance was a necessary policy, but this
must not be taken to involve 'autarchy', which would defeat the goal of
gaining foreign exchange. 	 According to Green, self-reliance was really
only "the awareness that only the citizens of an African state are
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primarily concerned with its welfare and progress" (Ibid: 293).
Secondly, the state must increase taxation because it was only by this
means that government revenue and domestic investible surplus could be
obtained.	 Thirdly, industrialisation should be encouraged, followed
by state control of institutions at the apex, leverage over other
financial institutions, trade and industrial licencing, and control
over exchange and imports (both as to levels and sources). 	 Fourthly,
there should be public sector involvement in productive activity.
Green added three conditions to this strategy.	 First, "the
political system which seeks to pursue these goals must demonstrate by
example even more than by word, its commitment to austerity for itself
and to an equitable distribution of benefits" (Ibid: 284). 	 Second,
manufacturing activities must be "orientated either to basic consumer
goods or to simple construction materials and which are able to utilise
largely local materials" and that outside capital was necessary but only
to "help bridge the domestic savings-domestic-investment requirements as
well as the foreign exchange gap" (Ibid: 285).	 This perspective led
Green to take a relatively indulgent view of Tanzania's development
experience.	 According to Green, Tanzania had used its policies as
instruments for achieving a socialist national economy. 	 The national-
isations that occurred and the subsequent development of the parastatals
amounted to the 'replacement of foreign by nationals' and hence the
beginning of creating a "national economy" (Green, 1977a:236).
	 National
economic integration was being pursued at every level, thus:
During the period 1972-75, most new projects
were concentrated on consumer goods, with low
import content (textiles, sugar), pre-export
processing (sisal twine, leather, cashew-nuts)
paper and metal products (bicycles, light
engineering), basic iron and steel. They
therefore fit into this strategy of enhancing
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internal linkages and reducing external
dependence.
(Green, 1979: 32)
pgain according to Green:
In simplistic terms the transition to socialism
in Tanzania could be said to be nearly
accomplished.	 Large scale economic activity
is at least 80% in the public (or public
majority) sector and will be 90% there by 1981.
(Green, 1977b: 24)
Tanzania's various policies for creating socialism had also been
successful, according to Green.	 Thus the policy of Ujamaa was viewed
as generally successful as late as 1974. 	 Green states (1974a: 27) that
"by the end of 1974 at least 7.500 ujamaa villages grouping about 3
million people (30% of the agricultural self-employed) will be in
existence compared to a handful as late as 1970" (Ibid: 27). 	 In addition,
exploitation had been eliminated and an egalitarian policy implemented,
through a series of progressive taxation on the one hand, and by increasing
wages for the lower income groups on the other hand (Green, 1974a).
Finally, in Green's view:
Tanzania has been able to pursue an energetic
strategy of advance towards economic independence
as an integral part of its overall development
strategy, without massive evidence of resource
Misallocation,	 stagnation or basic social and
political contradictions.
(Green, 1970 : 323)
Most of the problems which Tanzania has encountered are explained
by Green as temporary ones, mainly the result of implementation:
Inconsistencies and delays do exist in
recongiling projects and programmes with
the strategies and goals, but these are
specific weaknesses, not evidence that
stated goals are not seriously meant or not
related to key planning and management
decisions.
(Green, 1977a: 215)
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Thus Green's basic position in relation to Tanzania is that the
fundamental problems facing the country are extrinsic to the main
lines of government policy. 	 What are seen by other analysts as costly
failures reflecting the class nature of the state, appear in Green's
work as incidental weaknesses due to problems of implementation or
accidental factors.
The contribution from political science 
The third type of approach to Tanzania has come from political
scientists.	 Their interest was initially attracted by the unique
political conditions existing in Tanzania after independence: the
political stability which the country enjoyed and the attractive
personality and political ideas of the President, Julius Nyerere.
Both left-wing and liberal political scientists made early studies
of the Party, Tanu.	 Friedman (cited in Hopkins, 1971: 65) argued that
the Party had become a focal institution, an institution which pervades
and dominates all other institutions.
	 Bienen (1967) argued that the
Party was "under-centralised", with the centre having little power to
affect decisions or behaviour at the local level or in national insti-
tutions. Cliffe (1972b)attributed the Party's weakness, however, not
to organisational problems, but to a lack of ideological clarity. This
view was supported by Saul (1973) who re-emphasised the absence of
ideologically-minded and progressive Party members as its weakness.
Later political scientists, mainly Tanzanians, documented the
ascendancy of the Party towards supremacy (Msekwa: 1977) while Mwansasu
(1979) has shown the attempts made by the Party to rectify its organi-
sational weakness through the recruitment of qualified manpower and
through a greater emphasis on ideological training.
	 The strengthening
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of the Party, both organisationally and ideologically, has been
considered crucial in enabling the Party to perform its functions
under conditions of Party supremacy.
	 Mfupe (1976) has looked into
the debates of the Party Annual Meetings to assess the degree of
democracy in the types of questions asked between 1967-1975.
Political scientists have also studied the Government (Pratt, 1976;
Tordoff, 1965; Hopkins, 1971, 1968).
	 In The Critical Phase in Tanzania 
Pratt writes about Government mainly from the point of view of the
political actors, notably, Nyerere. 	 Earlier, Tordoff analysed
Government structures as well as the major policies of the pre-1967
period, and Hopkins studied Parliament.	 He analysed the types of
questions that were posed and found that there were more debates prior
to 1965 than afterwards (Hopkins, 1968: 55). 	 Rweyemamu and Hyden (1974)
and Belle Harris (1965-67) have provided useful documentation on how the
administration functions under conditions of the centrality of the Party
in development.	 An interesting point which emerges from a review of
early political science studies is the recurring theme of conflict between
the Party and Government. 	 This evidence of conflict indicates that the
'state' was not a homogeneous entity as neo-Marxist radicals and the
pragmatic dependency theorists have assumed.
A few political scientists have also studied policies (Collins,
1971; Hyden, 1979, 1980).
	 For instance, Hyden (1980) attempts to
relate policies which were formulated by the Party to the type of
developmental consequences they generated. On two major policies,
Ujamaa .
 (1967) and Mwongozo (1971), his writings offer a useful alternative
to the Marxists' explanations of the Tanzanian experience. 	 Since Hyden's
writings relate significantly to the position held in this thesis, I
shall summarise his book extensively.
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In Beyond Ujamaa (1980) Hyden sets out an alternative explanation
of the Tanzanian experience. He makes two major propositions. Firstly,
he argues that capitalism failed to develop African economies. Capitalist
policies were based on the market-economy, which aimed to integrate
peasants into a wider socio-economic context. But the existence of the
peasant mode of production and the 'economy of affection' is, argues
Hyden, evidence of the failure of capitalism to develop African economies.
Peasants remained autonomous from the state in the sense that they were
not dependent on the state for their livelihood, education etc. (reproduction).
This leads him to his second major proposition.
Hyden further argues that the failure of policies based on the
market-economy necessitated the introduction of a different policy-style,
one which is based on a political-market. Generally speaking, policies
based on a political-market are formulated primarily from the point of
view of achieving the aims of the state. 	 More specifically however
policies were made by politicians who were "more inclined to start from
the peasant premise".	 They formulated policies which embodied the
point of view of the peasants, that is, to receive benefits without having
to give a return in terms of producing more. 	 This created a situation
whereby economics fed politics:
The political market-place, unlike the economic
market, is a typically pre-modern institution.
Many of the deals that are entered into are
expensive, at least as seen from the perspective
of the capitalist or socialist mode of production.
There is no emphasis on efficiency. In that
respect politics in Africa is not sub-ordinated
to the demands of the relations of production.
It is this pre-modern articulation that makes it
possible to claim that in Africa economics feed
politics, as opposed to capitalist and modern
socialist societies where economics breeds
politics.
(Ibid: 30)
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But the consequences of such a process for development invariably
include the breakdown of production, upon which the modern economy
is dependent.	 Hyden uses the policies of Ujamaa and Mwongozo to
illustrate this second proposition. 	 In the case of the policy of
Ujamaa the state gave peasants free social amenities in the hope that
they would join Ujamaa villages.	 The state's attempts to alleviate
peasants' 'exploitation' by removing poll tax, providing schools and
dispensaries and water free of charge, providing subsidies and access
to loans (which peasants were unable to repay) and relaxing by-laws
regarding agricultural production, all worked against the state's
rationality in the sense that these initiatives did not facilitate the
state's aim of integrating the peasants into the modern economy. Instead,
they helped the peasants to maintain their 'autonomy' vis-a-vis the state,
because they could obtain benefits without giving anything in return. As
Hyden states:
The officials 'gave away' some of the policy
instruments that over the years had served to
make the peasants more dependent on other social
classes.
(Hyden, 1980: 124)
The crux of Hyden's argument is that the state's needs for foreign exchange
and sources of food are dependent on the peasants, but the latter are
not dependent on the state for their reproduction.
The second reason for the failure of Ujamaa stemmed from the
peasant mode of production itself. The peasant mode of production was
not capable of increased production:
The problem is that they (peasants) are
unwilling, and usually unable, to achieve
it (high rate of production) at a pace
and to the extent that other social classes
demand of them.
(Ibid: 125)
Hyden concludes that:
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Ujamaa as a radical strategy of development
at a national level could not be reconciled
with its objective of promoting development
from within the peasant mode.
(1980: 117)
Hyden finds similar problems with the policy of Mwongozo, which
gave powers to workers vis-a-vis the management.	 Thus, although social
amenities were given to the workers - for example, transport, cafeteria
services, time-off to visit sick relatives etc. - workers did not work
harder.	 "Their sense of socialism was that they would have more time
for themselves and their families" (Ibid: 161).	 As a result of this,
Mwongozo only managed to undermine the discipline, authority and economic
criteria of evaluation which were all identified with modern organisation.
According to Hyden, in effect the two policies, Ujamaa and Mwongozo, failed
because the needs of the workers and peasants were incompatible with the
needs of the state.
Hyden then sets out his third major proposition, namely that in
order to develop a socialist economy it is necessary to break down
peasants' autonomy and make them dependent on the state for their
reproduction.	 This proposition enables him to explain the recent
coercive measures by the Party to make peasants increase their prod-
uction.	 According to Hyden, the failure of Mwongozo and Ujamaa does
not signify the redundancy of the political-market.	 The political-market
is defined thus:
It is an approach in which the political
ends of the regime are employed by the
leaders to justify the use of the state
machinery regardless of what the formal
rules and regulations prescribe.
(Ibid: 220)
In this way Hyden sees the new approach of the Party as the 'correct'
way to modernise the economy as a prelude to socialist construction;
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that is, the increasing reliance on coercion and intimidation is the
only 'socialist' option left.
Hyden argues that the emphasis which has been put recently on the
building up of a strong leadership, and the process of militarization
of leaders in the Party which has taken place, have been in the hope
that 'military discipline and organisation' will lessen the demands of
the economy of affection.
	 The material incentives which have been given
to Party leaders making them at least 'one step above the highest paid
state officials at equivalent rank' (Ibid: 171), were to enable Party
°-
leaders to act as
A
socialist managerial elite.
	 Hyden's main argument is
that it is necessary to strengthen the political machinery in order to
break the autonomy of the pre-capitalist economy of affection.
Hyden's study is a path-breaking attempt to study policies in relation
to the political context. 	 His approach focusses attention on the short-
comings of policies themselves rather than invoking extrinsic issues to
explain their failure.
	 In this way, Hyden's work has given us a new
understanding of why the policies of Ujamaa and Mwongozo failed and had
to be reversed.
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THE CASE FOR A FRESH APPROACH
Crises of dependency theory and the inadequacies of class analysis 
We have seen how the writings of the radical left on Tanzania
typically explain political-economic changes in terms of the class-
analysis and Tanzania's dependence vis-a-vis international capitalism.
I believe this approach has serious inadequacies.
In the first place writers on the Tanzania scene have not incorporated
into their analyses now standard critiques of the dependency perspective.
E
Secondly, the hypothesis derived from a class analysis of development
policy in Tanzania do not stand up to close inspection. I shall begin
with the first point which calls for a brief digression.
The origins and development of dependency ideas have been well
documented by various authors (Booth, 1975; Cardoso, 1979; Palma, 1978).
From the analysis of these writers we can discern three major intellectual
influences on the development of the dependency ideas. 	 These were
Marxist theories of imperialism, the Prebisch thesis and the Cuban
Revolution.
First, the Marxist-Lennist tradition on imperialism had argued that
during the different historical epochs of capitalism, metropolitan
countries had exploited the periphery. 	 During the earlier stages of
capitalist development in the centre, exploitation of the periphery took
the form of plunder which provided the primitive accumulation of the
centre's industrial development. 	 The second type of exploitation,
reflecting the maturation of capitalism at the centre, was characterised
by the export of capital, competition for raw materials and monopoly. The
third type of relationship between the centre and periphery involved a
more complex post-colonial relationship of dependency in which foreign
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capital and technological dependency went to create obstacles to the
genuine development of the periphery (Sutcliffe, 1972).
	 These ideas
of imperialism influenced the general theoretical approach of the
dependency school, which viewed centre-periphery relationships as
exploitative.
The second major influence on dependency ideas was the Prebisch
thesis.	 Raul Prebisch worked from the late 1940s with the UN Economic
Commission for Latin America. 	 The Prebisch thesis argued (in a period
when conservative ideas about development, which emphasised the naturalness
of concentrations on primary production, were very popular) that the
relationship between the centre and periphery created obstacles for the
latter's development, especially its capacity to accumulate capital. He
identified as the principal obstacle . adverse shifts in the terms of
trade.	 This factor affected the capacity of the peripheral country to
accumulate capital.
It is important to note that during this period Prebisch was still
working with economic variables such as capital accumulation, prices and
productivity.
	 Secondly, he did not call for the elimination of centre-
periphery relationships; rather he called for an inward-directed
development strategy, and for foreign investment.
Prebisch's thesis was criticised by both the Left and the Right.
The Left was influenced by theories of imperialism and new ideas about
neo-colonialism, notably expressed in the work of Baran (1957). Baran's
major argument was that the political structures of peripheral countries
had to be radically altered in order to allow economic growth and social
progress.	 It was necessary to break down the alliance between the feudal
.
landlords, 
e 
industrial royaltstg and the capitalist middle classes.
Although there were differences between Prebisch's and Baran's
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ideas, there were also certain similarities. 	 This was in relation
to internal obstacles.
	 Both agreed that the 'feudal-imperialist
alliance' constituted a major obstacle and both attacked the centre.
Both agreed that their removal was a necessary factor in creating the
conditions for development (Cardoso, 1979: 62-3).
During the 1950s and 1960s most Latin American countries did adopt
Prebisch's inward-oriented development strategy based on import-
substitution and foreign capital.	 This process was facilitated
because foreign capital had changed its emphasis, moving away from mining
and agriculture, and beginning to invest in manufacturing industries
(Chilcote and Edelstein, 1974; Bodenheimer, 1971). 	 But by the 1960s
the inward-directed development strategy adopted by Latin America was
experiencing problems.	 There were adverse terms of trade conditions,
which affected the foreign exchange balance; profit repatriation was
taking place on an alarming scale; and the process of social marginali-
sation that industrialisation set in motion was becoming acute. 	 These
conditions were analysed in the 1968 UNECLA Report, which argued that
development in Latin America was 'perverse development'.	 The line of
argument which was used drew attention to the "structural distortion
and social malaise" which was taking place. 	 This emphasis, however,
was still situated within the centre-periphery theoretical framework
of the Prebisch thesis.	 This new emphasis became known as the
structural dependency conception of development (Furtado, 1970; Sunkel,
1969).	 Among these writers there was no argument that periphery
countries should opt out of the capitalist world market system. A more
radical tendency was expressed in the work of Gunder Frank (1967).
Gunder Frank, who had also worked with the UNECLA, added a new
element to the structural dependency arguments. 	 This was that it was
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necessary to opt out of the global capitalist system if the countries
of the periphery were to achieve development.	 He argued that capitalism
actively underdeveloped the periphery. 	 This new political emphasis,
breaking away from international capitalism, can be traced to the
influence of the Cuban Revolution and to a revival of the Leninist
theory of imperialism.	 The achievement of development became a political
struggle against capitalism and imperialism.
As a result of this, the definition of development also changed.
Development became equated with an autonomous type of socialist
development, because dependency on international capitalism created under-
development.
	 Mere economic growth was not considered to be development;
as Samir Amin, succinctly pointed out in relation to the 'miraculous'
performance of the Ivory Coast, "it was economic growth without development"
(Amin, 1973: 66).	 The idea of development changed from a focus on
economic growth and technical considerations to do with savings, capital
accumulation, foreign exchange, prices and production, to a broad and
often moralistic vision, which incorporated ideas of national autonomy,
even development and social equality (Dos Santos, 1973; Cockcroft et alia
1972; Cardoso, 1972).
Although these ideas appeared to explain many of the problems of
Third World countries, nevertheless, a critical re-examination of
dependency ideas shows that they were dangerously flawed. A common flaw
is generalisation from limited evidence and drawing far-reaching conclusions
on the basis of specific and short-lived situations. 	 It has been
argued	 (Palma, 1978) that in elaborating his theory of
imperialism, Lenin generalised from limited and short-lived situations.
A similar mistake was also committed by structural dependency writers in
the 1960s.
	 According to Cardoso (1979: 66) writers who analysed the
-31-
development process in Latin America during this period, mistook
"the recession circle which began in early 1960s for a law implying
the difficulty if not impossibility of development on the periphery".
This mistake was raised to a theoretical level, that of the inability
of capitalism to develop peripheral economies.
	 As a result of this,
critics then began to make a moral distinction between growth and
development.	 As Cardoso states:
The fragility of such a formulation consists
in its mistaking the socialist critique of
capitalism, for the inviability of capitalism
(Cardoso, 1979: 66)
The flaw of formulating theoretical generalisations from limited empirical
and historical evidence is compounded by the tendency for the dependency
approach to compete with its rivals on a political rather than a
theoretical basis.	 Empirical situations tend to be fitted into a fixed
set of categories even if the latter do not explain the former; attempts
are not made to revise the categories themselves in order to reach new
theoretical understandings (Friedman, 1976).	 In other words, the
political takes precedence over scientific rigour (with the obvious risk
that conclusions derived will be wrong and any political action based on
it misdirected).
The inadequacies of dependency ideas emerge even more clearly
when they are re-examined along the lines of Lall (1975).	 He states
that if dependency theory is to be used as an explanation of underdevelopment,
then it must fulfil two criteria. 	 First, it must lay down certain
characteristics of dependent economies which are not found in non-
dependent ones.
	 And secondly, these characteristics must be shown to
affect adversely the course and pattern of development of the dependent
countries.
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Lall finds that the dependency perspective does not generate
systematic differences between 'underdeveloped' and 'advanced' economies.
Belgium and Canada are more dependent on foreign capital and technology
than India and Pakistan.
	 The argument that Third World countries are
forced to specialise according to static comparative advantage in the
export of primary products or simple manufactured goods does not hold
true either.	 Many Third World economies with MNC capital export
manufactured goods and __ attempt to integrate their economies with
world capitalist markets.
	 Lall is therefore forced to conclude that:
That the concept of dependence as applied to
less developing countries is impossible to
define and cannot be shown to be causally
related to the continuance of underdevelopment.
(Lail, 1975: 808)
Ray (1973) also criticised the dependency argument by questioning the
causal relationship between dependency and underdevelopment. According
is
to Ray, the dependency argument that underdevelopmentAbrought about by
the domination of the centre on the periphery is a fallacy.
	 He points
out that domination of a weaker economy by a powerful one is not restricted
to capitalist societies but is also found in socialist countries. Ray's
second point is that dependency writers tend to homogenise all effects
of foreign capital and fail to differentiate between investments in
different sectors of the economy, which may have different effects on
economic development.
	 Finally, Ray argues that there is an implicit
or explicit assumption in all dependency arguments that there is an
alternative type of development which is non-dependent.
	 Ray argues
that this assumption is fallacious.
	 Market relations also operate in
socialist countries, because all countries need to trade; thus a country
will sell what other countries need to buy.
	 In such a situation, a
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country must re-structure its economy to its external market needs.
This is true whether a country is socialist or capitalist.
	 Weisskopf
(1976) also finds that there is no causal relation between dependency
and underdevelopment, although the latter has been characterised by
inequality, high unemployment, enclave-type industries, etc.
	 He states:
My main point is that these aspects of underaeNeloilmeh
(inequality, unemployment, waste and lack of
popular sovereignity which do indeed
characterise dependent nationg cannot
simply be attributed to dependence per se,
for they are inherent in the operation of
the capitalist mode of production whether
or not it takes a dependent form.
(Weisskopf, 1976: 21)
And that, "in the contemporary world situation dependence appears neither
in theory or in fact to be a major independent obstacle to economic
growth or industrialisation" (Ibid, 1976: 13).
	 Thus we can see that
dependency arguments do not stand up to serious re-examination of their
basic cau,Sal propositions.	 Other objections have been made concerning
the conceptual structure of the theory.
According to Bernstein (1979) the dependency school, despite its
radical ideology, took its underlying model of development from the
modernisation school.	 It was a model of an idealised version of
capitalist development portrayed as autonomous and self-centred with
full employment and social services.
	 This picture was taken as a 'norm'
with which underdevelopment, a dis-norm, was contrasted.
	 Bernstein
(1979: 91) states:
That world economy is as much a condition of
existence of advancecicapitalist economies as
of underdeveloped ones; that the bulk of
international capital flows and trade takes
place between the advanced capitalist countries;
that production for the international market
has been important throughout the history of
industrial capitalism; that the internationalisation
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of productive capital, the interpenetration
of capitals, and the internationalisation
of production processes, they increasingly
entail, are of central importance to the
advanced capitalist economies; that, in short,
they are no more 'autonomous' than the under-
developed economies - all this is lost at the
moment of making self-centredness the disting-
uishing attribute of 'development'.
(Bernstein, 1979: 91)
Phillips has also suggested that dependency arguments rest on "a contrast
between development in the (underdeveloped countries) and an idealised
version or type of development ... an ideal type of 'normal capitalist
development' which serves as a measure by means of which we can recognise
underdevelopment, an ideal type which ... does not correspond to the
actual process of development in most of the advanced capitalist countries"
(Phillips, 1977: 11).	 Because of this elementary mistake, the dependency
school condemned capital because it was not sufficiently 'national' (Ibid: 19).
Equally, one might add, exports were often viewed with contempt because
they were taken as a mechanism of dependency on international capitalism
(Cardoso, 1972).
These criticisms of the dependency conception of development are
very useful because they have shown what was intrinsically wrong with
the theory.	 Notwithstanding this, writers on the Tanzanian scene have
continued to work with conceptual schemes derived from dependency theory
and have not thought through the implications of its critique. 	 For
instance, Von Freyhold (1979), Shivji (1976), Saul (1979) and Coulson
(1979) have persisted in analysing Tanzania's policies in terms of
either its efforts to eliminate dependency or its failure to do so.
When the Tanzanian government under the strain of the economic crisis
of 1974/75, was forced to find solutions, critics again argued in terms
of the failure of the state to implement socialism (Raikes & Boesen,
1976; Tschannerl, 1976) rather than in terms of the failure of their
own theories.	 For the radical writers theoretical advance appears to
-35-
have slowed down, with the interesting contribution of Mueller (19W0)
coming from a very different, anti—dependency perspective.
I would argue that it is wrong to approach Tanzania's development
experience in terms of the 'need' to break with dependency and/or
failure to achieve this goal.	 As a second point, I would argue that
the pattern of Tanzanian policy before and since the Arusha Declaration
is incapable of being explained in class-interest terms.
In the first place the radical writers do not succeed in explaining
away apparent contradictions between the types of policies pursued and
what one would have thought to be the class interests of those in power.
In order to explain such 'progressive' policies as those of the Arusha
Declaration and Mwongozo, not only Saul but also Von Freyhold and Shivji
have to go 'outside' their own methodologies. 	 Thus, while Saul identified
a 'progressive wing of the petty bourgeoisie' (1975: 18), Von Freyhold is
forced to distinguish between "nizers" and "individual nizers" (1975: 18)
and Shivji resorts to 'a few progressive and revolutionary leaders' (cited
in Saul, 1975: 21).	 When it comes to explaining the failure of the
Arusha Declaration policies to eliminate Tanzania's dependency there are
other contradictions.	 Shivji (1976) and Von Freyhold (1979) argue that
the state has become a partner of international capital. 	 But it is far
from clear what those in power have gained from this alliance, given
Tanzania's chronic economic problems and stagnation.
Secondly, the explanation of policy changes and reversals in terms
of class struggles is unconvincing.	 For instance, Shivji explains the
demands to replace private trade with co-operatives in terms of the
"class-struggle between the commercial bourgeoisie and the petty-
bourgeoisie".	 The decision to dissolve the co-operatives in 1976,
after having replaced private trade, is also explained by Shivji in
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terms of the class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, because
it enabled the latter "a further penetration of the economy" as a
prelude to creating its class base on the foundation of state ownership
(Shivji, 1976: 74-76). But how would Shivji explain the reversals of
these policies in 1982, when the very same bureaucratic bourgeoisie
re-instituted the co-operatives?
	 The methodology of class-interests
fails to offer an adequate explanation.
Thirdly, examples of mis-management of public funds, corruption or
the inability of Government to take necessary action are given an
artificial aura of rationality so that they can be explained on the
basis of class-interests. Svendsenk(1977) description of Phillip Raikes
analysis of Tanzania aptly summarises the point.	 Raikes
... presents a model whereby irrational action
in Tanzania can be explained by the interests
of the state bureaucrats in increasing its
income, career opportunities and power and
control over the population. What appears to
be odd and incompetent behaviour of officials
turns out to be rational action as it strengthens
the position of the bureaucratic class.
To take another example, Resnick (1981: 169) outlines various types of
abuses which have taken place in the Government:
Some ministries failed to keep adequate records
and at one point one ministry did not know on
what it had spent more than $5 million over and
above its original allocation, more than one year
afterwards.
The Ministry of Finance labelled the orgy of spending
'recklessness and negligence' and warned that the
deficits created would, at the very least, endanger
the internal and external economic positions ...
Still the ministries refused controls, and some of
the disasters of the mid-1970s must be laid at
their doors.
The means of control and sanction existed, but neither
the ministries with such power, nor the cabinet, nor
the president, were willing to exercise them.
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These examples are used by Resnick to illustrate how the "privileged
classes continued to exploit peasants and workers after 1967 ... this
took many forms, including industrial acts for direct personal gain,
institutional manipulation, and the use of power by relatively large
groups to advance, consolidate, or avoid the erosion of their privilege"
(Ibid: 166).	 Resnick thus gives a 'rational', class-interest explanation
for the inability of the Government to assert its control but such an
explanation ignores the fact that the Government's inaction creates the
conditions for its own loss of legitimacy and in the long run may lead
to its downfall.	 Plunder is different from the rational pursuit of
class interests.	 While the latter creates conditions favourable to
political stability and economic growth, the former leads to destabilisation
and economic stagnation.
The explanations offered by the intellectual left - to conclude -
have failed to explain a number of issues which they themselves identified
as central.	 An incorrect formulation of the nature and causes of Tanzania's
economic backwardness had led to a concentration of the wrong problems and
the proposing of unrealistic solutions.
	 By postulating development as a
necessarily independent and autonomous process, and seeing this as a
potentially achievable alternative, these writers have deflected attention
from real problems.
Secondly, their stress on class-interests in analysing the adoption
and ultimate failure of Tanzania's radical policies also produces inade-
quate explanations.
	
Nowhere is a convincing account given of the link
between class interests and policy decisions. 	 In fact, the examples
chosen to illustrate this link fail to explain what they are supposed
to explain.	 On this basis I would argue that radical writers have
been unable to extend our understanding of the Tanzanian situation, and
that they have failed to increase our knowledge of both
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developmental and theoretical issues.	 As Whitehead pointed out:
The main evidence that a methodology is
worn out comes when progress within it
no longer deals with main issues.
(cited in Moore, 1958: 111)
Reginald Green: analysis as apologia 
While the radical intellectuals may be accused of naivety in
their analysis of Tanzania's development, no such accusations can be
levelled against Green.	 We saw that although Green accepted the
dependency definition of development, equating it with the creation of
an independent national economy, he nevertheless differed from the
radical writers who argued that it was necessary to break off links with
international capital. 	 Green argued that the export sector was
necessary to Tanzania because of its capacity to earn foreign exchange.
Without foreign exchange, Tanzania could not buy the intermediate and
capital goods needed to expand local manufacturing. 	 There is, however,
a major defect in this type of development strategy. 	 This is that
recurrent balance of payment crises are inherent within the strategy
itself.	 This can be explained in the following manner. 	 In the
Tanzanian context, a development strategy based on agriculture for
foreign exchange and taxation for local revenue to finance - import-
substitution type	 industries catering for the domestic market means
that essentially weak sectors of the economy are made to finance demanding
and expanding sectors of the economy.
In relation to taxation, a limit can be reached very fast in a
country with a very narrow tax base owing to the large size of the
ONL
subsistence sector.	 Relying on agriculture as Asource of foreign exchange
and government revenue is dangerous, because of its dependency on world-
-39-
market fluctuations and unstable weather conditions. 	 Tanzania's export
crops are also weak in terms of their purchasing power on the world
market.	 Finally the low technological level of Tanzania's predominantly
peasant agriculture precludes a very rapid increase in the agricultural
surplus.
The second type of weakness associated with financing a process of
import-substituting industrialisation from the export of cash crops is
outlined by Schydlowsky and Wicht (1978: 27).
A central ten e:E of import substituting
industrialisation is that industry must grow
at a faster rate than the primary sectors of
the economy.	 Since industry requires imported
raw materials as an input, its rapid growth
means that the demand for imported inputs and
hence for foreign exchange, will also grow
very rapidly.	 The supply of foreign exchange,
however, is provided by the primary sectors,
which grow more slowly. For a time this
divergence in rates of growth of the demand and
supply of foreign exchange is sustainable. In
part this is so because industry grows from a
much smaller base than the primary sectors, and
in part because of the foreign exchange savings
which the import substitution process itself
generates. The time comes, however, when the
level of demand of raw materials has become such
that the fast rate of industrial growth completely
outstrips the ability of the primary sectors to
supply the foreign needs thus generated. At that
point, a balance of payment crisis arises and the
industry must stop growing.
According to Schydlowsky and Wicht, the self-limiting nature of this type
of development strategy is also self-perpetuating.	 Since the central
policy element in the strategy of import substitution is protection, the
prices of industrial products are above those in the international
markets and are often not of good quality.	 The more mature the import
substitution process the higher the industrial cost level of the
industrial system becomes compared to world cost levels. 	 When the
balance of payments crisis occurs as the result of the divergent growth
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rates, the country finds it difficult to export its manufactured goods,
since costs are too high.
Thus Green's broad development strategy carried within it serious
problems.	 A second major type of weakness in Green's analysis of
Tanzania's development process is his tendency to hide and therefore
obscure serious defects.	 We can see this in various of his writings.
Green views problems as extrinsic to policies. 	 Thus, economic
problems tend to be viewed as having external origins. The drought
of 1973/74 is treated as a 'natural' disaster, and no attempt is made,
for example, to investigate the effects of low prices on production
(1974a: 44; 1977a: 251).	 Inflation is also treated as a wholly and
unexpected factor (1974a: 44; 1977a: 251). 	 It is difficult to see
how Green, given his commitment to import-substitution, can regard
imported inflation as exogenous to national policy considerations. As
a result of this methodology of viewing problems as external to policies,
Green is unable to predict crises (1977b: 13, 23). 	 For instance, in
1977 Green wrote:
Public finance and domestic savings are to
pose continuing difficulties but no major
crises over 1976-81.
(Green, 1977b: 23)
In 1974/75 Tanzania experienced her first major economic crisis. Green
explained the crisis in terms of external factors.	 Thus:
External events in late 1973 and 1974
combining to create a major crisis for
Tanzania.
(Green, 1974b: 44)
Green has found it increasingly difficult to explain away problems with
external constraints arguments. He has been forced to acknowledge that
certain problems may be derived from policies. 	 For instance, he has
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noted that political policy decisions (on major national issues) are
often taken without official (ministerial) participation and this
leads to low output.	 But such an approach, we are told,
Must be weighed against the failure to
overcome inertia and to achieve any serious
dynamic of development which is likely with
pure incrementalism.
(1979: 22)
Green has to accept that inefficiency has become a chronic problem.
But he argues that efficiency is definable only in relation to a set of
goals.	 When these are not complementary, efficiency cannot be evaluated
without taking into account gains and losses in respect of each goal,
and often as well without looking at a set of institutions and policies
together.	 Green states:
Tanzania has not been efficient in raising
exports: to the extent this has reduced its
capacity to mobilise surplus and has increased
its dependence on foreign funds, it is relevant
inefficiency; to the extent it was the price
of re-orientating productive structure towards
domestic ones, it is not.
(1979: 40-41)
If the price of re-orienting productive structures towards domestic funds
is the stagnation of all other economic-social development, then might
one not have expected Green to have questioned the wisdom of the goal
itself?
Green also resorts to blaming particular groups of people for
policy failures.
	
The 1971 mini-crisis is explained by Green in relation
to "foreign-consultant-designed restructuring" (1980: 14).	 He does not
blame rising consumer-goods prices on scarcity of goods, but argues that
"the egalitariansim has led many retailers to leave, and the others to
feel that they should raise margins to make money while they could"
(1974a: 42).	 The tendency to explain essentially economic problems
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of development in socio-political terms deflects attention from the
study of those problems and therefore of their solutions.
	
Finally,
Green argues that implementation is the major cause for
policy-failures (1974a: 31; 1977b: 25).
	 Again, implementation
problems are viewed as extrinsic to policy-making.
Thus as late as 1979 Green could argue that Tanzania's problems
"are problems of success and not of failure" (1979: 42) and that:
Tanzania's record of progress towards its
goals, and of overall efficiency in achieving
that progress, needs no special apologies or
rationalisation.
(Green, 1979: 42)
Green can write the above passage without being able to grasp the irony
of self-recognition.
	 His methodology of viewing problems as extrinsic
to policies is unable to explain Tanzanian reality.
	 This situation has
forced him to rationalise faulty and defective policies.
From political institutions to development problems 
The work done by political scientists has been more valuable in
comprehending the Tanzanian development experience than work done by
other social scientists.
	 Most of their analyses are of relevance in
understanding crucial problems of development in Tanzania.
	 For instance,
most political scientists writing in the early 1960s highlighted the
conflict between the Party and Government (Pratt (1976), Hopkins (1968)
and Leys (1972: 187-195 ).
	 This conflict was serious enought to warrant
constitutional changes.
	 These works show that the state in Tanzania
was not homogeneous.
	 Unfortunately, these findings have been ignored
by other social scientists, especially the radicals who have continued
to portray the state as a unitary entity.
	 However, one of the weaknesses
of the early political scientists has been their general inhibition about
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studying the implications of the political system for development
itself.
The Tanzanian political scientists (Msekwa, 1977; Mwansasu, 1979)
have continued the tradition of studying the Party to its fruition of
supremacy.	 But they have failed to look into the more intricate
problems of how the Party formulates its policies, and to look into the
relationship between Government and Party under conditions of Party
supremacy.	 These writers have also failed to assess the Party's
capabilities in performing its full functions and the types of problems
it is confronted with. 	 Most of the analyses, though important because
of the information they contain, tend to be descriptive rather than
problem-orientated. 	 In this way, they have remained of little
theoretical or practical value to enable us to understand the problems
of the Party.
Hyden's study (1980) has been a great contribution to the under-
standing of the Tanzanian experience. I am sympathetic to most of
Hyden's explanations, which are similar to the position I hold in this
thesis.	 Our positions vis-a-vis the Marxist class analysis of the
Tanzanian experience appear to be similar. 	 Hyden's argument that it
would be fruitful to understand the Tanzanian experience from "an analysis
of the actual policy experience" (Hyden, 1980: 123) is similar to my
position - as my criticisms of the radicals show.
The second similarity between Hyden's study and my own is that he
analysed two policies, Ujamaa and Mwongozo, and showed the consequences
of wrong policies for development. I have attempted to use the policies
on internal trade and private capital, as well as Ujamaa, to illustrate
the consequences of policies which ignore economic considerations.
But there are also divergences of view between Hyden and myself.
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Hyden's major theoretical and empirical weakness rests on his argument
that capitalism failed to develop the African economies, especially
Tanzania.
	 This argument is crucial in Hyden's thesis because, as we
saw, it forms the premise upon which he builds up his whole thesis,
namely the emergence of policies based on the political-market.
	 And
yet it is here that his arguments are weakest.
	 Hyden sees the failure
of capitalism to develop African economies in the continued existence
of the peasant mode of production, which is self-sufficient and
independent of the wider socio-economic system.
	 As a result the
peasants are autonomous from the state, they do not need the state
because peasants can satisfy their needs independently of the state,
while the latter is dependent on the peasants for foreign exchange and
food.	 The relationship between the two has been characterised cks a tug-
of-war, with the state trying to integrate the peasantry into commodity
production, and the peasants resisting.
But historical evidence on Tanzania has shown that peasants were
producing very effectively for the market (Coulson, 1982: 167 ).
Although Hyden accepts this improvement in agriculture, he dismisses
its relevance to his own arguments by stating that "the petty-capitalist
farmers were the main beneficiaries of the improvement approach" (Ibid:
81).	 I would argue that it may be more fruitful to explain the existence
of the peasant mode of production in Tanzania in terms of the specific
historical factors rather than as evidence of the failure of capitalism
to develop the economy.
	 As I hope to explain in Chapter One, the lateness
of Tanzania's integration into the world market, aggravated by the
interruptions of historical events, hindered the process of integration
of the peasantry into commodity production.
	 In fact, it was only
between 1950 and 1960 that commodity production could develop properly.
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It would appear that Hyden did not make a distinction between the
more specific experience of Tanzania and the idea of capitalism in
general.	 Despite his opposition to the tendency of western analysis
to impose their historical experience on theorisation about Africa,
Hyden expects that capitalism should have the same effect in Tanzania
in particular as it did in Western Europe, that is, to eliminate pre-
capitalist relations.	 I would argue that Hyden's explanation for the
failure of capitalism to eliminate pre-capitalist social relations in
Tanzania defeats his own methodological principle that:
We cannot presume a 'defined' reality a priori
as a guide for our understanding of the African
development problems because our models are
built on different historical experience.
(Hyden, 1980: 259)
I would argue, therefore, that Hyden has not given convincing reasons
for speaking of the failure of capitalism to develop Tanzania. This
weakness affects his other arguments as we shall see.
The second major weakness in Hyden's work is his failure to look
into the struggle between the Party and Government.
	 Hyden argues that
the change of policy from reliance on the market to use of the political-
market place was brought about through the difficulty of getting at the
peasants through market forces. 	 According to Hyden:
African politicians have tried to replace
the market forces with a political market-
place.
(Ibid: 30)
The replacement of policies based on economic considerations by
those based on political considerations was brought about, not by the
failure of capitalism as Hyden argues, but rather by the conflict between
the two organs of the state. 	 Hyden fails to focus attention on this
crucial relationship between the Party and Government, and appears to
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have ignored previous writings by other political scientists on this
subject.	 Although Hyden correctly points to the consequences of
Ujamaa and Mwongozo, which led to the breakdown of the modern economy,
he does not give sufficient weight to the institutional arrangements of
policy-making in Tanzania and the specific way in which the Party
formulates policies. 	 By ignoring his earlier writings (1979) Hyden
isolates the political-market context of policy-making from institutional
arrangements.
A final reservation which I have about Hyden's approach is the
following.	 We saw that most radical writers have emphasised ideology,
mobilisation and the creation of political cadres as instruments for
creating socialism.	 Hyden, on the other hand, argues that these
instruments are ineffective because the peasants are autonomous from
the 'state': they can satisfy their basic needs independently of the
'state'.	 This situation forces the 'state' to approach the peasants
in the context of a zero-sum game (Ibid: 229) and, argues Hyden, it has
forced the Party to adopt coercive and authoritarian measures to reach
the peasants.	 In fact, Hyden states that "unless they apply coercive
measures to change the premise of peasant action" (Ibid: 225), peasants'
autonomous existence will continue and will defeat the development to a
socialist or capitalist economy.
But authoritarianism as a policy measure must surely be seen as
evidence of failure rather than as a means to success.	 It is not clear
what levels of state violence might not be justified in these terms.
Moreover, policies which tend to justify unpopular means by the ends
could well undermine the political legitimacy of the Party, and hence
alienate the very people the Party aims at supporting.
	
Hyden's attempts
to legitimise coercion as an option in development strategy should cast
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grave doubts on some of his ideas.
Conclusion 
In concluding this section we can say that the failure of Tanzania's
post-Arusha policies to attain their objectives has not been satisfactorily
explained.	 The argument of the radicals that Tanzanian socialism was
sabotaged by the state bureaucracy is unconvincing in that it appears to
imply that officials deliberately promoted the decline in the country's
economic growth rate in the 1970s.
	
In addition, the assumption that
the bureaucracy and/or the state as a whole has a unitary 'character'
seems difficult to sustain in the light of analyses by political scientists.
The explanation offered by Green (1974a; 1974b; 1980, 1979) that
Tanzania's pursuit of socialist and self-reliant goals was hindered
substantially by 'external' factors of various kinds is only super-
ficially convincing.
	
Tanzania is indeed dependent, as other countries
are, on external factors such as the price of oil and other imported
inputs.	 Together with strictly fortuitous factors such as the prevailing
weather conditions, difficult international conditions played an undeniable
role in Tanzania's recent development. 	 However, this line of interpre-
tation appears to ignore clear evidence suggesting that the main external
constraints on Tanzania's development plans came into effect as a
consequence of the policies pursued domestically.
Hyden's explanation that the failure of policies based on economic
considerations led to the adoption of policies based on political
considerations is not very convincing. 	 His argument that the policies
of Ujamaa and Mwongozo failed because they were mistaken is correct but
provides an insufficient basis for understanding the Tanzania experience.
The persistent pursuit of inappropriate policies by rational and
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intelligent policy-makers itself has to be explained and is of
sociological interest.
A common feature of the radicals' and Green's interpretations
of Tanzanian development problems is that all rely on explanatory
considerations which are extrinsic to the basic policy options. 	 Thus,
in one form or another, the writers referred to take for granted the
consistency and viability of dependency-influenced policies as instruments
for creating socialism.	 Hyden has attempted to rectify this theoretical
deficiency by arguing that the failure of Ujamaa and Mwongozo were the
result of intrinsic weaknesses in the policies.	 However, he adds that
these were specific failures rather than signifying the failure of a
particular policy-making style, which might bring him under the same
criticisms.	 All these writers exempt key elements of the theoretical
basis of Tanzanian policies from critical scrutiny.	 All also ignore
the effects of the political system on the development process.	 Herein
lies the case for a fresh approach.	 I would argue that the particular
type of institutional arrangements evolved for policy-making and implement-
ation introduced chronic difficulties into the Tanzanian process of
development.
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THE THESIS: ORIENTATION, SOURCES AND STRUCTURE 
Orientation 
A major preoccupation of this thesis is with how social scientists
have interpreted the Tanzanian development experience. This is of
obvious interest because it can lead on to new interpretations and
understandings of the Tanzanian experience.
	
At the same time, a
re-examination of the standard explanations becomes a theoretical
problem to the extent that more general bodies of concepts and propos-
itions inevitably come into play. 	 The aim is to weld together empirical
inquiry and theoretical concerns, and to subject theoretical propositions
to critical scrutiny in the light of empirical data.
The thesis seeks to identify the causes underlying the Tanzanian
experience, and more specifically confronts three questions. 	 First,
which body, the Party or the Government, formulated the different policies
at each stage between 1962 and 1982?	 Second, what conditions, including
what theories or conceptions of development, influenced the formulation
of these policies?	 Third, to what extent can the failure of policies
be attributed to the conflict between the Party and the Government and
to the conceptions of development each supported?
The thesis will thus pursue three major themes in relation to the
period under investigation 1962 and 1982. 	 First, it will focus attention
on the relationship between the Party and the Government.
	 This line of
enquiry will help to evaluate the hypothesis that the state in Tanzania
is not the homogeneous and omnipotent entity which it has been assumed
to be by most of those who have sought to construct theories on the
subject (Goulbourne, 1979a).
The second theme is the views of development prevailing in Party
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and Government circles between 1962 and 1982. 	 For the period up to
1965, emphasis will be placed on how the Government formulated policies
in major areas of the economy, and the Government's conception of
development will be described.	 Government-formulated policies were
criticised by leading Party members, especially the Regional Commissioners
who dominated both the Party and Parliament. 	 The view of development
underlying these criticisms will be outlined. 	 This line of enquiry will
enable me to show that policies, as well as policy demands, were determined
by the beliefs and understandings about developmental problems held by
different groups policy-makers, but that they did not correspond to the
class interests of those in power as has been commonly assumed.
The third theme I propose to investigate will be the socio-economic
consequences of the implementation of such policies. 	 I hope to illustrate
empirically the types of problems that are generated as a result of an
institutional arrangement of policy-making after 1965 which separates
policy-formulation from policy-implementation and tends to exclude
economic considerations from the former. 	 This line of enquiry will
enable me to show that the problems Tanzania is experiencing are not
merely the result of implementation difficulties, of exogenous constraints
or of class-sabotage, but that they are inherent within the policies
themselves.
At one level, these three themes form a critique of the various
academic explanations reviewed in the last section. At another level
however, they form an alternative explanation of the Tanzanian develop-
ment experience.	 The three themes are logically interrelated because
each theme creates the conditions for the emergence of the next.
	 As a
result, all three themes appear in varying degrees throughout the three
Parts into which the thesis is divided.
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The first theme - relations between Party and Government - leads
on to a consideration of the opposing views of development held by the
Party and the Government respectively. 	 The latter's view, I shall
show, took economic considerations as the principal inputs into policy-
making.	 The former based its conception of development on redistrib-
utive goals and objectives relating to control of the economy. I argue
that the co-existence of these two views of development created an
ambiguous situation in Tanzania development policy despite the efforts
of the Government to create a development consensus.
The conflict between Party and Government which existed immediately
after independence was resolved constitutionally in the 1965 Interim
Constitution, which made the country a One Party State.
	 The Constitution,
however, created conditions in which the Party over the years,
increasingly assumed powers to formulate policies. 	
.	 This eme.f2t.n...9
institutional arrangement lent weight to the Party's view of development
and to its tendency to regard economic constraints and implementation
problems as secondary. 	 In the decade after the introduction of the
Interim Constitution, I show, this attitude hardened, and was elevated
into a consistently 'political' approach to development.
This leads directly to the third theme, that of the consequences
of a style of policy-making which ignores economic considerations and
implementation problems.
	 This style came into the fore especially
between 1969 and 1974, when the Party increasingly took responsibility
for formulating policies and adopted an increasingly 'political' approach.
It was consolidated by the growth of the Party to a de jure supremacy in
1975.	 As I shall show in detail, Tanzania's development experience
and its problems are best understood in relation to these facts. Hence,
the economic crises of recent years are the result of these internal 
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problems as well as of external ones, while what are commonly considered
mere implementation problems are properly seen as the result of faulty
policy-making.
Sources 
The major sources which have been used for this investigation
include policy statements from the Government and the Party (1962-1982),
and Presidential statements about the relative roles of Government and
-Party.	 From these two sources the differing positions of the Party
and the Government, and the official responsibility of each organ in
policy-making, have been ascertained in a preliminary way.
However, the interpretation of these statements and the conditions
underlying them have been investigated further by looking at the records
of various official bodies which discuss policies.	 These include the
Parliamentary debates (the Hansard), some minutes of the National Executive
Committee of the Party and those of the Central Committee of the Party,
the Annual Conference of the Party and various Government bodies (including
individual ministries). 	 Most of this material is in Kiswahili and had
to be translated into English.
In addition, some 25 interviews were obtained with high-ranking
Party and Government officials.
	 The time spent on each interview was not
less than three hours. The major theme underlying most of the questions
was the relationship between the Party and Government in relation to
policy-making.	 Some of the information gathered in this way cannot be
directly attributed to individuals because of commitments to confidential-
ity.	 Therefore references have been given using a form of words which
indicates the approximate location and responsibilities of the interviewee
without endangering his or her anonymity. 	 A list of interviews and
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their corresponding dates
	 is contained in the appendix. Newspapers,
The Nationalist (1962-1969) and The Daily News (1975-1981), as well as
secondary sources have been used to fill in some gaps and check inter-
pretations.
Structure 
The thesis is divided into three major parts. Parts One and Two
make a thematic and chronological analysis of the Tanzanian experience
from 1962 to 1982.
	 Part One looks at the period before the Arusha
Declaration when development policy-making was chiefly the province of
Government; and Part Two covers the period 1967 to 1982 when policy-
making was effectively in the hands of the Party.
	
Throughout the two
parts an attempt has been made to trace out consistently the three major
themes: the relationship between the Government and the Party; the
views on development held in the Party and in the Government, and how
these influenced the types of policies pursued; and the types of
problems that were generated by policies based essentially on 'political'
considerations.
Part Three contains case-studies of three major policy-areas,
private capital, internal trade, and agriculture and rural development.
In each of the case studies an attempt has been made to show the types
of problems that are generated by a policy-making style which ignores
the consideration of implementation problems. 	 This sector-by-sector
approach highlights in relation to specific policies and relying heavily
on empirical materials the themes traced out in Parts One and Two, the
relationship between Party and Government, and the contrasting views on
development of the two organs of the state.
	 In this way, Parts One and
Two are reinforced by Part Three, and the latter is explained by the
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first two parts.
The Introduction has examined the three major scholarly inter-
pretations of the Tanzanian development experience, namely, the radical
neo-Marxist position, the 'pragmatic dependency' approach and the work
of political scientists.
	 The argument has been that these interpre-
tations have failed to give a satisfactory explanation of the Tanzanian
experience and that there is a need for a fresh approach.
	 The remainder
of the thesis sets out the argument that the Tanzanian experience is best
understood in relation to political-institutional arrangements and the
contrasting views of development held by those responsible for policy-
making and implementation.
Part One, entitled 'Party and Government Roles and Conceptions of 
Development Before the Arusha Declaration', is divided into four chapters.
Chapter One, 'Colonial Economic and Social Policies', provides a short
review of major policies highlighting the features which were to affect
the relationship between the Party and Government after independence.
Chapter Two is entitled 'Political Institutions and Conceptions of 
Development', and it examines the institutional arrangements for policy-
making and the conceptions of development prevailing in the different
organs of the state between 1961 and 1963.
	 Chapter Three, 'The First 
Five Year Plan and the Deepening of an Ambiguous Situation', expands on
the theme of a conflict between Party and Government expressed in
opposing views of development.
	 This chapter looks at how the Government
argued for the acceptance of the First Five Year Plan (1964-1969) in
Parliament and how members of the Party in turn criticised the Plan.
The chapter also examines the 1965 Interim Constitution of the One Party
State and its consequences for Party-Government relations and views of
development.
	 The fourth chapter, entitled 'Outcomes of Policies Before 
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the Arusha Declaration', outlines the successes and failures of Tanzanian
development policies between 1962 and 1966 and sets out the argument
that policies of development which were implemented as a result of
political pressures were already creating immense problems by 1966.
The second part of this thesis is called 'Development Policy-Making 
since Arusha: Party Ascendancy and Chronic Economic Crisis', and is
divided into four chapters.
	
Chapter Five, 'General Principles of Policy:
The Arusha Declaration', analyses the various policies formulated as
part of the Arusha Declaration.	 An attempt is made to examine the
policies in terms of the President's, the Party's and the Government's
views of development.	 It is argued that all three organs of the state
were able to reassert their interests at different stages of the policy-
making process.
Chapter Six, 'The Primacy of Politics in Development, 1969-1974/5',
considers the growth of the Party from de facto to de jure supremacy in
1975 and the subsequent subordination of the Government. The most
salient feature of this period is the adoption of a 'political' approach
to development by all of the three organs of the state. 	 A number of
policies are analysed to illustrate this trend, implying the displacement
of economic considerations from policy-making in new ways.	 The chapter
argues that the real 'revolution' in Tanzanian policy occurred during
this period and not with the Arusha Declaration as has been commonly
assumed.
Chapter Seven 'The Failure orPolitical" Policy-Making and the Economic 
Crisis of 1974-1975: Analysis of Academic Explanations'. 	 This chapter
looks at the outcomes of major policies such as Ujamaa and Mwongozo as
well as at the economic crisis of 1974-1975.	 The chapter is concerned
with the changes of policy that took place during this period and examines
-56-
the academic and non-academic explanations that have been offered
for these changes and for the economic crisis itself. 	 The chapter
advances the argument that the failure of major development policies
as well as the economic crisis can be largely accounted for by the
nature of policy-making in Tanzania, which does not give due attention
to economic problems.
Chapter Eight is entitled 'PartySuDremacy and Chronic Economic Crisis 
1979-198112'. It examines the 'liberalisation' type of policies
pursued by the Government at this time and later reversed by the Party.
It also looks into the period of economic crisis which began in 1979
and reviews the external-versus-internal-constraints arguments put
forward by officials in Tanzania and the multilateral financial agencies
respectively.	 For the latest period, the argument is that the conflict
between the Party activists and Government still exists but that each
organ of the state is now pursuing its own policies independently of
the other and in different sectors of the economy.
Part Three is entitled Policies on Private Capital, Internal Trade 
and Rural and Agricultural Development 1967-1982, and looks into three
major areas of development policy between 1969 and 1982.
	
The analysis
of these parts is relatively detailed and empirical.
	
However, the depth
of analysis achieved is necessarily rather uneven, and the discussion on
agricultural and rural development policies relies substantially on the
secondary literature.
This Part is divided into three chapters. Chapter Nine looks into
the'Policy on Private Capital' from 1967 to 1982. The chapter attempts
to show that there has been a conflict between the positions of the Party
and the Government on the role of private capital in Tanzania.	 The
President alternates his support between one position and the other.
The lack of a consensus has led to conflicting measures being pursued and
has created a de-stabilising situation.
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ChapterTen: 'The Policy of Nationalisation of the Internal Trade System: 1967-1982'
examines policy on internal trade from 1967 to 1982.	 The three themes
of the thesis are analysed in relation to specific policy changes which
occurred during this fifteen-year period. 	 The chapter looks at the
nationalisation of foreign import-export trade and the creation of the
State Trading Corporation in 1967; the Presidential Circular which
nationalised wholesale and sub-wholesale trade in 1970; and the
'socialisation' of the retail trade four years later.
	 Each section is
followed by an empirical analysis of the types of problems the policy
generated in terms of its implementation.
Chapter Eleven, 'Agricultural Growth and
	
Rural Development',
examines this sector of the economy from 1967 to 1982 paying particular
attention to the three themes developed throughout the thesis. 	 Finally,
the case is made out that today the two organs of the state, the Party
and the Government, are pursuing policies independently of each other.
The findings of the thesis are summed up in a Conclusion.
PART ONE
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PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
ROLES AND CONCEPTIONS OF
DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE
ARUSHA DECLARATION
As has been indicated in the Introduction the main concern of the
thesis is with the interpretations of the failure of socialist
policies initiated in the 1967 Arusha Declaration. 	 However, the
conditions which this thesis is examining as possible major contrib-
utors to this failure, that is, the conflict between the Party and
Government and the conflicting views of development held by these
two organs of the state developed before 1967 and particularly in
the period between 1961 and 1967.
	 It is this period with which
this Part is concerned.
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CHAPTER ONE 
COLONIAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES
This chapter is not an attempt to give a thorough socio-economic
history of Tanzania before independence.
	 Rather, it attempts to
highlight certain socio-economic and political developments which occurred
and which created the conditions in which differing views of development
competed after 1961.
	 Briefly, as a result of certain historical inter-
ventions, Tanzania was less integrated into the international commodity
exchange system in 1961 than many other Third World, including African,
countries.
	 The most salient feature of the low level of development
a.
was manifested inlyery low economic ylo w4k- rAte. Two views of development
emerged, one based on re-distributive ideas and control of the economy,
and the other on economic growth based on private capital.
	 These two
views of development co-existed and competed for control of policy making.
The analysis in this chapter is directed solely to show the conditions
which led to the creation of the two views on development.
When we examine Tanzania's historical economic development in the
light of sociological theories of development four major factors assume
significance.	 Firstly, the relatively recent movement of the Tanzanian
economy into commodity production based on exchange; secondly, historical
interruptions of both economic and political natures which affected the
process and smooth development of commodity production; thirdly, a vast
territory comprising 343,000 square miles of land making communications
and administration difficult and finally, a harsh environment, associated
with the prevalence of tse-tse fly and unreliable rainfalls in which
agricultural activities took place.
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As late as the 19th century when Egypt, Latin America and India
were involved in production for the world market as well as in internal
trade, Tanganyika, as it was then known, was still involved in trade
based on plunder of ivory and slaves. 	 Furthermore, the people of
Tanganyika were still producing basically for their own subsistence
and were divided into tribal groups. 	 These facts do not deny that
internal trade was beginning to develop (Roberts, 1969). 	 But the process
of peasantisation, that is, of producing for external and internal markets
in a nationally defined territory, had not been established. 	 This process
only began in the 20th century but it was retarded by the intervention of
global political and economic changes.
In the 19th century the Omani dynasty of Zanzibar controlled
Tanganyika's trade of ivory and slaves but its political control of the
mainland was weak.	 The Omani	 presence in the country was brought to
an end when Britain allowed Germany to take over the mainland in the
Anglo-German Treaty of 1886. 	 This treaty formally introduced Germany's
colonialism into Tanganyika, and the country became known as Deutsch
Osta-Afrika.
Germany's first priority was to break the Arab monopoly of trade
and assert its rule over the territory. 	 Various economic policies
were adopted by the Germans to replace the Arab
	 influence, among these
the replacement of the Zanzibar rupee by the German rupee, and the
development of Dar es Salaam and Tanga ports to replace Bagamoyo. These
measures were successful in isolating Zanzibar from its former trade
activities.	 For instance, in 1911 Germany took 59% of the exports and
Zanzibar only 10% compared with 22% in 1897 when 72% went to Zanzibar
(Yaffey, 1970: 45).
Arab interests in the mainland did not accept Germany's administration
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because it undermined their trade links with Zanzibar. A rebellion
known as the Abushiri rebellion 1888 and 1889 developed, which was
crushed.	 But between 1889 and 1895 there were nine further revolts
against the colonial administration by the peasants, which culminated
in the Maji Maji War 1905-6.
	
Thus from its colonisation to 1906,
it took Germany nearly twenty years to merely establish its rule on
the territory, and even then, problems of finance and manpower hindered
total administrative control of the territory (Iliffe, 1979; Coulson,
1982; Coupland, 1938; Yaffey, 1970; Rweyemamu, 1973).
German colonial economic policies 
The economic aim of Germany's colonialism was to make the colony
self-financing so that the latter would not require imperial subsidies
for its development and would at the same time contribute to the metro-
politan economy.
	 Self-financement of the economy meant that the
territory had to generate its own revenue, local as well as foreign.
This principle in economic development meant that the economy's prod-
uction had to change from subsistence to production based on exchange.
Furthermore, in order to obtain foreign exchange with which to pay for
imports, the colony had to produce crops which could find value on a
foreign market.	 This process meant that the composition of crops,
direction of trade as well as organisation of production had to be
changed to meet the requirements of a foreign market, which, under German
colonialism, was metropolitan Germany.	 As a result, products which were
required by the Germans - sisal, rubber, gold - were in turn developed
in the territory.	 Likewise, the colonial Government had to introduce
taxation both as a means of revenue-generation and as a method of forcing
peasants to produce for exchange.	 Thus in 1897 the German colonial
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administration imposed a Hut Tax which could be paid in produce, cash
or work and in 1905 a Poll Tax was introduced.
From 1906 onwards the colonial administration tried to develop
commodity production by promoting peasant-based agriculture activities.
Rechenberg, for instance, the German Governor in Tanganyika (1906-1912)
advocated the development of market infrastructure and trade as well as
fair returns to the producers as a means of making peasants produce for
the market. This policy was more successful than the experience of white
settlement farming had been. 	 Although by 1913 543,124 hectares of the
best land had been alienated (Rweyemamu, 1973: 16)
	
, by the
end of German rule, the territory had a diversified economy based on
cash crops including sisal, coffee, cotton, tobacco, rubber, tea, vanilla
and groundnuts.	 Apart from sisal which was a plantation crop, most of
the crops were grown by peasants.
To facilitate the development of commodity production heavy invest-
ments were required in infrastructural development.
	 Between 1897 and
1912 exports ranged from 36.4% to 63.0% of imports, indicating roughly
the importance of the capital inflow which took place because of railway
buildings (Yaffey, 1970: 43-45).
	 For instance, the Northern Line served
the sisal estates of the Tanga region and was extended to Moshi to serve
the coffee producing areas in 1911.
	 The Central Line from Dar es Salaam
to the central region began,anA aimed at exploiting peasant groundnut
production. It reached Kigoma in 1914, and offered links to Rwanda and
Burundi, which were then parts of Tanganyika, over to the Congo (Yaffey,
1970: 46).	 Apart from railway construction there were various other
development activities which took place. 	 For instance, Coulson (1982: 41)
states that, "there was considerable investment. 	 Maps were drawn, roads
were built, towns were laid out, the country was explored for minerals,
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schools and hospitals were opened, and important advances were made
in medical and agricultural research".	 There were also a number of
industries established ranging from small-arms ammunition, mines,
spices, blankets, spinning wheels and important drugs and vaccines,
soap and candle making.	 A dock was constructed in Dar es Salaam.
ibid 72-73; Yaffey, 1970: 46).
Germany's colonial aim of making the territory self-financing
was successful.	 Yaffey for instance states:
As the colony developed and tax and custom
revenues expanded, the imperial subsidy
stagnated. A development budget relying
substantially on local revenue emerged.
(Yaffey, 1970: 43)
German rule created the need for local administrative staff especially
since finances limited the employment of German officials.	 There was
never more than 79 European administrative staff in the districts. This
forced the German administration to emphasise education, both literary
and technical, for Africans (Coulson, 1982: 41).
The significance of German colonialism of Tanzania was that it
involved a traumatic experience for the peasants who resisted colonialism.
The fact that it took Germany over twenty years to pacify the population
testifies to this.	 From an economic point of view, however, it meant
that it was only between 1905/6 - 1912, a period of only seven years,
that commodity production based on market incentives could develop under
conditions of relative colonial stability. 	 But the fact that a develop-
ment budget was evolved which relied mainly on local revenue also
signified to the success of the economic policy.
This success, however, was short-lived.	 World War One interrupted
the developmental process. 	 Commodity production was changed and became
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geared to food production to feed soldiers since the War was also
fought in the territory.
	 Some of the consequences the War had on the
population and overall effects on production has been documented by
Iliffe.	 For instance:
For civilians the primary emotion was fear.
... Danger existed for the civilian because
his labour, food and local knowledge were
needed by two armies (British and German)
both determined to commit him to their side
but neither able to guarantee the protection
which made commitment safe.
(Iliffe, 1979: 251)
Requisition and drought produced famine and by November 1917, 'the worst
famine in human memory occurred' (Iliffe, 1979: 269).
The dislocation of colonial central authority created problems.
There was an outbreak of smallpox, which could not be controlled and
the tse-tse fly spread to four regions and much cultivated land reverted
to bush.
	 It was only as late as 1924 that the colony's external trade
regained its 1912 level (Iliffe, 1979: 263-270).
	 Tanzania lost ten years
of development initiative.
British colonial economic policies 
The economic aim of British colonialism (1919-1961) which began
when Tanganyika was handed over to Britain as a mandate of the League
of Nations did not differ fundamentally from that of Germany in attempting
to make the colony self-financing as well as to make it contribute to the
metropolitan revenue.
	 Britain relied on the market and taxation to
increase the development of cash crop production and hence its revenue
This approach, however, was not always consistent because again, global
economic and political factors intervened to lessen its effects on
develo pment.
	 Secondly, Britain's economic policies were influenced
by its attitude towards the territory.
	 Unlike Germany, which aimed at
making Tanganyika independent from the surrounding British territories.
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Britain's policies aimed at linking Tanganyika progressively with
Kenya on unfavourable terms.
Between 1920-1924 the colonial Government concentrated on re-
establishing administrative control and getting the infrastructural
facilities to function again.	 By 1924 the railways began to operate
and exports attained their pre-war levels (Stephen, 1968: 41). Although
there was a short term post-war prosperity based on high prices in the
world market for cash crops, it was shortlived. 	 The world depression
from the late 1920s and 1930s led to loss of revenue for government.
Revenue fell, for instance, from £2.0 million in 1929/30 to £1.7 million
in the following year and to £1.5 million in 1931/32 (Yaffey, 1970: 55).
The intervention of World War Two also affected commodity production:
... rural Africans had tended to move
away from the cash economy back towards a
subsistence way of life.
	 Restricted export
outlets, inadequate supplies and high prices
of consumer goods, had discouraged a comp-
aratively self-sufficient peasantry from
making such effort to obtain cash. By 1945,
the development of a cash economy was probably
even less advanced than it had been in 1938.
(Erhlich, 1966: 8)
Thus global economic and political events again disrupted Tanganyika's
economic development.	 We could argue that between the 1930's depression
to the after effects of the Second World War Tanganyika again lost more
than ten years of development initiative. 	 These problems were further
aggravated by Britain's policies towards the territory.
Britain preferred to view Tanganyika as part of her East African
territories and measures were undertaken to integrate herimii41. Kenya
a/rt.
on
A
unfavourable basis especially in relation to her infrastructural
development.	 For instance, the policy of equalisation of freight rates
between Kenya and Tanganyika ensured that goods went through Kenya thus
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incurring revenue loss to Tanganyika's railways and ports. 	 As a
consequence derived from this policy, Kenya's railways and ports were
further developed and improved, while those of Tanganyika were not
(Yaffey, 1970: 57-58).	 Likewise, the customs union between Kenya/
Tanganyika border from 1923-1967, CcusQA Tanganyika to lose
revenue to Kenya (Coulson, 1982: 73).
A similar pattern can be ScI<Irl in relation to industrialisation
and the role of private capital. 	 Britain reversed Germany's policy
of promoting industries in Tanganyika but allowed Kenya to industrialise
as early as 1923 (Coulson, 1982: 73).	 The political ambiguous status
of Tanganyika also created uncertainty for private foreign capital.
Thus during the inter-war period the status of Tanganyika as a mandatea
territory of the League of Nations made it a risk area for British
capital investments. 	 These uncertainties were increased even more
before the Second World War when hand_pg Tanganyika back to Germany became
a real possibility (Yaffey, 1970: 37, 52). 	 Thus it was only
between late 1940s and 1950s that a limited amount of foreign invest-
ments occurred in the country.	 Tanganyika's economic development
occurred mainly through official grants and loans (Yaffey, 1970: 53).
This meant that there was an interventionist role of the state in
development.
The period from 1945-1960 was important in Tanzania's economic
development because it brought in a new set of conditions which allowed
for an annual economic growth rate of about 5%. (World Bank, 1961: 25).
Various factors account for this 'upturn' in the economy. 	 First, in
1945 the first Development Plan was drawn up.	 It was based on a ten
year period 1946-1956 and emphasised infrastructural development.
mer
Secondly, the Korean boom in export prices (1949-1951) helped to increase
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funds for development. 	 Thirdly, for the first time there was an
emphasis on the policy of developing industries based on local raw
materials for export to neighbouring countries. Both European and
East African Asian capital was invested in Tanzania during this period.
The major emphasis given 6 the Plan was to develop the infra-
structure, which would enable 	 more rapid economic growth to take place.
As the report of the Development Commission states:
... prime consideration has been given to
the basic requirements upon which the
economic development of the country must
depend.	 Emphasis has been given, therefore,
to communications, water supplies, and the
development of natural resources.
(Stephen, 1968: 80)
There was also greater emphasis given to improving peasant agriculture
and cattle practices.	 The Plan had about 40 schemes designed to arrest
soil deterioration and improve productivity. 	 The largest projects were
in Sukumaland, Mbulu, Usambara, Pare and Uluguru. The character of the
schemes varied but required culling of excess cattle, changing culti-
vation practice, bush-clearing and provision of water supplies (Stephen,
1968: 85).	 The aim was to improve peasant production.
The emphasis on the manufacturing sector also began to attract
foreign capital though on a limited scale. 	 Liebig Extract of Meat Ltd.
and Metal Box were some of the examples of the few that invested in this
area (Yaffey, 1970: 63; Coulson, 1982: 79). 	 From 1959 onwards Asian
capital began to invest in Tanzania diversifying from Kenya and Uganda
so as to spread the risks. 	 Such families as the Madhvani which had
factories in Kenya and Uganda began to invest in Tanzania. A Tanganyikan
Asian who began to invest in industries was 	 Chandes, who built up
the grain-milling and oil crushing industries in Tanganyika (Coulson,
1982: 170).	 The manufacturing sector was thus developed by private capital.
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By 1961 the Tanzanian economyl\was Stilt 40)mi/rated by agricultural
activities.	 Forty per cent of money incomes was derived from exports,
and 80% of export earnings came from the agricultural and livestock
products against 13% of minerals (Plan 1961/2 - 1963/4: 2). 	 Subsistence
activities, however, predominated in the agricultural sector. 	 About 40%
of the Gross Domestic Product was represented by the subsistence activities.
This reflected the economic backwardness of the coumk1since it was outside
the monetary seaor. Government was deprived of its produce, labour,
revenue as well as market.
	 The following table illustrates
TABLE 1.1
this:
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT i'000
1955	 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Gross Domestic Product - Monetary	 81,760	 89,335 92,941 97,945 106,231 113,860
Gross Domestic Product - Subsistence64,984 	 63,085 69,414 69,147 70,881 71,551
146,744 152,420 162,335 157,092 177,112 185,411
Domestic Product-Monetary as per
cent of Gross Domestic Product	 55.8	 58.5 57.1 62.3 60.0 61.4*
*Preliminary Estimate
Source:	 Plan	 1961-63: 4.
The final characteristic, of the economy was the interventionist role in
development taken by the colonial government.	 About one third of total
capital formation was made by the public sector (including the East Africa
High Commission) and the remaining two thirds by the private sector.
	
This
is illustrated by the following figures:
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GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION
TABLE 1.2
PRICES
f'000
AT MARKET
SECTOR	 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960*
A. PRIVATE
Building & Construction
Monetary	 5,408 4,323 4,888 5,825 5,350 4,328 4,904
Subsistence	 4,203 4,266 4,330 4,600 4,681 4,751 4,841
Machinery & Equipment	 6,133 9,426 9,073 9,274 8,887 9.438 11,434
TOTAL PRIVATE	 15,744 18,015 18,291 19,699 18,918 18,517 21,179
B. GOVERNMENT
Building &
Construction	 6,807 7,101 7,404 7,798 7,187 7,032 7,004
Machinery & Equipment	 3,407 3,803 1,919 2,036 1,296 1,028 1,180
10,214 10,904 9,323 9,834 8,483 8,060 8,184
GRAND TOTAL	 25,958 28,919 27,614 29,533 27,401 26,577 29,363
*Preliminary estimates
Source: Plan 1961-63: 4.
Public investment was mainly concentrated on the building of infra-
structure while private capital formation took place mainly in plantation
agriculture, manufacturing, building, industry, transport and distribution
(trade).	 The role of private capital ) though limited in comparison to
Kenya, was nevertheless crucial.
The economic conditions of Tanzania in 1961 and her economic history
was likely to affect attitudes to development after independence.	 The
salient feature was that almost 40% of GNP came from	 non-monetary sources
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in 1960, capital investment came largely from public sources and
Tanzania had suffered disadvantages both in the world and East African
markets.	 The Tanzanian experience would be likely to create fairly
widespread suspicion - or at least not encourage easy acceptance - of
conventional views of economic development.
Colonial social policies 
The social policies of the British colonial government were dominated
by the racial division of Tanzania. The tables gives the population of
Tanganyika divided into the major racial categories:
TABLE 1.3 
POPULATION OF TANGANYIKA 
SELECTED YEARS, 1910-1965
(thousands)
Year African Asian Europeans
1910 4,700 8.7 3.7
1920 4,900 9.7a
5.3a
1931 5,800 32.0 8.2
1940 6,500 340
b
..91
b
1950 7.730 76.8 14.9
1961 9,400 102.4 22.3
1965
a:
b:
c:
(est)
1921 figure
1938 figure
1963 figure
10,450 120.5c 21.1c
Source: Stephen, 1968: 31.
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But despite the African preponderance and despite the terms of the
Mandate which stated that Britain was
... to promote the political, economic and
educational advancement of the inhabitants
of the trust territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independ-
ence as may be appropriate to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its people ...
(Stephen, 1968: 76)
British social policies were governed by the principles of racism, which
structured the allocations of funds. 	 For instance, the Holmes Commission
on the civil services of the East African territories had recommended
and the Governor of Tanganyika had accepted the principle that junior
and senior branches be differentiated by race (Stephen, 1968: 195).
Until 1955 Government salaries for Africans were three-fifths those paid
to Europeans, regardless of the job performed (Ibid). 	 As a result of
this discrimination, Europeans occupied the higher administrative positions
of government as well as in the commercial enterprises and plantations,
Asians occupied the middle positions as traders and clerks, while Africans
were at the bottom of the strata consisting of workers and peasants.
Racism thus came to consolidate the class structure that was already
present.
Equally, discriminatory wages and salaries as well as racism
determined the composition of residential areas. 	 There were European,
Asian and African residential areas.	 The latter were characterised
by over-crowding and lack of basic amenities, such as roads, drainage,
and water supplies (Stephen, 1968: 103).
Policies based on racial discrimination also affected the allocation
of resources in education.	 For instance, when the colonial government
divided funds derived from the sale of German property confiscated during
World War Two equally among the three main races for their respective
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educational system, Nyerere pointed that 'equality' meant:
720 shillings for each European child, 200
shillings for each Asian child, and only
2 shillings for each African child.
(Stephen, 1968: 128)
A similar principle was also used in the nomination of the unofficial
members of the Legislative Council and Executive Council.	 The principle
of parity of representation of the three racial groups was applied for
the unofficial members of both Councils despite the predominance of
Africans (Taylor, 1963: 135).
Although the colonial government had accepted in principle that
Tanganyika was to develop along the West African model, nevertheless,
land alienation occurred.	 By the end of 1951 for instance, the total
area alienated to non-Africans, including companies and missionary bodies,
was 2,284,434 acres. 	 Of this area, 1,333,487 acres were held in lease-
hold and 950,947 acres in freehold (Taylor, 1963: 116). 	 Furthermore,
the alienated land was usually the most fertile.
While the economic development of Tanzania in the colonial period
did not encourage widespread acceptance of conventional views of the
means of achieving economic growth, colonial social 4 political policies
created the conditions in which there could be a strong emphasis on
redistribution of wealth and opportunities at the end of colonial rule.
The racially biased distribution of social benefits and political power
in colonial times created the conditions for pressure for Africanisation
not only of power but of social benefits.
Various quasi political associations emerged before 1954 such as
the Tanganyika African Civil Servants Association (1924), the Tanganyika
African Welfare and Commercial Association in the 1930s, and the
Tanganyika African Association (TAA). 	 Most of these associations were
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formed by teachers, junior civil servants and attempted to fight for
better re-distributive policies. 	 The TAA, for instance, became
increasingly politically orientated. 	 It rejected the idea of closer
union with Kenya because it feared that it would lead to the domination
by Kenya and white settlers.	 It was also involved in the Meru Land
Case (1951) a fight against further land alienation to settlers. In
1954 the TAA was transformed into TANU, Tanganyika African National
Union, which	 aimed at bringing about independence under African
majority rule.
But the first Constitution of Tanu in 1954 reflected the concern
with redistributive policies. 	 It stated:
Tanu will work to encourage co-operatives
and trade unions; urge that producers get
the best price and that consumers buy in the
best market; help Africans establish an
increasing share in the running and owning
of business; establish a minimum wage and
a system of assisted farming; and oppose
the alienation of land.
(Bienen, 1967: 218)
This view continued to have strong and continuing support after inde-
pendence even though the implementation of elements of the policy (by
some interpretations) could be in conflict with aims to achieve economic
growth.
In concluding this chapter, we can put forward the argument that
the historical development of Tanzania determined to a great extent
the major pre-occupations and priorities of the Government and the
Party.	 While on the one hand the Government, given its institutional
functions was involved with the problem of generating revenue through
the expansion of productive activities and called for the growth of
private investments, on the other hand, the Party, because of its
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institutional functions, was calling for redistributive measures to
change the racially underprivileged position of Africans.	 As a result,
it attacked the Europeans and Asians who represented private capital
and who had access to resources.
It is important to note here the recurrence of development
experience which occurred in Tanganyika. 	 First, Tanganyika's inte-
gration into the world system carried with it both economic benefits
and dangers, both of which had national impact on the economy.
	 When
world market prices rose Government's revenue would equally rise; when
they fell, Government's revenue would fall. 	 This rise and fall of
revenue in turn determined the development budget.
	 Thus the economic
advantages and disadvantages were both inherent within the system.
Second, when there was a break-down or drastic changes in the internal
political and economic systems peasants reverted to the subsistence
economy.	 This took place after the Two World Wars.	 Third, the country's
economic development was mainly undertaken by the state rather than by
private capital.	 Finally, the country suffered from political
uncertainties as a result of its historical development.	 These trends
in the development experience of colonial Tanganyika may explain why
Tanganyika was still characterised by a predominantly subsistence economy
when she achieved her independence in 1961.
-75-
CHAPTER TWO 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONCEPTIONS OF
DEVELOPMENT 1961 - 1963
At the time of independence political power was concentrated in
the Government.	 Tanu had a relatively sub-ordinate role. Between
1961 and 1963, however, Tanu's influence on policy formulation increased
and with this its impact on the dominant conceptions of development.
The establishment of a Presidential system of Government in 1962 created
a third force, which mediated between the Government and the Party. This
however, led to a more ambiguous situation in the struggle between the
two organs of the state over the control of policy formulation.
THREE POLITICAL ORGANS INVOLVED IN POLICY—MAKING
Tanzania had a Parliamentary system of Government. A cabinet of
ministers, each in charge of a Ministry and headed by a Prime Minister,
had executive power but were responsible to Parliament (Bunge), which
was elected by universal suffrage.	 The provinces of Tanzania each had
administrations headed by provincial commissioners who were civil
servants.	 Provinces were divided into districts administered by civil
servant district commissioners responsible to the provincial commissioners.
The Party, Tanu, had no constitutional standing in Government;
however, from 1961 all Ministers and the vast majority of MPs were Tanu
members.
The Party was organised at regional and district levels with
chairman and secretaries at these local levels. 	 Local branches
elected members of the Tanu National (Annual) meetings. 	 The National
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meeting elected a National Executive Committee (NEC), which proposed
Tanu policies to be ratified by the National Meeting. 	 Day to day
affairs were dealt with by the Central Committee (CC).
The position of Tanu in policy-making 
Within seven years of its formation in 1954 Tanu,under the leader-
ship of Nyerere, was able to lead the country into independence. More-
over, Tanu won the pre-independence elections of 1958-1959 and 1960
with such overwhelming majorities as to make Tanzania a de facto one
party state.
This strength, however, concealed its weakness. 	 Tanu was a
poorly organised party. 	 It lacked organisational capacity to mobilise
the population.	 For instance, in the 1960 general elections only half
the number of persons who were estimated as potentially eligible to
register, actually voted (Taylor, 1963: 191; Bienen, 1967: 56). 	 The
skitha
Party lackedeanpower as well as funds.
This organisational weakness of the Party has been noted by
political scientists. 	 Leys writes of Tanu that "it was in some respect
a less reliable and well established organisation than its extremely
rapid success and impressive organisational apparatus suggested" (Leys,
1972: 189).
	
Mwansasu makes a similar point in a different way when he
shows that Tanu annual meetings prior to 1967 were often without procedures
or prior knowledge of the agenda:
... there was no accepted order according to
which delegates could acquire a right to address
the conference.	 As a result, very often there
was a great commotion after a delegate had
finished speaking - there was a general rush
to the microphone since the first to arrive
received the right to speak.
... As a result, sustained debate was often not
forthcoming.
(Mwansasu, 1979: 183)
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The weakness of Tanu's capacity as an administrative and
organisational organ has been investigated by Bienen in his Tanzania:
Party Transformation and Economic Development (1967).	 Bienen's
argument was that Tanu 's overwhelming success despite its weak organis-
ational capacity was the result of the existence of favourable conditions,
which did not pose serious challenges to Tanu's growth.	 First, after
1958 colonial policy changed from hostility to acceptance of Tanzanial5
political independence. 	 Second, unlike Kenya and Southern Africa,
Tanzania's whites and Asian minorities did not represent a sustained
and unified threat because they were ethnically fragmented and were
numerically too weak. 	 Likewise, the 01/4.\0Se.rnCe e4cA0,11r#YknEtribes in
Tanzania prevented the emergence of super-tribal politics as occurred
in West Africa.	 The position of tribal chiefs had been weakened by
the 1951 system of Local Authorities.
The absence of organised opposition was responsible for both Tanu's
strength and its weakness:
The elections revealed that Tanu would win
any contest but that it had not organised
the population to support it overwhelmingly
at the polls.	 Its organisational strength
had never been tested by a vigorous opposi-
tion party which could seriously threaten it
in a contest for votes.	 Because of the
nature of the opposition and the nature of
its own growth, Tanu's electoral dominance
was deceptive: it did not illustrate Tanu's
great strength; in fact, it reflected an
organisational weakness.
(Bienen, 1967: 58)
Also:
... since a major organisational effort was
not required to defeat the opposition to Tanu
in the elections of 1958-1959 and 1960, res-
pectively, it is not surprising that by 1962
Tanu was still unable to call out even a
majority of the potential electorate.
(Ibid: 65)
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Tanu's weak organisational capacity was both caused and aggravated
by the shortage of manpower. At independence most of its high leader-
ship were taken to form the Government.
	 We shall analyse the composition
of the Government later on.
	 As a result, the Party was left with a
weak leadership, the majority of which was composed of people who had
not received a post-secondary education.
Various political scientists have given us insights into the
social characteristics of the leadership.
	 For instance, they were
farmers and traders (Tordoff, 1965: 37), primary school teachers,
transport entrepreneurs, lorry drivers and secondary school teachers
(Bienen, 1967: 46), police constables (Coulson, 1982: 119), taxi-drivers
and shoemakers (interview, July 1981).
	 Generally speaking, they lacked
a professional training.
	 We can make a further distinction within this
category, between those who did possess a secondary level education and
had become primary school teachers, and those who did not have such an
education.	 The former generally became provincial secretaries during
the independence struggle while the latter became provincial chairmen.
The distinction is important because the provincial secretaries became
Regional Commissioners after independence and entered national politics,
while the provincial chairmen were confined to 'regional politics' at
district level (Bienen, 1967: 97).
Tanu's power was	 strengthened significantly in 1962 when
an Act created political officers as regional and area commissioners each
to be assisted by a civil service administration.
	 It was party members
who filled these new political roles.
	 The aim of creating political
heads in regions was to give the Party a role and also to allow the Party
to consolidate its organisational structures in the country (Bienen, 1967:
120-1).	 Tordoff argues, however, that the aim was to establish the
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authority of the central government throughout the country and that
the Party was to be the main agent used by Government (Tordoff, 1967:
98-99).
The Regional Commissioners were recruited from the Tanu provincial
secretaries and secondarily from the provincial chairmen. 	 For instance,
Wambura and Mwakangale were provincial secretaries who became regional
commissioners in the 1962 appointments, while Mtaki was a provisional
chairman who became an area commissioner and then a regional commissioner.
They were also MPs who had been elected to the National Assembly in the
General Election of 1960. 	 By 1964, six Party secretaries at regional
level had become regional commissioners and three area commissioners.
Two local party chairmen became regional commissioners and five area
commissioners (Bienen, 1967: 134-137).
Until 1965 the Regional Commissioners were ex-officio regional
secretaries of Tanu.	 They were delegates at the Annual Party Conference
and members of the NEC.	 Some of them, such as Wambura and Maki were
also elected Members of Parliament during the 1960-1964 period. The
Regional Commissioners therefore were in a strong position to compete
politically in national politics.	 Pratt descri4 this group of party
activists which came to dominate politics at the national level after
independence thus:
Political office was very likely the only way
in which many of them (political leaders) were
able to earn a significant income. Few had
professional or technical skills which would
have made them easily employable within the
government service and there was no large
private sector capable of absorbing them in
any number. For many, therefore, a loss of
political office would have meant an eventual
return to peasant farming.
(Pratt, 1976: 185)
Despite their professional handicap, Party activists were able to
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constitute a strong pressure group on national policy formulation
whose opinion could not easily be ignored.
The Government 
The Cabinet was a powerful government body because it was
responsible for policy formulation and implementation of policies.
Likewise, Parliament was also important because it was the representative
and tegislative institution to which the Government was constitutionally
responsible.	 As Pratt describes the government, H ... each Cabinet
Minister was individually responsible to Parliament for the administration
and for the detailed policies of his ministry; the members of the
Cabinet were collectively responsible to Parliament and to the country
for the major policies of the Government" (Pratt, 1972: 226).
All the Ministers were strong and active supporters of Tanu and
had composed its higher leadership during the struggle against colonialism.
This is true of the African Ministers; Jamal (Asian) and Bryceson
(European) did not join Tanu until after independence when the constitution
of Tanu was changed to admit non-Africans. 	 But they had been effective
supporters of the Party and had helped Tanu actively by mobilising for
its support (Coulson, 1982: 119). 	 Thus, one can see that the Cabinet
was composed of men who had contributed in one way or another to the
building of Tanu.	 There appeared to be no basis for conflict, therefore,
between the Government and the Party.
The first cabinet consisted of men whom Pratt refers to as
'administrator politicians' because they were mainly concerned with 'the
improvement of the social services and the economic development of the
country' (Pratt, 1972: 234). 	 All of the Ministers had had post-
secondary education; some such as Jamal, Nyerere, Bryceson and Fundikira
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were holders of degrees.	 All of them had held responsible positions
either with the co-operatives (for example, Bomani was the founder of
the Victoria Co-operative Federation) or were teachers in secondary
schools (Eliufoo, Swai, Nyerere).	 Bryceson was a substantial farmer,
and Jamal had strong links with family mercantile traditions. 	 The
first Cabinet incorporated men with experience of finance or wider
development problems as well as in administration. 	 This fact is
important because, as we shall see, it may account for their common
approach to Tanzania's economic problems.
Conflict between the Party and Government and the emergence of an 
Executive President 
The relative power of Government vis-a-vis the Party was undermined
from 1962 by the creation of an Executive Presidency. 	 The President
had powers above both the Party and the Cabinet and could in fact tilt
the balance between one organ and the other. 	 This situation obscured
the conflict between the Party and Government.
One of the chief characteristics of Tanzania since independence
has been its political stability. 	 The explanations offered for this
remarkable achievement have centred on the absence of major ethnic
conflicts, absence of a strong indigeruus middle class, a fairly
homogeneous culture and language of Kiswahili, the popularity of the
political party, Tanu, and finally, the good leadership of the President,
Julius Nyerere (Hoskyns, 1972: 97; Taylor, 1963: 223-4).
The stability of the state in Tanzania however was belied by an
intense struggle for power which began to develop as soon as the government
was formed in 1960.
	 The struggle emerged from an effort by the Party
to control the Government, and particularly its policies. 	 Various
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political scientists have discussed this conflict (Pratt, 1976; Tordoff,
1967).	 Leys saw the resignation of Nyerere as Chief Prime Minister in
1962 as an attempt to avert a split between the Party and Government:
In short, Nyerere's resignation prevented any
kind of a show-down with the radicals which
might have led to a counting of heads and it
placed him in a position to prevent any further
splits developing between the middle leadership
of the party and the senior leaders of govern-
ment.
(Leys, 1972: 19)
The conflict between civil servants and politicians was, in fact, a
Rweyemamu and
common experience in most African countries during this period (Hyden,
1974).	 But the struggle assumed importance in Tanzania because policy-
making procedures were not clarified and adhered to. The Government had
the de jure right to formulate policies but the Party continued de facto 
to formulate policies while Nyerere as President had powers to override
both organs.
We have seen that Tanzania had achieved its independence within
a governmental system in which the central policy-making institution
was the Cabinet.
	 Nyerere supported the system.
	 In 1960, as Chief
Minister, he issued a Circular that said among other things, "I would
remind you, that policy is decided by the central government and not by
local party representatives" (Pratt, 1972: 226) and again, "I repeat
that the responsibility for carrying out Government's policies lies with
the civil service" (Ibid).
	 In 1961, in his independence message
Nyerere repeated the same point:
It is the job of the government to work out an
overall policy plan and to check the direction in
which we move just as the Tanu National Executive
in the past worked out the tactics of the struggle
... It (Tanu) is an organisation of the people.
Through it the people can and must express their
.desires and worries to the Government. Through
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it the Government can and must explain to the
people what it is doing and why.
(Mwansasu, 1979: 174).
But in that same year (1961) Nyerere, in defining the relation-
ship and therefore the relative power of the Party and Parliament, argued
that the former's role was the formulation of policy, while the latter's
was its implementation:
At the NEC, we are deciding in broad terms
what the Party's policy shall be, whereas in
the National Assembly, members are discussing
the question of exactly how, when, in what
order of priority and so on, the agreed
policies shall be put into effect.
(Msekwa, 1977: 14)
This elaboration of the Party's role in policy-making by Nyerere helps
us understand why major policy decisions continued to be taken by the
Party during this period and not by the Government. For instance, at
the NEC meeting of January 1962, it was decided to make Tanganyika a
republic:
For it was at that meeting that it was also
announced that Tanu had recommended to the
Government that Tanganyika become a republic
as soon as possible, and the Government had
accepted that recommendation.
(MacAuslan, 1964: 504)
Another meeting of the NEC held from 10th to 14th February, 1963
decided to adopt a One-Party Democracy, and authorised the President
to set up a Commission which would consider and make suggestions for the
appropriate structure and procedures of the Government and the Party
which would give effect to the system of one-party state.
	 This decision
was endorsed by the Annual Conference of Tanu meeting on December 16,
1964.	 The decision was never sent to Parliament.
	 As the President
pointed out to the Parliament:
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The decision has already been taken by the
Party.	 The task of the Commission is
merely to make recommendations on the form,
structure and procedures of the one-party
state which will be established.
(Msekwa, 1977: 21)
According to Msekwa this decision introduced a change in the decision-
making process whereby it was the Party which directed Government:
... no motion was introduced in the National
Assembly inviting the Government to present
proposals for appropriate changes in the
constitution to make the country a one-party
state; instead, the assignment was given to
the Government by NEC; and when the proposals
had been formulated by the Presidential
Commission, they were debated only by the Party
Organs, the task of the National Assembly
being limited to giving legislative effect
to what was agreed and decided by the Party.
(Msekwa, 1977: 21)
The contradictory statements which Nyerere issued on the Party
and the Government, supporting each organ's responsibility for formu-
lating policy, created a confused situation, which led to a decline in
the effectiveness of the Cabinet.
	 The second factor which also under-
mined Cabinet's effectiveness was the increasing tendency of Nyerere
to take policy-decisions without reference to it (Pratt, 1972: 236).
A case in point is the breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain
and Germany (1964/65); the President took this decision without
consultation with his Cabinet, even though it affected the funding of
the development plan (1964-1969).
One explanation which has been offered for the decline in the
effectiveness of the Cabinet has come from Pratt.
	 He argues that
"neither the Presidential system (of an Executive Head) nor the One
Party system directly undermined the role of the Cabinet" (Pratt, 1972:
231).	 Rather a number of secondary influences were important, including,
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first,	 the different decision making styles of the Party and the
Government.	 The latter was based on a literate culture, while the
former was based on informal face-to-face discussions. 	 Nyerere favoured
the latter.	 Second, ministers did not adhere to decisions taken at
Cabinet level; they often reversed them. 	 Third, Nyerere favoured
political activists and ministers who were strongly tied to the Party
at the expense of ministers of other backgrounds:
Nyerere attached more importance at that time
to holding within the Party the leaders of
several possibly divergent movements than he
attached either to a more united pursuit of
the policies of his government or to a more
loyal and honest acceptance of Cabinet
decisions and governmental procedures ...
... the persistent reluctance to discipline
members who ignored the most obvious rules
necessary to the smooth running of a cabinet
must have increased tensions within the Cabinet
and lessened its efficiency.
(Ibid: 232)
Although Pratt has proposed convincing causes for the ineffectiveness
of the Cabinet, he does not realise that these causes have themselves
to be explained.	 In fact, it is precisely in the relationship of
conflict between the two organs of the state that we can find the
explanation for the decline of the Cabinet.	 Pratt's over-emphasis on
individual inter-relationships tends to obscure the conflict that existed
between the Party and the Government.
It is therefore difficult to sustain Pratt's view that the Party
did not threaten the Cabinet. 	 According to Pratt:
None of the three central institutions of the
party - the Central Committee, the National
Executive Commmittee, or the Annual Conference -
threatened the Cabinet as the main policy-
deciding body.
(Ibid: 299)
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And again:
There was no serious ideological obstacle to the
continued reliance upon the Cabinet as the primary
instrument of policy making.
(Pratt, Ibid: 231)
As I have attempted to illustrate, the control of policy-making was
unclear.	 While the Cabinet had the constitutional right to formulate
policies, the Party equally had a de facto right to do so. Nyerere
gave contradictory statements, which supported in turn each of the
organ's claims to primacy in policy-making and he had the power to
override both.
	 It is therefore difficult to sustain Pratt's arguments
that such a situation could not have undermined the Cabinet's effectiveness.
The Party formulated two major policies during the period 1962-64.
These were that Tanzania become a Republic and that Tanzania become a
One-Party State.	 Was there any instance where Nyerere took a major
policy proposal in that period (1962-64) to the Cabinet and by-passed
the Party?	 In fact, the Union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika in 1964
was dealt with solely by the Government. 	 At no stage was the issue of
the Union discussed by the Party's National Executive Committee. 	 More-
over, when Nyerere presented the Agreement of the Union in Parliament on
25th April 1964 he re-emphasised the absolute supremacy of the National
Assembly (Msekwa, 1977: 19).	 How, then, does Msekwa explain this
discrepancy in policy-making and the relationship between Parliament and
the NEC?	 Msekwa argues that:
The reason for there being no necessity to refer
the matter to the NEC would appear to have been
that of the general principle of the desirability
of Tanganyika's Union with other states of Africa
has always been the declared policy of the Party.
Indeed, there is a provision in the Party's
Constitution which states that one of the principal
aims and objects of the Party is 'to see that the
Government co-operates with other states in Africa
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in bringing about African Unity.
(Msekwa, 1977: 22)
This explanation is weak. If everything that was in the Party's
Constitution was to be left to be implemented by Parliament then this
meant that policy formulation did reside with Parliament.
	 If we are
to follow Msekwa's logic, then the two policy decisions passed by the
Party between 1962 and 1964, would have had to be taken by Parliament
I would argue that Nyerere took the Union issue to Parliament and
by-passed the Party because the issue was so sensitive and required such
delicate negotiations that only very highly qualified and experienced
people could handle it.	 Nyerere himself dealt with the Union matter.
According to Tordoff (1965: 86), "it seems unlikely that more than a
handful of ministers were consulted in advance over the union between
Tanganyika and Zanzibar".
The President also took other major policy decisions without
consulting the Party.	 The decision to resign as Prime Minister was taken
unilaterally by the President. 	 According to Msekwa:
As a result of this development, which obviously
had been unexpected and unknown to the NEC, it
was decided to postpone discussion of most of
the remaining items on the agenda until the
next morning.
(Msekwa, 1977: 24)
Nyerere's style of switching either to the Government or to the Party is
itself a reflection of the confused state of policy-making that existed
during this period.	 The contradictory statements he gave in relation
to the responsibilities for policy-making are also an indication that he
was sandwiched between the pressures emanating from the two organs of state.
But Nyerere also made use of the confusion in policy making. 	 It
offered him a greater degree of manoeuvrability between the two organs
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of the state. He would take a policy issue where he thought it would
stand the greatest chance of being accepted without major modifications,
challenges or being mis-handled.	 He also took major decisions with
reference to neither the Party nor the Government because the 1962
Republican Constitution allowed him to do so. 	 As he himself acknowledged
during the 1962 debate in Parliament on the Republican Constitution
"I have enough powers to make me a dictator" (Hansard, 1962: Col: 1105-6).
This analysis shows that Pratt and Msekwa have tended to de-
emphasise the conflict between the Government and the Party in Tanzania.
I have shown that the state of policy making in Tanzania was complex.
Tanzania had a tripartite system of policy making in the sense that all
• three organs of the state formulated policies on different bases. 	 Further-
more, the Party's insistence on formulating policies was the result and
reflection of its conflict with Government.	 We can see this conflict
when we examine the different views of development held by Party activists
on the one hand and Government on the other.
CONCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 1961 - 1963
The conflict between the Party and Government over the control of
policy formulation was given greater importance for the development of
ft
Twnia because each organ had different basic views and their elaboration
between 1961-1963 should be examined in the context of the power struggle
dealt with previously.
The Government's conception of development in this period followed
conventional theories of development, which viewed economic backwardness
an,
in terms of the limited extent of production based onil exchange economy.
Agriculture based on commodity production had to be fully developed so
as to generate government revenue and to form a domestic market.
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Production was viewed as a primary concern, because development was
conceived primarily in terms of economic growth.
	 The achievement of
economic growth was seen to be essential because it created the
capacity for financing social services.
	 Government policies during
this period were also operating withinthe framework of conventional
ideas about development.
The Government's major aim in the First Three Year Plan was to
expand the agricultural and industrial sectors as rapidly as possible
and at the least cost to its budget by relying mainly on private capital.
Since economic growth played such a dominant role in the Government's
thinking, Government placed emphasis also on other economic criteria
such as efficiency in administration, low and efficient services to the
consumer, the need to minimise Government recurrent expenditure and the
need to generate a surplus.
	 These concerns were given priority over
socially-orientated types of values.
The second major reason why Government placed emphasis on economic
growth and on economic criteria was the result of its institutional
responsibility.	 As a Government, in charge of a national economy, it
had to operate in terms of recurrent and development expenditure, foreign
exchange earnings, consumption, savings, etc.
	 In other words, its
institutional responsibility as government forced the Government to operate
with conventional concepts of economic development.
The Party activists on the other hand pressed for policies of re-
distribution.
	 They attacked the Asians and Europeans whom they identified
as exploiters and called for policies of Africanisation and co-operatives,
to replace European expatriates in the administration and Indian traders
respectively.
	 As a result, they showed hostility towards private capital.
Party activists' opposition to Government policies was therefore a
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reflection of the traditional concern of the Party to redress inequalities
in the country.	 Political independence had to be accompanied by economic
opportunities, albeit politically created. 	 The Party activists were
expressing the legitimate concerns of the Party, which had always fought
for: equality and re-distributive measures to alleviate poverty. 	 They
were pressing for re-distributive policies to be incorporated as part of
the process of development itself.
The conflicts between the Government and Party in policy making did
create instability in terms of developmental strategies.	 The struggle
between the Party and Government can be seen in the different type of
development policies which the two organs of the state offered.
	 Here,
too, Nyerere gave contradictory statements which supported both the Party
and the Government's views of development.
Nyerere's contradictory views on a development strategy are important
because they created the condition whereby both organs of the state could
legitimately use Nyerere's speeches to oppose the arguments of the other.
Equally, each organ of the state could use Nyerere's speeches to legiti-
mise its own position.
The conflict within Nyerere sprang from the tension between the
need to maintain a stable society without gross inequalities and, on the
other hand, the recognition of the limited capacity for capital formation
that existed within the country, which necessitated the encouragement of
private capital.	 At another level, this tension reflected Nyerere's
institutional position in society, first as President, and second, as
Head of both the Party and the Government.
When Nyerere addressed Parliament 	 in 1962 he
elaborated a broad development strategy which Tanzania was to follow.
As the following extract indicates, the speech rejected a capitalist
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development strategy:
It is Government's intention to extend the
co-operative into every town, every village
and every hamlet in Tanganyika, and to enable
these societies to undertake every kind of
enterprise which can be run by co-operative
effort.
If our aim were to go into competitive business
for profit we could set up together in partnership with
private business to form commercial companies, which would
be much easier and far more profitable than the
co-operative method.
A much better word (for co-operative) is 'ujima'
for ujima means living and working together as
a family.	 A way of working for the benefit of
all.	 'Ujima' is indeed the instrument of
ujamaa, just as the commercial company is the
instrument of capitalism.
All of us have agreed that we must establish a
true socialist society in Tanganyika. Two very
important instruments we shall use for this
purpose are the Government itself and the
Co-operative Movement.
(Hansard, 1962: 17-20)
Party activists used the above speech of Nyerere's to criticise and
oppose the Government's policies, which rested on the need to encourage
both foreign and local private capital to invest in the economy. 	 The
Party pressed for redistributive types of policies, such as Africanisation
and the expansion of the co-operatives to replace the Indian trader.
These will be discussed later when we consider the Party's views on
development.
But Nyerere also gave speeches which clearly indicated that private
capital was needed to develop the economy, and that African socialism
did not preclude investments by private capital. 	 Nyerere's speech to
the Association of Chamber of Commerce in East Africa formulated the
problem of African Socialism in terms of distribution and not in terms
of ownership.
	 Thus:
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We are committed to a philosophy of African
socialism and the basis of it is human
equality: the important question is how can
we deal with income inequalities ... First
we must energetically pursue policies which
will increase the amount of wealth produced
in the country.
	
Second, we must not allow
the present income differentials to be
sacrosanct.
(The Standard, Feb. 11, 1963)
The Government often used the above speech to legitimise its position
and policies vis-a-vis the Party (see Plan 1964-69: 13). 	 Throughout
the period from 1962 to 1965 various statements by Nyerere clearly showed
that he supported the Government's views on development and thus by
implication, its policies.	 For instance, Nyerere supported Government
concern for the need to maintain qualified manpower in the form of
expatriates in the Administration and was opposed to rapid Africanisation.
As Nyerere stated in February 1961:
I have no intention of risking the good name
of the government of the country just for the
sake of Africanisation.
(Tordoff, 1967: 195)
The Prime Minister Kawawa also gave contradictory statements on
the role of private capital vis-a-vis African Socialism. In a
Parliamentary debate of 1962, Chief Mhaiki asked: "Will Government give
the authentic explanation of Tanganyika Government being socialistic?".
Kawawa reflects the uncertainty of the period:
My Government is committed to the principle
of African Socialism, that is, it is committed
to fostering an attitude of co-operation between
the people on the basis of individual equality.
It is opposed to the exploitation of one man by
another, it is opposed to discrimination of any
kind.
(Hansard, 1962, 257[NC:175])
But in the same debate of that year he also did not deny the role of
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private capital in the country as his speech illustrates:
Sir, the private sector is already here. It
is a small sector, of course, but it is already
here, and it is the only one which has the
technical know-how.	 The Government is not
going to be the sole agency for building this
country. We can only build this country
through a joint cooperation between the people
and their government.
(Hansard, 1962: 232).
In this speech Kawawa argued that private capital was essential for
the development of the country.
None of the three political institutions, responsible for policy-
making, that is, the Government, the Party and the President, attempted
to clarify and resolve the dilemma between, on the one hand, socialism
and on the other hand, the need for private capital. 	 The failure to
resolve this dilemma theoretically also meant that the conflict between
the two organs of the state remained politically unresolved. 	 Despite
issuing contradictory developmental strategies, both organs of the state
could legitimately identify their positions as those of Nyerere and use
this to counteract the other.	 A fuller analaysis of Government and
Party views on development will illuminate this conflict further.
The Primacy of Economics in Government's conception of development 
An analysis of the Government conception of development is important
for this thesis not only because it explains the types of policies
pursued but also because it illustrates an approach towards economic
problems which contrasts with that of the Party activists. Most radical
writers have tended to dismiss early Government policies rather than
subject them to investigation, because they were considered 'capitalist'.
Such criticisms fail to extend our knowledge of development problems
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since they fail to explain why and how 'capitalist' policies were
adopted, as well as to assess their validity in terms of alleviating
developmental problems.
The Government's conception of development was primarily determined
by its institutional functions as Government.	 This took two major forms.
First, as Government, one of its major responsibilities was to develop
the economy on the basis of the types of resources it had or could muster.
Secondly, it had to operate within certain pre-defined economic parameters
in such matters as investments, savings, consumption, balance of payments
issues, employment, etc.
	 This is true of all governments, given their
role as caretakers of national economies.
A third major influence on the Government's conception of development
was no doubt the economic theories current during that period. The more
progressive wing of economic development theory during this period was
what I shall refer to, as the conventional view of development. Writers
such as Nurkse (1953), Myrdal (1957) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1964) focussed
attention on 'obstacles to growth' in Third World countries.	 Writers
of this school emphasised various obstacles. 	 For instance, Nurkse saw
the limited capacity that existed in Third World countries for capital
ci.n.
formation as Aobstacle to growth.	 There was insufficient savings to
match the requirements for investments.	 Myrdal,on the other hand,
emphasised limited markets as an obstacle and only an expansion of
productivity would create a market. 	 This school therefore called for
capital injection into the manufacturing sector, the modernisation of
agriculture, which would create backward and forward linkages (Hirschman,
1958)	 and the expansion of employment opportunities. 	 They argued
that the economy would then be transformed because the processes would
involve a change in the structure and composition of output and employment:
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balanced growth would be achieved.
The main aim of these writers was to achieve economic growth in
both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 	 Social goals such
as health, housing, were not identified as part of the process of
development but rather as an outcome of development. On the other hand,
education was seen as a component relating to economic growth because of
the need for skills.	 For instance, Lewis (1955: 1) states the case for
seeing development in these terms quite explicitly: "First, it should
be noted that our subject matter is growth, and not distribution".
These ideas were influential enough to influence the World Bank's
policies, which changed from an emphasis on infrastructure to production,
from projects to sectors.	 The Bank also began to see the necessity for
the state's involvement in the tasks of national development, and it
began to finance education because of the need for skills. 	 Like the
school of thought by which it was influenced, the World Bank also did
not consider re-distributive policies (Adler, 1972).
	
This almost
exclusive focus on growth was to predominate for more than a decade
(Morawetz, 1977).
These new views on development were used as theoretical approaches
in analysing Tanzania's economic development. 	 Notable cases in point
were the World Bank's The Economic Development of Tanganyika (1961) and
the Arthur D. Little study, Tanganyika Industrial Development (1961).
These studies formed the basis for the First Three Year Development Plan 
1961/2 - 1963/4, but they were also endorsed by the Government. It will
only be necessary to give a short exposition of the World Bank and Little
Reports, since the Three Year Plan will be analysed fully below.
The World Bank Report began by identifying the predominant role
of agriculture in the Tanzanian economy.
	 The average annual rate of
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growth of gross domestic product during the previous six years was
calculated at 5%.
	 The Bank pointed to the significance of agriculture
in national development because 80% of export earnings came from agri-
culture as against 13% from minerals.
	 Development of the economy
would have to come from the agricultural sector.
	 The Report recommended
a combination of what it called 'transformation' and 'improvement'
approaches.
	 The former was to deal with the subsistence peasants by
attempting to re-organise their productive activities, while the latter
was to assist the 'progressive' farmer who was already producing for the
market through credit and extension services (World Bank, 1961: 5-8).
The Little Report also reflected the prevalent ideas on economic
development. It emphasised the development of the manufacturing sector,
which was to be financed by private capital.
	 The Report stated:
The Government of Tanganyika recognises the
importance of industrial development in
furthering the economic progress of the
country. The Government recognises also
the significance of the role of the private
investor in this development, and aims to
encourage such investment.
(Little, 1961: 2)
The Report stated that private investment was essential because of
'Government's limited resources'.
	 It thus recommended that 'a favourable
climate for private investment' should be maintained (Ibid: 3).
	 Little's
industrial strategy reflected the concern with economic growth. It had
three major components.	 First, industrial strategy should be
orientated towards agriculture, thus forming forward and backward linkages
in the economy.	 The manufacturing sector was to serve as a market
for agricultural produce, provide tools and materials to agriculture,
and increase the incentives of producers by improving the availability
of consumer goods and therefore creating a national domestic market.
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Secondly, manufacturing was to reduce imports and therefore conserve
foreign exchange.	 Thirdly, the manufacturing sector was to process
raw materials for increased exports in order to earn
	 foreign
exchange.	 The Report stated:
The drive for rapid economic development,
which will increase with the country's
independence, will seriously strain its
foreign purchasing powers. Industrial
processing, by up-grading the level and
price at which raw materials are exported,
and by substituting in part for increasing
imports, can help keep the country's trade
in balance and minimise the drain on foreign
exchange and credit available in the country.
(Little, 1961: 24)
Finally, it also pointed to the obstacle posed by the lack of technical
and management skills "to carry out industrial operations" (Little, 1961,
30) and called for the establishment of business education (Little, 1961:
34).	 These ideas were in line with the economic theories of the period.
Viewed in the context of the 1940s and 1950s, these ideas were 'progressive',
because they were against the ideas which argued that Third World countries
should specialise in merely producing cash crops.
	 We can now see how
these ideas were translated into the first economic development plan
1961/2-1963/4.
The Primacy of Economics in Development Plan 1961/2-1963/4 
The Government's conception of development was primarily determined
by the need to expand the rate of economic growth.
	 As the objectives
of the 1961-63/4 Plan stated:
The problem facing Tanganyika now is that of
laying firm foundation for (sustained economic
growth). The same problem can also be seen in
its many aspects of expanding the base of the
economy, affecting a more rapid transistion from
subsistence to monetary economy, increasing
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production, increasing the incomes of the
people, improving the infra-structure and
providing training and educational
facilities.
The crucial choice before:the Government
was between the sort of development plan
which would lay foundations for a more
rapid growth of the economy and a plan which
would cover a very much wider field at the
expense of slowing down the rate of growth.
The first choice implied a concentration on
economic projects which would yield the quickest
and the highest returns in the near future,
whereas the second choice meant distribution
of scarce resources over all competing sectors
alike. The Government's view and also the view 
of the World Bank Mission was that at this stage
of Tanganyika's development the first choice is 
the right one.
(URT, 1962: 7)
As the above quotation illustrates Government made a deliberate choice
for uneven development in order to maximise economic growth.
This choice was determined by the state of the
economy's development.
	 What was this stage?	 Firstly, over two-thirds
of Tanzania's population were still at subsistence level mainly producing
for their own consumption, though an increasing number had also began
to market some of their crops for goods and services.
	 But the pre-
dominance of the subsistence sector meant that the economy was deprived
of their revenue, labour and produce as well as of a market. Thus only
one third of the population was producing 60 per cent of the gross domestic
product (Stephen, 1963: 158).
	 This posed problems for capital formation.
The country had a small taxable capacity and the Government had to depend
mainly on revenues from import duties, excise duties, and income taxes.
As a result, the Government could only contribute 4% towards the £24 M
required for the Plan (Stephen, 1963: 58).
	 It was this low capacity for
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capital formation that forced the Government to consider economic growth
as its primary objective, with emphasis on projects which were likely
to 'yield quick returns' in terms of output and income (United Republic
of Tanzania, 1962: 13).
In line with this objective of achieving a high rate of economic
growth, 60% of the £24 M required in the plan was to be allocated for
economic development while social services accounted for 20%, and the
other 20% shared between the army, police, foreign services and others
(URT, 1962: 13).	 Consistent with the emphasis on growth,
agriculture and infrastructural development received the highest fundings.
This was followed by education, which was considered as an input into
economic growth because of the need to develop skills. 	 Africans
occupied only 26% of the senior and middle level civil service posts in
1961 (Stephen, 1968: 160) and there was a dire shortage of technical
manpower in such fields as doctors, engineers, teachers, agriculturalists,
chemists, etc. (Pratt, 1967: 93-4).
In order to cope with the shortages of manpower and capital, the
Government evolved policies based essentially on private capital for
agriculture, industry and trade.	 Government hoped that private capital
would invest in production and maintain its traditional role in trade thus
alleviating the shortages of resources in these crucial areas.	 Private
savings rather than the taxation of labour was supposed to bear the brunt
of investment.
We shall now turn to how the Government argued for the acceptance
of its economic policies in Parliament, where Party activists were also
present. Particular emphasis will be given to the three policy areas of
agriculture, trade and manufacturing because they were integrated into a
consistent strategy of development.
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An analysis of official documents of this early period showsa
very clear and direct emphasis on the need to expand production and
productivity as a means of raising revenue and living standards generally.
The Government's conception of development in fact centred on production 
as a process which required the investments of such economic assets as
capital, manpower and technology.
Bomani, Tanzania's first Minister of Finance, illustrated the
relationship between increased production and incomes very succinctly
when he presented his 1962/63 Annual Estimates in Parliament:
We should always remember that a nation like
a business or an individual can only spend what
it earns. It earns by selling what it produces
and it is, therefore, important that we should
produce more, and that what we produce should
be of good quality, and that we should be properly
equipped to sell; for unless we sell, we cannot
earn the money which keeps the nation alive and
its services expanding.
(Hansard, 1962: 45)
Thus not only was production emphasised but also trade, which was seen
as a twin-sister of production.	 Without trade (both internal and
external) the effects of production would be limited.
Bomani also drew attention in the same speech to the fact that silke_
availability of finance would have to determine to a great extent the
adoption of projects:
In the past our development planning, our
choice of projects and priorities, and the
order in which we executed them proceeded
relatively independently of financing. From
now, on, the reverse will be the case, and a
new approach will have to be adopted.
(Ibid)
Thus the idea was that the availability of finance would have to be
considered a crucial input into policy-making. 	 Finance for development
was important and crucial because 'no nation can develop without capital
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investment'; Bomani continued:
A limit will be reached beyond which no progress
can be made without capital investment. In the
end there must be more capital formation each
year to secure a satisfactory rate of economic
growth.
(Ibid)
This idea led him to the problem of capital shortage in Tanganyika:
In Tanganyika, we must face the plain truth that
we simply haven't got enough resources of our
own for such capital investment, and the only way
to achieve a faster rate of economic development is
to obtain capital from abroad.
(Hansard, 1962: 45)
These ideas were taken up by various Ministers in their various capacities;
but their arguments were similar, namely that in order to expand
production rapidly it was necessary to have private capital.
Policy towards Internal Trade: 1961/62 - 1963/4 
The Government's policy towards internal trade was to maintain the
existing system based on private trade, which was dominated and controlled
by Asians.	 In 1962 officials of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
and the Treasury had requested the London Economist Intelligence Unit to
conduct a survey of the wholesale and retail trade in Tanganyika.
Its findings may have been a contributory factor in the Government's
decision to maintain private trade.
We can distinguish four forms of trade which took place within the
distribution system in Tanganyika during this period.
	 This distinction
is important because, as will be illustrated later, various policies at
different times attempted to deal with the different sub-sectors of trade
and distribution in order to eliminate the private trader.
First there were the importers who were mainly foreign companies
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such as Dalegty, Intrata and Wigglesworth, who were involved in
importing capital and intermediate goods as well as cars into the
country.	 The second form of trade was wholesale trade which was mainly
involved in buying goods in bulk and re-selling to retailers, sub-
wholesalers, industrial or commercial companies, institutional organis-
ations or other wholesalers acting as agents in buying and selling
merchandise to such persons or companies. 	 Third were the sub-wholesalers
who were mainly involved in buying from the wholesaler and packing in
small units and selling to retailers.	 Retail trade, finally, covered
the re-sale of these goods to the final consumer.
The Economist Intelligence Unit's research (1962) found that the
distribution system was very flexible because it was made up of thousands
of private traders, stretching from major towns to the remotest villages.
It pointed to the dominan	 position of the Asians in trade but also to
an increasing number of Africans who were becoming traders:
Non-African retailers were mainly in Lake Region,
Dar es Salaam and Tanga Region, very few were
situated in the Southern, Southern Highlands and
West Lake Regions. Just under a third of all
non-African retailers were located in the 12
largest towns. The rest were widely scattered.
On the other hand, over a fifth of all African
traders were in the Lake Region, where 7,820 were
licensed in 1961.	 The smallest number 2,088
is in the Central Region. Very few African
retailers are located in townships.
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1962: vii)
Thus although Asian traders were still holding a strong position in towns,
African traders had also began to participate in trade. Regions which
had strong co-operatives had already pushed the Asian trader out of
business.
The report found that the system of trade that existed in the four
tiers ensured that remote villages were also reached:
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Sometimes, retailers in rural areas buy their
supplies from sub-wholesalers in the local
trading centres, who also sell retail. The
transport of such goods is usually done on
the local bus.
(Ibid)
In very remote villages where there was no retail trade the report
discovered:
Of the 16 districts with the fewest number of
regular traders, there were 10 with over 100
licensed itinerant traders. Hawkers provide
the consumer with a very useful service, partic-
ularly in remote areas, and they should,
especially in these areas, be encouraged.
(Ibid: ix)
The report showed that those who supplied the rural market worked on a
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very small grossAmargin, normally only 3 to 4 per cent.
	 This sector
of the trade was the most competitive in the whole distribution system
since it serviced the low-bargaining purchasing power of the peasants.
The report stated that the financial viability of both wholesale and
retail trade was heavily dependent on credit: "A large part of traders'
supplies are obtained on credit, and the amount of working capital
employed by most traders is small" (Ibid: xxi).
	 The report also found
that where there was intense competition in both wholesale and retail
trade, prices were kept down; but where there was little competition
in b9th wholesale and retail trade, as in the Southern Region, prices
became higher.
The report showed that the system of trade which existed was
extremely low-cost especially if one took into consideration the vastness
of the territory and the poor infrastructure:
Tanganyika has a low-cost distribution system.
This is mainly because wage levels are low,
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distribution is a very labour-intensive
industry, and because most traders manage to
keep their overheads to a minimum. Most
businesses are family concerns, and members
are prepared to work long hours, paper work
is minimal, advertising almost non-existent,
premises are inexpensive and few services are
provided for the customer.
(Ibid: xxiv)
It also added:
The overall gross margin obtained by traders in
Tanganyika is not high.
	 Considering the
difficulties of distribution, distance, small
markets, seasonal fluctuations etc. the average
cost of distribution is remarkably low.
(Ibid: xx)
The report thus found the system of Tanzania's internal trade to be
efficient, low-cost and providing a useful service to consumers. It
also helped in the process of development by integrating subsistence
peasants into the monetary economy:
Every encouragement should be given to its
(the distribution network's) expansion, as
its existence is essential in the process
of change from subsistence agriculture to
cash crop production.
(Ibid: vi)
The findings of the report was that private trade in Tanzania was
cheap and efficient and that it was providing a useful development
function to the economy.
Policy on agricultural growth and rural development 
Between 1962 and 1966 there were two diverse views of development
pertaining to the agricultural section in official circles. On the one
hand was the Government view of agricultural development which was
determined by its concern for economic growth.
	 This view was translated
into the policy of encouraging the 'progressive farmer' and maintaining
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commercial farms. On the other hand, there was Nyerere's view of
development which was expressed in a policy of village settlement.
This approach involved the resettlement of peasants in villages so
that social services could be made available to them.	 We shall
consider these views and policies in greater detail and emphasis will
be given to how Government attempted to reconcile these two views and
policies.
The aim of Government was to increase agricultural production
without increasing its own share of costs.	 But such agricultural
expansion had nevertheless to take place within the context of capital
accumulation.	 The Minister of Agriculture, Bryceson, explained why it
was necessary to have capital investments in agriculture:
We have the land, we have quite a lot of energy,
we have the knowledge but we do need the capital
to allow us to take the best advantage of the
very promising combination.
If we go ahead without it, and this we certainly
can do in a good year, we shall be able to put
a little aside for development, but in a bad year
we can lose that little, and perhaps slip back
again. In that case it will take considerably
long time to develop, and the standards of living,
the education of our children and the health of our
families will all suffer as a result.
(Hansard, 1962: 284)
Bryceson's speech illustrates very clearly Government's view of development,
namely that the development of social services was a product of economic
growth, and secondly, that capital was necessary in order to achieve a
higher and faster rate of economic growth.	 Government's policy to
achieve these aims were two-fold, first, commercial farms were to be
maintained, and secondly, progressive farmers were to be encouraged
through extension services, community development and access to credits.
Furthermore, by encouraging the social class that was best equipped to
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invest and organise production, Government hoped that it would minimise
its own subsidies.
In relation to the subsistence peasants, Government hoped that
they would be gradually drawn to produce for exchange through trade.
am 14 P a" a
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Jhaver	 a supporter of Government's view of development,voiced this
idea when he stated:
In order to produce more, Sir, the people
must have an incentive.	 Unless their
needs arise, unless their wants increase,
they may not have any incentive to grow
more, and therefore they must be induced
to increase their standards of living.
(Hansard, 1962: 255)
Government was relying primarily on market incentives to integrate
peasants into commodity production.	 It was approaching the subsistence
peasants as consumers.	 For instance, the Minister of Agriculture,
Bryceson, rejected the idea of enforced agricultural practice which would
force peasants to produce according to certain acreage (Hansard, 1962: 435).
The President on the other hand had an idea of rural development
which he expressed in 1962 at his first speech to Parliament. Nyerere
stated:
If you ask me what our Government intends to
do in the next few years, my answer is very
simple. In the next few years, the Government
will do everything possible to enable the
peasants of Tanganyika to live together in
village settlements. If you ask me why the
Government wants the peasants to live in
village settlements, my answer is equally very
simple: without living in village settlements
they cannot get the essential modern facilities.
(Hansard, 1962: Co1:7)
Nyerere's ideas of rural development were mainly focussed on the subsistence
peasants who were living in isolated homesteads and who formed the
majority of the people. 	 Its view of development was based on the idea
-107-
that it was necessary to re- locate peasants into nucleated villages
in order to make available social services. This view thus incorporated
the idea of re-distribution and re- location of peasants residence.
The initiative for early settlements came from Party activists
(Hyden, 1982: 72).	 Joseph Nyerere was the Head of the Youth Wing
and was a strong supporter of village settlement schemes. The aim was
to channel the youth enthusiasm into constructive national building
activities (interview,July 1981).Thus, we can conclude that the President's
idea of re-allocation of peasants' residence and re-distributive policies
were supported by the Party.
We can, therefore, see that Government kept separate policies
which dealt with separate interests, namely those which dealt with
agricultural growth (improvement approach, 'progressive farmers') and
those which dealt with rural development problems (transformation approach,
scattered homestead peasants). 	 By maintaining separate policies
Government aimed at minimising conflicts as well as safeguarding its
policy on economic growth, especially since it was not enthusiastic about
the transformation approach (Tordoff, 1967: 93; Leys, 1973: 2, 7).
Policy on the manufacturing sector 
Government's policy towards the manufacturing sector was to mobilise
investments from local and foreign private capital. Again, this policy
was a continuation of the colonial policy pursued in the 1950s. 	 Both
the Little Report and World Bank's report had recommended the encouragement
of private investments in manufacturing sector. Kahama, Minister for
Commerce and Industry when presenting a motion in 1961 of the Annual
Estimates, 1962/63 spoke of the benefits of private capital to the economy
of Tanzania.	 Such benefits, he argued, accrued to the government in the
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form of taxation, it provided plants and building as well as giving
people employment. He ended by saying:
... And so an investor will only invest where
he will be assured of the most favourable
overall return. And if we are to get our share
of this private investment we must compete with
the other capital importing countries in
offering favourable terms. And as far as these
terms are concerned those who have money to invest
will not find the government of Tanganyika
ungenerous ...
To the world I say, then, that the government of
Tanganyika welcomes the direct investment of
foreign capital and that its policy is to create
conditions which will stimulate the flow of capital
into the country.
(Hansard, 1962: 448)
Thus, to conclude this section, the policies in Agriculture,
Manufacturing and Trade sectors which Government pursued in the first
three year plan were all based on the promotion of private capital.
Saul argues that this was contrary to the Party's socialist ideology
announced at independence, and calls the policies, 'a Trojan horse
within a socialist professing state' and that there was a 'rhetorical
commitment to neutral policy tools and a practical achievement of
capitalist results' (cited in Botting, 1978).	 But Saul ignored the
types of problems which faced the Government during this early period.
As already noted, three major problems were manpower capital and
technology.	 Government lacked the resources to expand the economy.
The encouragement of private capital was viewed as solution to these
problems.
Secondly, Government policies were quite consistent with its view
of development, which saw that economic growth was the pre-condition to
development.	 This was in line with the conventional idea of development.
Thirdly, the policies were also consistent with Government analysis of
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economic backwardness in Tanzania, which was viewed as a result of
limited development in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The
problem as it presented itself to Government was to expand production.
The fastest way to achieve this was through private capital because it
would relieve the Government of a commitment to heavy financial subsidies.
But the Government's conception of development as well as its
policies were criticised by Party activists.
	 Criticism against Government
policies took place in Parliament, where both Party and Government officials
met to discuss development plans and the budget. It is now necessary to
look into how Party activists criticised Government policies because the
criticism also shows the view of development of the Party.
The Party's view of development 
The Party's view of development was based on theidistribution of
social benefits to Africans and on control of the economy. These two
concerns are reflected in the major policies proposed by the Party as
well as in its criticisms of Government policies.
The Party's pre-occupation witi-qdistribution and control of the
economy was affected by the historical development of colonial Tanzania.
We saw in Chapter 1 that during colonial time Africans had been discrim-
inated against in all sectors of the economy - in the civil service,
education, credits, loans, health, residential areas in favour of
Europeans and Asians. 	 The major aim of the Party therefore was to
redress the racially un-balanced monopoly held by Asians and Europeans.
This objective was enshrined in the Party Constitution of 1954.
The hostility of Party activists to Asians was more intense in the
middle-level leadership of the Party.
	
After independence, this group
felt threatened because of their lack of professional training. 	 Many
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of these, however, became Regional Commissioners as we have seen and
others were appointed as principal secretaries and Ministers during the
'Kawawa interlude' (Pratt, 1976: 121-6).
Despite these efforts by Government, however, the hostility against
Asians and Europeansremained. 	 Pratt explains this behaviour in the
following manner:
The frustrated officials and the unrewarded
activists sought their status and asserted
their sense of their own importance by a 	 ,
continuing indulgence in the rhetoric of ante-
colonialism, interspersed on occasion with a
racist hostility to the Asian and European
minorities.
(Pratt, 1976: 109)
Although what Pratt says may be true for certain personalities
nevertheless, it is also true that the Party had consistently emphasised
re-distributive measures as part of the process of development, in contrast
to the Government, which saw them as an outcome of development. 	 Both the
1954 and 1961 amended Tanu Constitutions emphasised distributive measures.
The hostility shown against Europeans and Asians by Party activists was
precisely because of their economically superior positions in society.
In addition, precisely because Party activists knew that Africans could
not compete on a professional basis with non-Africans, they pressed for
policies of re-distribution such as the policies of Africanisation, and
of the replacement of the private traders by the co-operatives - to be
included as development objectives themselves. 	 The improvement in the
socio-economic conditions and living standards of Africans were development
objectives in the same sense as a higher rate of economic growth was for
Government.
This position of the Party can help us understand why the Party
became so concerned with problems of distribution to an extent of ignoring
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production problems, why it pressed for Africanisation of the economy
irrespective of consideration of problems of manpower and capital.
The Party
	
pressed for policies which would reverse the
ve% ,Itk,Ne \no.nds 4
concentration of income and resourcesA	 previously privileged groups.
As a result, it identified the Asians as the exploiting group in the
country.
The Party's concern with distribution can be seen, for instance, in
the 1963 NEC meeting, which expressed opposition to private traders:
NEC meeting expressed great opposition to the
current practice of allowing experienced
capitalists to compete in trade with young
wananchi (citizens) trading organisations, as
a result of which these young organisations got
utterly discouraged and failed.
It was necessary to stop this competition in
order to encourage those wananchi who are ready
to co-operate.
(Msekwa, 1977: 26)
A similar concern as that expressed above appears again in 1963 NEC
meeting held between 10-14th January; on its agenda was the following
item, "The problem of food shortage in the country".
It was recorded that the meeting specifically
directed the Government to make suitable
arrangements which would enable Wananchi (citizens)
to get their foodstuffs at a reasonable price
without being exploited by those individuals who
are engaged in the trade of foodstuffs. 	 For
that reason it was directed that the Government
alone should undertake the purchasing and selling
of foodstuffs throughout the country through
COSATA.
(Msekwa, 1977: 28)
These two meetings with their emphasis on distribution are
indicative of the Party's concern with trade matters. 	 They also
illustrate other important factors of the Party's attitude towards
policy making.	 First, the Party did not look into problems of
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production as a cause of food shortages.	 Secondly, the Party did not
make any form of assessment as to whether COSATA was capable of organ-
ising the distribution of food nationally.	 Thirdly, the Party's
concern with trade led it to view profits as a form of exploitation.
the
The costs of maintaining trade by/private trader was often not considered.
This led to the belief that state organisations could undertake trade
without costs, or if it did have costs, somehow. these would not be
passed on to the consumers.
We shall now examine Party activistscriticisms of Government
policies based on the 1961/2-1963/4 Development Plan.
	 The Party
activists used the ideas of African Socialism, first eniunciated by
Nyerere in 1962, to oppose the Government policies, which were based on
private capital.	 Most frequently, Party activists ideas were expressed
in terms of distribution of social and economic benefits:
But deputy Speaker, Sir, how many Africans
in this country own sisal estates? None. If
we want to make this a socialist country and
at the same time be very democratic, I think,
Sir, we must consider how we are going to cause
our national economy to be shared more equally
between the haves and have-nots.
(Hansard, 1962: 256)
The poverty of the masses was often taken to be caused by the capitalist
and petty traders and the belief prevailed that if the wealth were to be
distributed then it would solve the problems of poverty.
	 These ideas
can be seen when we look into how the activists criticised each of
several main areas of government policy from 1962-1963/4.
Party activists' attitude towards the policy of internal trade 
The Party activists opposed government policies of maintaining
the private trader.	 As we saw, the policy of internal trade
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was seen by Government as an integral part ?fits policy of production.
An efficient and inexpensive system of internal trade was necessary in
order to create a domestic market as well as to boost production.
Government was therefore against a rapid expansion of the co-operative
system because of the lack of manpower.
Party activists however pressed for the elimination of the private
trader in favour of the co-operatives. They pressed for price-control,
they favoured the confinement of goods to the co-operative as an attempt
to push the private trader out of the market. Maki, called for the
co-operatives to replace the private trader:
The Government has already decided that the policy
of Tanganyika would be socialism ... if there is
any team of middle men who would try, whether it
is an individual middle man or group of middle
men, trying let down the Government policy of
co-operatives, we should have strict measures ...
I mean that property of these middle men should
be seized and also they should be deported.
(Hansard, 1962: 898)
Throughout the period 1962-1963/4 there were pressures exerted on the
Government to control private shops. 	 Most frequently expressed was the
demand for price control and withdrawal of licences to private shopkeepers.
(Hansard, 1962, 1963, 1964).
Party activists therefore criticised government policy of internal
trade on all fronts: the policy itself, which encouraged private trade
and.
to compete with the cooperativesXthe idea of price control which opposed
the idea of a market economy.	 The Party activists were pressing for
the co-operatives to replace the private trader. 	 These ideas, as we
have seen, had been discussed in Party meetings of 1963 which indicate
the strong feelings of the Party activists towards the private trader.
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Party activists' attitude towards the policy of private capital 
The reaction of the Party activists to the role of private capital
in the economy was initiated when the Minister of Commerce and Industry,
Kahama, spoke of the benefits of private capital when he presented his
motion in Parliament in 1962. 	 This motion provoked an intense and
contradictory type of debate on the role of private capital.'
It is interesting to note that the two most vocal members of the
Party, Wambura and Mwanjisi (the Parliamentary secretary to the Prime
Minister's office) blamed the Asians for not investing their money.4
the language used, at the same time, illustrates the antagonism against
the Asian. Wambura had this to tell the Asian community:
I think the time has come when our friends who
form almost a hundred percent of the private
capital formation in this country have got to
tell us where they stand. If they think that
our government has not been able to make its
policy clear, then they had better say so. If
they think Tanganyika is not a place for them,
and the place where they are going to live for
ever, they had better say so. It is time for
them to decide where they are going to live.
... They should straight away now start investing
it and those who are not prepared to invest it
must make up their minds and go, Mr. Speaker, Sir.
(Hansard, 1962: 202)
While Mwanjisi echoed similar view:
Do these communities (Asian) need more assurance
than those given to them for the last eight years?
Do these people think that it is a good thing that
the economic fortunes of 10 million souls should
depend upon the caprice of 100,000 people?	 Do they
think that this Government will continue to pay
attention to the sentiments and fears of 100,000
who have all the money and all the education, and
leave uncared for the fortunes of 10 million people
who have all the ignorance, poverty and disease?
If they cannot give the money free, it must be taken
away from them. Socialism demands that a man must
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contribute to the development of his country
according to his ability.
(Hansard, 1962: 174)
More serious questions however were posed by Baghdellah in relation
to foreign capital:
One of the dangers Sir, is if the Government or
the people themselves in the form of a co-operative
is in partnership with foreign investment there
is always the likelihood of the country's economy
being dictated to in the way these foreign
investors might wish ... then it is quite easy for
both the prices to go up and up and the investors
to claim or to force government to continue giving
them safeguards.
(Hansard, 1962: 452)
While Tunze asked the Minister of Commerce:
How can you have big business without economic
colonialism?
(Ibid: 457)
Party activists' attitude towards manpower policy 
The Party pressed for the policy of Africanisation of the civil
administration.	 This policy was extremely sensitive because on the
one hand, Government needed to maintain the efficiency of the admini-
stration and on the other hand, there was mounting political pressure
to Africanise the civil service as fast as possible (Tordoff, 1967:
97-98; Pratt, 1976: 124-6).
Nyerere in 1960 as Chief Minister before independence, attempted
to clarify the dilemma between the need for Africanisation and the need
for manpower when he laid down in a parliamentary debate in October of
that year the policy of the Government. 	 First, that every vacancy
should, if possible, be filled by an appointment made locally. Secondly,
that in the case of new appointments African candidates of Tanganyika
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should have prior claim to consideration.	 And thirdly, only if no
suitably qualified Tanganyika African candidate was available would
other candidates be considered (Hansard: 36 Session, 19.10.1960).
But the disparity between non-Africans and Africans in employment
were very real. In 1960, the non-Africans, with 4 per cent of all
salaried employees, accounted for 37 per cent of the total annual wages
bill and still held 2,700 of the top 3,800 civil service posts (Stephen,
1968: 152).	 Since most of the middle level politicians as well as other
Africans, could not qualify on the basis of qualification, the problem
remained, and mounting pressures by Party activists were exerted to
Africanise the administration.	 For instance, the demand to Africanise
the civil service was formulated by Mwakangale, a Regional Commissioner,
in the following manner:
We want other Ministries (as the Ministry of
Home Affairs had africanised the top positions)
to do the same without delay. We are being
told that there are no people to take such posts.
Do you really think that an African with Standard
10 or more years experience cannot act as
Commissioner of Police or Prisons?	 Do you mean
that he cannot really do the job? These are the
tactics which were used by the imperialists or
colonialists ... I would just ask the Government
to try and africanise all the top-most posts.
(Hansard, 1962: 220)
In conclusion, these speeches by the Party activists in their
criticisms of Government policies illustrate the Party's view of develop-
ment, which was based on the idea ofThstribution and the identification
of groups who had privileged access to resources.
Party activists showed strongly-held convictions concerning social
justice and the dignity of the commim men, but they also showed highly
simplistic notions of social and economic change and an optimistic self-
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assurance of their capacity to bring about changes. Thus most of the
speeches implied that if the wealth owned by Asians were redistributed,
poverty would be eliminated. 	 Finally, the strongly held convictions
of Party activists on issues of redistribution and socialism often
prevented the discussion of production problems and of the need for
manpower and capital.	 On the few occasions when attempts were made
to direct the debate into this crucial area, the debate regressed into
emotionalism. 2	Thus the opportunity was missed when both Government
and Party could have come to grips with the problems posed by, on the
one hand, Party's demands for redistributive policies and the idea of
socialism, and on the other hand, Government's need for manpower and
private capital, for economic growth.
The opposing views of development held by the Party and Government
led to an ambiguous situation, which in turn came to affect Government
policies based on private capital. 	 This situation will now be discussed.
THE CREATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION
The conflict between the Party and Government over the role of
private capital in developmental strategy led to an ambiguous situation,
which affected the rate of investment. This situation was mentioned by
the Minister of Finance as early as 1962:
Although the main reason for the shortfall of
indirect taxation (a shortfall of £300,000)
is to be found in the natural disasters we
have suffered, it would be unwise not to admit 
that a lack of confidence and a feeling of 
uncertainty has contributed also the slowing
down of our economic growth and the fall in
our revenue.
And:
One of the tasks to which the Government must
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address itself is how to resolve these
uncertainties - and in this task it will
need the help and co-operation of all
persons in responsible positions.
(Hansard, 1962: 46, emphasis added)
The Minister of Finance's speech provoked an intense debate as to
the causes of 'a lack of confidence'.	 This debate is illustrative
of the Party and Government views on development.	 Supporters of
Government development policies explained the lack of confidence in
terms of the Party activists' attitudes towards private capital. Party
activists on the other hand offered other types of explanation.
Hodgson, a supporter of government development policies, elaborated
on the potential amount which was lost due to the lack of confidence:
I approached the Management Committee of
Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce, who I
thought, would be the most likely people to
have access to figures of this kind, through
their association with other4lambersof
Commerce and other bodies ofnature. Although,
of course, they said they cddld not give exact
figures - exact figures could not be obtained -
but a reliable estimate, if I can describe it
as that, is that since from the loss of capital
leaving the country has amounted to £5m, and
the loss of potential investment which might
otherwise have come in, totals about fl5m,
so that it is a matter that I know the Minister
of Finance regards as a serious one.
(Hansard, 1962: 305)
Hodgson ended his speech by saying that investors would wait and see
'until it was established by actions clearer than words exactly what
Tanganyika's policy is and that policy is endorsed by all the people of
the country' (Hansard, 1962: 311).
Vasey, the Economic Adviser to the Government, put himself in the
shoes of a private investor and stated that:
I then wonder whether indeed the moment I am
in (as an investor) and I begin to make a
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profit, I am going to be accused (4 exploitation,
and I am going to be threatened with national-
isation.
(Hansard, 1962: 478)
Hodgson also commented on certain anti-capitalist speeches made in
Parliament in the following manner:
Sir, that certain speeches on Friday and Monday
would be interpreted overseas, almost at any
rate, as venom against expatriate capitalist
exploiters.	 That Sir, does not encourage the
capitalist to invest his money in a country
like this. But I think (those speeches) might
be described as either ill-advised or ignorant
or inexperienced or irresponsible or in some
quarters a mixture of all four.
(Hansard, 1962: 310)
Supporters of the Government's view of development thus saw the lack
of confidence by the investors as a result of the party activists' attitude
towards private capital. Kapilima, for instance, a strong critic of
Government's view of development, admitted during a debate that "Government
has been telling us all the time not to make irresponsible speeches because
the would-be investors would be scared" (Hansard, 1962: 486).
	 Chief
Mhaiki was more blunt:
Now what sort of socialism do we want to introduce
into this country.
	 To make all goods, all things,
all property in this country common? Naturally,
people who have money of their own, must be afraid
of bringing it here.
(Hansard, 1962: 234-244)
Hodgson re-emphasised the same point:
If there is any sense of uncertainty, people are
not going to bring in such capital until complete
confidence is restored ...
(Hansard, 1963: 310)
These arguments from supporters of Government policies were opposed by a
number of Party activists, who offered a different explanation of the
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'lack of confidence' shown by private capital.
Wambura, for instance, explained that the lack of investment was
quite natural. It was 'mere hesitation' by foreign capital rather than
an indication of 'lack of confidence'.	 He continued:
Now, even if I were a businessman, I would
naturally hesitate during this transi tional
period.
(Hansard, 1962: 198-200)
Various political changes have occurred, he explained, among these were
that in 1960 responsible government was achieved, in 1961 independence,
and possibly in 1962 a republic. 	 The Prime Minister, Kawawa saw the
'lack of confidence' as a result of the 'gross misinterpretation of our
nation by some people and their flat refusal to accept our explanations
for them' (Hansard, 1962: 226).
Minister Bryceson, however, pointed out that whether the 'lack of
investment' was the result of 'mere hesitation' or 'lack of confidence',
there was not much difference:
The fact is (he said) call it what you like,
we are not getting the investment that we need
in order to help us develop our economy ....
(Hansard, 1962: 284)
Laxman, another Government supporter, came up with suggestions asked for
by the Minister of Finance in his speech, which would assist in resolving
the uncertainties. He proposed that the state must intervene in the
economy; secondly, the government must demarcate lines between private,
co-operative and state capital: and fourthly, there must be a Ministry
of Economic Planning.	 Laxman stated:
Above all, we must do one thing and that is to
demarcate the role which private capital is to
play and the way private capital is to fit in our
image of African Socialism. Private enterprise
and private capital, the moment these are
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mentioned they bring to different people
different connotations. It is important, therefore
that the Government should make it clear as to how
and where private enterprises fits in the economic
fabric of this country. Even more than that we
must make it quite clear as to where co-operative
effort on the part of the people of this country
ends and where private enterprise takes over.
What I would like to see is the formulation of a
policy by government which puts out in no uncertain
terms, the reliefs, the advantages and the aid and
assistance which this government would give to outside
capital.
(Hansard, 1962: 162)
Laxman's suggestions are important because they were taken into
consideration by Government.
	 As the Prime Minister, Kawawa answered:
As I have said, Government is delighted with
the suggestion of the Hon. Member (Laxman),
and we are going to consider this matter quite
seriously, so that our people should know where
we are going.
(Hansard, 1962: 230)
The Government attempted to ease the ambiguous situation by evolving
policies between 1962-1963 which would satisfy the needs of Government
in terms of economic growth and which, on the other hand, would accommodate
Party activists' pressures and demands. 	 This can be seen in the very
careful manner in which Government formulated its policies. Government
gave in to Party pressures in two major areas, namely on Africanisation
and on the co-operatives; but it held firm on the issue of private
foreign investments.
African isation 
Government initiated the Africanisation Commission and its Report
(1962a) advised the government that the feelings in the Party shared by
-some members of the Government was that the racial imbalance in the public
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service arising from historic factors should be redressed by giving
preference to Africans (Tordoff, 1967: 195).
The Commission's findings therefore tended to support the Party
activists' view, namely that re-distributive policies in the form of
Africanisation should be incorporated as part of developmental objectives.
The process of Africanisation was also greatly ezteecka-eld. by the
resignation of Nyerere as Prime Minister in 1962. Expatriate resignation
jumped from 15 percent to 40 percent (Stephen, 1968: 160). 	 By 1964 the
issue of 'Africanisation was no longer a political problem' (Tordoff, 1967:
202).
Co-operatives: 1963 
We have already seen that another major area of contention between
Party activists and senior Government officials was in the area of
internal trade. Party activists pressed for the expansion of the co-
operative system to replace that based on private trade, in order to
remove Asian control.
To accommodate these political pressures, the Government changed
the Co-operative Societies Ordinance in 1963 so that the Registrar
of Co-operative Societies "no longer had the final power to refuse to
register a co-operative because he was not satisfied as to its viability;
in the future such decisions were to be subjected to reversal by a
Minister carrying out a political policy" 	 (United Republic of Tanzania,
1966: 15).
As a result of this change in the ordinance, registered co-operatives
increased from 657 in 1961 to 1,533 by the end of April 1966. (Ibid: 15).
In the urban areas government formed a consumer co-operative known as
COSATA, which was a step towards replacing the Asian shopkeepers.
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The Government therefore changed two major policies during this
early period in order to accommodate political pressures, emanating
from Party activists.	 Government sacrificed efficiency and manpower,
both in the administration and in the co-operatives, for political
stability and in order to bring about a consensus on development policies.
Foreign Investment (Protection) Bill: 1963 
But the Government did not give in to political pressures on the
issue of foreign investments. In 1963 the Government issued an Act
which was to protect foreign business in the case of eventual national-
isation.	 This Act was an attempt by Government to allay the fears of
private foreign capital over nationalisation so as to make them increase
their investments.
Government passed the Foreign Investment (Protection) Bill (FIPA)
in 1963, which gave guarantees to foreign capital.	 Section 6 of the Act
states that in case of compulsory acquisitions:
The full and fair value of such enterprise
or property shall be ascertained and the
holder of a certificate relating to such
enterprise shall be paid a proportion
specified in his certificate as the approved
proportion.
The Bill also allowed for the repatriation of profits after taxation
in an approved foreign country and at the prevailing official rate of
exchange.	 It also stated that the Minister of Finance is empowered to
issue certificates to foreign nationals who invest foreign assets (or
re-invest their profits) in Tanganyika, if he is satisfied that the object
of the investment will benefit the country (URT, 1963: 2). Government
therefore did not give in to Party pressures on the issue of foreign
private investments. 	 Government's views on development which was
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centred on increasing and expanding production saw that foreign capital
was essential in achieving this aim.
	 Government did not therefore
compromise its development . aim on achieving a high rate of economic
growth.
The nature of the three policies discussed here - Africanisation,
policy on the Co-operative and the policy on foreign investments - as
well as their timing (between 1962-63) clearly indicates that the
Government wanted to remove the tensions which existed between itself
and the Party.	 This tension, as already illustrated, was expressed 	 in
terms of opposition to Government's development policies. By appeasing
political demands in the policy of Africanisation and Co-operatives,
Government hoped that a developmental consensus, a pre-condition for
stability and effective development planning, would be reached.
We shall explore further the Government's attempts to resolve
conflicts in development strategy between itself and the Party when we
consider the rirsE Five Year Plan 1964 - 1969 in Chapter 3.
An implication of my analysis is that, although the Party was not
constitutionally involved in the formulation of development policies
during this period, nevertheless, the Government did accommodate political
demands into policy-making. 	 In two crucial areas, on the policy of
Africanisation and on the Co-operatives, Government gave in to pressures
from the Party. 3
	This would indicate that Rweyemamu is not correct
when he argues that since Tanu was not involved in the formulation of the
First Five Year Plan (1964-1969), the Plan did "not address itself to
any political changes" (Rweyemamu, 1973: 51).
These concessions to the Party can be seen not simply as a long
term and stable compromise but as creating the conditions firstly for
continuing conflict over the power to formulate development policy between
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the Party and the Government and secondly for serious contradictions
to emerge in these policies. 	 Either the Party would use the
concessions to try to make further inroads into the power of Government,
or else a Party policy on Africanisation and on the Co-operatives would
co-exist with a Government policy on private investment. Since the
policies of the Party and the Government were based on fundamentally
different (and possibly conflicting) views of development a serious
contradiction could emerge.
Conclusion 
In 1962 Tanzania had a tripartite system of policy making operating
under a Tanu umbrella. There was the Tanu Government which was able to
formulate policies on a de jure basis, the Party which formulated policies
on a de facto basis and the President of both the Party and Government
who had powers to supersede both organs and formulate policies independ-
ently.	 Notwithstanding the unchallenged position of Tanu in the country,
the Party and Government were involved in a conflict. 	 Although the
President was sandwiched between the two sides in this conflict, he often
used his position to mediate between them by alternating his support
between the two organs and thereby maintaining stability, because each
organ could identify with the President.
The conflict between the Party and Government found its most vocal
expression in opposing views of development, the Government's view of
development was similar to the conventional view of development which
saw the economic backwardness of the country as the result of the limited
extent of production for exchange. 	 Its major concern was to achieve
economic growth.	 Government evolved policies in major sectors of the
economy such as trade, agriculture, manufacturing which relied on private
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capital, both foreign and local. 	 Government hoped by these policies
to achieve a higher rate of economic growth which would enable it to
improve living standards and meet other social goals. The Government's
conception of development was consistent with its institutional functions
as caretaker of the national economy.
Party activists criticised Government policies because they promoted
capitalism and also because they strengthened social classes that were
already in privileged positions, namely, the Asians and Europeans. 	 They
called for re-distributive policies, for Africanisation, and for the
replacement of the Asian trader by the cooperatives. In articulating
these demands, the Party activists were also expressing a view of
development which was based essentially on re-distributive ideas; re-
distributive measures were seen as central to, if not the essence of,
development.	 The President's position on the other hand, while accepting
the Party activists' demands for re-distribution did not exclude him from
supporting the Government's policy on private capital.
The conflict between the Party and Government created uncertainties
in development, since it appeared that the Government lacked the political
support of its Party.	 Moreover, the Party was constitutionally weak,
nevertheless party activists constituted a strong pressure group, whose
criticisms and demands could not easily be ignored. 	 Thus between 1962-
1963, Government gave in to Party pressures on the issue of Africanisation
and modified its policy on the Co-operatives, but it stood firm on the
role of private capital, which was considered essential to the achievement
of economic growth. It passed the policy of FIPA to encourage foreign
investment by offering protection in case of nationalisation.
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Ernst Vasey, the first Economic Adviser to the Government attempted
to show that all countries, whether capitalist or socialist required
capital to develop:
What indeed do you mean by the word capitalist?
What do you mean by the word, capital?
(Hansard, 1962: 468)
He went on to elaborate:
Capital is used and needed as much in any communist
system as in a capitalistic system.	 You may give it
a different name. It may take a different form. But
capital is that part of our expenditure which is
essential for development but which does not
constitute recurring expenditure. And I would suggest
to the Hon. Members of this House that they should,
in fact, re-think, or at any rate, not use these
slogans until they have though-kas to what is the
basic factor involved.
(Hansard, 1962: 471)
He continued:
Capital is not something to condemn. In the modern
sense even in the socialistic sense, capital plays
a necessary part with labour in the production of
wealth and one without the other cannot be effective.
This is the lesson of the modern world. This partner-
ship of labour and capital is just so essential a
part of the creation of wealth and important indeed
that we need it in this country.
(Ibid)
He mentioned that the eastern bloc were not advanced as the capitalist
countries. It was this point which appeared to infuriate the party
activists, such as Kapilima and Wambura who rose up to challenge
Vasey's speech.	 Unfortunately, they only managed to focus on Vasey's
motives of trying to discredit socialism. 	 In other words, they failed
to bring forward arguments which could have proven Vasey's statement
wrong.	 This necessitated the intervention of the Deputy Speaker to
remind the members that Standing Order 59, Section 9, did not allow
a member to impute motives to any other Hon. Member, and finally that
Standing Order 19 does not allow a member to dispute the decision of
the Chair.	 Wambura continued however to challenge the Deputy
Speaker in Parliament, whose decision is always final. 	 This in
turn led to the intervention of the Minister of Justice. (Hansard,
1962: 476-493).
The significance of this debate is that party activists were angered
-128-
by Vasey's speech because it argued that capitalist societies were
more developed than socialist ones. 	 This statement was taken to
mean, notably by Wambura and Maki, an attack against socialism.
But they were unable to criticise or formulate a thorough counter-
argument against Vasey.	 Their inability to do so is reflected in
their continuously falling back on the motives of Vasey, which in
turn necessitated the intervention of the Deputy Speaker since it
was contravening Parliamentary rules. 	 But the crucial question
which was posed by Vasey, the difference between capitalists and
capital within the context of Tanzania'seconomic problems, was not
discussed at all.
2. e.g. The episode discussed in Note 1.
3. In addition, beginning from 1962 a fair progressive taxation was
adopted.	 The Poll tax was abolished and replaced by a personal
tax system, under which people with an income of less than
Shs 2,000/- per annum were exempt from tax ... (cited in Rweyemamu,
1973: 50). These measures do show that Government between 1962-63
did incorporate a limited degree of re-distributive measures.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN AND THE DEEPENING
OF AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION
In the last chapter we saw that there was a conflict over
development strategy between the Party and the Government. 	 We saw that
the Government's development strategy was based on the need to expand
production by encouraging local and foreign capital as well as to maintain
efficiency in the administration by maintaining expatriates. Initially,
these policies received support from the President.
	 But Government
policies were attacked by the Party activists on the grounds that they
ran counter to the policy of African Socialism.
	 The conflict over
development strategy between the two organs of the state created an
ambiguous situation which was discussed in the 1962 Parliament.	 In
response to this situation, the Government attempted to resolve the
uncertainties by evolving policies which would meet both Party demands
and Government needs.
The same aim of attempting to achieve a consensus over development
policies between the Government and the Party also structure the principles
governing the first Five Year Development Plan, 1964-1969. 	 Government
attempted to strike a balance between on the one hand, the Party activists'
demands for control of the economy and redistributive measures, and on the
other, Government's needs for economic growth and manpower considerations.
But Government failed to appease political demands. The Party
activists continued to criticise Government's policies on the grounds that
they were not socialist.	 The struggle between the two organs of the
state was not resolved.
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The conflict between the Party and the Government was only resolved
constitutionally with the enactment of the 1965 Interim Constitution
which separated the functions of policy making from its implementation.
The new Constitution gave powers for policy-making to the Party and the
responsibility for their implementation to the Government. It weakened
the Government and strengthened the Party.
GOVERNMENT: AFRICAN SOCIALISM WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF PRIVATE CAPITAL
Party activists criticised Government policies 1961-1963 because
they were based on the encouragement of private capital and therefore
contrary to the ideas of African Socialism.	 But in the 1964-1969 Plan
the Government was arguing for the acceptance of its policies on the
basis of African Socialism.	 How then did Government interpret the
idea of African socialism?	 Some insights can be gained by the various
speeches of Ministers.
Most senior members of Government when presenting the First Five
Year Plan (1964-1969) to Parliament defined socialism in terms of
distribution and not ownership. 	 The Minister of Finance, Bomani, when
presenting the first Budget of the First Five Year Plan stated that
African Socialism was "concerned with the people's need to control the
development of their country through the constitutional means available
to their Government".	 He explained further that control of the economy
could be exercised by government through the various indirect mechanisms
such as taxation, regulation of the monetary system, encouragement of
co-operatives and economic planning. 	 Such mechanisms could assist the
government to achieve the distribution of wealth and provision of increased
social services.	 Bomani then stated:
Socialism is not only concerned with the
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control of economic development and with
the distribution of wealth. It is also
concerned with the expansion of wealth,
with the growth of output, with the raising
of incomes, with the increase of welfare.
And here we must be utterly realistic and
completely frank with ourselves. 	 We must
recognise, that throughout the five year
period of the Plan and for many years ahead
we must as a nation concentrate all our
endeavours on the investment of effort and
savings, on investment in industry, on
investment in roads and railways, in
education and health of our children.
(Hansard, 1964: 24)
Bomani was thus emphasising the need to expand productive activities.
But in order to achieve such investments in terms of capital, machinery,
expertise, Tanzania, he explained, would require the assistance of
"development finances from our friends in overseas countries" (Hansard,
1964: 24).
The Minister for State in the President's Office, Jamal, argued
that Socialism meant the expansion of production:
What we must constantly tell ourselves is that
revolutions ought to have clear objectives and
there should be a definite course set for
attaining these objectives. To have revolutions
just for the sake of having them is to commit
a deception on our people. They will never
forgive us for it. Let us always remember that.
He then went on to emphasise the need for production:
In the highly technological and competitive
world of today our objectives must enable us
to stand on our own, not merely as a techni-
cality through membership of the United Nations
or recognition by other sovereign states of the
world, but in reality. This means production
and more production at prices wnich internally
lead to real and ever-increasing savings for
further investment and, externally, enable us to
pay in the most effective way for all that we
shall need to import to revolutionise our
economy.
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Jamal then pointed to three economic factors, which he said would
"determine our success and will demonstrate whether we understand the
enormity of the task which we have undertaken ahead of us".	 These
three factors were, the magnitude and extension of production, the cost
of such production and the size of savings for investment in schemes and
projects leading to further production. 	 Jamal then warned that:
To attempt to produce without regard to cost
of production can be self-defeating and
retrograde effort. To produce to the maximum
extent at the lowest possible cost and then
not to save for further investment will be
equally frustrating and could lead to
stagnation.
He continued:
This is not a matter of Eastern or Western
ideologies and 'isms'. These are stark
economic facts staring us in the face. Ignore
them if we will, it can only be at our own
peril.	 Every single activity, every attitude,
every approach of ours must be determined by
the recognition of these realities. We are not
the only struggling developing country in the
world nor are we the most gifted and favoured
of them all.
(Hansard, 1964: 69)
Thus Jamal's speech clearly pointed to the need for economic production
and the necessity for its expansion. 	 Chief Fundikira in the same
Budget speech also explained the idea of African Socialism in terms of
the needs of an exchange economy, which required that everyone must
make a contribution towards production.
	 He pointed to two ways in
which wealth could be distributed under conditions of African Socialism
situated within the context of an exchange economy.
	 These were firstly,
to allow opportunities for employment and fair wages to all workers and
to pay fair prices to the primary producers and secondly, to distribute
wealth through the welfare services.
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Fundikira also pointed to the dangers of confusing African
r
Socialism with African Communalism.	 The latter refered to a situation&
whereby a number of people do not contribute extensively to the exchange-
economy but "expect to share equally in the wealth which is produced by
those who are more actively engaged in economic activities" (Hansard, 1964:
247).
These speeches indicate that Government's position in terms of
development ideas was modified to accommodate Party pressures on re-
distribution.	 By 1964, redistribution was considered by Government to
be important and it was incorporated into the Development Plan. This
is in contrast to the 1961/62 Plan where the primary aim was on economic
t r
growth at the expense of redistributive policies.	 However, Government
still maintained its traditional concern over the need to expand production
as well as the need for private capital.
The major aim which structured the First Five Year Development Plan
1964-1969 was an attempt to maintain a balance between redistributive
measures and the need to expand production.	 The Plan attempted to
define the spheres of activities of public and private sectors in the
commercial and industrial areas. 	 The objective was to accommodate
Party requirements, especially regarding the role of the co-operatives
vis-a-vis the Indian traders, and to "ensure the equitable distribution
of wealth in the country" (URT, 1964: 14). 	 On the other hand,
the Government maintained the role of private local and foreign capital
in the 1964-69 Plan but it was down-graded from 60% (1961/2 - 1963) to
47% of total . capital expenditure.	 Thus while in the First Three Year
Plan, the public sector undertook only 40% of development expenditure,
in the 1964-69 Plan it was to undertake 52% of public expenditure.
Nevertheless private capital was considered to be crucial in
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development. The Private sector was supposed to finance £116 million
towards development.	 Government's reliance on the private sector
(48%) was seen to be essential by government precisely because of its
recognition of the economy's limited capacity to generate and expand
production through reliance on its own internal resources. 	 Tanzania
lacked manpower, capital and organisational experience. By encouraging
foreign and local capitalists to invest, government hoped that the burden of
generating the necessary revenue would come from private investment
rather than from individual labour through taxation. 	 It was held that
only through capital investment in production could a higher rate of
capital formation be achieved which could finance the infrastructure of
health, education, housing which were orientated towards supporting
labour since the majority of the population fell into that category.b
The main objectives of the Plan were defined as:
a] to raise per capita annual income from
£19.6s to £45.
b] to be fully self-sufficient in trained manpower
requirements.
el to raise the expectation of life from between
35 to 40 years to 50 years.
These objectives illustrate that there was an emphasis on health and
education.	 But the need to expand production as a means of overcoming
the problem of poverty was overwhelmingly stressed:
The paradox of Tanganyika is that it is a
country of 10 million people, possessing not
inconsiderable natural resources, enjoying
climatic and health conditions that are not
abnormal for Africa and yet, in terms of
average per capita incomes (under £20) it finds
itself amongst the poorest of the nations in
this continent.
(United Republic of Tanzania, 1964: 7)
What were the causes of this poverty?
	 The Plan identified as the first
problem, the absence of a manufacturing base and the predominance of the
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subsistence sector.	 Thus, "during the years 1960-62, 80 percent of
non-food consumer goods purchased by Tanganyikans were imported and
80 percent of foodstuffs consumed did not pass through any market
economy" (URT, 1964: 7).	 Secondly, the weakness of the distributive
and transport sectors hindered the creation of a domestic market (Ibid: 11).
The absence of a domestic market was further aggravated by the existence
of the subsistence peasants:
80% of Tanganyikan consumers are peasant farmers
and it is their effective demand for consumer
and producer goods which sets the limits to the
scope and diversity of the domestic market and,
consequently, sets the pace for the expansion
of the non-agricultural sectors.
(United Republic of Tanzania, 1964: 12).
Another major obstacle to accelerated economic growth was
	 the lack
of manpower especially in education and in the technical training of
the people.	 For instance, the Plan pointed that in 1963 only 1.7 percent
of the school age population attended Form 1 to IV (1964-1969: 12).
Finally, the Plan pointed to the necessity of changes towards greater
equality in the income structure, and stated that economic growth
should be used by government to contribute to a more equitable distribution
of income in society.
The major solution to the problems outlined by the Plan was increased
production, which would require private capital because:
... there is an upper limit to the investment
capacity of the Government, owing on the one
hand to the low level of domestic resources and
on the other to constraints upon its ability
to service overseas borrowings, the economy of
the country will continue to rely to an
appreciable extent upon the private sector to
accomplish the necessary accretion of capital.
(Ibid:	 13)
The Plan envisaged a form of mixed economy where "the private sector will
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be given all reasonable guarantees for carrying out its business in
conditions sufficiently attractive to induce the re-investment of
profits in Tanganyika and an inflow of new investments from abroad"
(Ibid: 14).
In order to ensure the equitable distribution of wealth within the
country, the Plan envisaged the "expansion of the co-operative movement
and the promotion of Government participation in industry and commerce
in the form of joint ventures (Ibid: 14).1 	 Furthermore, the Plan
demarcated the spheres of activities of each sector. 	 Thus the
co-operativeSwould take 40% of trade leaving 60% to private trade, while
that of the manufacturing sector would rely mainly on the initiatives of
private capital.	 We shall examine more closely the individual policies
later on
Thus basically, Government attempted to add a re-distributive
measure and partial state ownership on top of the conventional ideas of
development, which emphasised economic growth and private capital.
How the Government applied its general conception of development to
specific sections in the Five Year Plan will now be examined.
Internal trade 
Government's policy on internal trade was to expand the network
of retail trade into the remotest areas by encouraging Africans to
participate as traders. In 1964 there were 45,000 retail licences issued,
and over 35,000 were held by Africans (Hansard, 1964: 624).
	
The plan
aimed also to have the co-operative movement secure 10% by volume of
turnover of retail trade by 1970 and later on 30% to 40% of the total
volume.	 Once this was achieved, Government hoped that retail trade
would revert to free competition.	 Sixty percent of the trade would
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still be in the hands of private traders.
	
Likewise in the wholesale
of consumer goods, Government hoped that COSATA, a co-operative
consumer society would secure 10% of total turnover by 1970. COSATA
was also to be given distributive rights over consumer goods made and
sold locally by industries in which there was government participation.
Government's aims therefore was for a gradual transfer of trade to the
co-operatives, because it considered organisational capacity crucial in
implementation.
The Minister of Commerce and Co-operatives when presenting the
Annual Estimates for 1964/65 on Commerce and Co-operative Policy
emphasised the importance of commerce to the economy:
The urgent call to our nation is, therefore,
for increased production at home which will
raise the people's standard of living, whilst
increased trade to foreign countries - instead
of pleading for aid from them - will enhance
our national dignity, personality and
prosperity.
(Hansard, 1964: 623)
This view was consistent with the Government view on development which
viewed trade as an integral aspect of development because it integrated
subsistence peasants into the exchange economy and because of the need
for foreign exchange.
	 The Minister also expressed full support for
the co-operative, COSATA: but he added:
I must make it quite clear that as the Minister
responsible I am here to encourage the
establishment of successful co-operatives only,
and not just a mushroom of hay-wire prestige
co-operatives.
(Ibid)
He explained that some people accused the government of not having greater
ambition, that the target of securing 10% of the retail trade by
co-operatives within the next five years was too modest. But he argued:
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I wonder, Sir, if Hon. Members are fully aware
of the scale of operations required to achieve
even this figure; are they aware, for example,
that there were 45,000 retail licences issued
in this country, 35,000 of which incidentally
have been issued to Africans? Allowing for a
thrice times turnover no less than 4,000
co-operative shops would be needed to secure
30% of trade. The small turnover and scattered
nature of existing small shops make rural coverage
of co-operatives most difficult as overheads
cannot compete with family management.
(Ibid)
He continued:
Rapid as has been the expansion of our co-operative
movement since independence, it is only fair to
inform the House that less than half of the
secretaries of our primary societies have received
any co-operative training whatever, and quite a
number of them have either seen a jail sentence
or are still there cooling their castle building
ambitions!
(Ibid)
It would appear that Government was against a rapid take-over of trade
because of the weakness within the co-operatives themselves:
Maybe, this is somehow revolutionary, but it is
dangerous to do such a thing. It was even
dangerous to the masses. We have got to remember
that when a human being wants sugar, he wants to
get sugar, if he wants to buy a piece of soap,
he wants to get a piece of soap. Now if perhaps
we just confiscate things and then announce to
the masses that they should have them buy from
our people, while our people are not experienced
then maybe things will be scarce; the masses will
be the first to complain, saying you merely
brought us problems.
(Hansard, 1964: 630)
By incorporating implementation problems in policy thinking Government
hesitated to replace the private trader by the co-operative.
	 These fears
were again expressed by the Minister:
It is Government's policy to have a lot of things
sold through Cosata and other co-operatives for
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the benefit of the masses. But we do not
have enough manpower.
I want to remind you that if we undertake
to do something very rapidly we can fall.
(Hansard, 1964: 207)
Government was, therefore, against rapid nationalisation of trade because
of its realisation that, given the absence of implementation capacity,
the policy might cause more problems.	 Government feared that a dis-
ruption of trade might affect production since peasants would have no
incentive to produce for exchange.
	 Failure in production would in turn
undermine the policy of economic growth, upon which Government's major
objective were based.	 Finally, private trade was considerably cheaper
for the state coffers since the expenses involved such as transportation,
insurance, storage and administrative overheads were borne by private
capital itself and not by the Government.Given all these reasons, Government
considered it rational in terms of Tanzania's economic interests to
a_
maintain 60% of retail trade onXprivate basis.
Emphasis on external trade 
As already illustrated, the Government's conception of development
emphasised external trade as an important factor in development because
of the need for foreign exchange.	 Thus the 1st Five Year Plan maintained
the Marketing Boards for the individual cash crops. 	 This was a
recognition of the need to have specialised and efficient export organi-
sation.	 The emphasis on external trade was, in fact, emphasised by the
Plan:
In selling to the world market the produce
Boards will have to be competitive with
sellers in other countries and contracts
with individual buyers that have already
been established. Here they will be able
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to appoint as their agents organisations
which have the necessary expert knowledge
of world market terms and conditions and
adequate resources to carry out their
operations. It will also explore possi-
bilities of non-traditional markets.
(United Republic of Tanzania, 1964: 42)
The emphasis given on exports can also be seen in its proposal to form
an Exporter	 Association (with an Export Promotion Council) covering
Tanganyika's exportSand comprising representatives from Government
Ministers, industry, the produce boards and other commercial organs,
"as part of the general policy of intensifying export promotion'l
(URI, 1964: 22).We could argue on this basis that Government had an
export policy.
Agricultural policies: 1964-1969 
In agriculture, the Plan adopted policies which did not differ
greatly from those of 1961-1963.	 The major and overriding aim in this
sector was to increase production.
First, the 1964-1969 plan allowed for the continuation of commercial
farmingcflarge-scale estates, which had been established during colonial
times.	 Many of these were owned by foreigners, who constituted less
than one percent of the total population, but as the President pointed
out:
They account for some forty percent of
the value of our exports.
These estates have both the capital and
the technicians that are needed to increase
output, and we need increased output, and
we need an increase from them.
(Ibid:	 X)
The significance of their numbers is that they did not pose any political
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threat because it was easier to control them but at the same time,
their contribution to the national economy was significant.
Furthermore, the Plan expected the private sector to invest over
£8m in primary rural activities.	 The expansion of the rural sector's
monetary output during the five years of the Plan was expected to proceed
at an average annual rate of about 7 percent per annum which was expected
to raise the value of its output by over f40m between 1960-62.
The Government also maintained its 1961 policy of the improvement
approach which encouraged the progressive farmers through extension
services and access to credits.	 Subsistence peasants on the other
hand were considered to be an obstacle because they were not fully
integrated into the exchange economy.	 The Plan thus aimed at discouraging
the self-sufficiency of the subsistence peasants by encouraging them to
specialise in one or two cash crops. 	 The Plan envisaged that the subsis-
tence sector's contribution of about 32% of GDP in the years 1960-62 would
shrink to 22% by 1970 and to a mere 14% by 1980 (Plan 1964-69: 22).
Government relied on trade to integrate subsistence peasants into
the money economy.	 But it was also directing the transformation approach
onto this category of peasants.
	
Its goal was to introduce technical,
social and legal systems of land tenure which allowed the exercise of
'modern agricultural techniques based on relatively high productivity'.
Nyerere outlined his vision of the transformation approach:
Volunteers coming to these new areas will
be becoming modern farmers in every sense;
they will use machinery and perhaps
irrigation because the land tenure will be
such as to ensure areas permanently large
enough to justify the investment; they
will have to follow laid-down crop rotations;
and they will live in villages, going daily
to their shambas.
(URT, 1964: x)
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The Rural Settlement Commission (RSC) (1963) was given charge of this
policy. It was administered by the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and
Water.
	 The RSC evolved pilot schemes to implement the transformation
approach which aimed at breaking with traditional farming 	 . (Wood,
1965).
Policy towards the manufacturing sector 
The 1964-1969 Plan placed great stress on the development of the
manufacturing sector.	 The manufacturing sector provided a crucial
linkage with the agricultural sector and a mechanism through which
peasants would be integrated into a domestic market.
	 Government thus
gave a high priority to this sector because it was also an area which
could generate a higher rate of capital formation:
It is estimated in the Plan that more than
£50 million will be invested in manufacturing
and processing industry between now and 1970
and that output in the industrial sector will
grow by almost 15% per year.
We intend to stimulate the whole pace of
economic and social change by building up an
industrial base which will not only process
our exports of agricultural commodities, but
will provide a much wider range of manufactured
goods for the benefit of consumers in this
country. If we are to reach the ambitious
targets which we have set outselves, we shall
continue to require plant and equipment, finance
and technical assistance from overseas countries.
.	 (Hansard, 1964: 29)
The policy for developing a manufacturing base in Tanzania was based on
establishing firstly, industries to process agricultural produce and
secondly import-substitution projects such as assembly plants for trucks
and consumer goods. 	 The aim was to minimise the transportation bottle-
necks which existed in the country and increase the consumption of consumer
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goods, which would integrate peasants into the monetary economy. The
development of the manufacturing sector was to be spearheaded by private
capital.
Policy towards private capital 
Government policies relied substantially on the role of private
capital both in agriculture, trade and in the manufacturing sector.
In the latter sector, private capital was to play a substantial role in
its development. In order to achieve the implementation of the manu-
facturing development, Government envisaged that three quarters of
investment in industries would be undertaken by private agents, both local
and foreign.	 About £116 million was expected to come from the private
sector if the Plan was to be achieved. '
Although the Government supported private foreign capital it was
nevertheless prepared to assert greater control to check the outflow
of capital. In 1965 the Exchange Control was introduced which was
successful in curtailing the outflow of capital (Yaffey, 1970: 81).
This strongly indicates that Government did not adopt a laissez-faire
attitude towards foreign capital at the expense of national interests.
A special department, the Sectoral Relations Committee, was set up early
in 1966 in the Ministry of Economic Planning to co-ordinate the affairs
of government and those of private capital as well as to instil
confidence in private capital:
Its membership includes Development Plan
(which provides the Secretariat ), repre-t
senktives from the private sector and all
ministries connected with the private
sector.
The idea in setting up this committee was to
facilitate easy communication between the
private sector and the Government so that
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Government could constantly be kept informed
of the progress taking place in the private
sector as well as its problems.
It was hoped that frequent contacts with the
private sector would sustain a favourable
investment climate because the problems
arising between Government and the private
sector would be solved mutually.
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Development Planning, 1967).
Another kind of encouragement given to local capital by the Government
was the formation of a Local Production Promotion Council, whose
objective was to give "priority support to local manufacturers,
processors and traders whenever purchases are to be made". The Principal
Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Co-operativesexplained further:
To demonstrate the practical nature of the
Government's interest in the setting up of
the local Product Promotion Council, the
Minister of Commerce and Co-operatives
proposes to allocate up to f1,5000 towards
the costs of the Council's Activity during
the current financial year.
(The Nationalist, October 27, 1965)
The idea of the Council was approved by about 60 representatives from
private industry and commerce and from Ministries and Government bodies
(Ibid).	 Government's initiative to boost the morale of local private
capital was well received by the business community, as remarks by the
President of Dar es Salaam Merchant Chamber, Diwani, showed:
My Chamber would be prepared to co-operate with
the Government in this kind of work and I am
sure this statement will be received well in
local business circles.
(The Nationalist, March 5, 1965)
These institutional mechanisms are an indication that Government considered
the investments from private local capital to be crucial and that it
arranged to coordinate private capital activities with those of national
development.	 By 1964 Government was systematising its policy towards
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wa&
private capital which had begun in 1962 andilfclarified in the 1963 FIPA
Investment Act.
Policy on manpower 
Another area in which Government re-asserted itself vis-a-vis
the Party was in its policy on manpower.	 In this case the policy of
Government won out because of Nyerere's intervention. It was estimated
that in the Government sector alone - excluding all teachers, police
and nurses, there was a need of 1,002 qualified people in various fields
(URT,1964: 86).	 When Nyerere addressed the General Assembly when the new
budget was presented, he explained Government policy in the following
manner:
I know that this recruitment from outside is
unpopular with us.	 None of us like it, and we
have in fact lost many experienced administrators
and technicians because we desired to Africanise
our civil service.
... We have now passed the stage when it was a
matter of national pride just to see an African
in a high position; now we are able to take
pride in this only when the officer concerned
is doing efficiently the job we want done.
(URT; 1964: xii)
Nyerere supported Government policy. 	 In 1964 the President redefined
the policy of Africanisation (Pratt, 1972: 236) to mean localisation,
that is, the recruitment of Tanzanians irrespective of their ethnic
origins.	 This was an attempt to meet Government's needs for manpower.
A year later, in 1965, a policy statement was issued which explained the
policy of localisation.	 Its arguments show an attempt to balance the
political demands expressed by the Party activists on the one hand and
those of Government in the other, in its economic demands for manpower
and capital.
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The policy statement on localisation began by stating that it was
Government's determination to cordrroL - the economy: "There can be no
compromise on our national aim to get real control of the Tanzanian
economy by the people of this country"; it then went on to state that
the virtual monopoly of business and commerce which was now held by
foreign monopoly of business and minority communities would have to be
broken.	 But the statement continued:
It must be broken not by destroying what
exists but by the policies adopted in our
expansion. These must be such that we
gradually extend the collectively-owned
sector of the economy and thus ensure both
growth itself and the capability of the
economy to serve the national interests at
all times.
(The Nationalist, March 16, 1965)
In this way, the policy of Africanisation was supposed to allay the
fears of private capital and manpower.	 The policy warned against the
dangers of attempting to Africanise management with untrained people.
It stated:
This would be as disastrous to the economy
of the country as the Africanisation of
hospitals with witch doctors would be to
the health of the nation.
(Ibid)
The policy statement then pointed to the bottle-necks which were hampering
economic development.	 These were the "shortage of manpower, skills and
experience, local finance to cover the local costs of a productive
investment or . commercial undertakings".	 The statement specifically
argued that these factors were available in the Asian community. "Tanu,
the government, the parastatal organisations, and the co-operatives",
the statement continued, "should now quite deliberately take advantage
of this existing local managerial and technical know-how and this local
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finance".	 The statement ended with the following words:
We must emphasise this need to throw our
bucket where we are in our search for men
and money in our war against poverty.
(The Nationalist, March 16, 1965)
The way in which the policy statement argued its case clearly showed that
it was attempting to maintain a balance between the economic needs for
capital, manpower and the political pressures from the Party. 	 Secondly,
it also attempted to allay the fears of private local capital and manpower
by arguing that there was still a place for them notwithstanding
Africanisation.
	
It is pertinent to note the comments of the leader of
the Nationalist Paper:
The policy statement, however, makes it
clear that the Government does not intend
to stifle private investment in this country.
The evidence of this fact remains in the
guarantees and other safeguards offered for
private investments by the government.
(The Nationalist, March 16, 1965)
The policy statement can, therefore, be seen as an attempt to assist
Government policies of development ... by removing the restrictions which
had been imposed by the policy of Africanisation. This policy, however,
did not emerge from the Cabinet. 	 Nyerere, according to Pratt, issued
it independently without the Cabinet's knowledge (Pratt, 1972: 236). This
fact indicates two important points.	 First,	 that the Presidency was
an institution of policy-making and as such, the President could issue
policy independently of both the Cabinet and the Party.
	 Secondly, this
function gave him a balancing role between the two organs of the state.
In other words, he could 'tip' the balance towards either organ. In this
case, the policy of localisation tipped the balance towards the Government
in 1965 since it reflected its major concerns for capital and manpower in
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economic development.	 Finally, the policy reflects also the view of
development which Nyerere held during this period and which was similar
to that held by the Government.
It is worth noting in passing that at this time the President
also gave support to the Government's policy on private capital as well
as its overall emphasis on economic growth. 	 Thus:
We shall achieve this increased prosperity
if we expand our production of goods. We
shall become more wealthy by producing more
wealth. By no other means.
(URT, 1964: ix)
And on private capital, Nyerere stated:
Private investors can provide this quantity of
money. They will do so only if they believe
that they can make a profit and that they will
be allowed to export their profit if they wish
to do so.	 These conditions we must accept; we
can do nothing about them. The question we must
ask ourselves in every separate case is whether
we also benefit in proportion. When we benefit -
by increased employment opportunities, by
increasing government revenue, by the increase
of wealth produced locally and so on, then we
should welcome private enterprise as much as
we welcome loans from friends abroad.
This is one of those matters about which we must
start with the world as we find it. To be truly
revolutionary we must be absolutely realistic and
use what opportunities the world provides.
(Ibid: xiv)
Equally so, Nyerere supported Government's policy on exports:
No country owes Tanzania a living, we have to
earn it for ourselves.	 Sentiment will not make
people buy our goods if they do not want them,
it is our responsibility, tofind, and to supply
every possible market.
(The Nationalist, Febrary 2, 1965)
Nyerere's speeches firstly illustrate that he supported Government's
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policies and priorities. But more important, the speeches also
illustrate that Nyerere was operating within the conventional view of
development. We could argue that both Nyerere and Government used a
similar approach towards analysing development issues.
PARTY ACTIVISTS' CRITICISM OF THE 1964-1969 PLAN
Plan not Socialist 
Party activists criticised the Plan because it was not socialist.
While some party activists focussed on the issue of equality others
focussed attention on the need of the state to control the economy.
Thus, the Plan, party activists argued, did not foster equality:
Sheikh Thabiti Kombo:
Our attack throughout these years has been
because of the masses and our life conditions
... We can no longer stand and see individuals
benefit at the cost of others, we want to see
the masses benefit.
(Hansard, 1964: 13-14)
Diwani:
Mr. Speaker, I would like to mention that a
socialist policy in a socialist country aims
many times at raising the standard of those
who have none. The danger in our country today
is that there is no equality within the country,
96% out of 100% of our people are poor.
(Ibid:	 133-4)
Mtaki:
The basis of socialism states that the
means of production must be in the hands
of the state or the masses.
(Hansard, 1964: 89)
Siyovelwa:
Now if you think of our policy here, all the
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means of production should be ours as a
whole.
(Hansard, 1964:150)
Party activists used the term Socialism and African Socialism inter-
changeably.	 Siyovelwa, a Party activist remarked on this issue:
There are those others in African countries
who believe in scientific socialism, and
those who believe in African socialism.
Most of us, most of the MPs are confused,
our brains are in turmoil ... One advocates
scientific socialism today, and tomorrow
he advocates African Socialism.
(Hansard, 1964: 789)
The inter-changeability of these terminologies indicates therefore that
the problem of socialism had not been clearly defined by the Party, the
President or the Government.
	 Nyerere's Ujamaa: the Basis of African 
Socialism (1962) had referred to African Socialism and not to scientific
socialism.	 While one can argue that those who used the term African
Socialism to criticise Government policies derived their legitimacy from
Nyerere's ideas of 1962, it is difficult to argue likewise for those who
criticised the plan on the basis of scientific socialism, which was
equated with state ownership of the means of production.
What is important, however, is that Party activists' criticism of the
Development Plan clearly shows that they failed to take into consideration
the type of problems which Government was attempting to solve. It would
also appear that Government's attempts to explain these problems to the
Party activists when the ministers were presenting their policies failed
to impress the Party activists.	 We can appreciate my arguments further
when we see how Party activists criticised the individual policies.
Party activists' attitude towards private capital 
We saw that Government policies relied substantially on private
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capital especially in the manufacturing sector. Party activists
criticised this policy on many issues, ranging from profit-loss accruing
to the country. exploitation and national loss of control of the economy.
These ideas were expressed in various forms by party activists:
Siyovelwa:
What I want to ask is, where does this
profit go to? We benefit from the taxes
imposed and collected by the government
from these people. But where does the
remainder, after all taxes, go to? Who
owns these industries?	 The owners are
abroad and own shares in these industries.
All the profit acquired after all taxes
are expropriated, go abroad as dividends
among those who own shares and they get
enormous profits.
(Hansard, 1964: 152)
Sheikh Thabiti Kombo:
Capitalistsi ve - on the sweat of the
masses. In the industrial sector I stress
that the capitalist should not be left free
(laughter) - to install a plant for his
own benefit.
(Hansard, 1964: 181)
Mtaki pointed to the dangers of loss of national control of the economy
as a result of foreign capital:
This allows the expropriation of large
amounts of money abroad - this is
dangerous, because it removes the economy
from our control and usually the cure is
only one, that is, to close down all
insurance companies, to remain with only
one, which belongs to the state of
Tanganyika.
(Hansard, 1964: 211)
Diwani, another strong Party activist also emphasised the same point of
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loss of national control of the economy:
... (that) the 60% of investment will be
held by private sector and owners will be
ruled by their own aims and targets, and
these targets may not be to the advantage
of the nation ... All the industries, Sir,
must of necessity serve the national goal,
and if this is the case, then it is
essential Sir, that the Government is in a
position to hold the chain of destiny of
these industries. And I suggest that the
Government both control the profit margins
as well as the targets of production.
(Hansard, 1964: 126)
Maki voiced the same idea:
All the existing insurance are foreign,
they are company insurance. In a country
like this, aspiring for socialism, such
foreign insurance, many times are against
socialism ...
... I could request that all Banks in
Tanganyika today have got to be nationalised,
iAStead there should be the National Bank.
(Hansard, 1964: 210-211)
Party activists articulated a strong hostility iowqr-ol$ foreign capital.
They feared that it would lead to the loss of control of the national
economy as well as lead to profit-repatriation, thus depriving the nation
of investable surplus funds.
	 This same concern with control and an
anti-profit attitudetuMagain voiced in the form of criticisms against
Government's policy on internal trade.
Party activists' criticisms against the policy of internal trade 
As we have seen, Government policy on internal trade allowed up to
40% of retail trade to be conducted by co-operatives leaving 60% in the
hands of private traders. Goverment had opposed a rapid replacement of
private trade by co-operatives on the grounds that the latter were not
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well equipped to handle trade nationally.
	 This policy was criticised
by Party activists:
Wambura:
We are allowing competition between private
and co-operatives. I personally think that
this is not fair because if we have opted for
socialism, it is not enough to be mere
idealists, it is better to be full socialists,
we should agree to be 100% socialist - why
should co-operatives compete with individual
enterprises?
(Hansard, 1964: 73)
Mbogo:
It is obvious that most of the enterprises
even today are still being held by Indians
and their sub-ordinates. Perhaps it would be
better to request them, if not possible to
force them, to hand over some of their shops
to the masses, to enable them to start
co-operative shops for their benefit.
(Hansard, 1964: 117)
Sarwatt:
Is it still the government policy to
eradicate the 'petty bourgeoi*' in trade,
that is, the middlemen, and to stabilise
the co-operatives/
(Hansard, 1964: 559)
P. Mbogo:
These people are great thieves, this is why
they have been able to build storey houses,
shops, cars etc.	 Prices have got to be
controlled.
(Hansard, 1964: 647)
Thus the hostility against the Indian trader was still present, though it
was couched in ideological terms.	 Party activists still pressed for
the total replacement of private trade by the co-operatives.
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The criticisms by Party activists of Government policies 1964-69
illustrate that they were still expressing the same ideas in 1964 as they
had done in 1962, with the qualification that antagonism against the
Asian trader was increasingly expressed in socialist ideological terms.
Party activists were still arguing for re-distributive policies on the
basis of equality as well as for the need to control the economy. 	 These
two major ideas constitute the traditional concern of the Party activists.
The persistence of these ideas up to 1964 shows that, unlike the
Government which had modified its policies to accommodate Party demands,
the Party activists did not modify their ideas so as to accommodate the
Government's preoccupation with economic growth.
	
The criticism of
the Party activists of Government policies illustrate a singular lack of
concern regarding problems of production, capital, manpower, expenditure
in development processes.	 By pressing for re-distributive policies
and control of the economy irrespective of their economic consequences,
the Party activists acted as if they were an opposition Party rather than
a Party whose Government was in power.
Finally, Party activists' criticisms clearly showed that the
Government failed to appease political pressures and that the conflict
between the two organs of state had not been resolved.
	
This conflict
could only be resolved constitutionally, to which we shall now turn.
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THE 1965 INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF THE ONE PARTY STATE
The One Party State Constitution was enacted on 10th July 1965.
One of its major aims was an attempt to resolve the conflict which
characterised Government and Party relations from 1961.
	 That the conflict
between the two organs of the state posed a serious political problem was
reflected in Nyerere's instructions to the Presidential Commission on the
One Party State: "Should the Bunge and National Executive Council both
continue to exist?	 If so, what should be the relationship and the
division of powers between them?". 	 The Commission was directed to find
a "working relationship between the Party and Government" (Hopkins, 1968:
18).
The Presidential Commission on the One Party State recommended, first,
that Tanzania should be a de jure One Party system under Tanu; secondly,
that the nomination to Parliament must be a member of Tanu; and thirdly,
that two members, nominated by the Party should stand for election in
CAN Q-0-01- corst,:iikevNed
Parliament.	 Votershave a choice of two people to represent national
I\
policies.	 What is important for our thesis, however, is the relationship
between the Party and Government.
The Commission gave the Party the basis upon which it strengthened
itself over time. This occurred by recommending that the Party be able
to continue its traditional role of formulating broad political
guidelines of a policy nature, while the National Assembly continue
with its legislative functions.
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In order to enhance the role of the Party in policy-making, the
Presidential Commission on the One Party State also recommended that the
National Executive Council of the Party be given powers of summoning
witnesses, taking evidence and requiring the production of documents to
be presented to the NEC, as well as be given the powers to penalise anyone
for disobeying the Party's summons.	 These recommendations were enacted
in the Constitution under the legal provision Act No. 49 of 1965. Previous
to this, such powers and privileges had been granted only to Parliament.
The 1965 Constitution thus not only made Tanu the only political Party,
but it also made it more powerful than Parliament. Bienen comments on
this change:
If anything, the NEC has become a more important
organ than it was before 1965, its scope and power
have increased, and it has begun to function in
Government capacities.
(Bienen, 1967: 198)
How can we explain this change especially since we know that there was
a conflict between the Party and Government? Who were the members who
constituted the Presidential Commission? 	 Pratt gives us an insight to
the members of the Commission:
Nyerere selected the members of the Commission
extremely carefully. The Commission was
chaired by Kawawa and included four other
African Members of Parliament, including
Oscar Kambona, the Secretary General of
Tanu. The other members were an Asian and
European Member of Parliament, four senior
African civil servants and Roland Brown,
the trusted expatriate Attorney-General.
One of the civil servants, Amon Nsekela, was
named by the President to serve as Secretary
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to the Commission.	 Nyerere had not excluded
those in the party who had wanted an olig-
archic pattern of rule but he had been careful
to establish a Commission which would not be
dominated by them.
(Pratt, 1976: 203)
In the Commission therefore there were two strong Party 'men',
Kawawa and Kambona, but the latter, according to Pratt 'stopped attending
the Commission meetings and did not sign the final report' (Pratt, 1976:
203).	 Although Kawawa was a strong Party man and was the Commission's
chairman, it is difficult to attribute the strengthening of the Party to
him alone, since the Commission had also very strong minded civil servants.
We must remember that there were various interrelated problems
which the Commission WAS involved in.	 Two major ones were the mechanisms
of a de jure one party, and the second the relationship between the two
organs of the state.	 The sub-ordination of government did not occur as
a result of a de jure one party state but on the second account. According
to MjAuslan, the Presidential Report in fact wanted to make the Parliament
a 'strong, vital, questioning and articulated' organ but that 'it
unwittingly gave more powers to the NEC' (ksAuslan, 1972: 206).
The Q.Yne)r3in3	 solution of dividing the functions of policy-making
and implementation between the Party and Government respectively 6e80.rilro
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resolve after a fashion the conflict between the two organs of the state.
be8iymtvuj 6
Bykeparat€ their functions the two organs of the statecokaa now
function as a homogeneous entity since the tensions that characterised
their relationship 1961-1965 were removed. 	 Nyerere expressed this
intention when he stated:
Under the new constitution the integration
of Tanu and Government machinery makes it
possible for clear co-operation to develop
without the danger of over-lapping. By our
new system we have demonstrated finally that
the conflicts between Tanu and the Civil
Service, and between Tanu and the institutions
of central Government, are out of date.
(Nyerere, 1965: 4)
Nyerere repeated the same point about unity between the two organs of the
state when he said:
There can be no room for difference or division -
This is our time of emergency and until our
war against poverty, ignorance and disease
has been won, we should not let our unity be
destroyed by a desire to follow somebody elses
'book of rules'.
(The National Ethic in One Party
cited in Hopkins, 1968: 48 )
The Party, Tanu, was powerful by 1965 not only because it was the only
political party allowed but more important because it had legal powers
to formulate policies. 	 In turn, the Government was weakened. As Pratt
also noted, "by 1965 the Cabinet no longer occupied a central position
within the government system as it had occupied during the period 1962-64"
(Pratt, 1972: 233).
However, the institutional arrangement of dividing policy-making
from its implementation also strengthened the Party's traditional position
of not considering problems of implementation or of economic growth in
policy-making.	 These problems were now formally considered to be the
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concern of Government. 	 The Party's position of disregarding economic
requirements was now legitimised and consolidated by the Constitution.
The problems of implementation which, under the Constitution, became
the concerns of Government, were not considered to be the problems of
the Party.	 This institutional arrangement of policy-making was also
accompanied by the strengthening of the Party activists' view of development.
The Presidential Commission on the One party state gave recommend-
ations on development, which reflected Government's views of development.
For instance, the Commission recommended that the Tanu Constitution should
require members to support a government devoted to, among other things:
encouraging private enterprises where this
is directly towards the benefit of the
whole country.
(cited in Bienen, 1967: 256)
But when the Constitution was adopted in 1965, this clause was dropped
and among others, there were added:
That in order to ensure economic justice the
State must have effective control over the
principal means of production.
and:
That it is the responsibility of the State to
intervene actively in the economic life of the
Nation so as to ensure the well-being of all
citizens and so as to prevent the exploitation
of one person by another or one group by
another, and so as to prevent the accumulation
of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent
with the existence of a class-less society.
To see that wherever possible the Government
itself directly participates in the economic
development of this country.
(Bienen, 1967: 256)
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The major concerns of the Party activists, namely the ideas of control
of the economy, redistributive policies, which had been expressed in
Parliament between 1962-1965 and which were used to oppose Government
views of development, were now incorporated and became part of the
Constitution of Tanzania.
The Party, as we have seen, had since its very existence fought
and pressed for re-distributive policies to improve the socio-economic
position of Africans in society. 	 These demands led to modification
in Government's policies and re-distributive aims were incorporated in
the 1964-1969 Plan as part of the process of development. But Government
continued to maintain the role of private capital both in the trade,
manufacturing and agricultural sectors because it was unwilling to
compromise its policy on economic growth.	 Nyerere's early ideas on
socialism showed more concern with problems of inequality and saw the
necessity for re-distributive policies.	 But his position allowed him
to support Government policies especially on the role of private capital
and on the need to recruit efficient manpower.	 Thus the inclusion
of re-distributive ideas into the Interim Constitution by 1965 reflected
the general agreement of the three major political institutions, namely,
the Party, the President and the Government.
But the situation is more complex when we look into the ideas expressed
in the 1965 Interim Constitution which called for the state to control
the means of production.	 As we have seen, the arguments of senior
Government officials opposed a total and rapid assumption of control
over the economy because it argued that the Government lacked the resources
to sustain and manage state expansion of economic activities. Nyerere's
arguments and position also appeared to support Government's stand on
this issue. It would appear, therefore, that the major influence for
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for the inclusion of ideas of state control over the economy came from
Party activists.	 The exclusion of the clause on private capital from
the Constitution (which Bienen cites) further indicates that senior
members of the Government did not have the sort of influence with the
Party in 1965 that they had at the time of the framing of the 1961 Tanu
Constitution.	 In this way, Government's view of development was under-
mined further. But more crucial and significant for our thesis was that
the problem posed by the Government's need for economic growth and for
manpower on the one hand and the Party's demands for state control of the
economy on the other, was never resolved.
What seems strange in the light of the last paragraph is that there
is no evidence to suggest that ideas about state control of the economy
and its implications for development were at all discussed at Party
meetings after independence. 	 Party activists appear to have reserved
socialistic ideas merely for criticising Government policies in Parliament:
Particularly surprising, the subject of state control was not discussed
in the 1965 Party meeting (the year in which the Interim Constitution was
drawn up), which was held on 20th September at Msimbasi Community Centre,
Dar es Salaam (Tanu, Minutes: 1965).
The evidence suggests, then, that the problem of development posed
by the idea of state control of the economy within the context of chronic
problems of shortage of capital and manpower had not been seriously
considered.	 This argument would appear to be substantiated by the
following event - in 1966 Nyerere was going to appoint a Commission of
Enquiry to study the whole issue of socialism and its relation to
development (Hopkins, 1968: 100). 	 That the President wanted to appoint
the Commission in 1966, that is, a year after the Interim Constitution,
strongly suggests that the clause on state control of the economy (and
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by implication, the exclusion of private capital in development) raised
very serious difficulties for Government. The Commission never took
place because it was pre-empted by the Arusha Declaration.
Conclusion 
In concluding this chapter we can state that the Government failed
to appease political pressures and to win support for its policies from
the Party activists - despite the concessions it had made in the 1964-1969
Development Plan.
	
The Party activists criticised Government policies
because they were not socialist. 	 They called for the control of the
economy and the replacement of the private trader by the co-operatives.
Government was against the premature replacement of private trade by the
co-operatives because the latter lacked the capacity to undertake trade
nationally.
On the last point, it is worth stressing that the Government's
reluctance did not rise from opposition to the co-operatives or from
class interest.	 In fact, the Cabinet during this period had Ministers
such as Bomani and Kasambala who had been strongly identified with the
co-operative movements and it would have been to their class interest to
replace the private Asian trader. 	 Equally important, Government was
against the rapid expansion of the state sector which the Party activists
were demanding because it lacked the resources to manage a centralised
state economy.	 Ironically enough, Government does not appear to have
seen state control of the economy as an opportunity for it to strengthen
its own position and increase its own bureaucratic powers and status.
And on the other hand, the Party, which was demanding the control of the
economy and therefore the growth of the bureaucracy, had in fact very
little to gain in material terms. 	 Thus in different ways both the Party
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and the Government might be said to have been arguing against their
respective self-interests.
This must throw doubt on Shivji and Von Freyhold's contention that
Party and Government were united in seekingto consolidate themselves as
a bureaucratic class based on the extension of state control over the
economy.	 In seeing the state as a homogeneous body, Shivji and Von
Freyhold overlook the clash of policies between the two main organs of
the state, namely, the Party and Government. In representing the interests
of the different actors as those of an emergent bureaucratic class, they
oversimplify the preoccupations and perceptions involved on both sides.
The conflict between the two organs of the state was only resolved
constitutionally by the 1965 Interim Constitution, which gave powers to
formulate policies to the Party, making the Government responsible for
policy-implementation.	 This separation of functions between policy
formulation and its implementation also placed an institutional wedge
between 'politics' and 'economics' of policies, the longer-term developmental
consequences of which will be analysed in Part II.
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FOOTNOTE
1. G. Kahama, Minister for Commerce and Industry spoke of the need to
encourage foreign capital (Hansard, 1964: 526-7).
	 He stated
that:
But here Mr. Speaker, I must offer a word
of explanation to our own people: when we
have a positive policy of Africanisation;
and when we are desperately anxious to
develop our own resources; and when we
fully appreciate the dangers of political
pressures resulting from the injection of
foreign funds; it may strike some of my
non Friends in this House as frustrating
that we have to rely on foreign investment
at all.
He then pointed to it'	 three things which "the people of
Tanganyika must realize - and which must be fully grasped and understood" -
The first one is that the expectation of a
reasonable rate of return is an absolute
necessity if foreign capital is to be
attracted.
The second is that the earning of a
reasonable rate of return by an investor
costs this country nothing, and third is
that the Government can impose conditions
which will safeguard our people from
exploitation, or alternatively can, through
our Development Corporation or the
Tanganyika Development Finance Company,
insist upon some form of financial
participation by the Government which will
give us the power to see that such industrial-
isation is developed upon the lines of our
own choosing.
(Hansard, 1964: 526-527)
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OUTCOMES OF POLICIES BEFORE THE ARUSHA DECLARATION
In this chapter we shall examine the outcomes of the policies
pursued by the Government during the half-decade starting in 1962.
These policies, we have seen, were challenged on political grounds by
an increasingly powerful party. 	 The political struggle between the
Party and Government in terms of policy-making was resolved in 1965 in
favour of the Party.	 Likewise, the Party was able to assert its view
of development, based on redistribution and state control of the economy,
in the 1965 Constitution. 	 By 1965 therefore the Party was in a much
stronger position vis-a-vis the Government than it had been in 1961.
Nevertheless, an examination of Government policies in this period shows
that they did achieve a certain degree of success in economic terms
despite the difficulties under which it was operating.
The Cabinet during this period was also operating under difficult
conditions.	 Pratt (1967) has analysed some of the problems in economic
planning.	 There was the initial problem of inexperience among the
Ministers in their new tasks. 	 There was a lack of basic information
and statisticipertaining to new socio-economic conditions which made
policy-making difficult.	 In addition, there were manpower problems,
instability of world market prices, adverse weather conditions and the
effects of the 1964/65 foreign policy crisis, which led to the withdrawal
of aid upon which the Plan depended.
The 1964/65 foreign policy crisis affected the Government's
development strategy, which had been based on promised aid. 	 Tanzania
quarrelled with West Germany over the Hallstein doctrines; with Britain
on the latter's handling of the UDI crisis in Rhodesia and twice with
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the USA, once when Tanzania believed the USA to be involved in a plot
against her and again when US diplomats were deported over America's
policy towards Vietnam.
	
These disputes led to a loss of aid which
affected the fundings of the FIrsE- Five Year Development Plan 1964-1969
(Hartmann, 1977; Nyerere, 1967).	 A second setback was a drought in
1965 which affected production of various crops. In addition world
market prices for sisal, cotton and coffee fell in 1965 (Pratt, 1967:
41).	 A third setback was the Arusha Declaration which affected the
inflow of private capital.
Thus there were serious problems which created obstacles to the
full implementation of the Plan; but there was also economic success
in areas where Government policies were adhered to in implementation.
Government's policies were most successful in agriculture and in the
manufacturing area.	 The success of its policy on private capital was
curtailed by political events. 	 Before we consider the individual outcomes
in these areas, it will be best to consider the overall outcome of the
1964-1969 Plan.
SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC POLICIES
Although the Plan had aimed for a 6.7% economic growth rate the
actual rate achieved was only 5%. 	 This, however, was not a mean
achievement if we bear in mind the conditions under which the Government
was operating during the Plan's (1964-69) implementation. 	 Secondly,
when foreign funds were not forthcoming, Government was able to mobilise
65% of development funds from internal resources. 	 As Nyerere explained:
We forecast that about 22% of the Central
Government expenditure and about 48% of the
total investment expenditure would come from
local sources; for the rest, we were relying
on external assistance. In fact, however,
out of a total expenditure only slightly smaller
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in money terms than that planned, more
than 65% of the Central Government capital
expenditure was financed from domestic
sources, and something like 70% of the
total investment spending came from within
Tanzania.
(URT, 1969: x)
Nyerere's acknowledgement of the success of the First Five Year
Development Plan (1964-1969) is reflected in the following statement:
In particular we discovered at the end of
that Plan that we had been pursuing a
policy of self-reliance long before we
officially adopted it.
(Nyerere, 1970: 5)
Attempts by radicals to argue that the 1962-1967 'capitalist' policies
failed are not supported by evidence, either on overall economic
performance or in regard to particular sectors.
Agricultural production 
With the exception of sisal and groundnuts, there was an increase
of cash crop production.	 The Minister of Finance had this to say in
relation to the marketed cash crops:
Since 1960/62 the growth in marketed
agricultural output has risen to around
6% per annum, compared to 3.5% in the
1954/61 period.
(URT, 1969: x)
Thus the growth in marketed agricultural crops was higher during the
First Five Year Plan (1964-1969) than it had been during colonial times.
The decline in sisal production was the result of a fall in the world
market price.	 In the case of groundnuts the price was so low that
producers switched over to other crops, incidentally showing that
peasants did respond to market prices as the Government had argued.
(URT, 1969: xiv, 15).
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The achievements in the area of agricultural production in this
period cannot be separated from Government policies to encourage the
progressive farmer and commercial farming, since these sectors were
making major contributions to marketed production.
	 As Nyerere noted:
In the First Plan we talked only in terms
of increased production and our efforts
were directed at encouraging greater output,
even when this meant helping individual
peasants to become employers of labour.
(URT, 1969: ix)
The Government's approach to achieving higher agricultural production was
therefore successful in economic terms.
Manufacturing sector 
If we consider that Tanzania had begun with a very low manufacturil3
base, which accounted for only 4% of G.D.P. in 1960/62, then the
achievements of this sector during this period were not negligible. Most
of the industries were of a processing type or linked to import-substitution.
Of the 569 establishments employing 10 or more persons in 1965, only 18%
were established before 1946. 	 About half of the total establishments
(48%) were begun between 1946-1960; and over one-third of the total
were begun after independence (Rweyemamu, 1973: 112).
	 Both Asian and
multi-national capital invested in the manufacturing sector (Coulson, 1982:
172).
	 As a result, industrial growth was over 10% per annum, after
allowing for price increases,which compared to the growth of 5.8% per
annum in the period 1956-61 (URT, 1969: 15)
Foreign private capital 
The outcome of Government's policy on foreign investment was very
much influenced by the political climate and events. As the figures
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in Table 4.1 illustrate, the inflow of foreign investment was
haphazard.
TABLE 4.1 
Gross profits outflows and net inflows of private
capital 1961-1968 
Year
1961
Profit
outflows
(Million
shillings)
71.2
Capital
inflows
(Million
shillings)
50
1962 73 58
1963 123 155
1964 93 79
1965 110 -6
1966 114 138
1967 159 -66
1968 114 76
TOTAL 857.2 484
Source: J. Rweyemamu,	 'The political economy of foreign investments
in the underdeveloped countries', African Revievi,
1 1 (1971), 115.
quoted in Coulson, 1982: 174.
The limited capital inflow which took place in 1962-63 was the
result of the 'uncertainties' which were discussed in Parliament in
1962 and which were resolved ID.J the enactment of the Foreign Investment
Protection Act (1963).
	 As a result, capital inflows exceeded outflows
by the margin of 32 million shillings. The period 1964-65 was charact-
erised by a greater outflow which can be accounted for by the foreign
policy crisis and the mutiny of 1964.
	 The situation, however, improved
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in 1966, when a higher capital inflow occurred, becausethe Government's
evident success in stabilising the political situation in the aftermath
of the mutiny.	 However, this situation was again reversed in 1967 and
1968 as the result of the Arusha Declaration.
DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING PARTY ACTIVISTS' DEMANDS
Other policies which were implemented between 1962 to 1966 failed
and had to be abandoned.
	
Yet others generated problems which could
not be solved.	 We shall examine three such policies, namely the Village
Settlement Programme (VS ); the policy of rapid expansion of the
co-operatives and the policy of Africanisation. A major theme under-
pinning these three policies was the political pressures made by the
Party for their implementation by the Government.
The failure of the Village Settlement Programme 
enks twki-kw.
We saw that initially the Government had expressed doubts about
the VS programme because of the high costs of funds it would require
but thatyacquiesced.	 By 1966 the policy of VS had to be abandoned
because it was a failure. 	 The scheme failed, as Government had anti-
cipated, because of its over-capitalisation. 	 The high capital overcost
of £150,000 perseiflementwas too much for Government, the policy of
mechanisation was un-economic and the scheme failed because it also bred
an over-dependence on government resources (World Bank, 1977: IV: 15).
The Second Vice President, Kawawa, also emphasised the scheme's highly
capitalised nature as a reason for its failure (cited in Hyden, 1980: 74).
A British Mission report, the Ross Report explained the failure
of the VSS programme in the following manner:
One contributory factor to the failure of
the settlement programme was the inadequacy
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of the technical organisation responsible
for the execution of the programme.
(cited in Georgulas, 1967: 3)
Georgulas (1967)has given us an insight into the types of problems the
Rural Settlement Commission Agency experienced while implementing the
VSS programme.	 Georgulas found that there was intervention by poli-
ticians when the policy was being implemented and that politicians
frequently ignored technical and administrative constraints involved in
the process of implementation.
	 Thus, "often, politicians and admini-
strators were not aware of each other's needs" (Georgulas, 1967: 3);
and again:
It is reasonable to assume that the
politician's lack of formal education
and their limited relevant working
experience inclined them towards a
rationalism which was not necessarily
orientated towards scientific and
empirically based reasoning.
(Ibid: 122)
Politicians viewed village settlement as part of the development drive
and they pressed the administrators to increase the numbers of village
settlements.	 For instance:
In October 1963 the Agency was requested
by the Vice President to increase its
initial programme to 150 and to provide
assistance to 80 other schemes. By November
the same year, the agency was asked to
increase these to 200 and 160 respectively
for the same five year period.
	 Later in
early 1964 these instructions were revised
and the number of proposed settlements were
first reduced to 60 and subsequently
increased to 74.
(Ibid: 130)
Politicians pressures to expand village settlements faster than what had
been planned for by the Agency was explained in the following manner:
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The politician's ignorance of the
technical limitations to development
coupled with their lack of appreciation
for these limitations, as well as with
their fear of political capitulation,
frequently perpetuates drives which aim
to attain development goals which are
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
(Georgulas, 1967: 128)
The pressures to increase village settlement schemes were not
accompanied by further allocation of funds nor were there any explanations
to the RSC agency for the departure from the original policy, which had
been based on the consideration of technical and economic constraints.
Thus when the agency attempted to reduce costs of building houses by
using temporary materials (so that it could stretch the funds to more
settlements), the President rejected the idea.
	 The Agency then had to
adopt a different formula where it would provide houses, frames and a
permanent roof and the settler was expected to build it. The settlers
rejected this formula (Georgulas, 1967: 134).
Georguals' analysis of the failure of the VSS programme does throw
light on the intervention of political factors in the process of develop-
ment.
	 However, the failure and subsequent abandonment of the VSS
programme did not affect production mainly because it was marginal to
production.
	 Moreover, the practice of evolving different policies to
cater for different sorts of agricultural producers helped to minimise
the risk of policy failure from the point of view of the agricultural
economy as a whole.
Problems in the co-operatives 
We have seen that the Government, in order to appease political
demands, changed the Co-operative Societies Ordinance in 1963.
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Co-operatives could be registered for political reasons rather than
simply on the basis of viability.	 The change in the Ordinance removed
the restrictions and co-operatives increased from 657 in 1961 to 1,533
by the end of April, 1966.	 The aim of the Party in exerting these
demands was to replace the Asian trader with the co-operative system.
But by 1965 the co-operatives had immense problems and the
President instituted a Presidential Committee of Enquiry into the
Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards.
	 The Report began by
investigating the complaints of the peasants about the co-operatives.
It quoted these:
We complain of the continuous economic
plunder which we endure from the corrupted
employers and committeemen of the
Co-operative societies and Unions whose
behaviour no person on earth can long
tolerate.
(URT, 1966: 13)
The Report suggested that co-operative inefficiency and corruption were
the direct result of a political decision to expand the co-operative
movement without taking into consideration manpower problems: the
Government's co-operative development division found it difficult to
train people as fast as the expansion was taking place:
There were 157 men in four grades in 1960,
and by 1st May 1966, their numbers had grown
to 331 in 7 grades; but of this total only
137 were fully trained. 12 were wholly
untrained and 57 had had no more instruction
than a 14 week course.
	 Nevertheless, this
partly trained Division was spread thinly,
one man for each 9 co-operatives in 1966,
compared with one for 6 five years earlier.
The difficulties of supervision were
compounded by inadequacy of transport.
URT, 1966: 29)
The Report also stated that it was extremely difficult to train a
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society secretary rarely with "more than Standard VIII education and
sometimes only Standard VI, in such matters as the handling of book-
keeping, weighing and storage facilities etc.". 	 The Report continued:
Often the secretary is completely new to
the concept of employment and to the
handling of other people's money.
(Ibid, 29)
One of the major causes of the failure of the co-operatives was political
interference:
... final basic defect is the susceptibility
of the co-operative movement to political
interference. We have already mentioned
the political decision to accelerate the
growth of the co-operatives, this decision,
however, sound in intents, has been mis-
interpreted so as to justify exaggerated
demands for the premature registration of
societies, a root cause of the present
problems.	 Political interference is also
manifested in the deployment by commissioners
of the scarce personnel and scarcer vehicles
of the co-operative Development Division.
(Ibid: 51)
Similar problems affected the urban consumer shops, COSATA, which party
activists had called for to replace the Indian retail shop-keeper. The
Report found:
It will be noted that a defect with respect
to COSATA is the same defect we have observed
in the case of many of the newer agricultural
societies: the formation of a co-operative
as a result of a policy determination from
above without adequate demand for the society
on the part of those expected or required
to use its service.
A consequence of this defect is inadequate
interest in the society, a higher costs which
must be passed along to the public one way
or another (i.e. through higher prices or a
public subsidy).. This is noboom to the
farmers, to the urban consumers, or to the
co-operative movement,and is a practice which
should be resisted.
(Ibid: 184)
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It is pertinent to note that the reasons for the failure of the
co-operatives as a result of over-expansion regardless of economic
considerations had been anticipated by senior Government officials as
the parliamentary debates between 1962-1965 illustrated.
African isation 
We saw that Government gave in to political demands for rapid
Africanisation and within four years, it was no longer a political
problem .	 Government accepted the inevitable drop of standards that
was involved in such a rapid process of Africanisation. 	 Nyerere, for
instance, regarded any attempts to ensure that Africans were as qualified
academically and professionally as the Europeans and Asians before they
were appointed to senior posts as "misapplied idealism" (Abedeji, 1971: 17).
The lowering of standards manifested itself in the educational
background of the members of the administrative service and staff grade
officers. Only 18% of the principal secretaries and administrative
officers had received a university education.	 Eighty percent of them
had no post-secondary education at all. 	 Most of the principal
secretaries	 had less experience than the Ministers whom they were
aavisiY,3	 (Abedeji, 1971: 19).	 By 1967 the problem of inefficiency
in the administration was a cause for concern. An Ad Hoc Committee was
established to review the selection, recruitment and training arrangements
for the administrative service. It referred to the unsatisfactory
experience of admitting officers to the Administrative class from the
Executive class and concluded that it was unrealistic to expect such
officers to perform successfully (Establishment Circular, No. 15, 1968
cited in Abedeji, 1971: 19).
	 The Government, therefore, sacrificed
efficiency in its own administration and came thereby to limit its own
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effectiveness.	 As Abedeji (1971: 20) states, "Tanzania will have an
administrative service which will be a hindrance to economic development.
One of the basic requirements of public administration is competence".
To sum up this section, the three major policies - the Village
Settlement Programme, the policy of Africanisation and the policy on
the Co-operatives - failed to achieve their ends because they were
transformed by the Party's intervention in a way which negated their
economic rationale and functions.	 There has been a tendency by radical
writers to criticise policies which consider economics as 'capitalist'
or 'apolitical'.	 Saul's (1966) criticism of the Report on the Enquiry
into the Co-operative Movement is symptomatic of this type of analysis.
For instance, Saul states:
In strongly urging the isolation of the
co-operative movement from any political
influence, it is not too much to say that,
for better or worse, the Committee members
have written a profoundly apolitical even
anti-political document.
This is perhaps surprising in a country like
Tanzania which has chosen as a strategy for
development ctto unite relevant groups and
agencies in t 'development front' this being
postulated upon joint and co-ordinated
efforts under the leadership of a political
party.
(Saul, 1966: 4)
Radical writers tended to view a 'political' approach as implying the
non-existence of economic considerations. 	 Their analyses have taken
'politics' as a substitute for economic understanding. But as will be
shown throughout the thesis, politics complements but can never sub-
stitute for economic understanding in development.
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CONCLUSION TO PART ONE 
We can conclude that between 1962-1965 Tanzania had a tripartite
system of policy-making.
	 This system created uncertainties in policy-
making because each organ of the state - the Government, the Party and
the Presidency - was able to formulate policy on a different basis.
Constitutionally, while the Government was more powerful than the Party,
the Presidency was more powerful than the Government.
	 This state of
policy-making was made more complex by the conflict between the Government
and the Party, which was expressed in two opposing views of development.
The Presidency attempted to maintain a balance between the two organs of
state, sometimes favouring one, sometimes supporting the other.
The Government's view of development, which had similarities
with the conventional conception of development, called for investments
from private local and foreign capital to expand production because of
shortages of capital and manpower within the country.
	 The major aim
of the Government was to achieve economic growth.
	 This view of develop-
ment, however, was opposed by the Party activists, who called for policies
of re-distribution and for state control of the economy.
	 Although
Nyerere supported Government's position, nevertheless the latter modified
its aims to incorporate the Party activists' demands in an attempt to
create a consensus in development thinking, a pre-requisite for development
planning. These attempts by the Government failed and the conflict
between the two organs of the state remained.
	 Thus the state in Tanzania
was not the homogeneous entity some writers have presented it as, and
the stability it appeared to enjoy concealed an intense struggle between
the two organs of the state.
The 1965 Interim Constitution was partly an attempt to solve the
conflict between the Party and Government. 	 However, by confirming the
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Party's traditional role of formulating broad political guidelines of
a policy nature, while the National Assembly retained its legislative
powers, it gave the Party the basis on which it strengthened itself over
time. A relationship began to emerge in which the Party was seen as
responsible for policy formulation while the Government retained
responsibility for implementation.
This institutional arrangement for policy-making and implementation,
however, introduced a de-stabilising element into Tanzanian development.
It created conditions whereby the Party could formulate policies taking
into consideration only 'political' factors - that is, taking the economics
of the policy to be the responsibility of Government by virtue of
the latter's responsibility (duty) for implementation.	 The Party would
attribute policy failures to poor implementation, while the Government
would blame the Party for faulty policy-making.
	 A fuller analysis of
these problems will be considered in Part II.
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Part II
	
DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING SINCE
ARUSHA: PARTY ASCENDANCY AND
CHRONIC ECONOMIC CRISIS
This part has two themes.
	 First,	 policies from the Arusha
Declaration onwards will be analysed.
	
The consequences of Party
supremacy in policy formulation will be examined in the ways that the
Arusha Declaration was interpreted and extended from 1967 and in the
outcomes of these policies in the 1974-1975 economic crisis and the
crises at the end of the 1970s.
	 This element of the analysis will be
a continuation of the approach taken in Part 1.
The second theme is the examination of the explanations that have
been offered for the economic crisis of 1974-1975 and the later crisis
in the light of the policy-making analysis that has been undertaken in
this thesis.
The two themes cannot be separated easily. The analysis of explan-
ations follows immediately on the description of the outcomes of policies
leading to the 1974-1975 crisis in Chapter VII since it is on this crisis
that so many of the interpretations have focussed. 	 Events after 1975
are then considered in Chapter VIII as a means of further evaluating the
explanations offered in this thesis and in other interpretations.
However, a more continuous analysis of policies in particular
areas for the whole period up to 1982 will be undertaken in Part III.
-180-
CHAPTER FIVE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF POLICY: THE ARUSHA DECLARATION
Most writers on Tanzania's political economy have recognised that
the 1967 Arusha Declaration constituted a watershed in her development.
The nationalisation of foreign capital together with the Leadership Code
have been recognised as important in Tanzania's policies of socialism.
Interpretations of these actions by the early radicals, who viewed these
policies as 'socialist' differed from those of the later radicals, who
argued that they created an economic base for the bureaucratic class to
consolidate its powers.	 However, while interpretations of the Arusha
Declaration have differed, recognition of its importance in Tanzania's
history has not been disputed.
The Arusha Declaration also has significance in terms of policy-
making in Tanzania.
	 It shows that Nyerere was an independent agent of
policy-making, not simply responding to pressures from either the Party
or Government.	 Nyerere could be considered as an initiator, himself
acting independently of both organs of the state.	 At the same time, he
could also support both organs. The intricate and complex policy-making
roles of Nyerere can best be illustrated by an investigation of the process
by which the Arusha Declaration was in turn conceived, accepted, formulated,
passed, discussed and clarified.
An investigation of this complex process will also help to bring
out the different concerns and priorities of the Party, the Government
and the President himself.	 It will be argued that although Nyerere's
priorities in the Arusha Declaration were different from those of the
other two organs of the state, nevertheless, the outcome of the
-181-
Declaration in January 1967 led to the further strengthening of the
Party's position and view of development vis-a-vis that of Government.
It will also be shown that the same year, Nyerere was attempting
to explain the Arusha Declaration in the light of the Government con-
ception of development as well as to re-assert the Government's major
priorities.	 This apparently contradictory position on the part of
Nyerere indicates firstly that he was attempting to maintain a balance
between political and economic needs, and secondly, that Nyerere had not
totally abandoned his conventional view of development.
My position therefore differs from that of those Marxists who have
explained the policies of the Arusha Declaration in terms of class
interests (Shivji, 1976). 	 I also differ from Pratt's explanations
which have over-emphasised Nyerere's moral principles (Pratt, 1976).
Nyerere's overriding concern was the maintenance of political stability.
This will be shown in this chapter.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARUSHA DECLARATION
The origins of the Declaration:
Nyerere as an independent organ of policy-making 
The Arusha Declaration was drafted by Nyerere himself, though it
was sent to the Party for discussion and acceptance in accordance with
the 1965 Interim Constitution which made policy-making the responsibility
of the Party.	 The Government was not consulted over the new policies
e.
and was concerned over the manner in whicqdecision on nationalisation,
for instance,was taken.	 As Pratt illustrates:
At a single, hurriedly called Saturday
Cabinet meeting on 6 February 1967,
Nyerere sought Cabinet approval for a
substantial number of nationalisations.
And:
And:
-182-
All of this occurred without any detailed
planning by the relevant Ministries,
without any full Cabinet discussion based
upon a detailed briefing and without any
proper legal preparation.
(Pratt, 1976: 238)
They (Jamal and Bomani) were very uneasy
about the hasty and unprepared way in which
the nationalisations were done but they
were not basically hostile to them. They
greeted the proposals as Nyerere later
recalled 'not with horror but with concern'.
(Pratt, 1976: 241)
Therefore we can see that the ideas of the Arusha Declaration did not
originate from Government.
	
Did they then come from the Party?
	 This
would have been a more logical source because Party activists had
I..
criticised Government policies because they were not sock_Vsts. But
Msekwa, for instance, notes that the 1967 agenda of the NEC did "not have
on it the policy of socialism and self reliance" (Msekwa, 1977: 38),
while Mwansasu comments thus:
even on an issue of this magnitude
members received no advance notice;
they went to these meetings without
having either thought about the issues
or discussed them in local party circles.
(Mwansasu, 1979: 184)
Therefore we can conclude that the pressures for the Arusha Declaration
did not originate from the Party.
	 It is therefore necessary to look
to the President, the third policy-making institution.
We have seen that no organised political force was the source of
the Arusha Declaration. 	 There was also no foreign exchange crisis.
As we saw in the last chapter,foreign capital did begin to come in after
1965 and local capital was being invested in the manufacturing sector.
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But inevitably class inequalities were beginning to emerge.	 There was
a proliferation of Mercedes-Benz bought on loans by Ministers and their
parliamentary secretaries, as well as the building of houses for rental
purposes (Pratt, 1976: 235).
	 There was a tendency towards conspicuous
consumption. The material benefits for workers and peasants on the
other hand were not as rapid.
	 There was public disillusionment because
not everyone was getting richer (interview with senior Government official,
June, 1981).
The student crisis (1966) was another factor which had a profound
impact on Nyerere's mind. In October of that year 400 students from
the University of Dar es Salaam marched to the State House to protest
against the newly established National Service scheme, which required
secondary school and university graduates to undergo five months of
military training followed by 18 months in which they would work at their
jobs but receive only 40% of their salaries (tax free) (Coulson, 1982: 181).
Nyerere was angered by the stupid arrogance of this newly educated
social group.	 Foremost in his mind was the question "What kind of a
country are we building?" (Pratt, 1976: 234). 	 The students were
expelled.
A final crisis which had an impact on Nyerere and led to the
Arusha Declaration was the foreign policy crisis of 1964/65 which led
to withdrawals of aid.	 It illustrated that dependency on foreign sources
was dangerous since it could be withdrawn at any time. Both these
circumstances - increasing distance between leaders and masses, and the
vulnerability of the economy's dependence on foreign capital - were
seen as potential sources of political instability.
The 19605 was a period of intense political instability in Africa;
no fewer than 26 of the 35 African States experienced some form of military
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intervention.	 During 1965 and 1966 there were nine military coups
in Africa (Jacob, 1971: 169); Nyerere was greatly shocked when Nkrumah
was overthrown.
	 He stated:
What is happening in Africa? What are
the coups about? The last four months
have seen changes of governments in many
African countries. The latest has been
in Ghana. What is behind all this ...
(The Nationalist, March 1, 1966)
And Nkrumah writing from exile cautioned African leaders of the dangers
of foreign intervention to political stability:
Wherever we turn, we are in trouble
... If we stand up against foreign
intervention we are assailed ...
If we receive foreign aid and investment
we are liable to come under their
domination and control. If we welcome
foreign intervention and assistance they
bring in their wake confusion and turn
our people against us.
(The Nationalist, March 9, 1966)
In an article of March 4, 1966, Minister Babu, writing under the
pseudonym of Pressman, pinpointed the dangers of political instability
threatening Africa:
In Africa we are helplessly watching Smith,
Verwoerd and Salazar and now the army
take-overs, adding to making the confusion
worse confounded.
What are we to do? Are we to sit back and
let unfavourable events overtake us without
lifting a finger to influence them to our
favour?
(The Nationalist, March 4, 1966)
Babu was a close confident of Nyerere's and an acute observer of political
events.	 We can assume that the danger of political instability facing
Africa in general, as well as their relevance to Tanzania, were discussed
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since both men were interested in political and foreign policy issues.
The problem of political stability was foremost in Nyerere's mind.
His concern over inequality and class conflict was also part of this
9
greater concern for political stability, an analysis of the newspaper,
The Nationalist, during the period 1966-67 indicates.
	 This is illustrated
by Nyerere's speech in Ma-ka island where for the first time the President
used a class analysis of exploitation. 	 This speech marks the beginning
of Nyerere's radicalism. 	 Because of its significance I quote at length
from the newspaper summary of the speech:
Mwalimu said Tanzania would not tolerate
seeing its people being divided into
exploited and exploiter classes. Mwalimu
said that Tanzania had chosen to pursue
socialist policies in order to bring
equality among her people. "Each and every
individual must toil to earn his living
and not simply exploit others" he said.
Dividing people into exploiters and exploited
classes was very dangerous and in fact had
brought many problems and troubles in other
parts of the world, the President explained.
Speaking about leadership, Mwalimu said that
leaders should never use their positions to
benefit themselves. "Sterner measures will
be taken against any leader found using his
position to acquire wealth".
(The Nationalist, February 7, 1966)
The Arusha Declaration was conceived.
	 By January 1967, and before
the policy was sent to the NEC meeting for discussion , it was evident,
given the following statements, from the newspaper, The Nationalist,
that the higher leadership had already accepted the policy of socialism:
'Nyerere Hits at Exploiters' - The Nationalist, January 9, 1967.
'Its Time for Take-Over' - Kambona, the General Secretary of
the Party. - The Nationalist, January 20, 1967.
Although Nyerere was preoccupied with problems of political instab-
ility and foreign policy concerns, he was also very worried about economic
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development. He was concerned about the effects of the withdrawal of
FtvE
aid on the development of the FirsqYear Plan. 	 Two informants who
were closely associated with Nyerere during this period, emphasised that
after the crisis had occurred, Nyerere apparently posed himself the
question - Now what?
	 A number of development projects had been
abandoned; Nyerere was afraid of losing the momentum of development.
According to these two interviewees, Nyerere had to arrest the problem
a shock treatment was required (interview with former Government official
and Party official, June, 1981). 	 For Nyerere, the Arusha Declaration
was to be among other things a development strategy, which would be
based on mobilisation of the people.
President's Opening Speech and final Party document 
At the 26-28 January 1967 meeting of the NEC held in Arusha,
Nyerere gave an unpublished opening speech in which he outlined broadly
and in popular language the ideas of socialism and self-reliance, which
were to form the basis of the Arusha Declaration policies. His pre-
occupation with foreign-policy issues, political stability and the use
of labour to counteract the effects of lack of capital were expressed in
his opening speech.
The President posed the question: Is Tanzania really independent?
He said that in the country there were many economic linkages with
countries such as Germany and America and that it was these 'linkages'
which led to exploitation. He stated:
It must be Tanu's and the Government's policy
to reject exploitation nor do we want
Tanzania to exploit another country.
(Tanu, NEC Minutes, 1967)
The postulation of the problem of exploitation in terms of economic linkages
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between foreign capital and Tanzania brought the President closer to
the ideas of the Party activists.	 He re-emphasised this point again
when he posed the questions:
How about money coming from outside Tanzania?
We must not depend on money to bring us
development.
(Ibid)
The rejection of capital as an active catalyst in development brought
him to emphasise labour instead:
The progress of a country is brought
about by the people, not by money. Money
is the result, not the foundation of
development.
(Ibid)
The mobilisation of labour required the participation of the Party and
Nyerere spoke of the need to strengthen the Party as a development agent.
Nyerere also stressed that there should be no exploitation within
the country.
	 His definition of exploitation was based on the employment
of labour which allowed the generation and appropriation of profits (Ibid).
Nyerere reinforced his arguments on exploitation by arguing that income
differentials were not necessary because man's basic needs did not differ
from one to another: Nyerere stated that pay differentials were not
consistent with the policy of socialism (Ujamaa) (Ibid). 	 This moral
justification for the attack on income differentials brought him to
the Leadership Code. He stated:
One works and one gets a fair pay.
The ability to work must not be turned
into a marketed commodity, it must be
that one is serving the state and the
state pays one a subsistence income plus
a bit more for purchasing cigarettes.
(Ibid)
He ended his speech by stating that it was possible for Government to
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stop exploitation:
The Government should be called upon to
act for we now enter the path of Ujamaa.
I know the Government will accept this
call and will fulfil it as well as observing
any problems that will emerge.
(Tanu, NEC Minutes, 1967)
Nyerere developed his ideas consistently, and used both political
and moral arguments to convince his audience to accept the policy of
socialism and self-reliance. 	 Socialism was equated with the idea of
elimination of exploitation, and self-reliance was implied in the idea
of activating labour in development.	 But Nyerere's major concern under-
lying these ideas was to create political stability. He wanted to avoid
the development of gross income inequality in Tanzania, as happened in
West Africa.	 We can see this further when Nyerere himself explained the
significance of the Arusha Declaration.
Nyerere used nationalisation of foreign capital, which he knew was
popular with the Party activists, to pave the way for their acceptance
of the conditions for leadership:
Nationalisation, well very little - what
is there to nationalise in Tanzania!
I think it (nationalisation) has prepared
the mood for everything. It is very
difficult after nationalisation to oppose
self-reliance or to oppose the conditions
of leadership ...
(The Nationalist, March 6, 1967)
Nyerere saw the policy of self-reliance and the conditions of leadership
as the most important factors;
	 nationalisation was secondary, 'although
it got more publicity than the other ingredients of the Arusha Declaration'
(Nationalist, March 6, 1967).
	 For instance, Nyerere again re-emphasised
his point that the biggest challenge in the policies of the Arusha
Declaration was not nationalisation but self-reliance (Tanu, Dar es Salaam,
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1967: 15).
	
Nyerere saw the need for an uncorrupted leadership and
equality between the masses and the leaders as pre-requisites for
political stability.	 The fact that Nyerere did not consider national-
isation as the most important factor indicates that he was still working
within a conventional view of development.
	 Nyerere's priorities as
Head of State were concerned more with stability than with either
redistributive questions or economic growth per se.
Nyerere's priorities and concern with political stability never-
theless strengthened the Party's position vis-a-vis that of Government.
First, Nyerere's call for nationalisation of foreign capital and
egalitarian policies added weight to the Party's view of development.
Secondly, Nyerere's emphasis on mobilisation strengthened the Party's
role in development.
The President's Opening Speech also paved the way for Party activists
to super-impose their ideas on development onto Nyerere's concern for
political stability.	 We can see this when we compare the Arusha
Declaration and Nyerere's ideas in the Opening Speech.
The Party's position was strengthened by the Committee of Eight
which was appointed by the NEC meeting at Arusha to study the President's
speech and gives its recommendations to the NEC (Tanu Minute No. 77,
26-28 January, 1967).
	 This committee appears to have influenced the final
published form of the Arusha Declaration.
	 The chairperson of the Committee
of Eight was Barongo who was Regional Commissioner and at one point also
a junior minister to the Ministry of Agriculture.
	 The Agenda was
divided into three parts; the first part dealt with the policy of Ujamaa 
(Socialism), the second part with the policy of self-reliance, and the
third part with the strengthening of Tanu (Tanu Minutes of the NEC, Arusha,
1967).
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The Committee of Eight's discussion of Nyerere's ideas is
important because of its influence on the ideas of the Arusha Declaration
as we have come to know them.
	 We shall see how a development strategy
was evolved from Nyerere's concerns of political stability.
	 We can do
this by comparing Nyerere's ideas given in his Opening Speech and the
final form of the Arusha Declaration policies.
	 These will be analysed
under different headings, because they also illustrate the conflict with
Government's policies and concerns.
The policy of socialism 
The final published version of the Arusha Declaration begins with a
definition of socialism:
A truly socialist state is one in which all
people are workers and in which neither
capitalism nor feudalism exists. It does
not have two classes of people, a lower
class composed of people who work for their
living, and an upper class of people who live
on the work of others. In a really socialist
country no person exploits another.
(Nyerere, 1968: 233)
The definition of socialism was explicitly given in terms of classes based
on ownership of the means of production.
	 In this sense it was definitely
at variance with the conception of African Socialism based on re-distributive
policies which had been upheld by the Government, some Party members and
most importantly, the President.
The Party's definition of socialism in terms of ownership led to
the policy of nationalisation as its logical conclusion.
	 Under socialism:
The major means of production and exchange
are under the control of the peasants and
workers.
(Nyerere, 1968: 233)
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Thus the Party gave greater emphasis to nationalisation than Nyerere
had done.	 By doing so, the Party was able to undermine Government's
view of development which was based on private capital.
	 We can see
this further when we analyse the Arusha Declaration policies towards
foreign private capital.
The policy statement of the Arusha Declaration towards foreign
capital was explicit; it rejected it although accepting that it was needed
for economic growth:
It is true we need these enterprises.
We have even passed an Act of Parliament
protecting foreign investments in this
country. Our aim is to make foreign
investors feel that Tanzania is a good
place in which to invest because investments
would be safe and profitable, and the profit
can be taken out of the country without
difficulty.
(Nyerere, 1968: 240)
The above quotation directly refers to Government's view of development
and its concern for economic growth.
	 The Party rejected this position
of Government because of profit-repatriation:
Could we agree to leave the economy of
our country in the hands of foreigners
who would take the profits back to
their countries?
(Ibid)
This view directly reflects Party activists' concern with profit
repatriation.	 But the document went on to assert political arguments
also.	 Thus:
How can we depend upon gifts, loans and
investments from foreign countries and
foreign companies without endangering our
independence? ... The truth is that we
cannot.
(Ibid)
The rejection of aid, loans and private investments reflected closely
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Nyerere's foreign policy concerns as expressed in his Opening Speech.
Finally the document rejected the use of foreign capital because it would
endanger not only independence but also the creation of socialism:
The policy of inviting a chain of
capitalists to come and establish
industries in our country might succeed
in giving us all the industries we need,
but it would also succeed in preventing
the establishment of socialism.
(Ibid: 241)
Thus the establishment of socialism was postulated as an anti-thesis
to foreign capital.
The Arusha Declaration gave a higher priority to agriculture and
down-graded the manufacturing sector.
	 This aspect of the new development
strategy was absent in Nyerere's Opening Speech, suggesting that it can be
attributed wholly to the Committee's recommendation.
	 It was also an
explicit attack on the Government's policies which since 1961 had consist-
ently emphasised the development of industries (see Three Year and Five
Year Plan).	 The Arusha Declaration stated:
The mistake we are making is to think
	 /
that development begins with industries. 1
(Nyerere, 1968: 241)
Two reasons which are interrelated can explain this policy shift. Firstly,
the chairperson of the Committee of Eight was Barongo, who had been a
junior minister for Agriculture.
	 The heavy bias towards agriculture
at the expense of the manufacturing sector may perhaps be attributed in
part to his influence.
	 Secondly, the Party had always shown more
interest in the agricultural sector because it was in this sector that
the majority of the population were involved, and because Party
administration and structures were established in rural areas.
	 Thirdly,
since the Arusha Declaration had rejected the policy of encouraging
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foreign capital investment, it was logical to de-emphasise manufacturing
since this was the sector which was most dependent on private capital.
The policy of self-reliance 
The policy on self-reliance, unlike that on socialism, was completely
based on Nyerere's ideas given at the Opening Speech. 	 There was no
modification but nor was there any form of elaboration, especially in
its methods of achieving a self-reliant economy.
The Declaration began with the assertion that the aim of self-
reliance was "to move the people from a state of poverty to a state of
prosperity".	 But this process must not depend on money. The attitude
that "money is the basis of development and that without money we cannot
develop is wrong" (Ibid: 235). 	 It was wrong because Tanzania was a
poor country and it did not have money, which were the weapons of the
economic powerful countries.	 The policy paper further argued that
calling on the Government to spend more money without increasing taxation
was equally wrong:
demanding for more milk from a cow while
insisting that the cow should not be
milked again.
(Ibid, 1968: 237)
This argument took the Government's concern of lack of resources into
consideration for the first time in this document.	 On the other hand,
foreign private capital was rejected because:
Independence means self-reliance. Independence
cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts
and loans from another for its development.
(Ibid: 239)
All these ideas drew their roots from Nyerere's Opening Speech. 	 The
policy paper then outlined a strategy of development which was based on
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the assets which Tanzania possessed, that is, the people, land, good
policies and good leadership. 	 It also emphasised hard work and
intelligence.	 But again, these ideas were put forward by Nyerere in
his Opening Speech.
Not only this but those concerned with the agenda on self-reliance
failed to reformulate Nyerere's ideas into a development strategy. The
document merely restated Nyerere's ideas without studying or elaborating
their implications in developmental terms.
Strengthening of the Party 
The third part of the Agenda dealt with the strengthening of the
Party.	 Nyerere's idea of a self-reliant economy was based on the idea
of mobilisation of labour. 	 Although Nyerere did not elaborate very
much on this idea nevertheless it was implicit in his notion of a self-
reliant economy.	 If there was no capital, then labour, the only other
alternative, had to be used to generate wealth.
In a meeting of the Regional Commissioners held at Arusha on 24th
January 1967, just prior to the NEC meeting, Nyerere had explicitly
stated that Tanu must step up political education and orientation for
its leaders, party cadres and party members (The Nationalist, January 24th,
1967).	 Two days later but before the NEC meeting, Pressman sketched
out a development strategy based on mobilisation:
Our approach to National planning will accordingly
be transformed. Instead of emphasising
foreign investments and private capital,
we shall emphasis mass mobilisation and
self-reliance.
In order to make this policy effective,
the masses i.e. the workers and peasants
must be in a position of leadership in the
party and state organs so that the party
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and state reflect the interests, the
experience and the feelings of the
masses.
Hence, training of cadres from among
the masses becomes the first priority
in our National Planning.
(The Nationalist, January 27, 1967)
But there was no policy document which emerged from the Party on how
to strengthen the Party in order to enable it to undertake mobilisation
as a developmental instrument. 	 A month later we have the first
statement on how the Party was going to be strengthened:
Party branches are to be set up in all
government Ministries, Local Government
bodies, industries and organisation in
order to enable the people to get a
thorough teaching of Party's ideas as
outlined in the Arusha Declaration.
When already established, the Party
branches will study the Arusha
Declaration, its implications and how
"it can be effectively implemented -
in the Ministries, Local Government,
industries and organisations throughout
the country".
(The Nationalist, February 5, 1967)
The second paragraph of the above quotation clearly illustrates the
failure of the policy at the NEC level. 	 Partly as a result of this
deficiency, the Party Annual Meeting held in Mwanza in September-October
1967 emphasised that attention should be given to political education.
Minute 90 stated:
NEC should create a department of political
education in the Party's Headquarters in
order to train leaders, party members and
the people in general on political education.
(Tanu, Party Annual Minutes, 1967)
We could argue on this basis that the Party failed to evolve a policy on
how to strengthen the Party in order to implement mobilisation systematically
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and constructively.	 The emphasis on party branches and political
education was not a sufficient condition for a self-reliant strategy
capable of meeting the Government's need for economic growth.
Finally, the Committee of Eight also failed to elaborate further
on the notion of 'good leadership', which was closely related to the
notion of mobilisation and strengthening of the Party. 	 Nyerere's
definition of good leadership which meant that leaders should not have
more than one salary or income was considered sufficient (Nyerere, 1968:
249); other factors such as a leader's capacity to mobilise people (without
coercion), to instill confidence in the Party or to solve practical
development problems, were not considered.
We can therefore conclude that the Committee of Eight and the NEC
meeting at Arusha in 1967 were able to strengthen the Party activists'
position in areas which Nyerere had not given a very high priority (i.e.
in the matter of nationalisation) but did not elaborate on areas which
Nyerere had considered crucial, namely, policies of self-reliance, of
good leadership, and of strengthening the Party in order to undertake
mobilisation.	 The rejection of an industrial development policy in the
Arusha Declaration also shows that policy-makers had not seriously
considered the implications of a development strategy which was merely
based on agriculture.
These deficiencies within the policies of self-reliance, socialism,
mobilisation, made the policy of the Arusha Declaration unworkable.
For instance, the failure to find a consistent policy on mobilisation
affected the policy of self-reliance which made the policy of socialism
unworkable.	 For example, the Party failed to evolve a development
strategy based on mobilisation which could contribute revenue or
contribute towards expenditure and thus make the economy self-reliant
and socialist.	 The Party merely criticised Government's policies 	 of
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obtaining funds from private sources but did not elaborate on how it
could obtain these from internal sources - apart from taxation, which
it criticised.	 The statement that self-reliance is based on the land,
the people, good leadership, intelligence and hard work is a tautolo-
gical statement rather than a development strategy. The latter must be based
on the assumption that land, good leadership, people, intelligence
and hard work existed in the first place! 	 Thus the weaknesses of the
Party activists was shown by their inability to consider development as
a process which required economic inputs. This oversight hindered the
formulation of a viable strategy in the Arusha Declaration.
The policy of Ujamaa 
Ujamaa has been traced to Maoist influences on the basis that
Nyerere returned from China in 1965 greatly impressed with Mao's
rural-based development (The Nationalist, February 26, 1965).	 Mapolu
(1973) has also pointed to similarities between Nyerere's Ujamaa and
Robert Owen's Villages of Cooperatives.
	
Musti (1978) argues that the
experience of the Ruvuma village schemes was influential.	 To acknowledge
these influences is not to deny that Nyerere himself had also always
been preoccupied with problems of rural development; and the policy of
Ujamaa can be seen as a logical development of his own ideas, matured
by wider experiences, which helped him to see 'old' ideas in a new light.
An important question which I wish to pose is why Nyerere did not
adopt the policy of Ujamaa until September 1967. 	 The policy of Ujamaa	
has always been seen as part of the Arusha Declaration package but as
we have seen, it was first mooted at the Mwanza meeting, not at the
Arusha NEC meeting.
It can now be established that Nyerere did not have in mind the
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soctaiis 1.:-
policy of Ujamaa cural development) in January 1967 when he was at
soc...10..\%.sL
the NEC meeting.	 There is no evidence of the policy of Ujamaa (rural
A
development) in his Opening Speech, nor is there evidence to suggest
that the NEC discussed the ideas of communal production as a means of
achieving self-reliance.	 Second, the ideas of communal production
in agriculture were equally not discussed at the Party Special meeting
held at Dar es Salaam in February-March 1967.
	 As we shall see later
in this chapter, district members of the Party argued that the prohibition
of recruiting labour as a result of the leadership code, would make it
difficult for rural-based Party leaders to undertake agricultural
activities and this would in turn constrain agricultural growth.
	 In
the discussion of this issue I argued that Nyerere's answer avoided
the problem posed by the District Party leaders. On this basis, I
would argue that Nyerere had not thought of communal production as a
solution to the political requirements of the leadership code and the
economic requirement for increased production at this meeting.
	 This
solution in the form of Ujamaa policy only crystalised between April -
August, because he first outlined the policy at the Party Annual Conference
September 1967, held at Mwanza.
	 As we shall see, moreover, the President's
speech on the policy of Ujamaa showed a certain tentativeness; it was
more of an expression of associated ideas rather than an exposition of
a systematic approach towards policy.
	 It raised more questions than it
could answer.
In September 1967 at the Party Annual Conference in Mwanza, Nyerere
Sociall
outlined the policy of Ujamaa:
A
rural
 development. He stated:
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Our aim is to make sure that, people
in Tanzania should live together and
work together communally, to the extent
that every family co-operates with
another for the nation's benefit.
The only difference between people's
income in these communal villages, will
be a result of his own efforts and not
through exploitation.
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 49)
The aim was to develop rural life on the principles of equality,
co-operation and democracy.
	 The objective was to organise rural life
on a village basis and on the principle that the land would be 'our land',
the crops 'our crops', and the herd 'our herd'.	 Living in a village,
he re-emphasised, would also enable the development of social services
to take place (Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 50).	 But Nyerere stressed that
ujamaa had to be voluntary:
For we are not simply trying to organise
increased production; we are trying to
introduce a whole new way of life for the
majority of our people.	 This can only be
done once the people understand its
purposes and voluntarily decide to parti-
cipate.
(Ibid)
Since the policy was voluntary, it did not appear to overtly clash with
Government's interests and priorities.
Debates over the Arusha Declaration in the Party and the Government 
Although the President could be considered an independent organ of
policy-making as well as an initiator, Nyerere took the Arusha Declaration
proposal to the NEC, the highest policy organ of the Party. 	 The Arusha
Declaration therefore came out as a policy document of the Party.
The second major important organ of the Party which discussed the
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Arusha Declaration was the Special Annual Conference held at
Dar es Salaam on February 27 to March 3 1967. 	 Members of the Annual
Conference included nominated district and regional Party secretaries,
members of the NEC, MPs and Central Committee members.	 Another meeting
of the Annual Conference was also held in September of that year in
Mwanza, at which further elaborations on the Arusha Declaration were
made.
The Arusha Declaration was also discussed by Parliament at its
sessions of 1967.	 We have records of the discussions at the two Party
Annual Conference and of the Parliamentary discussions, but have no
written record of the discussions which occurred at the NEC and in the
Cabinet, since these meetings were not public. 	 In these two areas I
have therefore relied on interviews to see how the Arusha Declaration
was discussed.	 An examination of the types of questions raised in these
discussions may throw light on how major development issues were posed
in Tanzania.
Two major pre-occupations appear to have predominated in both the
discussions held in the Party circles and those in Parliament.	 These
were the effects of the Leadership Code on the personal welfare of the
leaders, and demands for further nationalisation, especially of local
capital.	 A major characteristic of these discussions both in the Party
and in Parliament was that the new policies were not debated thoroughly
or systematically evaluated, especially in terms of their implications
for development strategy. 	 When an important issue on policy impli-
cation was raised, there was a tendency for the person to be either
rebuked or ridiculed.	 This occurred both in Parliament and in the
Party meetings.
Discussions at the NEC were mainly debates which were held in camera.
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It would appear from an interview conducted by the author with one
of the leading members of the Party who was present at the NEC meeting
at Arusha, but who was not part of the Committee of Eight, that discussion
of the President's Opening speech was very lively and Party members
discussed all its political and economic aspects and implications. It
also appears that Party members expressed an overwhelming 	 conviction
and confidence in the peasants' and workers' enthusiasm to generate
development, and in the possibility of sustaining economic expansion on
the basis of the state sector (interview, June 1981).
	 According to the
interviews, senior Party officials at the NEC were aware of the problem
of shortages of manpower and other economic constraints, but it was
argued that socialism was a political decision, which had to be made.
The economic problems that derived from this decision, as well as the
intricate problems of management etc., would be confronted during imple-
mentation phase.	 Party officials argued that if Tanzania had waited
until all her economic problems were solved, then the Party would not have
been able to take any major political decisions, least of all, taking
the country's independence (two interviews with high ranking Party
officials, June 1981).
Under the 1965 Constitution the Cabinet was responsible for the
implementation of policies.	 How was the Arusha Declaration discussed
in the Cabinet?	 According to a former minister interviewed by the
author:
The Arusha Declaration interrupted Commerce,
it brought confusion, private capital stopped
investments.
And:
The discussion at Cabinet in relation to
private capital and its role in development
was general.	 Nobody knew what to do. One
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minister tried to establish government's
statement on private capital but was
stopped by the President.
(interview July 1981)
According to another source:
No preparations were made over the
running of the Banks - it could have been
disastrous ... but helped by Indian
managers and some people from the University
who rushed to assist ....
(interview with senior Government
official, June 1981)
In an interview with a senior official of the Ministry of Economic
Development and Planning:
The AD introduced a strong element of
uncertainty because there were undefined
criteria in terms of the role of private
capital in Tanzania.
(interview, July 1981)
On the policy of Ujamaa and its relationship to agricultural development:
Nobody knew what it was ...
it was never discussed at Cabinet level ...
(interview with former minister,
July 1981)
It would therefore appear that the Arusha Declaration created uncertainties
for Government's policies, especially those which relied on private capital
to achieve economic growth. 	 Most ministers were left to manage as best
they could and to wait for the situation to clarify itself.
-	 We have seen that in two major organs of the state, the National
Executive Council and the Cabinet, the discussions of the Arusha
Declaration as a development strategy were one-sided, in different ways.
The NEC discussed in only a very restricted way the economic implications
of the Arusha Declaration, whereas in the Cabinet the discussion was cut
short because of the 'political' status of the document.
	 How were these
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problems then discussed at the Annual Meetings of the Party and in
Parliament?	 Since these organs showed similar pre-occupations, I
have examined them together.
The participants in the meetings could be divided into three
groups in terms of their responses to the proposals. The first group
showed greater interest in the effects of the Leadership Code on their
personal welfare.	 These were mainly district Party secretaries. 	 But
the same attitude was also present in Parliament. 	 The second group,
presumably the more 'radical', pressed for the nationalisation of local
private capital.	 This concern was expressed both in Parliament and in
the Special Meeting of the Party. 	 The third group, containing the more
educated and higher-ranking officials of the Party, focussed attention
on the contradictions between policies of the Arusha Declaration and the
goal of socialism.
The first group were mainly composed of the lower hierarchical
officials of the Party who were district secretaries. 	 Since most of them
were in villages, they had farms and were thus affected by the conditions
of Leadership, which stipulated that leaders should not have an income,
other than from their salaries. 	 The second factor which also concerned
these leaders was the idea that recruitment of labour was a form of
exploitation.	 When Nyerere opened the Special Annual Conference at
Dar es Salaam he returned to the theme of his Arusha speech, making an
explicit relation between recruitment of labour and exploitation:
What is exploitation? We explained.
First we said exploitation is depending
on others, that is on the sweat of others
to earn your living.	 For example you have
a shamba which people cultivate, at the
end of the year you get a due, but you don't
cultivate; or you have cars working there,
at the end you get a due, but you don't
drive them yourself ...
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One group is that of capitalists, then
there is that of the bourgeoisie who own
land and buildings.
(Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 4)
S. Hassani (Geita) appeared to voice the concern of many when he stated:
Mr. Chairman, this question of exploitation
is cracking our heads. We have been unable
to define it exhaustively, since we are not
told, how many people a plantation owner is
allowed to have on that plantation or whether
he should work on it alone.
(Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 36)
Another delegate tried to circumvent the problem of exploitation by
arguing:
Mr. Chairman, you could develop 200 acres
or more, sow seeds, when the time to weed
comes, and you have to finish weeding in a
week's time - can you (then) use the labour
of the youth around to do the job, youth
who will be employed by someone else when
they are through with your work? Is it
allowed? (applause) ... No one could say
'I have my employees', not at all.
(Ibid: 68)
It is interesting to see how the Chairman, Nyerere, answered
these questions:
What does he want to be told? Whom do you
want to help you for six months .. (laughter)
i.e. he stays for six months on your land,
why shouldn't he work on his? (laughter).
And you are the leader, you are obliged to
urge the people to better their lives, how do
they do this, if they are to work six months
for you - picking your tea? (laughter).
(Ibid: 70)
Nyerere concentrated on the personal interests which were involved in
such questions.	 He commented:
I thoughtyou'd come here to discuss about
ujamaa policy, but you have come here to
talk about your farms and your houses and
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your water supplies. (laughter).
(Ibid: 70)
He then pointed out that the condition of being a Tanu leader was that
the person had either to be a peasant or a worker. A peasant, Nyerere
pointed out, was not a farmer, who employed labour:
A peasant is a person who cultivates land
with his own hands: A Tanu leader must
be a 'peasant i ,r. one who works on land
oneself or a worker.
(Ibid: 75)
But Nyerere failed to offer an adequate explanation of how the cycle
of agricultural production could be undertaken without recourse to the
recruitment of labour.	 A few attempted to formulate the problem in
terms of agricultural production generally. 	 Thus, Rajabu Saleh Tambwe
(Tabora) had this to say:
You say yourself that, 'peasants should
expand agriculture', How do we do this?
We can plant, can we harvest? (applause).
(Ibid: 49)
Meanwhile, John Mhaville, a delegate from North Njombe pointed out that
even on an acre of tea a man and wife need labour to harvest. (Ibid: 80).
The serious implications of the prohibition of labour for agri-
cultural growth were not pursued at this Meeting because the policy of
Ujamaa in Agriculture had not been formulated at this stage. Not until
the Mwanza meeting in September of that year was the policy approved.
What is important to note, however, is that Party members in the rural
areas were concerned about the prohibition of recruitment of labour
because they were more knowledgeable about agricultural conditions.
Members of Parliament also raised issues on the direct effects of
the Leadership Code on their welfare.	 These questions, however, were
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written down, submitted to Nyerere for reply, and then published with
the replies (The Nationalist, July 1967). But unlike those of the
district Party officials, these questions related mainly to the idea
of personal monetary investments:
How can a man guarantee education for his
children in the event of his death or loss
of job if he cannot invest his savings?
If a man sells his second house, what does
he do with the money if he is not allowed
to invest it and enjoy the income from the
investment?
How can a man make provision for his old
age when he is too old to farm?
An interesting fact about these questions is that not one question was
posed in relation to the implications the Arusha Declaration would have
on economic growth.	 This is in contrast to the Party district secretaries
who at least attempted to relate the problems of agricultural growth to
the policy of the Arusha Declaration.
We have seen that throughout the period 1961-66 the role of private
local capital was criticised in Parliament. Both in Parliament and at
the Special Meeting of the Party, demands were made to nationalise private
trade, which was mainly in the hands of the Asians. 	 There were demands
expressed for the nationalisation of the wholesale trade. 	 Kasella_
Bantu, for instance, called for the nationalisation of houses (Tanu, Dar
es Salaam, 1967: 91).	 The demands to nationalise private local trade
were made again in Parliament in that year (for instance, Kwilasa, Hansard,
1967: 446), while Ali Migeyo asked the Minister of Industry:
If Tanzania is a republic and has decided
to nationalise industries it should
nationalise all of them.
(Hansard, 1967: 228)
Masaha suggested that the Ministry of Industry should not only promote
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industries but also own them itself (Ibid: 222), and Mtauka stated:
People made processions that day because
they knew fully that if the economy is
in the hands of the masses who reside in
that country, they will benefit. 	 Masses
believed :that they will get a benefit
in trade:
(Hansard, 1967: 79)
As we have seen, nationalisation of local capital was one of the major
traditional concerns of Party activists.
	 Many members thought that
state trade would lead to greater material benefits, for the consumer.
Thus for instance, in the discussion of ihe Insurance(Vesting Interests
and Regulations ) Bill, 1967, Rusimbi called for uniform pan-territorial
prices. He explained that differential prices were the result of
transportation costs, but he argued that the geographical location of
remote areas was the result of God; he therefore expressed the hope
that the Arusha Declaration would rectify differential prices (Hansard,
1967: 51).
	 In the discussion of the National Agricultural Products
Board (Vesting Interest) Bill, 1967, Magotti told the House that because
private business was taxed, it had resulted in higher prices, but since
these industries were now nationalised, they would not pay taxes, and
the price of products would, therefore, be low (Hansard, 1967: 65). This
brought the Minister of Finance immediately to his feet to inform the
House that there was no reason why state organisations should be exempted
from taxation (Hansard, 1967: 67).
The third group was mainly higher-ranking Party officials who
focussed attention on the discrepancies between the policies of the
Arusha Declaration and the goal of socialism.
	 One contradiction was
that while the Leadership Code of the Arusha Declaration prohibited
leaders from accumulating wealth, it allowed non-leaders to do so. The
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second contradiction was that the Arusha Declaration conceptualised
socialism as 'faith', which meant that people who did not believe in
socialism could opt out of its demands. Thus, for instance, Siyovelewa
argued:
It has been advocated that we as leaders
should begin, doing what? We have all
agreed to a socialist policy, we want
to give up all our property, what do we
do with those who are outside? - those
who are not leaders? You cannot argue
with a rich man, in front of a hungry
man.
(Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 55/66)
He continued:
We claim that socialism is faith, an
individual faith.
	
If this is so, there
is no need for us to hold discussions for
faith is undefinable. Faith is personal
and it differs.
(Ibid)
Meanwhile Mhando stated:
That no country in the world which after
its ruling party had decided that the
policy of the party and the government
would be socialism the people were left to
volunteer on the matter. Everywhere it
was through force.
(Tanu, 1967 DSM: 57)
By raising the problem to a theoretical level, this group was also able
to expose the contradictions within the Arusha Declaration, namely on
the one hand, its policy of socialism and on the other hand, the fact
that it left local capital unnationalised.
	 It was thus an implicit
criticism of the limited nature of the Arusha Declaration, especially in
its relation to private local capital.
For different reasons, therefore, the discussions held both at
the Special Meeting of the Party and Parliament of that year concentrated
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on matters other than the developmental implications of the policy of
Socialism and Self-reliance.
	 How do we account for this situation
where major new policies are not thoroughly discussed?
	 First, the
policy of Socialism and Self-reliance had already been formally approved
by the NEC before the discussions were held in the other forums.
	 This
limited the type of debates that could take place. On the other hand,
the continuous demands expressed for the nationalisation of private local
capital would indicate that it was not a major practice of the Party
activists to give sufficient weight to economic constraints and imple-
mentation problems in policy-making and discussions.
However, a more critical approach towards the discussion of policies
may have been limited by the fear of being ridiculed. This applied both
in the Party and in Parliament.
	 Attempts to raise serious development
implications in relation to the policies of the Arusha Declaration were
very few.	 Two instances occurred, one in Parliament and one in the
Party meetings, and both were defused.
	 We shall first consider the
type of issues that were raised in the Party.
After the President had outlined the policy of Ujamaa at the Mwanza
Annual Conference, Chief Fundikira raised issues about the relationship
between communal production and the exchange economy.
	 He explained that
communal production occurred in a traditional society because the economy
was based on subsistence.
	 He explained that the nature of subsistence
economy where food was based on use-value enable people to share the
food.
	 Likewise, houses were not made of materials which cost money but
only labour was needed to build a simple house.
	 Subsistence economy
enable people to work and live together communally (Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 125).
Fundikira pointed out that the economic conditions governing social
life had changed.
	 Money now characterised the economy. For instance,
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building a house required specialised knowledge, as well as differentiated
skills, for the different components of the house. 	 Everything had a
monetary cost.	 Food, cash crops or cattle also had monetary value. A
labourer would need to be paid with money because it offered him a
greater degree of flexibility compared with payment in kind.	 Fundikira
argued that Africa was late in developing because of the existence of
the subsistence economy:
We have been left behind by people of
other nations maybe because they had
changed their methods of farming; of
course exploitation played a part but
then, that is a different matter since
it relates to the distribution of actual
income, but I am referring to the
creation of wealth itself.
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 128)
Fundikira then spoke of the entreprq_pural characteristics of a progressive
farmer, who was able to employ labour, pay them and would have to wait a
year for his harvest.	 Within that period the rains may not have come
and he would lose.	 But labourers would prefer to have a steady income
rather than take risks.	 He added that the government could take further
measures to protect the labourer against the entrepreneur by safeguarding
their wages.
Chief Fundikira's speech illustrates the conventional view of
development, that  economic backwardness was the result ofsubsistence
economy; that exploitation was a result of the absence of redistributive
policies rather than a matter of ownership and that the major problem was
to expand production.	 But its major significance is that it attempted
to discuss the implications of the policy of communal production as
propounded by the policy of Ujamaa within the context of an exchange
economy.	 This speech was criticised by the Second Vice President Kawawa.
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The Second Vice-President pointed out Ujamaa would be different from
traditional communal production; but unfortunately he did not elaborate
further on the nature of the differences. He merely stated that:
The policy of Ujamaa is that we are
all brothers, if you all can agree that
we can live together, then we have
already become brothers.
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 139)
Kawawa rejected Fundikira's idea that bourgeois farmers were necessary
in order to produce a surplus and hence develop.	 He also rejected
Fundikira's explanations of the causes of Africas' backwardness and
said that it was the result of capitalist exploitation (Ibid: 140).
Finally he argued that discipline was indeed necessary and that:
Several meetings have set up laws of
minimum acreage, of about an acre a
person. You have got to work.
Development cannot be a matter of
personal choice only.
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 142)
Kawawa's arguments relied mainly on moralism and convictions and expressed
what might be termed a 'political' approach to development.
In Parliament a similar tendency can be observed to deflate
criticisms or attempts to examine developmental implications of policies.
Senior government officials in Parliament reminded the Members of Parliament
of the need to discipline themselves.	 For instance, Minister Bomani
specifically called for self-restraint among the MPs "to prevent
imperialist press from exploiting disagreements between Parliament and
Government, thereby sowing confusion among the public" (The Nationalist,
June 27, 1967).
An MP stated that the failure of COSATA, the urban consumer
co-operative, in 1966 was the result of lack of manpower and expressed
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the hope that a similar experience would not befall nationalisation
(Hansard, 1967: 49).
	 The Minister of Commerce, Trade and Co-operatives
admonished those who questioned how nationalisation was going to help
the peasants and workers:
We are busy shouting, we have instituted
the Arusha Declaration, we have demonstrated
and held meetings at Arnautoglu, and today
we come here and ask each other "Well, how
would this matter benefit us?"
Mr. Speaker, I fail to understand this logic
nor do I think any Tanu delegate - and they
are all Tanu delegates - can ask such questions
because this matters comes from Tanu ...
The very delegate who came from Arusha comes
here today and asks "But, how would this
help us?".
(Hansard, 1967
As the Minister implied in the above speech, such questions should have
been discussed by the Members in Arusha where the policy was passed.
This clearly indicated that Parliament was no longer the forum for the
discussion of policies. It also shows that top members of the Government
gave their support to Party policies in Parliament and did not encourage
any criticisms to emerge.
Although Government did not allow members to pose embarrassing
questions which could not be dealt with anyway in Parliament, nevertheless,
they themselves were aware of the problems. 	 For instance, the same
Minister of Commerce, Trade and
	
Cooperatives when presenting the
State Trading Corporation (Establishment and Vesting of Interest) Bill
to Parliament (as the result of the nationalisation of the import and
export firms), pointed to the need to maintain efficiency in the light
of manpower problems.	 He stated:
We are quick in shouting that we will
build socialism, we are quick in saying
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that we should nationalise certain things,
but the administering or running of these
things is the greatest problem.
And in other socialist countries, that have
passed similar actions as ours, passed a
law to the effect that anyone given these
jobs in trade by the government to administer,
if found to carry an illicit trade or
involvement in bribery, is to be shot. Why?
Because the capital involved is not an
individual's nor that of a rich man, if you
steal, you steal from the whole country, the
whole nation, and a poor nation such as ours!
(Hansard, 1967: 42)
Thus implicitly the Minister of Commerce, Trade and 	 Cooperatives was
drawing attention to the problems of management.
REASSERTION OF GOVERNMENT'S PRIORITIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
We saw that the policies of the Arusha Declaration conflicted with
Government's concerns for economic growth, especially in relation to
private capital and manpower. 	 The Party and Government discussions did
not consider the economic implications of the policy of socialism and
self reliance within the context of problems of capital and manpower.
At the same time, members in both Parliament and in the Party Annual
Conference held at Dar es Salaam pressed for the nationalisation of local
capital.	 When certain individuals did attempt to raise issues of economic
growth, they were rebuffed.
Nevertheless, the Government's concern for economic growth had not
yet lost its influence with the President. 	 In February 1967 there were
further clarifications on the policy of socialism and self-reliance which
were meant to resolve the conflict between political needs and economic
requirements.	 Whether or not the result of a direct intervention by
members of the Government, the arguments reflected the Government's
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conception of development and its priorities.
	 This suggests that
Nyerere had not abandoned totally conventional ideas on development, and
that he was still attempting to maintain a balance between the Party and
Government.
It is not surprising that the first policy paper to clarify the
Arusha Declaration policies of socialism and self-reliance was on the
role of private capital.
	 The policy paper Public Ownership in Tanzania 
stated that its aim was to "make clear the areas where public ownership
and control are required, and the areas where private investment is, and
will be, welcomed". (Nyerere, 1968: 27).
	 It began by stating that the
list of firms which was affected by the Arusha Declaration was small:
It is small because, in the words of
Norman Manley, 'You can't nationalise
nothing'.	 The potential of Tanzania is 
still undeveloped; our real task is to
develop it. For this we need hard and
intelligent work, and some capital.
(Nyerere, 1968: 254, emphasis added)
This clearly illustrates the Government's conception that the major economic
problem was to expand production and that capital was necessary.
	 The
policy paper then continued:
Does this imply that Tanzania is no longer
interested in receiving capital aid from
abroad, or in receiving private investment -
either foreign or local? It is obvious that
it does not mean that ... We shall not depend
upon overseas aid to the extent of bending
our political, economic or social policies
in the.,-lope of getting it ... But we shall try
to getg;in order that we may hasten our economic
progress, and that it may act as a catalyst to
our own effort.
Similarly with private enterprise: we have
rejected the domination of private enterprise;
but we shall continue to welcome private 
investment in all those areas not reserved
for Government in the Arusha Declaration.
(Nyerere, 1968: 254, emphasis added)
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In this way, Government was able to intervene and forestall further
nationalisations by arguing that private investment ulcks still needed.
The policy paper Public Ownership in Tanzania then outlined three
categories of ownership.	 First was wholly government-owned enterprises,
including VI/e banking, insurance and4 import-export sector.	 These had
been nationalised under the Arusha Declaration. 	 Second was joint owner-
ship ventures between Government and private investors and third was
enterprises based entirely on private investment.
The second major area in which Government reasserted its interests
was manpower.	 The same policy paper argued that ownership did not imply
management, which meant skilled staff:
But policy has to be implemented. This
is done by management and staff together,
and taking an industry under Government
ownership or control does not eliminate
the need for skilled work and astute
commercial expertise. We shall be asking
the existing managers to continue in their
present work ...
(Nyerere, 1968: 256)
Thus Government was able to reassert its concerns on the need for private
capital and manpower in development.	 As a result of this, the FIPA Act
was not repealed.	 The President accepted Government's position because
the policy paper on Public Ownership in Tanzania became a policy statement
and was included as part of the Arusha Declaration, although it was
written a month after the NEC Arusha meeting.
As a result of this policy clarification of the role of private
capital, the Government was able to make a public announcement in order
to allay the fears of private capital. 	 The Minister for Commerce,
Industry and Cooperatives, whose ministry was most involved with private
investors, addressed a	 meeting of the country's Chamber of Commerce
in Dar es Salaam and stated:
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It will perhaps help to clear the air
(he said) if I repeat the categorical
assurance already given by the President
and re-iterated in Parliament, to the
effect that the limited nationalisation
programme undertaken by the Government
has now been completed. No more national-
isation will take place: full and fair
compensation will of course be paid to
all concerned.
He stated that he was therefore able to
say that all remaining channels of
distribution, i.e. wholesale, sub-
wholesale, and retail distribution outlets
will not be affected and "there is no
need for any further speculation whatsoever
regarding their future".
(The Nationalist, February 21, 1967)
A month later, Government granted full rebates on custom duties on
imported raw materials for local industries; this was a bid to encourage
local industries to export their products but it can also be seen as an
attempt to instil confidence in private capital (The Nationalist, March 12,
1967).
Nyerere's explanation and re-interpretation of the Arusha Declaration 
In 1967 Nyerere was against the nationalisation of local capital
and his arguments reflect his conventional view of development which
supported Government's position because it took problems of implementation
and capacity as inputs into policy-making.	 For instance, in relation
to the policy of nationalising internal trade Nyerere pointed out at the
Dar es Salaam Party Annual Conference that the country lacked the capacity
to handle and distribute internal trade on a national basis; secondly,
private wholesale and retail trade offered a valuable service to the
consumer (Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 71). 	 Nyerere stated:
... these middlemen do work ... in spite
of the commission they get -even if the
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shops were government controlled still
you will need to get these people who
will take the goods to the consumer.
If you touch distribution at this stage,
the supply/circulation of goods will
cease: if you touch these distributors
who have the expertise - for every
occupation has an expert, we have several
tribes in our country ... The Sukuma are
proficient in cotton cultivation; the
Chaga and the Haya specialise in coffee;
the Masai are skilled in rkdising cattle
... and our Asian tribe are experts at
running shops ...
An Asian in a shop is equivalent to a
Masai in raising cattle (laughter). Now
to move an Asian and ask him to raise
cattle and a Masai to run a shop (laughter)
you will only do that for self-amusement -
but it is not a constructive way of running
things.
(Ibid: 104/5)
Nyerere argued that if the state were to nationalise internal trade there
would be demonstrations, not to congratulate the state but to demand,
'where is bread?' because nationalisation of internal trade would create
congestion of goods (Ibid: 71).
In his arguments against rapid nationalisation Nyerere made a
distinction between realism and idealism. He argued that to have idealism
without realism is stupidity. He stated:
A true idealist is one whose one eye
aims in the direction of his journey
and the second eye is aimed at the
path, it sees mud, thorns, ant-hills
and hills.
But the idealism of a distant vision
only is blindness for you can fall in
a pit.
(Ibid: 96)
Nyerere said that the Arusha Declaration was a policy of intent, Tanzania
was not a socialist country but it showed a vision of where Tanzania was
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intending to progress. The road towards socialism had to be negotiated
through the reality of the present situation. In this speech Nyerere
was attempting to point to the practical problems of development in
such areas as capital and manpower shortages which prevent rapid
nationalisation.	 Nyerere reiterated the same point, that of considering
the problems of capacity in policy making, when he said that, in the
formulation of the Arusha Declaration it was necessary to pose the
question, "How much can we do, how far can we go?". He then asked "Why
did we not go full-speed and nationalise everything? We cannot go full
speed, where are the lieutenants of full-speed socialism?" (Ibid: 99).
Nyerere further argued that to have gone 'full-speed' would not have been
revolutionary but it would have become adventurist and opportunisE (Ibid:
100).	 He then went on to elaborate the method of assessing capabilities
or reality and the difference between scientific socialism and adventurism
or emotionalism.
One thing I am not at variance with those
who call themselves scientific socialist
is their method of investigating the reality,
in that you do not do something because you
fancy it, no not at all, except because that
action is predicted by the state of affairs;
its determined by prevailing circumstances,
the prevailing situation: then that prevailing
situation is the determinant of your action.
You simply do not decide to act because of
your imagination. That is not science, that
is emotionalism or it is a4enturism or it is
opportunism, but it is not scientific
socialism.
If you are to study things scientifically you
have to say, I have studied and seen the
conditions as such, those I have studied and
seen as such, although my beliefs suggest so
and so, facts suggest otherwise, I therefore
choose this action on the basis of facts not
on the figment of my imagination.
That's one thing ... that I would like honourable
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Tanu members to learn, the purpose of
wanting to know the facts, - facts, facts,
do not ignore facts and make TT6Eision 
intuitively. 
(Ibid: 103, emphasis added)
In the Mwanza conference, Nyerere's Opening Speech emphasised
Tanzania's poverty and the need to expand production. 	 Tanzania's
economic backwardness and problems were viewed by Nyerere in this speech
as the result of limited production rather than in terms of exploitation
or profit appropriation.
Nyerere stated that Tanzania was a poor country and the problem
of distribution of wealth was like sharing one rabbit between 10 people:
The reason for the poverty is that we do
not produce enough, to enable all of us
to live a respectable life. We are like
10 hunters who seek to divide one tiny
rabbit ... There is no way in which to
increase our wealth except by increasing
our production.
The Government could, since it is very easy,
order the Bank of Tanzania to print lots of
bank notes and to give everyone a whole
sack of notes annually, however, this would not
be able to increase our wealth at all. You
do not increase wealth through an increase
in printing notes ....
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 40)
Nyerere here was directly speaking to the Party activists, who did not
share Government's view of development, because Nyerere continued:
Tanu leaders should realise the extent of
our poverty ... At times, people get
carried away when they see a few driving
their cars and they begin to believe that
there is great wealth in certain parts of
the country and that the poverty that
exists, is due to its unequal distribution
or exploitation ....
(Ibid: 41)
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Nyerere then stated that:
If all the wealth of this country were to
be collected together and then equally
divided to each and every Tanzanian then
everyone would get things worth 525/-
only. And the payment of this sum would
not be each month either.
(Ibid: 42)
Thus even if we were to divide our
resources our poverty would remain
the same.
There is no way we can increase our
wealth without first increasing our
produce.
(Ibid: 41-42)
This speech clearly sets out the argument that redistribution of resources
would not eliminate poverty because what was to be redistributed was very
little.	 Improvements in living standards could only come from economic
growth.	 As we have seen, this view and its arguments had been held by
the Government consistently since 1961. 	 Nyerere's speech therefore is an
implicit criticism of the Party's view of development which was wholly
based on redistribution of resources and control of the economy.
Nevertheless, Nyerere had incorporated a limited idea of redistribution,
which he had imposed on his conventional ideas of development, as can be
seen in his arguments for nationalisation and progressive taxation:
But the real problem in Tanzania is not
redistribution between the rich and the
poor, but a fair distribution of wealth,
of contribution to national expenses,
between the very poor and the poor, between
the man who can barely feed himself and
the man who can barely clothe himself.
(Ibid: 43)
Nyerere's Opening Speech in Mwanza therefore shows that he was still
operating within a conventional view of development though he had added
an element of redistributive ideas onto it.
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At the Mwanza meeting, Nyerere also made an important clarification
on the question of self-reliance.	 Certain people, he said, thought
that self-reliance meant self-sufficiency in manpower and financial
resources. It meant nothing of the kind.
	 "Self-reliance meant that
the country had to make the maximum use of available resources" (The
Nationalist, October 18, 1967).
	 Nyerere stated:
The Arusha Declaration suggested that
our aim should be to build a self-
reliant socialist state. It didn't
bring self-reliance nor socialism on
its own. We will only achieve that goal
by working intelligently and hard. The
AD did not bring miracles, nor was it a
miracle itself, it did not ad our
productivity nor bring rain when we needed
it. It did not educate people nor did it
better our situation through miracles.
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 31)
He then defined a self-reliance development strategy thus:
It means to choose a different path of
development independent of people of
foreign nations. It means to agree to
cooperate with other countries and to
be prepared to give and receive aid. It
means to accept that foreign aid can
enhance the progress of our projects.
But it also means that our (development)
path must be the one which we Tanzanians
can afford.
(Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 36)
In relation to the need for foreign manpower, Nyerere stated:
We should ask ourselves, if it is logical
to have inexperienced Tanzanians just
because they are Tanzanians, rather than
have foreign expatriates.
To employ an inefficient person just
because he is a Tanzanian when the job he
has to do is crucial for our development,
is not self-reliance it is stupidity.
(The Nationalist, October 18, 1967)
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In relation to foreign aid Nyerere stated that the Arusha Declaration
was not against aid (Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 33).
But Nyerere was against private commercial farming and was responsible
for undermining Government's policy on this matter after the Arusha
Declaration.
	 The Minister for Lands and Settlement had discussed the
problem of large-scale capitalist farms at the Cabinet and it was decided
that they were not to be nationalised but that attempts should be made
to integrate them into the national economy by making them contribute to
the building of satellite village/farms and co-operatives around their
farms.	 The Tanganyika Farmers Association agreed to assist in the
development of these satellite villages in terms of expertise and to act
as marketing agents as a means of reducing transportation bottlenecks
and infusing into village farms good husbandry methods. It appears that
this proposal was discussed and accepted in principle by the Cabinet
after the Arusha Declaration had been passed (interview with former
Cabinet Minister, June 1981).
	 This would indicate that firstly, Government
was still attempting to maintain commercial farms because of their
contribution to GDP, although the Government was attempting to integrate
commercial farming, which were enclaves, into the wider agricultural
communities, by making them contribute towards the peasant economy. But
Nyerere went to Tanga and told the Tanganyika Farmers Association that
there was no room for private farming (interview with same).
	 Since the
policy of Ujamaa was not discussed at Cabinet level, the Minister of
Agriculture continued to emphasise its traditional policy of encouraging
cash crop production for foreign exchange based on the progressive farmers:
this policy was
	 consistent with the policy of Ujamaa because Nyerere's
policy was not antagonistic to small-scale capitalist farmers (Tanu,
Mwanza, 1967: 51).
	 He stated:
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We must seek their co-operation, and
integrate them into the new socialist
agriculture by showing them that their
best interests will be served by this
development.
For energy and initiative such as these
farmers have displayed will be very
important to our progress. We need these
people, we must not (arrest the trend)
by persecuting the progressive farmers!
(Ibid)
To conclude this section, the clarifications issued on the policies
of the Arusha Declaration show that Government was very successful in
persuading Nyerere to prevent the Arusha Declaration policy becoming too
extreme, particularly in relation to the role of private local and foreign
capital, and manpower. 	 Government was successful partly because the
Party failed to take the initiative in elaborating a consistent policy
on self-reliance based on mobilisation, and it offered no solution to the
problem of shortage of manpower. 	 Government's success was also the
result of Nyerere's own acceptance of some of the Government's main
preoccupations.	 It confirms that Nyerere had not totally abandoned the
idea that economic considerations were important in development policy-
making.
CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the Arusha Declaration in this chapter raises a
number of theoretical issues which are of relevance to the Tanzanian
debate.	 In order to understand these issues it is best to view them
within the context of the theoretical discussions reviewed in the
Introduction.
We saw in the Introduction that Shivji explained Tanzania's policies
in terms of class interests. 	 He argued, for instance, that the Arusha
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Declaration policies "constituted the first open attempt on the part
of the bureaucratic sector of the petty bourgeoisie to carve out an
economic base for itself" (Shivji, 1976: 79). 	 Shivji's arguments rest
on the Marxists'theoretical approach which views the state as omnipotent
and homogeneous.
My analysis and investigation, however, indicates that the Arusha
Declaration was more complex than Shivji's propositions allow. In the
first place, it was not an act but a process. 	 There was a tripartite
system in which Government, Party and President were involved in various
ways in policy-making, had different concerns and were able to exert
different influences on the process .	 These organs were pre-occupied
with different problems and priorities, and, as the analysis of this
chapter shows, each was able to super-impose and re-interpret the Arusha
Declaration at different stages of its development. 	 Nyerere's Opening
Speech was chiefly concerned with political stability and he accordingly
gave greater emphasis to the policy of Self-Reliance and the Leadership
Code.	 The Party, however, during its discussions at the NEC, gave
•nationalisation a greater emphasis because it expressed their major
interest, control of the economy. 	 When the policies of Arusha were
clarified, the Government was successful to some extent in restoring the
centrality of problems of economic growth. 	 This process illustrates that
the state was not functioning as a homogeneous entity but rather as
different entities which were able to intervene at different stages with
different priorities in the formulation and clarification , of policy.
Von Freyhold (1979), Shivji (1976) and Saul (1979) have attempted
to explain certain policies, such as the Leadership Code which curtailed
the material interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie,in terms of the
actions of a few progressive leaders. In other words, finding certain
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policies to be inconsistent with class-interest explanations they have sought
to explain them in terms of individual actions. 	 My analysis of a
tripartite system with each organ having different priorities offers a
better explanation of such complexities because it can account for the
contradictions involved in policy-making more rationally and consistently.
As a second major point, my investigation has shown that the Arusha
Declaration policies cannot be understood in terms of class interests.
The two organs of the state held conflicting views of development. The
organ which sponsored the policies of nationalisation, namely the Party,
had in fact very little to gain in terms of class interests; and the
organ which opposedXParty's policies had more to gain from the creation
of 'an economic base for itself'.	 This being the case, it is more
fruitful to try and understand policies in terms of the view of development
a particular organ of state was sponsoring.
Throughout the analysis, I have attempted to illustrate that the
two major organs of the state held contradictory views of development.
The Government's conception of development was based on economic growth,
which was viewed as a necessary component of the process of development.
Government's major concern was to expand production, and it evolved
policies of development accordingly.	 It also considered implementation
problems as inputs into policy-making. 	 Party activists, on the other
hand, thought that re-distributive policies and control of the economy
should be considered as central developmental objectives, and they pressed
for such policies.	 The Arusha Declaration offered them their unique
chance to have nationalisation incorporated as a central element in socialist
development.	 Party activists criticised the limited aims of the Arusha
Declaration and pressed for the nationalisation of local capital.
But the President supported Government's pre-occupation concerning
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capital and manpower and this prevented a further radicalisation of
the policy.	 Thus despite the 1965 Interim Constitution which stipulated
that the Party was responsible for policy-making, Government was able to
exert its influence on policy-making. 	 This was made possible through
the President.	 This indicates that the Presidency held an important
mediating role between the two organs of the state and that his
institutional functions as head of both organs enabled him to maintain
a balance between Government and Party's demands.
Various political scientists have tended to over-simplify these
complexities of the Tanzanian political system, either by de-emphasising
conflicts (Msekwa, 1977) or by over-emphasising Nyerere's moral principles
(Pratt, 1976).	 My analysis shows that Nyerere was primarily a political
animal, able to assess political situations and to act independently of
the two organs of the state.	 The contradictory speeches Nyerere gave,
for instance at the NEC in Arusha, where he emphasised the problem of
exploitation, and at Mwanza in that same year, when he emphasised the
need to expand production, show both his dilemma and his ability to
maintain a balance between the two organs of the state. By attempting
to reduce such a complex political situation to one actor-in the case of
Msekwa, the Party and in the case of Pratt, Nyerere - these authors leave
us with an over-simplified picture of the process from which the Arusha
Declaration emerged.
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FOOTNOTE 
tke.
As withialumehE that the Niopion oT a rural-based strategy
was principally Nyerere's doing and was a reflection of Maoist ideas
on VI Ir" 3 if -11v2&E ideas had been that influential he would
have incorporated them in his opening speech. Thus although Nyerere
had always favoured a rural bias, during 1966 and 1967 his major
preoccupations were mainly with political stability.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS IN DEVELOPMENT 1969-1974
According to the standard view of recent development policy-making
in Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration is the principal watershed leading
to the adoption of more radical policies. 	 I would argue that while the
Arusha Declaration represents an important departure, a more important
turning-point comes in 1969 and 1970/71. 	 In 1969-1974, I would argue,
there was a break from the principles underlying Tanzania's policies
during the whole of the period 1962-1968. 	 The new period can be under-
stood in terms of the principle I shall call the primacy of politics in
development.
This new approach saw development in terms of class struggle: the
more class struggle there was, the more socialist development was achieved.
This proposition had two major corollaries. 	 The first was that the
Party came to be seen as the major agent in implementing socialist
development; the second was a tendency to formulate policies of develop-
ment without adequate regard to economic constraints.	 In this chapter
we shall see how the Party was strengthened to assume leadership in
socialist development and how it evolved an approach to development policy-
making which systematically underrated the importance of economic variables.
A second major element characterising the period 1969-1974 and
distinguishing it from the whole of the previous period, was the progressive
adoption in Government circles of a new view of development in terms of
removing dependency on international capitalism. 	 This view of development
received support from the President and these shifts in the Government
and the Presidency complemented the Party's orientation and the overall
-229-
move towards a more 'political' approach to development.
In this chapter we shall see how the conventional view of development
of the Government (1962-1968) progressively changed and became a minority
view within the mainstream of official thinking. 	 This group was no
longer able to influence Party policies through the President because
the latter had changed his ideas.	 Together with the overall adoption
of a 'political' approach to development, this was reflected in the types
of policies pursued during this period as well as in the principles
structuring the Second Five Year Plan (1969-1974).
POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS.
We saw in Chapter Two that the Party was a weak institution when
Tanzania achieved its independence. 	 Bienen concluded that Tanu
does not provide an institution which
can transform the economy and make
itself more effective in the process;
it is too weak and too loose and has too
few material and human resources to tackle
development problems.
(Bienen, 1967: 407)
Most of the radicals would have argued also that socialist reconstruction
required
a strong centralised party capable of
unerringly directing Government agencies
and the people towards a socialist goal.
(Cliffe, 1972b:267)
Cliffe and Saul ,for instance, emphasised the need for clarity in ideolo-
gical orientation of the Party because 'politicalisation' was viewed as
a necessary instrument in implementing socialist development:
politicalisation has appeared to be
an important aspect of the solution to many
problems of the development front, and it is
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also clear that the political party
must be the major vehicle of that
political isation.
Such a party must be characterised in
turn by an effective organisation and
ideological coherence if it is to accomplish
its twin tasks: to engage and involve the
mass of the people, while simultaneously
raising their level of consciousness -
educating them, that is, to a heightened
awareness of the context of imperialism and
'historical backwardness' within which the
development effort must take place.
(Cliffe & Saul, 1972a:323)
The same authors in the same article argued that:
... it is again evident that there is a
parallel need for further institutional
creativity - with respect, in particular,
to consolidating and clarifying Tanu's
role as an agency with responsibilities
for education, planning and implementation,
as a force for socialism, and as a framework
for popular participation, and as the core
around which a more effective front can be
structured.
(Ibid: 324)
The great stress given to the strengthening of the Party by the
radical writers was because of the types of policies they were advocating.
As we have seen in the Introduction, radical writers called for policies
based on the class struggle; the more class struggle there was, the more
socialist development the country achieved. 	 Cliffe for instance, called
for more wide-ranging and radical policies than the initial ones of the
Arusha Declaration:
If they are to contribute to an overall
strategy of socialist development, new
policies will have to be worked out for
the financial, trading and manufacturing
sector.
(Cliffe, 1972b:268)
The Party was seen as a logical agent for implementing policies based on
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class struggle.	 The analysis of the radicals as well as their emphasis
on the need to strengthen the Party appeared to be supported by polit-
ical events which occurred between 1969-1974.
The consolidation of the Party 1969 - 1974/75 
We have seen that the 1965 Interim Constitution had turned the
country into a One-Party State and it had given the Party powers to
formulate policies.	 In October 1967 the NEC was given new powers to
expel Party members.	 In 1969 an amendment to the constitution of Tanu
was effected which provided for the establishment of Tanu branches in
work-places where there were more than 50 Party members, or in Ujamaa 
villages.	 These mechanisms gave the Party means of ensuring compliance
by Party members in work-places, complementing the cell system (1965),
which ensured compliance at the point of residence. 	 Thus by 1969 the
Party had means of controlling the population's behaviour at the most
strategic points of social existence - at work and in the home.
	 Running
parallel to this strengthening of the powers of the Party, the structures
of the Party were extended down to the cell (1965) and branch (1969) levels.
Unlike in 1961, the Party by 1969 and 1970 was strong, with a growing
bureaucracy.	 Kjekshus commented on the development of the Party structures
in the following manner:
The net effect will be the expansion of
the Party bureaucracy (paid party secretaries)
to the branch level and in the industries.
This means that the central bureaucracy of
the Party, which has so far been numerically
modest in the extreme (Msekwa: 1967) will
continue to expand into the localities.
Along with the decentralised state personnel
(which may reach the ward level through the
extension services) this will add up to a
formidable bureaucratic presence. The
extensive re-organisation of settlement
patterns in large parts of the country
-232-
through Ujamaa and villagisation policies
had made the bureaucratic presence a
bigger reality at the grass roots and this
may emerge as the most decisive element in
Tanzania in the 1970s.
(Kjekshus, 1976: 2)
Finally, activities of such groups as Women, Youth, and Workers were also
placed under the Party's auspices.
In 1971 the Party issued the Guidelines (Mwongozo) which clarified
the Party's aims and role. 	 The main aim of the Party was defined as
establishing its presence at all levels within the society. Paragraphs
12-14 defined the functions of the Party in the following way:
1. defining the national goals as well as issuing
directives and guildelines of implementation.
2. politicising, organising and mobilising the people.
3. overseeing and supervising the work of all public
institutions charged with the task of implementing
the policies laid down.
4. reviewing the record of performance of these
institutions.
(Mwongozo, 1971: 4-5, emphasis added)
The Party also had control of security in the form of the proposed People's
Militia (Mwongozo, 1971: 8).	 Thus by 1971 the Party had assumed
considerable powers and functions in addition to those allowed by the
1965 Interim Constitution .	 These new functions included
directing the implementation of policies and the supervision and control
of government institutions; and the Party penetrated into matters of
security by establishing a people's . militia.	 This created a situation
of de facto Party supremacy.
Three years later in November 1974 at the National Executive Meeting
at Musoma, the NEC declared Party Supremacy and Parliament gave legal
backing to this declaration.	 Parliament passed the Interim Constitution
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of Tanzania (Amendment) Act No. 2, 1975, the relevant clause of which
read, "The functions of all the organs of the State of the United
Republic shall be performed under the auspices of the Party" (cited in
Mwansasu, 1979: 170).
The increasing intervention of the Party in public life led many
people, including the Party members themselves, to think that the Party
would replace the Government. 	 Nyerere explained the issue thus:
There are people who think that if the
Party governs it would be strong but I
say that it is not true. Should the Party
and Government merge into one, it is the
Party which gets transformed and becomes
the Government. The Government would never
be transformed and become the Party. What
is transformed is the Party and not the
Government.	 The Government has one
characteristic, it never gets transformed ...
It is possible for a country not to have a
party; but you cannot have a country without
a government.
(Mwansasu, 1979: 176)
Between 1970 and 1974 the Party was unusually active in formulating
policies.	 New policies were formulated for sectors ranging from the
nationalisation of local capital, to education, industry and agriculture.
Common themes expressed in many of these policies, particularly with
respect to the decision to nationalise local capital were to achieve
greater social equality, to increase the role of the state, to lessen
the use of market criteria and to make the Party the implementor of
socialist transformation. The conception underlying these themes was
the Party's attitude of viewing socialist development as essentially a
'political' problem.
It could be argued that the formulation of the political policies
of development as well as their implementation during this period showed
that the Party was successful in replacing Government's conception of
-234-
development as well as its priorities.	 The emphasis and priorities
in development moved away from problems of revenue generation, savings,
manpower considerations to class struggle, state control of the economy,
mobilisation and ideology.
The subordination of Government 
The Government was affected by the process which culminated in the
establishment of Party Supremacy in a number of ways. 	 First , the role
of Parliament was downgraded and it ceased to become a forum for debating
policies.	 Second, since the Party was increasingly active in policy
formulation the role of Government in policy-assessment was also made
redundant.	 Policies came to be accepted and implemented by the Government
because they were 'political' and therefore above resource considerations.
Thirdly, by making the Party supreme vis-a-vis the Government, it eroded
the political authority of the Cabinet, making it more difficult for
Government to exercise control over its own agencies. 	 This factor has
been complicated because supervision is supposed to be vested in the Party.
Parliament:	 A number of political scientists (MLpAuslan, 1972; Tordoff,
1965; Msekwa, 1977) have documented the change that had already occurred
in Parliament as a result of the 1965 Interim Constitution.	 Kjekshus
describes the consequences of the subordination of Parliament thus:
... disagreements have been muffled,
criticisms softened, and efforts made
generally to keep the parliamentary
arena open for compromise and accommodation,
with a clear expectation that MPs should
adjust to the Party's lead.
(Kjekshus, 1974: 28)
Kjekshus (1974b: 79) noted that Parliament changed from a vigorous and
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assertive institution to one which was "restricted to an august replay
of consensus themes worked out in the process of Party deliberations
of policy measures".
A few members of Parliament voiced their concern at the whittling
away of the powers of the legislature.	 For instance in 1968 Chogga
insisted:
I am telling this House that it is Bunge
which is supreme, and not Tanu
(Hansard, 1968: 34)
Meanwhile Ali Migyo stated:
For sometimes, I see that it is the Government
which is leading Tanu, and at other times,
I see that Tanu wants to lead the Government.
Therefore, when the mover of this motion
gets up to reply, I would like him to help
me understand this matter: which institution
is leading, Bunge, the Government or Tanu?
(cited in Msekwa, 1977: 48)
The Second Vice-President, Kawawa replied that "in a One Party democracy
the Party is supreme all the way" (Msekwa, 1977: 48).
In 1968 the Party expelled a number of its members. Those expelled
automatically lost their seats in Parliament.	 Hopkins explained:
Among those MP's who were most critical
according to the analysis of speeches in
1965-1966 period, by December 1968 nine
had lost their Assembly seats for political
reasons, either by virtue of being expelled
from the Party or because of political
detention or exile.
(Hopkins, 1971: 147)
This action by the Party, noted Hopkins, had a • sobering effect on others
and marked the eclipse of Parliament" (Ibid).	 Van Velzen (1973: 263)
concluded that the expulsions illustrated that "the Party had made it
abundantly clear that it would not tolerate any challenge to its supremacy";
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while Kjekshus (1974: 32) stated:
The expulsions demonstrated that the political
elite was under the absolute control of the
Party, now the ultimate judge of popular
representatives.	 They also confirmed that
the Party was the sole policy maker, and that
the Bunge had a sub-ordinate and technical
role as a legislature.
In 1971 the subordinate and technical role of Parliament was confirmed
by the Party's Guijelines (Mwongozo) which defined the role and duties
of Parliament:
1. Enacting laws
2. Supervising the Government's implementation of
various development plans;
3. Asking questions and making queries over government
and public corporations in Parliament;
4. To deliver the masses' view to Government, and
to communicate to the citizens the Government
plans and ideas;
5. To discuss and affirm the annual government
budget.
As Goulborne (1979: 22) states, Parliament's tasks were now "restricted
to rubber stamping decisions taken elsewhere because it is still, in
legal terms, the body responsible for effecting legislation of a certain
type".
The supervisory role of Parliament was also taken over by the Party.
For instance, in 1971, there was a great public outcry against shortages
of goods and a Select Committee was appointed by Parliament to investigate
these problems.	 But since then, Select Committees have not been used -
despite the magnitude of problems which people have had to endure in
many fields of life. 	 In an interview, a senior official in the Parliament
office explained that "this activity (of supervision/investigation) has
now been taken over by the Party" (interview with official in Parliament
Office, July 1981).
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The Cabinet and its relationship to the Party: 	 In principle, the Cabinet
is the nerve-centre of Government. The Cabinet is the mechanism which
allows for the co-ordination of activities within the Government and is
responsible for the implementation of the policies of the Party as well
as those formulated by the Government itself.	 Within the Cabinet there
is an Economic Commission of the Cabinet (ECC) composed of the most
strategic ministries such as those of the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture,
Economic Development and Planning, and Industry. 	 The chairman of the
ECC is the President.
Since 1965, the Cabinet has been required to report to the Party
through the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee;
if there are any problems in a particular portfolio, then the Minister
concerned is called to explain in the Central Committee and these explan-
ations reach the National Executive which in turn gives guidance (interview
with senior civil servant, June 1981).
	
In 1970 this mechanism of
communication was strengthened when the Party decided that all major
government decisions and all Cabinet papers must be sent to the Chief
Executive Secretary of the Party (interview with Party official, July 1981).
Thus, by the early 1970s the Party had the right to interview senior
government officials over specific issues, to have access to official
,
documents and to see Cabinet papers.
The Government on the other hand, had no reciprocal rights vis-a-vis
the Party.	 It could not question or discuss policy-making with the
Party:
No Government view is represented in the
Party. If a Minister happens to be at
policy level, and gives his opinion, he
will do so as an individual, not as
Government.
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Government as such cannot have a view
which is separate from the Party; this
would be a contradiction.
(interview with senior Government
official, June 1981)
The increasingly real separation of functions between policy-making and
implementation between the two organs of the state effectively isolated
the Government from influencing policy-making in Tanzania during 1969-1974.
This meant that the agent which was most knowledgeable about the economy
was, in fact, excluded from policy-making.
	 While Government might have
limited influence over those policies which reached Cabinet for discussion
in terms of planning their implementation (Hyden, 1979a:100)it had no
control whatsoever over policies passed and implemented by the Party but
which affected production.
Finally the form of 'consultation' conducted by Party officials with
individual senior Government officials over specific issues was often
resented by the latter because it was often carried out as if it were an
interrogation (interview with senior Government officials, July 1981).
This method of 'consultation' was also ineffective from the point of view
of the Party.	 According to a Party official, the Government official
consulted over a certain policy would not give a true picture of the
implications involved because of fear of opposing a powerful Party
individual who might be sponsoring that particular policy (interview with
Party official, July 1981). 	 We can conclude that while the Cabinet's
• effectiveness was greatly reduced as tha result of the new arrangements,
the types of co-ordination between the Party and Government based on
'interviews' was ineffective for both organs of the state.
The effectiveness of the Cabinet as an institutional mechanism for
evolving policies as solutions to problems, for co-ordinating and planning
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policies in relation to expenditure and manpower considerations, and for
considering the very complex issue of timing within a political, social
and economic context, had been made virtually redundant. 	 Furthermore,
not all Party policies reached the Cabinet for discussion even in terms
of implementation.	 Thus the policies of Ujamaa (1967), Villagisation
(1973) and Politics is Agriculture (1972) were not sent to the Cabinet
for discussion at all.	 Universal Primary Education (1976),the
Socialisation of Trade Policy (1967-1979) and Mwongozo (1971), on the
other hand, were sent to the Cabinet for discussion and implementation.
In the case of Mwongozo (1971) the policy went to the Cabinet because of
the legal aspects of establishing a people's militia. 	 There were no
firm criteria.	 It appears that if a basic policy had complicated
implications in terms of finance, law or manpower requirements, then it
would go before the Cabinet.	 But the discussion of those policies which
did go to the Cabinet would not focus on the principle involved in the
policy but rather on the logistics of its implementation in relation to
the How, When and Where inputs (interview with State House official,
June 1981).	 This meant that the Government could not influence the
principle of the policy even though it might conflict with problems of
implementation.	 It also meant that since policy formulation was outside
the control of Government, the Government was unable to conduct research
as a prelude to policy changes or to evaluate the validity of the policy
in terms of the problem to be solved.
The Cabinet and its relationship to Government agencies: 	 The normal
procedure under which the Cabinet operates in relation to its responsibilities
for sub-policy-making, is that a particular ministry which is concerned
with implementing a policy or sub-policy drafts a three-page paper outlining
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the problem and how the particular policy sets out to alleviate it.
The draft has to outline the financial requirements of the policy.
This draft is then submitted to the ECC Secretariat 14 days prior to
the meeting of the Cabinet.	 The draft is also circulated to all the
ministries for comments prior to being discussed at the Cabinet meeting.
This procedure allows for the views of the other ministries as well as
comments from the ECC Secretariat to be taken into consideration at
the Cabinet meeting (interview with senior Government official, July 1981).
This method allows for the co-ordination of policy-activities, expenditure
allocations and planning of resources.
One of the main roles of the Cabinet is its supervisory functions
over ministerial responsibilities. 	 Once the Cabinet has made a decision,
the ministry concerned has to implement it and inform the Cabinet of its
progress.	 Equally, each ministry which is a parent to a parastatal
organisation has the duty to inform the Cabinet of the progress or problems
of the parastatal.	 In this way, the Government knows of the exact
progress and problems of each policy and of each sector of the economy.
It would appear, however, that this procedure was not adhered to.
According to a well-placed source, many ministries failed to inform the
Cabinet of the progress of their parastatals, or a specific policy or
project which was adopted by the ministries themselves.	 Another common
problem was the tendency of certain ministries to jump the procedure of
obtaining approval from the Cabinet and seek support for their policies
_
from the President.	 As most policies have financial implications, the
practice has come to defeat the whole principle of planning because it
allows for the mushrooming of resources from left, right and centre in an
uncoordinated, unchecked and unplanned fashion. 	 This practice has come
to reduce the value of the Cabinet as a coordinating mechanism in
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development.
The Cabinet had also changed its methods of policy-consideration.
The following interview illustrates the change that has occurred:
Q. What factors are decisive to make
the Cabinet reach a decision.
A. Let us give the Minister a try.
It also depends on his presentation and
ability to answer questions ... so the
meeting decides.
Q. Can you give me an example of such Cabinet
decisions?
A. Yes. Before 1971, we had Marketing Boards, which
were mainly involved in only one activity, namely the
marketing of cash crops for exports abroad. In 1971
the Minister for Agriculture and his Principal Secretary
presented a Cabinet paper which argued that it would be
a good idea to have one organisation which would deal
and specialise with all aspects of a particular crop,
that is, from its research on seed development, to
production and marketing.
The Cabinet thought it was a good idea and the
Marketing Boards were dissolved and Crop Authorities
were instituted.
(interview with senior Government
official, July 1981)
Discussions of major policies as well as the actual policy-decisions were
not made in the context of resources or capacity-considerations, but were
takon on the basis of personal convictions.
	
Another example which may
fall within this category is the policy of the Village Training Programme
for Village Management (1976).
	 The policy-recommendation argued that
one of the major causes for village economic problems was the absence of
expertise at the village level.
	 Villages suffered from skill-deficiencies,
because expertise was located mainly at the centre, regions and districts.
The draft paper outlining the policy argued that there was a need to bring
expertise to bear on production, which is located at village-level.
According to a well-placed official, most of the strategic ministries
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concerned with revenue-generation such as the Ministries of Agriculture,
Treasury, Industry and Mines and the State House, voiced their concern
because the programme involved increasing the bureaucracy and increasing
expenditure.	 These twin problems had become acute enough during this
period for the Director of Planning to have instructed all ministries
to cut down their expenses.	 But despite this recommendation, the
programme was adopted.	 Such practices have made it difficult for the
Government to reduce recurrent expenditure in order to increase development
expenditure.	 Thus the Cabinet itself appears not to have been exempt
from the practice of formulating sub-policies in isolation from the
concrete capabilities of the nation.
One explanation which may account for this weakness is that the
Cabinet as a Cabinet is no longer a powerful institution even vis-a-vis
its own agencies. A second reason is that there is a tendency for policies
to be identified with particular personalities and there has been a switch
from a collective form of decision-making based on research to personalised
debates.	 This has weakened the Cabinet's authority. 	 Under the new
situation there is a lot of lobbying for a certain policy, thus turning
sub-policies into 'political' issues. 	 It would appear that ministers
who have reservations about policy proposals are afraid of speaking their
minds more forcefully for fear of creating ill-feelings among their
colleagues; they may give their professional advice as to the likely
consequences of a policy but they are unlikely to fight or oppose a policy
to an extent of having it reversed (interview with senior Government
official, July 1981).
We can therefore conclude that the Cabinet during this period was
not an effective institution and it lacked the powers and authority to
assert its control and discipline its own governmental agencies. Ministries
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and other government agencies do not consider that the Cabinet is an
institution with powers to discipline them.
Sub-policies changed by Government to accommodate Party's ideology: occasion-
ally the Government attempted to change previous policies and practice
to accommodate the political guidelines defined by the Party. 	 For
instance, in 1974 there was a resolution by Government for a multi-purpose
agricultural staff, to bring it in line with the ideology of the country
as propounded by the Musoma Declaration.
Our curricula and our trainiv19 system as
a whole should respond to changing needs
and changing circumstances in our country.
Our curricula should particularly respond
to changes in our rural setting and rural
development strategies.	 Following the
Arusha Declaration, Musoma Declaration,
for example changes , had to be made
in our curricula to take account of the new
policy changes.
(Kilimo, 1980a)
Under the previous system of training in extension servicesfor agricultural
students, 80% of the content of the curriculum was devoted to basic
agricultural science. It was based on a two year training 13Y-05"--''e-.
This system was changed to one which combined Agricultural and
Veterinary courses into one combined course, the 'Agro-Vet' Service course.
As a result, the teaching materials for each course were.severely reduced
so as to combine two separate disciplines into one course. 	 But the
training period for the new course remained the same as in the previous
system.	 The aim of the two combined subjects was meant to simplify
the work of the extension worker in a manner which would enable him/her
to cope with all agricultural and livestock problems. 	 It was also hoped
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that such an inter-disciplinary approach would help the peasants by
reducing the burden of making him contact so many specialised extension
officers. (Kilimo, 1980a).
The decision to rationalise through amalgamating developmental
functions calls to mind the arguments used for the creation of the
Crop Authorities.	 It stems from a view of development which gives
little importance to specialisation of functions and to professionalism
as well as economic concerns such as efficiency and capacity.
Party attitudes towards policy-making 
The consolidation and growth of the Party during this period was
accompanied by an increasing role of the Party in policy-making. The
policies of the period were aimed at solving a variety of problems;
nevertheless a common feature was the 'political' character of the policies,
in the sense that 'political' considerations were given predominance over
economic ones.
Rapid Nationalisation:	 We have seen that immense pressures were
exerted by Party activists in favour of the nationalisation of local capital.
In 1967 Nyerere had rejected the policy of rapid nationalisation because
of implementation problems (Tanu, Dar es Salaam, 1967: 114). 	 But the
bitter attacks against the Asians continued to be expressed by the Party
activists throughout the 1969-1971 period as shown in both Party meetings
and in Parliament. 	 Thus:
Kassella Bantu: The Indians exploit us too much
and you are afraid of the Indians.
(Tanu, 1970: 184, cited in Mfupe,1976;
Mhando:
	
It is better to disturb one's wound
than to have it disturbed by somebody
else.
(Tanu, 1970: 180, cited in Mfupe, 1976
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Similar attacks against the Asians were also voiced in Parliament. For
instance, Kwilasa called for the nationalisation of wholesale trade
and of houses (Hansard, 1969: 92).
By 1969 the President appeared to have accepted the principle of
rapid nationalisation.	 Thus:
Wholesale trade will be nationalised and
retail trade too will be under co-operatives
in villages...
These co-operatives will gradually take over
retail trade (applause) after proving that
they have the ability to serve the people well.
(Tanu, 1969: 38)
A year later in 1970 wholesale trade was nationalised. The President
explained the nationalisation of wholesale and sub-wholesale trade in
terms of "preventing a small group of people from controlling a large
section of the economy on which people depend" (The Nationalist, February 6,
1970).	 Between 1971 and 1974 citizen-owned industries and rented
buildings were nationalised.
Mwongozo: 1971:	 Although Mwongozo did emphasise the importance of
economics in such issues as conserving foreign exchange, and savings
(Mwongozo, 1971: 10) nevertheless, its greatest impact was on workers
relations vis-a-vis management.	 In 1971 the Party passed the policy
of Mwongozo which superseded the Workers' Council established in 1969.
The aim of Mwongozo was to give workers rights and powers to control their
own production process.	 Para. 28 of Mwongozo illustrates the emphasis
given to 'political' considerations:
For people who have been slaves or have
been oppressed, exploited and disregarded
by colonialism or capitalism, 'development'
means 'liberation'. Any action that gives
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them more control of their own
affairs is an action for development,
even if it does not offer them better 
health or more bread.	 Any action that
reduces their say in determing their own
affairs or running their own lives is
not development and retards them even if
the action brings them a little better
health and a little more bread - if
development is to benefit the people, the
people must participate in considering,
planning and implementation of their own
development plans.
(T.A.N.U. Guidelines, 1971: 9,
emphasis added)
One of the major reasons for Mwongozo was to replace economic
criteria in production with a political approach.	 The Party aimed to
achieve this through the workers. As Hyden states, "the party leadership
were in the position of forcing the managers to obey political instructions
or otherwise be exposed and forced to quit".	 (Hyden, 1980: 1959). It is
worth noting in passing that Saul saw Mwongozo as a crucial document in
crystallizing worker consciousness and in legitimizing, even demanding,
the unleashing of popular pressures against oligarchical tendencies on
the part of wielders of state power ("leaders") (Saul, 1979: 186). Shivji
too saw Mwongozo as the product of the most left-wing members of the Party
who were able to push through officially radical policies (Shivji, 1976: 125).
Decentralisation, 1972:	 The policy of Decentralisation was initiated by
the President as Head of the Government rather than by the Party.
Decentralisation was a popular idea in the 1960s because of the need felt
by many African countries -Cor a new system which would have a greater
capacity to solve problems (Rweyemamu & Hyden, 1975: 150). In 1960sthePresident
instructed Nsekela, a senior civil servant, to make a study of the
possibility of introducing decentralisation in Tanzania. The recommendation
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given by Nsekela was against decentralisation. 	 But the idea was again
revived in the 1970s and this time the Government commissioned the US
McKinsey Corporation to undertake the study. 	 They were given different
terms of reference and the consultants recommended decentralisation
(interview, senior Government official, July 1981).
Them were basically two major reasons for decentralisation.
	 The
first was the concern for solving local problems which were made difficult
in a vast territory with poor infrastructural facilities:
The centre of power and supervision was
in Dar es Salaam and these could not
supervise local problems efficiently.
In addition, when you went to Dar es
Salaam to consult over a problem ...
it was also a problem, because you had
to consult different ministries, Maji
(Water), Kilimo (Agriculture) and there
was no centre as such but rather centres
of power, which again aggravated the
problem of implementation. Accountability
should also be closer to the people.
(Interview with Regional Commissioner,
July 1981)
The second reason was to enhance the effectiveness of the Party in
development.	 Hyden explains that "in Zambia and Tanzania the problem
was tackled by allowing stronger party control over the administration
at the regional, district or local levels" (Rweyemamu& Hyden ,1975: 150). Theaim
was to enhance the capacity of the political leaders to implement development;
"for the first time, there was a strong, well-paid party bureaucracy at
regional, district, divisional, and ward level" (Coulson, 1982: 254). The
Regional Commissioners had access to the technical know-how of the
representatives of the technical ministries who were now based in the regions.
A Prime Minister's Office was created to co-ordinate all decentralised
planning and administration in the regions. 	 The ministries based in
Dar es Salaam were excluded from regional development. 	 Government
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therefore changed the administrative structures to enhance Party
leaders' roles in development.
Politics is Agriculture, 1972:	 At the NEC meeting in Iringa the Party
adopted the policy of Politics is Agriculture, which called for all
political leaders to learn the basis of good husbandry in their areas so
that they could give the peasants practical assistance in addition to
exhortation • This policy restated the need to increase production of
food crops and cash crops.
Re-location of the Capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, 1973:
	 Another
major decision taken by the Party was to move the capital from Dar es
Salaam to Dodoma.	 This idea was proposed by Joseph Nyerere in the
Parliament of 1966 but the Minister for Economic Affairs and Development
Plan argued against the proposal on the basis that "many other productive
projects would have to be stopped and neither Dodoma nor Dar es Salaam
would benefit" (The Nationalist, March 1st, 1966).
But in 1972 the decision to move the capital to Dodoma was revived
by the Party, and after "careful considerations" (Msekwa, 1977: 52), it
was decided that:
The NEC resolves that the capital be
moved to Dodoma and that the move be
completed within a period of 10 years.
This decision is final and the Government
is hereby directed to take immediate
action for its implementation.
(Msekwa, 1977: 53)
There were two major reasons which appear to have promoted the decision to
transfer the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma. 	 The first was security.
It was believed that Dar es Salaam, being a port, was more vulnerable to
attack.	 This view may have received extra credibility when Guinea
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was invaded by mercenaries in 197/
	 The second and more important
reason, however, was that the Party felt that there was a need to
'weld together' the various regions and to look 'inward' rather than
'outward' to neighbouring countries (interview with senior Government
official, July 1981).
The Musoma Declaration, 1974: 	 The Party passed the Musoma Declaration
at the NEC meeting in 1974 when it met to discuss the success and failure
in implementing the policy of Education for Self-Reliance (1967).
	 The
rulings at Musoma were that:
a] universal primary education be achieved within three
years, that is, by November 1977;
b] secondary education should be expanded and curricula
should be diversified and opportunities for vocational
training multiplied so that secondary level institutions
could better provide terminal education;
c] for academically eligible students entry into university
should not occur immediately after Form 6, but only
after the student has completed two years in a job and
received a satisfactory report from his employer and
his Tanu branch; and
d] less weight should be given to final examination.
(cited in World Bank, 1977:1:36)
The Musoma Declaration illustrates the traditional concern of the
Party for redistributive policies and for asserting its control over
public affairs.	 The call for universal primary education to be completed
within three years was brought about because of the policy of limited
villagisation which was taking place between 1971-1973. 	 New villages
requested schools for the children and the Party had to meet these needs
(interview with senior Party Official, July 1981).	 But there was also
an element of control in the Musoma Declaration, especially in relation
9° 410
to secondary school graduates aspiring to/university. 	 Goulbourne has
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explained the element of control in the following manner: "The Party
is strategically placed as gateman into the University without in fact
seeming to directly impinge on the internal autonomy of the educational
system" (Goulbourne, 1979: 14).
Party resolutions:	 The Tanu Guidelinesof 1971 (Mwongozo) made two
resolutions: these were that the basic social services must be equitably
distributed throughout the country, and secondly, that there should be an
increase in Government planning effort and financial allocations in regions
with low per capita incomes. (see Annual Plan 1971/72, 55 para 2). 	 These
resolutions clearly reflected the Party's priorities 	 of redistributive
policies.
A major characteristic of the policies of this period was an apparent
disregard for economic considerations. In particular, the problem of
increasing recurrent expenditure for the Government and the shortage of
manpower were not considered as constraints on policy-making. Moreover,
increasing production was de-emphasised in relation to the goal of creating
socialist organisations. 	 This de-emphasis occurred in both the two main
productive sectors, agriculture and industry, with the policies of Ujamaa 
and Mwongozo respectively.	 A similar tendency can be observed in the
Musoma Declaration where educational criteria were subordinated to
ideological ones, and manpower considerations and financial constraints
were set aside in setting a timetable for meeting social needs.
It is on this basis that I have argued that the period 1969-74 can be
understood in terms of the principle of the primacy of politics in development.
As already explained, the new approach saw development in terms of the
class struggle, and the Party's role was to formulate policies which
furthered the class struggle and the raising of class consciousness. 	 By
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this method the Party believed that it was transforming the economy into
a socialist country.	 Nyerere summarised the situation correctly when
he explained:
But we are a One Party State. It is the
Party as defined in the Constitution which
lays down the policies on the basis of which
we legislate and run the Government of this
country ...
By practice our Party leads the nation.	 The
Arusha Declaration, Mwongozo, Politics is
Agriculture, the Policy of Small Industries,
the emphasis on irrigation, Decentralisation,
the recent educational changes, all stem from
our recognition that the Party is the real
leader of the country.
When the Party has laid down a policy our custom
is to make every effort to implement that policy.
Our laws, our administration, our various
endeavours to expand the economy and so on are
all intended to implement the policies of the
Party and all involve a recognition that the
Party has a right to supervise that imple-
mentation. This has been our belief; this
has been our practice.
(Nyerere, 1975)
THE INFLUENCE OF DEPENDENCY THEORY ON GOVERNMENT
We have seen in the Introduction that the University of Dar es Salaam
was greatly influenced during the late 1960s and early 1970s by the
dependency perspective.	 It created an intellectual climate in which
more sophisticated forms of interpretation of the ideas of socialism and
self-reliance were able to flourish. 	 Intellectually inclined leaders
such as the President and Minister Babu were susceptible to this intellectual
climate.	 But dependency ideas were also able to penetrate the estab-
lishment in a more direct manner.	 This was through the recruitment of
university-trained intellectuals into the Government. The most prominent
of these, J. Rweyemamu, was appointed the Economic Adviser of the President
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in 1971.
We saw in the Introduction that Rweyemamu called for a capital
goods industry in his book Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania 
(1973) and argued that such a strategy would enable Tanzania to break out
of her dependent status and create a national independent economy. This
strategy known as the Basic Industrial strategy or BIS, was incorporated
into the Third Five Year Development Plan (1975-1980) and forms the basis
for the long-term 20-year plan of 1981-2000 (Long Term Plan, 1981-2000).
The aim of BIS was to re-structure production and eliminate dependence
on outside forces; industry was seen as the principal agent of structural
transformation and self-reliance. 	 The colonial pattern of trade
fostered dependence; it resulted in an economic structure in which
Tanzania produced what it did not consume and consumed what it did not
produce.	 The aim of the BIS was to transform the structure of the economy
by bringing production and consumption into line, by using domestic
resources for domestic needs. 	 The basic needs of food, shelter, clothing,
health services, transportation and capital goods would all be produced
by using domestic resources as far as possible.'
	 In this way a direct
link came to be established between the ideas of dependency and actual
policies.
The second type of influence of the dependency thesis on Tanzania
can be seen in the methodology of analysing economic problems which was
increasingly adopted.
	 The following is a quotation from the Economic
Survey 1970-71 in its review of the first year of the Second Plan 1969-
1974:
Continuing the trans	 ion from a lop-sided
economy to an internarly integrated national
economy, the period since the Arusha
Declaration has been of great progress. Out-
standing changes have taken place in three
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broad fronts.	 Firstly, public ownership
of the major means of production and
financial institutions has proceeded apace,
culminating more recently in public owner-
ship of the wholesale trade and the major
rental properties. Secondly, there have been
rapid institutional and structural changes
essential for the socialist transformation
in the economic, cultural and social fields.
Thirdly, the country has been investing at
an accelerating rate in its basic social and
economic infrastructure, concentrating on
Primary and Secondary schools, higher education,
highway bridges and other forms of transport-
ation, water supply, storage electric power
and administration.
There was a healthy decline in foreign private
investments in areas where this was deliberately
discouraged as part of the national policy.
Self-reliance became more of a reality over the
years although a great deal remains to be done
in order to fully implement our policy of self-
reliance and economic integration with a view of
redressing the still excessively externally-
orientated economy inherited from our colonial
past.
(URT, 1971: 1)
The above quotation shows the unmistakable influence of dependency ideas
replacing conventional ideas of development in the Government's analysis
of problems of economic development.
Government proponents of the dependency theory (who viewed Tanzania's
links with the world market as a sign of its dependency and as exploit-
ative) were a source of worry to those members of Government who were
concerned about Tanzania's foreign exchange reserves. 	 For instance,
the Minister of Finance tried to explain that socialist development in
an economy like Tanzania could not be equated with fewer links with the
world market because of the need for foreign exchange. 	 External trade
was essential for development. Minister Jamal stated in 1969:
The smaller the size of the economy
the more dependent a country is on
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external trade both for purpose of
survival and for development.
(Hansard, 1969: 430)
Minister Jamal pointed out that foreign exchange was:
the surest guarantee of our independence
of actions and, in fact, of our ability
to pursue a self-reliant economic policy
insulated from short-term fluctuations
in our export earnings, or temporary set-
backs in our efforts to secure external
finance on the most advantageous terms
possible.
... We have accepted obligations for the
future which must be discharged through
increased productivity and increased
production, particularly for exports.
and:
We shall not pretend that self-reliance and
self-sufficiency are one and the same thing.
We recognise that they are not, and we know
we are increasingly part of an inter-dependent
world.
(Ibid: 430-439)
Jamal's arguments for the need --o‘r* exports shows that he was attempting
to convince an audience in Parliament which thought that exports were
not essential for a self-reliant and socialist economy. 	 Equally, the
Bank of Tanzania (BUT) re-affirmed continuously the need for exports.
Thus:
The main problem (of balance of payments)
in this connection is the fact that the
country has not yet achieved a sustained
and high rate of growth of exports.
Above all, there is really a need for a
dynamic export drive both for our traditional
exports and particularly for our manufactureCL oocls.
(Bank of Tanzania, 1972: 10)
A more urgent message was again repeated by the Bank of Tanzania in 1973:
Furthermore, it is a matter of some concern
that local production has not been expanding
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at a satisfactory rate. Although industrial
production has been gaining in some lines,
agricultural production remains virtually 
stagnant. Money supply has also continued
to rise rather too strongly. Experience
in other countries would indicate that if
such a development is not matched with
increased output soon enough , it would
start causing difficulties by way of price
increases. For the time being it is
possible to meet the situation through
price controls. In the long run, however,
it is difficult to hold prices in check
in this manner.
In the opinion of the Bank it is necessary
to step up production in the economy to
prevent the possibility of a widespread
inflation. For this, it is necessary to
increase investment in the economy, partic-
ularly of the quick-yielding type, and also
to raise labour productivity. In this
connection it is necessary to re-consider 
the role of foreign exchange in the economy.
(Bank of Tanzania, 1973: 11,
emphasis added)
In 1974 the Bank of Tanzania's Economic and Operations Report again stated
that "A consistent export strategy has ... been lacking" (1974: 9).
It would, therefore, appear that between 1969-1974 - apart from
the Minister of Finance and the Bank of Tanzania - there was no clear
appreciation in Government circles of the role of foreign exchange in
development.	 The absence after 1969 of such a crucial policy as one for
promoting exports can only be explained rationally by the influence of
the dependency thesis, which was unable to reconcile the ideology of
socialism and self-reliance with the economic realities of increased links
with capitalist economies and the world market.	 The co-existence of
the two views of development, namely the dependency and the conventional
views, would indicate that between 1969-1974 the Government's conception
of development was no longer homogeneous, as it had been between 1962-1967.
The dependency thesis was the most popular and appeared to be the
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ideologically acceptable view of development. This was so, first,
because Nyerere was himself sympathetic to such ideas as his speeches
will illustrate, and because it had affinities with the ideology of
socialism and self-reliance.	 The conventional view of development as
expressed by Jamal and the Bank of Tanzania was considered during this
period reactionary.
NYERERE'S CHANGED CONCEPTION OF DEVELOPMENT
We have seen that up to 1969 Nyerere still held a conventional view
of development. Onto that theory, from mid-1965, he added a new element;
without abandoning conventional ideas about economic growth and the
need for private capital, he added a re-distributive element.
	 In 1967,
in the Arusha Declaration policies, Nyerere was still maintaining that
balance.	 The theoretical balance he maintained was one dimension of
political balance he was holding between the Government and the Party.
But from 1969 onwards, Nyerere abandoned this balance - both
politically and theoretically. 	 At a theoretical level, Nyerere began
to work within a dependency framework.	 In 1969 he assumed that external
capital created economic underdevelopment and that class struggle was
essential to bringing about socialist development. 	 From 1970 onwards,
he continued to favour the dependency view, but now in a form which gave
less emphasis to class struggle.
The Presidential Circular 1/69 on Ujamaa illustrates that Nyerere's
ideas on socialist development had radically changed, especially on rural
development.
	
We saw that in 1967 when Nyerere introduced the policy of
Ujamaa at the Tanu Annual Conference in Mwanza, he had stated that the
progressive farmers were not to be persecuted and that Ujamaa was to be
voluntary.	 On this basis, I argued, that the policy of Ujamaa as outlined
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in 1967 was still able to accommodate the Government's need for agri-
cultural growth, which was dependent on the progressive farmer. It also
showed that Nyerere in 1967 still thought in terms of conventional ideas
of economic growth.
Two years later, however, Nyerere had changed his mind. The
Presidential Circular on Ujamaa looked upon the progressive farmers as
an obstacle to the creation of Ujamaa villages and called for discrim-
ination against individual producers in terms of inputs, credits, etc.,
in favour of Ujamaa villages:
We have to give (Ujamaa Villages) priority
in all our credit, servicing and extension
services - at the expense of the individual 
producer if necessary.
Co-operative farming and production must be
looked upon as the main source of economic
growth in the rural areas - where the vast
majority of our people live and work and will
continue to live and work in the foreseeable
future.
All Government policies should be argued at
. discouraging the continuation of private
individual farming.
(Collins, 1971: 3.22)
The policy of Ujamaa in 1969 was a different policy from that of 1967
in two crucial areas. 	 First, it discriminated against the progressive
farmers, and second, the creation of Ujamaa villages was to be imple-
mented throughout the country in a "frontal attack" (1969-74: xvii).
It would appear that in proceeding with the Presidential Circular,
Nyerere rejected the advice given by his economic advisors. We know for
instance, that Rene Dumont's report Tanzanian Agriculture after the Arusha 
Declaration (1969) can be seen as an anticipated and implicit criticism
of Presidential Circular 1/69. 	 For instance, the report considered
progressive farmers as "a group indispensable for the modernisation of
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agriculture" (Dumont, 1969: 3) and as "capable of setting in motion the
progress of the whole agricultural community, if they are not discouraged"
(Ibid: 11).
In relation to private farming, Dumont wrote:
such private investment seems to us highly
desirable. In this country, people have
too much taken to the habit of thinking
that the State should provide for nearly
all investments. As its resources are and
always will be very limited, such an
attitude holds up general progress.
One must therefore try and encourage -
especially at the present stage of development
- the said private investments, which here
are of a family and not of a capitalist
character.
(Ibid: 23)
Finally:
Development requires that people can become
rich to a certain extent by hard and
prolonged work and by economy.
(Dumont, 1969: 34)
Dumont's report was an attempt to restate the economic benefits accruing
from the encouragement of progressive farmers.
Nyerere also rejected the advice given to him by senior government
officials.	 According to Pratt:
... those people who were involved in the
planning of the Second Development Plan,
such as Jamal, Msuya, Dickson Nkembo,
Brian van Arkadie, Hellen,jer, Svendsen,
warned the President that a 'frontal'
approach to ujamaa was beyond the
capability of both the government and
the Party and that the smallscale peasant
farming was more efficient and compatible
with socialist strategy.
(Pratt, 1972: 424)
Finally, I was unable to find any clear evidence to show that the pressures
for the Presidential Circular 1/69 came from the Party.
	 This was in
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contrast to the pressures leading up to the nationalisation of trade,
which are documented in Party and parliamentary debates.	 It seems,
therefore, that there were few pressures and little favourable advice
given to the President from either the Party or Government on this issue.
A possible exception was the analysis of the radicals at the
University of Dar es Salaam. 	 They did identify the progressive farmer
as an exploiter and as an obstacle to the creation of Ujamaa villages
(Cliffe, 1973: 2: 203) and they concluded that more 'radical' policies
were required to eliminate capitalist social relations of production.
Just how directly the radicals at the University influenced Nyerere's
thinking remains a matter for conjecture.
In 1969 Nyerere also began to place greater emphasis on the creation
of a socialist organisation even if this might lead to decline in
production:
For example, when we were giving aid, we
aided industrious peasants who has developed
100 or 200 acres, and has employed labourers.
We therefore make him a modern farmer, at that
time we were bent on production and not on the
manner of production.	 This situation has
changed...
The Ujamaa policy introduced by the Party in
October 1969 marked the beginning of this
change. This change has clearly shown that,
this new plansbasic aim is villagisation in
a socialist way.
(Tanu, 1969: 25; also see
Plan 1969-1974: ix)
As the above quotation illustrates, Nyerere had accepted changed priorities
in development.	 The change from his traditional concern with immediate
economic benefits to long-term political goals can also be seen in Nyerere's
ideas when he compared the opponents of relocation of the Capital from
Dar es Salaam to Dodoma with peasant opponents of villagisation.
	 Both,
he said, "put a permanent house and a good shamba" before "the long-term
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benefits of living together" (cited in Department of Sociology, University
of Dar es Salaam, 1980: 31).
	
Nyerere's new conception of development
incorporated an element which de-emphasised immediate economic benefits
for deferred political goals. 	 From 1970 onwards, finally, Nyerere
began to voice ideas which were very close to the ideas of dependency
writers.	 First, international capitalism was rejected because it did
not allow for national independence for third worldeconomies, since it
led to foreign owned and controlled interests in the peripheries. Second,
capitalism was rejected on a class basis, because it led to exploitation
of the workers:
Indeed,(Africa) often discovers that there
is no such thing as a national economy at all!
Instead, there exists in its land various
economic activities which are owned by people
outside its jurisdiction, which are directed
at external needs, and which are run in the
interests of external economic powers.
(Nyerere, 1976: 5)
For the purpose of capitalist enterprise
is the making of profit. To do this, the
capitalist must keep his costs of production
as low as possible, and get the maximum
return from the sale of the products. In
other words, he must pay the lowest wages
for which he can get workers, and charge the
maximum price at which he can sell the goods
produced.
(Nyerere, 1978)
Thus dependence on international capitalism was postulated in terms of
creating obstacles to the emergence of a national economy.
Economic growth which was considered to be the pre-condition to
development before 1967 was now considered unfavourably thus:
... there are Third World countries which
accept their neo-colonial status, and even
glorify in it. They point to the statistics
of their Gross National Product as an example
of what can be gained from it - rather in
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the manner of a high class prostitute
glorifying in her furs and jewels.
(Nyerere, 1976: 6)
The point to note is that Nyerere's conception of development changed
radically after 1969.	 This change was in the direction of a 'political'
approach towards development, premised on the idea that capitalism could
not develop Third World national economies, that it created classes and
was exploitative.	 Where capitalism did produce economic growth, Nyerere
argued that such growth was not development.
Nyerere's changed conception of development can perhaps be explained
in the following way.	 We know (Pratt, 1976) that Nyerere as an individual
had a very strong moral streak in his views of development. It is possible
that he became receptive to the dependency thesis because of the latter's
moral critique of capitalism. 	 This may explain why Nyerere abandoned
conventional cum re-distributive ideas of development, which appeared to
legitimise capitalism and therefore by implication, inequality and social
injustice.
PRINCIPLES DETERMINING THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1969-1974
As we have seen, the prevailing conception of development in Tanzania
as well as the methods of achieving the process of development began to
change in 1969 from its earlier focus on economic growth and pre-occupation
with economic considerations of capital formation and manpower, to
encompass a more generalised vision of socialist development. The new
conception viewed socialist development as a process of liberation from
oppression, exploitation, inequality and dependency.Supporters of the
dependency view called for control and planning to bring about even and
internally-oriented development. 	 The Party called for control of
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the economy in order to give the 'state' power to protect the weak
against the strong, as well as to safeguard the economy from external
forces.	 They also called for mobilisation of the people to increase
production rather than to allow material incentives to control workers.
And the President called for communal production to remove inequalities
in development.
This approach towards development was a fusion of various ideas
which came together during this period and which found expression in the
Second Five Year Development Plan.
	 An analysis of these ideas as
manifested in the Plan shows that they were drawn from the Party's
traditional and new concerns, as well as from Nyerere and the section of
Government which was most influenced by the dependency thesis.
Party's influence in the Second Five Year Plan 
We saw in earlier chapters that the 1962-66 Government had placed
great emphasis on economic growth and that various policies were evolved
to expand production as rapidly as possible. 	 The Party's nationalisation
was successful in changing Government's conception of development because
it led to the down-grading of private capital and made the state sector
the major agent for development and accumulation of capital.
	 The role
of private capital was demoted and confined to consumption orientated
activities.	 The Second Plan stated:
Thus, private sector investment remains
dominant in housing and other real estates,
road transport and the construction industry,
but is no longer crucial to the basic
industrial and agricultural investment
programmes of the country.
(URT, 1969: 212)
When Nyerere introduced the Plan at the 1969 Party Annual Conference, he
was able to state that:
-263-
..., according to the Arusha Declaration
a great part of industrial work, will be
done by public corporations (Applause).
Individuals will only remain with 16% of
the industrial undertakings (Applause).
It is intended that, most among these,
will be small industries which require a
few employees. It is also hoped that,
employees and co-operatives will
co-operate to work on these industries.
(Tanu, 1969: 31)
The extent of the change from private to state (ownership) can be seen in
the fact that while in 1965 the private sector accounted for 60% of all
monetary fixed capital formation, by 1970 its share had fallen to under
30% and by 1973 the public sector was representative for more than three-
quarters of monetized fixed capital formation (World Bank, Main Report,
1977: 38).	 The following table illustrates the growth of parastatals:
Parastatals No. of firms No. of employees
1967 (after the AD) 64 26,000
1968 73 34,690
1969 78 49,925
1970 85 54,613
1971 99 67,880
1972 104 68,329
1973 117 71,576
1974 142 80,057
1975 142 83,376
1976 135 96,269
1977 159 105,875
Source: World Bank, Dar es Salaam, July 1981.
As we can see from the figures the vast expansion of parastatals took place
between 1969 and 1974, and not in 1967 with the Arusha Declaration.
The policy of rapid nationalisation and parastatal growth was effective
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in undermining Government's concern for efficiency and manpower constraints.
Minister of Finance Jamal, for instance, alluded to the problems of man-
power posed in the policy of rapid nationalisation when he presented the
1969/70 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure:
All the calculations of the Treasury
officials as to the availability of
resources, both for recurrent as well as
development expenditure, could go wrong
in a big way, in one direction or another,
depending on the performance of these
state institutions in the years which
lie immediately ahead of us.
The cumulative success of all these
institutions will be greater than the sum
of successes of these institutions taken
separately.	 And by the same token, let
us warn ourselves, that the failures of a
few, of even a single key institution will
inevitably be passed on to the others, and
thus to the entire economy.
If the National Bank of Commerce fails, we
all fail, if the STC fails, the National
Bank of Commerce cannot remain unaffected as
indeed will the consumers, not even the
National Development Corporation can remain
untouched, because its distributional
channels will be affected severely, and so on.
We have taken upon ourselves heavy tasks.
It is a good thing to remind ourselves of the
heavy stakes involved. This is one sure way
of doing battle with the danger.
(Hansard, 1969: 434)
Nyerere's influence on the Plan 
Nyerere's major input into the Second Development Plan was in the
policy of Ujamaa Vijijini.
	
This policy meant a new emphasis on the
creation of socialist organisations.
	
As Nyerere explained it in the
Second Development Plan:
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The policy of Ujamaa Vijijini which was
adopted by the Party in October 1967
meant the beginning of a change; gradually
we are moving towards a programme of inte-
grated rural development which leads in
the direction of the kind of socialist
society we are trying to create. 	 This
changed policy is fully reflected in the
new Plan, which has socialist rural
development at its very core.
(URT, 1969: ix)
The policy overturned the Government's previous policy of relying on the
progressive farmer for agricultural growth. 	 As the Second Plan stated,
"emphasis on development through the individual farmer, which has been the
basis of previous extension practice, will be ended (URT, 1969-74: 29).
The Second Development Plan also emphasised mobilisation as an
instrument for the implementation of Ujamaa but attempted to give it a
more economic explanation. 	 Thus: "For the future the government is
emphasising self-help, ujamaa village development, with the maximum
mobilisation of local leadership" (Ibid: 21).
	
And: "The kind of
help they (ujamaa villages) need is ideological and organisational as much
as material.	 They need to know how a ujamaa village works, to discuss
the concrete problems of organisation, to recognise the importance of savings 
and to learn improved agricultural techniques"
	
(Ibid: 28),	 emphasis
added).	 Thus the Government attempted to relate the political concept of
mobilisation to the process of production.
Although Ujamaa was to be implemented by the Party (The Nationalist,
September 25, 1969), there was no Party document which gave further
clarification to the concept of mobilisation in relation to Ujamaa. 	 It
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fell to the Government to explain it. 	 The practice of implementing
development policies through mobilisation (Ujamaa,1969; Mwongozo, 1971;
Politics is Agriculture, 1972) indicated that the methods of achieving
increased production had changed from reliance on trade and material
incentives to political instruments.
Influence of Government proponents of the underdevelopment thesis 
We can discern two major influences on the Plan stemming from
supporters of the dependency thesis within the Government. 	 The first
concerns the role of exports.	 Unlike the First Five Year Plan (1964-1969),
which had a very unambiguous attitude towards exports, the Second
Development Plan showed an ambivalent attitude. For instance, the Plan
stated:
Care will have to be taken not to over-
produce sisal, coffee, pyrethrum and fire-
cured tomacco, all of which face limited
markets.
(URT, 1969: 4) -
The case for de-emphasising exports was based on the following analysis:
In the past, rural development had a
heavy colonial bias. "Cash crops" were
grown mainly for export overseas, while
rural needs for manufactured commodities
were met from imports. Thus the pace
of development was determined by the
condition of foreign markets and the
prices at which imports could be obtained
- over neither of which did Tanzania have
any control. With the growth of domestic
urban food markets, the shift in emphasis
in policy towards food production and
the expansion of the range of goods manu-
factured in Tanzania the colonial economic
pattern will be modified by increased
internal trade.
(URT, 1969: 6)
The point to note is that the development of the export sector and the
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enlargement of the internal market were postulated as contradictory
objectives rather than as mutuaili re-inforcing developmental goals.
This lack of emphasis on exports would indicate that those who had called
for an export strategy in development such as the Minister of Finance
and the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania, were in a minority during this
period.
The second major influence of the Government proponents of the
dependency thesis can be seen in the policy on intermediate and capital
goods industry which made its appearance in the Second Five Year Development
Plan (URT, 1969: 62).
	
The rationale for creating an intermediate
co. pi 1-od2.
andgoods industry in Tanzania as opposed to limiting import-substitution
to consumer goods manufacturing as in the first Five Year Plan (1964-69),
was given in the following manner:
When the process of import substitution
for simple consumer goods manufactured is
completed, the domestic growth in demand
for these goods is limited by the rate of
growth of the overall economy. Many of
the consumer goods industries created at
the first stage produce only a small part
of the final product with domestic materials,
using a high proportion of imported materials
and creating a domestic market for new types
of imports.	 Export possibilities are
limited, because other developing countries
have established similar industries.
(Ibid: 62)
The Plan argued against conventional arguments in relation to the smallness
of the national market in the following manner.	 By the turn of the century:
the population of the three East African
countries alone will increase to at least
60,600,000 and with increases in per
capita incomes total output will rise to
Shs 70,000 million (at today's prices).
(Ibid: 62)
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In relation to the conventional argument that the high level of technology
necessary for this level of industrial development is absent in Tanzania,
the Plan stated that:
Limits placed on industrial development
by the scarcity of technical know-how
existed in most industrialised countries
when they began the process of
industrialisation.
The reasons industrial countries have
the techniques is that they acquired them
in the process of industrialisation. The
early stages of industrialisation must aim
to increase technological know-how as much
as to expand industrial output as a whole.
(Ibid: 62)
A NOR Consult (1973: 31) was less sanguine about Tanzania's industrial
development potential.
We can therefore see that during this period conventional economic
principles were downgraded in favour of goals derived from a dependency
view of development. 	 The Second Five Year Plan summarised the aim of
development as follows:
The Second Plan also aims to achieve structural
change in the economy to provide the basis
T(717.-i171-stained growth over the long period.
The objective is to create a high investment,
high growth economy in which, on the one hand,
rural mobilisation and social change have laid
the foundation for continuing agricultural
expansion, while on the other hand, efficient
investment institutions have been developed
to provide a local basis for industrial growth.
Seen in this light, although increased output
during the five years of the Plan period is
important, the critical objective is to create
an economy capable of high growth over the 
long period.	 The strategy of rural development
should eliminate those bottlenecks in agricultural
production which have checked development in many
economies. Further, if the parastatals are
able to act as source of local investment
initiative, then the undue dependence on foreign 
investment, which is the root cause of industrial 
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stagnation, will be avoided.
(Ibid: 2, emphasis added)
CONCLUSION 
The above analysis of the Second Development Plan 1969-1974 indicates
the influence of the Party's vision of socialism as control of the economy,
as well as its traditional concern with redistributive measures. It also
illustrates the influence of neo-Marxist dependency ideas with their
emphasis on class struggle in the rural areas and the need to restructure
the economy away from its dependency on international capitalism.
	 In
relation to the ideas of class struggle, the Presidential Circular 1/69
discriminated against the progressivefannersandMwongozo (1971) discrim-
inated against the managers.	 In relation to the idea of restructuring
dependency relations, the policy of creating a capital-goods industry
was an attempt to create an inward-oriented independent economy. Exports
were also downgraded. 	 Supporters of the dependency thesis within the
Government were able to give a more sophisticated theoretical explanation
of the Party's policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance during this period.
Thus all the three organs of the state - President, Party and
Government (temporarily under the sway of proponents of the dependency
thesis) - were for different reasons operating within a 'political'
approach to development. 	 For the Party, the policy of rapid national-
isation of local capital was undertaken irrespective of the economic
consequences.
	
Nyerere's Presidential Circular on Ujamaa and the Party's
Mwongozo were also issued with little consideration to their impact on
production.	 In relation to the Government supporters of dependency a new
attitude towards development was adopted, where current problems of imple-
mentation were transposed with future potentials.
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All three organs of the state, for different theoretical reasons,
gave political goals priority over present economic needs and constraints.
In other words, they took what I am calling a 'political' approach towards
development.	 The ideology of development that prevailed during this
period had a bias against exports, and a bias against professionalism
and specialisation; there was a mistrust of economic management and a
disregard of the foreign balance and fiscal matters in the development
processes.	 On this basis I conclude that the real watershed in Tanzania's
revolution' occurred between 1969-1974 and not in 1967 with the Arusha
Declaration as has been commonly assumed.	 During 1969-1974 the whole
pattern of development thinking in Tanzania was changed.
The absence of a serious foreign exchange crisis during this period
helped to nurture this ideology of development. 	 Unfortunately, the
pattern of thinking with its lack of concern for economic inputs and
discipline continued long enough to become uncontrollable and the result
was the crisis of 1974/75 and the eventual reversal of several key policies.
This will now be examined.
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FOOTNOTE
1. Minister Babu, the then Minister for Economic Affairs and Development
Planning wrote in the Tanzania Supplement of the Financial Times,
December 9, 1971, calling for an 'inward-strategy' of development.
(Financial Times, London, 1971).
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE FAILURE OF 'POLITICAL' POLICY-MAKING AND THE
ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1974-5
We saw in the last chapter that the Party was successful in sub-
ordinating Government politically as well as in replacing the early
economic orientated policies of the Government with its own.	 The
'political' approach towards development which was adopted between 1969-1974
included such elements as lessening dependence on foreign influences,
extending state control of the economy, lessening the use of market forces,
and relying on ideology and mobilisation to increase production.
From the mid 1970s, however, important sectors of the economy experienced
problems and difficulties.	 In 1974-1975 Tanzania had a severe balance-of-
payments crisis.	 In this chapter I shall explore the connection between
the types of policies chosen between 1969-1974 and the events of 1974-5.
I shall also be examining the various explanations which have been offered
in the literature for the Tanzanian economic crisis of the mid-1970s.
POLICY FAILURES AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1974-75
From Ujamaa to villagisation 
The 1969 policy of creating Ujamaa villages by a 'frontal approach'
had uneven success.	 Ujamaa was more successful in regions which were
poorer and characterised by scattered homesteads than in the richer regions
where settled agriculture and cash crops had already developed. Thus:
As of March 1973 about one third of the total
number of villages were located in only two
regions while five regions which together
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contributed less than 25% of 1969 GDP
accounted for over 60% of villages with
nearly 70% of total village production.
Conversely, the six most affluent regions,
which contributed over 50% of 1969 GDP,
accounted for only about 15% of the
number of villages and less than 10% of
the ujamaa population.
(World Bank, VI, 1977: 18)
The Ujamaa movement appeared to have reached a point of stagnation
and Nyerere saw the solution in a distinct policy, that of Villagisation.
At the NEC meeting of the Party in 1972, the President presented the idea
of Villagisation. 	 He argued that it was possible to separate the idea of
"living together" from that of "working together on a communal farm", and
that these two could be tackled at different stages (Msekwa, 1977: 63).
Nyerere's arguments for separating the two facets of Ujamaa and tackling
them in different stages was an implicit acceptance that the policy of
Ujamaa Vijijini as outlined in the Presidential Circular (1969) had failed
as of that specific time.
The policy of villagisation was accepted by the NEC and in 1973 the
Party Conference directed that by the end of 1976 the whole rural popu-
lation should live in villages (Coulson, 1982: 249). 	 Operation Vijiji
moved 11 million people in a space of merely two years (Fortmann, 1978: v).
The use of force was not precluded (Mwapachu, 1976; Coulson, 1977;
Nyerere, 1977: 42). 	 Matango gives a graphic description:
Many peasants in Ichungu were taken by surprise
to see armed militia-men climbing on top of
their houses, taking away the thatch, in some
cases, the iron sheets were torn off, doors and
windows removed or smashed to pieces; houses
pulled down in some cases ...
Their homes having been destroyed and the people
having received orders to move with all their
property to the village building sites that same
day; they moved with chickens, children, wives,
cattle, goats and sheep, with beds and bedding,
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some of them settled under the trees for
shelter provided they were within the
village sites ...
While the Operation was going on the leaders
failed to even control the militia men or
given them proper guidance. At Pemba and
TKyorubu villages some militia men looted
the property of the peasants. There have
been occasions when the militia men have
even opened fire at a passenger bus and a
lorry wounding and killing travellers in
North Mara.
(Matango, 1971: 17-29)
Another observer wrote:
In certain areas where the militia did not
strike, people rushed in panic to build
temporary accommodation in unplanned village
sites. The entire division was in motion.
Moving, moving in panic to the unplanned
village sites. Thus creating new villages
in areas which are not even surveyed, no
water, no school, or dispensary - virtually
no facility to maintain the population there
or any plan to bring any, but only to serve
the purpose of moving into the Development
villages. This haphazard, skimble-skamble
movement has created problems which need
urgent government attention and resources.
(Mwapachu, 1976: 1-6)
These quotations show the fear and insecurity which peasants experienced
throughout the nation during the implementation of Operation Vijiji.
Mwongozo and its demise 
The policy of Mwongozo led to a number of strikes which began around
February 1971 and by September 1973 had involved about half of the labour
force engaged in the manufacturing hdustry. 	 One of the major consequences
was that Mwongozo "effectively destroyed the flimsy fabric of modern
organisation that had been institutionalised in Tanzania" (Hyden, 1980: 166).
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Politics is Agriculture(l972) 
We saw that in 1972 the Party called for leaders to acquaint
themselves with agricultural practice, but Nyerere's comments are indicative
of its problems:
Many of our leaders know nothing about
agriculture. What is more, they don't
want to learn.
(Nyerere, 1977: 20)
Decentralisation 
The policy of decentralisation increased the recurrent costs/expenditure
to the Government and led to decrease in development expenditure. 	 The
following table shows this.
TABLE NO. 7.1
Share of Regions in Government Expenditure 
per cent 
1972/73 1973/74 1974/751 1975/762 1976/773
Recurrent: 30.1 29.1 27.4 27.3 26.6
Development: 7.1 14.6 13.9 14.0 10.0
Total: 22.5 24.0 22.5 21.9 20.3
Note: 1. Provisional Actuals
2. Revised Estimates
3. Budget Estimates
Source: World Bank Main Report, 1977: 67)
This means that in the long run the narrow economic base would not be able
to sustain the growth of the bureaucracy.
Parastatals 
We saw in the policy of rapid nationalisation that occurred between
1969-1974 that there was a proliferation of parastatals, which became
the main agency responsible for generating economic growth.
	 But a study
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conducted by the Ministry of Finance in 1974 of 24 parastatals showed
that by the end of 1973, they "had accumulated Shs 178m in losses which
accounted for 91 per cent of the total capital allocated to these
companies, that is, 195 million shillings" (Minister of Finance, 1976,
36:9).	 In the 1975 speech to the National Assembly, the Minister of
Finance, Msuya warned that:
Those parastatals which fail to generate
surpluses will have to be closed down.
(Minister of Finance, 1975: 73:10)
The growth of the state sector also increased the rate of recurrent
expenditure.	 The problem where consumption of revenue exceeded its
generation was summarised by the Minister of Finance:
In the last five years Government Recurrent
Expenditure has increased at a rate of
approximately 27% per year. During the same
period the average increase in GDP has been
17%. These statistics do tell a story.
(Minister of Finance, 1976: 91:18)
The Minister explained:
... it remains an inescapable fact that such
building up of administration, especially if
undertaken with the speed that we did, is
bound to commit us to recurrent expenditure on
an expanding scale.	 When cost inflation is
added to it, the situation gets more burdensome
in terms of resource requirements to meet these
continuing commitments.
No country can afford to carry an increasing
burden of a recurrent nature beyond a certain
limit at a certain time, and at the same time
save for investment in new development. At
some point we have to add up the total situation.
(Minister of Finance, 1976: 90:18)
In 1967 the public sector in Tanzania was not very big; in 1975 it was
much enlarged and a heavy burden.	 The parastatals failed to provide any
surplus to the Government in order to finance the social services of the
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public sector and some did not cover their own costs, and had to depend
instead on subsidies from Government (Nyfrabu, 1980: 4).
Economic Performance 
Tanzania's agricultural sector was in serious difficulties. The
average rate of growth of total agricultural production in real terms
from 1964-1975 was only 2.8% per annum - compared to a rate of growth
of 4.8% for total GDP.	 Since the population was growing at an estimated
2.8% per year, the expansion of production was only sufficient to keep up
with population growth (World Bank, 1977, IV: 9). 	 The following table
shows, moreover, that the rate of growth of agricultural production, and
particularly of its marketed components, declined steadily between the
mid-1960s and the mid-1970s.
TABLE 7.2 
Average Annual Growth Rates of Agricultural Production 
1964-1969 1969-1973 1973-1975 1964-1975
Subsistence
Production 2.9 4.0 4.0 3.4
Monetary
Production 3.8 2.6 1.3 2.1
Total
Production 3.3 2.9 1.5 2.8
Source: World Bank, 1977, IV: 9
This poor performance in the agricultural sector affected both food and
cash crop production.	 In 1974 Tanzania had to import 440,000 tons of
foodgrains.	 Maize imports alone amounted to 29,000 tons compared to an
average of 36,500 tons in 1970-73. 	 The total food import bill rose from
274 million shillings in 1973 to over a billion shillings in 1974 (World
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Bank, 1977: 72).	 Coupled with high import bills, Tanzania's main
foreign exchange earner, the export sector based on cash crop production,
was equally in serious trouble. 	 In the period of the Second Five Year
Plan agricultural exports stagnated:
From 1965-67 to 1971-73 the total volume
of Tanzania's six major primary exports
(cotton, coffee, sisal, cashew nuts, tea
and tobacco) actually declined by 5%.
This was followed by further declines of
15% in 1974 and 3% in 1975; thus by 1975
Tanzania was exporting 21% less of these
commodities than the average of ten years
before.
(World Bank, 1977: 29)
Declining cash crop production in turn affected the manufacturing
sector.	 Thus between 1974-1975 manufacturing output virtually stagnated
although demand was high.	 This was largely due to supply problems:
shortages of locally produced raw materials owing to agricultural production
problems; breakdowns in water and electricity; and shortage of spare parts
and transport owing to the shortage of foreign exchange. The following
figuresillustrate the growth and stagnation of the manufacturing sector.
As we shall see there was an impressive rate of real growth in the manu-
facturing sector but it was disrupted first by the mini-crisis of 1970/71
and then by the economic crisis of 1974-1975.
The weaknesses, problems and declining economic growth performance
of the economy impaired its ability to respond effectively when confronted
with the exogen ous intervention of adverse weather conditions and
rocketing prices of oil.	 The latter triggered the descent of the economy
into disorganisation via a severe balance-of-payments crisis.
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The Drought:	 Between 1973 and 1974 Tanzania experienced a severe
drought which affected production.
	
Thus between 1972 and 1974 the
production of maize declined by over 20%.
	 Paddy and wheat production
also declined.	 The decline in food production necessitated the import
of food. The drought also affected cash crop production. Thus volumes
of coffee, cotton and sisal exports declined by 32%, 20% and 18%
respectively, and overall export volume declined by more than 20%
(World Bank, 1977: 73).
Increase in petroleum prices:	 The increase in petroleum prices and the
general world inflation in manufactured and capital goods raised average
import prices to Tanzania by over 60% (Ibid, 72).
Crisis of 1974/75:	 The consequences of the aggregate led to a balance
of payment crisis.	 The trade surplus of some T.shs 130m per year in
1965-1967 (under the First Five Year Plan) was converted into a deficit
of over T.shs 1,000m per year in 1971-1973, then soared to T.shs 2,500m
in 1974 and T.shs 3,000m in 1975, following the drought (World Bank, 1977:
28).	 This situation created the 1974/75 crisis.
We can therefore see that Tanzania was in serious difficulties -
the popular policies of Ujamaa and Mwongozo had been replaced by the more
authoritarian policy of villagisation and the re-assertion of managerial
authority in work-places; parastatals were failing to produce adequate
surpluses; industries were working at under-capacity; exports were
stagnating; famine was an immediate threat; and in 1974 and 1975 Tanzania
had	 severe balance of payment problems.
What were the causes of this dismal development experience? Why did
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Tanzania's acclaimed policies fail to achieve their objectives? 	 Before
trying to give answers to these questions, it will be useful to examine
once again some of the standard explanations offered to account for
Tanzania's failure to achieve an independent socialist and self-reliant
economy.
ACADEMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FAILURE OF UJAMAA AND MWONGOZO
-
How did the academics explain these problems?	 Most academic
explanations of Tanzania's 'failure' to achieve socialist development
have focussed on, first , the reversal of policies of Ujamaa and Mwongozo;
and secondly, the general political economy of Tanzania, specifically,
its links with international capitalism.
Von Freyhold's Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania explained the failure of
ujamaa in terms of class struggle. The policy of ujamaa was sabotaged
by bureaucrats and the state.	 Ujamaa failed because "there was no
proposal to recruit and train political cadres" to undertake the mobil-
isation of the peasantry. 	 Ujamaa was not a 'political' concept.	 Von
Freyhold also attempted to link the failure of ujamaa to the intervention
of metropolitan interests.	 Thus the bureaucrats in Tanzania who
sabotaged the policy of ujamaa were linked with the metropolitan bourg-
eoisie and the World Bank:
The state and its managerial functionaries
(through the expansion of the state sector)
put themselves in the place of the local
bourgeoisie and collaborated with the
metropolitan bourgeoisie (in the form of
the multi-national firms and capitalist
aid agencies) to co-operate in joint ventures.
And:
Having already become a partner of inter-
national capital in this manner, the state
in Tanzania moved one step further and
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demanded a controlling share of the
enterprise whose profitability it ensured.
And:	
They (bureaucrats) did not contradict him
(Nyerere) openly, first because they needed
him to appease workers and peasants and
- secondly, because they expected that in
• practice the whole campaign would look quite
different - as indeed it was.
	 Eventually,
the bureaucracy managed to turn the slogan
of Ujamaa into a tool which could be used
for its own purpose.
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 120)
Raikes (1973) also argued that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie wrecked
the policy of ujamaa because they feared a socialist transformation would
threaten their social status.	 Shivji (1976: 107) saw the policy of ujamaa 
as "a continuation of the preceding agricultural policies" in its attempts
to "accelerate the process of monetarisation".
	 According to Shivji, the
policy of Ujamaa was not a political question involving class struggle
(Ibid: 107) but an attempt by the bureaucratic class to consolidate and
integrate the Tanzanian economy into international capitalism. Although
radical writers may differ in their emphasis as to the intentions of
ujamaa, all appear to be in agreement that the policy failed because of
class struggle and more specifically, because of the class interests of
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.
Mwongozo 
The radicals have also explained Government's actions to restore
discipline in factories and other work-places in terms of class struggle.
For instance, they argued that the state withdrew its support from the
working class (Mapolu, 1976; Miyo, 1975).
	 In this way, they argued, the
radical policy of Mwongozo was defeated.
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Parastatals 
Problems of the parastatals have also been analysed in 'class'
terms by the radicals.	 John Loxley and John Saul (1975) saw that the
major problems besetting the parastatals were the reflection of the
characteristics of the political economy of Tanzania.	 Tanzania's lack
of a theory of imperialism and the class nature of the society have
"blurred the possibilities for progressive advance, namely, the leader-
ship's inability to confront the realities of class struggle as another
crucial ideological weakness" (1975: 62). 	 Thus the weakness at the
ideological level help to forestall the definition of a coherent radical
strategy of development and industrialisation (Ibid).
Problems of parastatals were viewed as the result of an "over-
emphasis on the technical aspects of management" (Loxley & Saul, 1975: 75).
These writers argued that "the nationalisation of the major modern sector
means of production in Tanzania was not accompanied by a complete break
with western capitalism" and the state firms relied heavily on foreign
borrowing and on foreign management. 	 But they argued that even if foreign
management were to be replaced, it would not lead to the introduction of
socialist production relations, which could only be achieved by creating
politically aware Tanzanian managers and "in the final analysis a committed
cadre of Tanzanian socialist managers must be one crucial component of a
solution to the management problems of parastatals" (Ibid: 71-75).
Thus, like the failure of Ujamaa Vijijini and Mwongozo, the problems
of the parastatals were also explained in terms of class analysis and
class-interests.	 The solutions to these problems were sought in a more
and more 'political' approach, that is, the creation of political cadres.
The failure of these specific policies was in turn explained by the
radicals in relation to the political economy of Tanzania.
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Failure to eliminate links with international capital 
Radical writers saw the failure of Tanzania's overall socialist
development as a result of her links with international capitalism.
	 Saul
for instance, argued that "the investment of surplus often being directed
first toward such immediately profitable domestic spheres as luxury
consumption goods and toward such immediately effective earners of foreign
exchange as tourism, rather than towards structural transformation"
(Saul, 1979: 207).
Von Freyhold argued that the increasing role of the state sector in
agriculture, external and internal trade, banking, insurance, and its
control of prices and finances, gave it powers to nurture itself "with
surplus drained from the private sector".
	 But this state control, argued
Von Freyhold was not socialism because:
The working class in Tanzania had never
seized state power, the expansion of the
state economy could certainly not be
explained as a move to assure the predominance
of the working class. The state economy
was not the creation of the working class
but the creation of a petit bourgeoisie
which tried to gain an economic base by
integrating metropolitan capital into
peripheral state capitalism.
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 119)
And the "peasants, who were to lay the golden eggs for the system, were
thus put under the control of international finance capital, the World
Bank, in particular" (Von Freyhold, 1979: 120).
	 Under these conditions,
Von Freyhold argued, a political revolution was necessary:
The first step towards a transformation
of the state economy and the peasant
economy would have had to be a political
change, a change putting workers and
peasants in power.
(Ibid: 121)
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For the radicals therefore, far-reaching and almost impossible
political changes had to occur first, before 'development' could be
achieved.
It is difficult in retrospect, to see what kind of economic
development the radicals were calling for.	 The political approach towards
development disregarded the need for economic management.	 The radicals
did not seem to have a clear understanding of some of the basic mechanisms
by which the economy worked.	 Being hardly able to perceive the economic
structures and requirements of the economy, they were certainly unable to
transform the economy.	 They substituted politics for economic knowledge,
thus negating the economic rationale in development.
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1974/1975
It is interesting to note that while the radical academics contributed
an explanation of sorts for modifications or changes in specific policies,
they have remained silent over the general economic crisis of 1974/75. This
is not surprising, since the analysis of the crisis would have forced many
of them to re-examine their own theoretical assumptions.
	
The debate on
the 1974/75 crisis is mainly between the Government and the non-radical
academics, which is also an indication that the debate on Tanzania has
progressed from the flea-Marxist dependency approach of the radicals to the
consideration of economic factors.	 The divide is now between the external
and internal constraints arguments. 	 We shall examine these debates.
External constraints arguments 
Official explanations of the crisis have focussed attention on the
drought conditions and petroleum prices as reasons for the 1974/75 crisis.
The argument behind the external constraints explanation of the crisis is
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that if these exogenous factors had not occurred, Tanzania would not
have experienced such a crisis.
	 Implicit in this argument is the idea
that internal factors such as official policies were not to blame but
that the effectiveness of policies were sabotaged by the intervention of
external factors, which were beyond the control of Tanzania. The following
speech of Nyerere illustrates the external constraints argument very well:
... there are three major reasons for our
present difficulties. They are the rapid
inflation rate in the developed world,
the sudden and large increase in the price
of oil and petroleum products, and the
drought which caused widespread crop
failures and animal deaths in our country
... the three adverse economic factors I
have already mentioned - none of which were
within our control - we were not able to
maintain our rate of expansion last year.
(Nyerere, 1975: 4)
The Minister of Finance stressed similar factors:
... Since 1974 Tanzania has faced an
increasingly difficult economic and
financial situation. In that year the
economy suffered from both a large
shortfall in food production due to
drought and the initial shock of the
sharp increase in world oil prices.
(cited in Agency for Development, 1980:
49)
Internal constraints: policy deficiencies 
A number of academic writers, mainly economists, have explained the
economic crisis of 1974/75 in terms of policy deficiencies. Lofchie (1976)
argued that the shortfall in agricultural production was the result of
mistaken policies and not the result of drought.
	 Basing his arguments
on the analysis of meteorological data, he explained that there was a
severe shortc.5-e. of rainfall in 1973 which could have led to a reduction
of the maize crop by about 20% but that in 1974 there was adequate rainfall.
Peasants resisted communal production in the policy of Ujamaa Vijijini 
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and there was a failure to encourage production of traditional export
crops.	 Thus Lofchie argued that the fall in agricultural production
was the result of peasant resistance to ujamaa, low producer prices and
other misguided policies.
	 In another article entitled Agrarian Crisis 
and Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania (1978) Lofchie argued that ujamaa 
was the cause of food crisis.
Since collectively villagisation had
been the cornerstone of Tanzania's rural
policy for the preceding five years, it
seemed obvious to conclude that this bore
some responsibility for the food crisis.
(Lofchie, 1978: 452)
Hyden on the other hand was reluctant to draw a causal relationship
between ujamaa and the fall in agricultural production.
	 He conceded
that the failure of ujamaa to increase production was the result of the
deficiencies within the policy itself (Hyden, 1980: 119, 124) but he was
categorical in rejecting the argument that villagisation was the principal
cause of Tanzania's decline in agricultural production in the mid-1970s
(Hyden, 1980: 146).
Ellis (1979) on the other hand, showed that the cashewnut production
declined considerably from 1974 despite favourable international prices.
He stated:
that in the case of cashewnuts no
justification for depressing the level
of producer prices can be found in the
international market situation confronting
Tanzania.
(Ellis, 1979: 11)
Yet despite these favourable conditions operating at the world market, the
cashewnut producers were paid very poorly.
The real producer price of cashews fell
continuously from 1969/70 through to
1977/78, by which time it was between 35%
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and 47% of the level prevailing 9 years
earlier.
(Ellis, 1979: 11)
Ellis' research therefore shows that world market conditions cannot be
accepted as a-valid reason for the decline of this crop; rather it was
internal factors, namely, the prices paid to producers.
	 The second
reason was the impact of the villagisation programme: it separated the
cashewnut producers from the sites of their trees:
This not only increased the travel
time required to tend to cashew trees
but also substantially affected the
economics of combining cashew production
with other cropping activities.
(Ellis, Ibid: 15)
But Ellis also pointed to the process of dis-accumulation of the capital
stock which began before the policy of villagisation took place. 	 He
argued that the decline in production should be seen more in the context of:
the outcome of a progressively more intense
squeeze between the rising labour cost of
cashew cultivation imposed by villagisation
and the falling level of real producer prices.
(Ibid: 20)
In another study, entitled An Economic Analysis of the Coffee Industry in 
Tanzania 1969/70 - 1978/79: Towards a Higher and more stable producer prices,
Ellis again argued that internal factors such as prices, export taxes, and
the Coffee Crop Authority's expenses progressively reduced the real income
of the peasants.
Ellis' study is also important because of his attempt to relate
these processes to the fall in export production and the loss of foreign
exchange.	 For instance, in relation to the decline of cashewnut production
Ellis stated:
At international market prices prevailing
in 1978, the industry could have generated
-289-
foreign exchange earnings of the order of
T.sh 550-600 million, whereas the actual
outcome in that year was T.Shs 229 million
for all cashew products combined.
(Ellis, 1980: 2)
In this way, -Ellis illustrated the significance of the export sector for
national development.
Explanations of Tanzania's problems in terms of 'internal' factors
have been implicitly criticised in the explanations offered by Green,
Rwegasira and Van Arkadie, in their book entitled, Economic Shocks and 
National Policy Making: Tanzania in the 1970s (1980).
	 These writers
explained the crisis of 1974-1975 in relation to external factors or
exogerupus shocks', which were "extended drought conditions compounded by
oil and related price increases on international markets".
	 The authors
argued that the 1974-1975 crisis was "mainly a result of events outside
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the influence of domestic policies" (,,980: 23).
	 This argument is therefore
similar to the official one.
But the authors also concede the validity of five general criticisms
of the government's approach, thus indicating that internal factors were
also responsible for the crisis.
	 First, there was no coherent strategy
or view of the role of exports at the decision makingleve/ from 1967 to
1971 (Ibid: 87).
	 Later when it was accepted that exports were necessary
to achieve a self-reliant strategy there was "neither a co-ordinated
project list nor a strategy with targets, instruments and resources set
out" (Ibid: 96).	 Second, until the mid 1970s, industrial strategy "tended
to contain a systematic a '
 priori basis against pre-export processing of
(raw material exports) and to assume that ... export and domestic manu-
facturing were inherently unrelated" (Ibd: 88). 	 Third and fourth,
serious efforts to build up a number of feasible new agricultural exports
were not made in the 1967-1974 period, and systematic research on exportable
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and other crops "has made at most a sporadic recovery since about 1975"
(Ibid: 89).	 Lastly, but most significantly:
The standard Tanzanian pattern of
institutional development by crisis
resolution appears, at least in
. retrospect, to have had a built-in
bias against exports.
(Green et alia, 1980: 89)
The 4.0ument of Green et alia that exogerjous factors were responsible
for the crisis cannot easily be accepted.
	
Although they conceded the
importance of the five internal factors 	 mentioned, nevertheless,
their methodological approach de-emphasises their significance. First,
they have a tendency to underplay mistakes which were the direct result
of policies.	 For instance, between 1969-1974 there was a vast expansion
of the state sector despite the problems and shortages of skilled manpower
and capital.	 Between 1970 and 1971 there was a sharp deterioration in
the current account of the balance of payments (Green, 1980: 7). 	 Green
and his fellow authors offer this explanation:
What is of particular interest for our
purpose, however, is the fact that these
pressures mainly originated from expansion
in internal demand in the economy whose
supply side was rather weak.
(Ibid: 8)
And:
that the Tanzanian economy was emerging
into a new period in which much tighter
short-term planning of credit, balance of
payments and various categories of democratic
spending would be required.
(Ibid: 9)
Intrinsic problems which emerge as a result of policy-making are merely
reduced to 'short-term' planning problems. 	 This can also be seen in the
explanation of the 1970-1971 mini-crisis. 	 They concede that the State
Trading Corporation contributed to the 1970-71 crisis but only after:
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an abortive foreign-consultant-designed
restructuring, supplied shortages, drained
foreign reserves and achieved deficits.
(Ibid: 14)
As I hope to illustrate in the case study, the collapse of the State
Trading Corporation was mainly the result of policy-making in Tanzania.
Green and his co-writers state that the 1974 crisis was foreseeable
by late 1973.
	 First, agricultural and particularly grain output in 1973
had been poor and world grain prices were exploding; second, there was
poor export performance; third, oil prices had risen sharply since 1973.
We are told, however, that these signs were blurred, but again it is
admitted that there was "poor communication of critical data which should
have been available to the technical and decision taking process sooner"
(Ibid: 17).	 They concluded: "Thus at the beginning of 1974, no strategic 
re-thinking was in hand, nor even seriously advocated" (Ibid: 17, emphasis
added).	 What does seem interesting is that these authors do not
problematise this "poor communication".
	 In retrospect, it seems very
strange indeed that conditions like a drought and deteriorating agricultural
growth rates could have taken the whole decision making process based on
the three organs of state by surprise.
Throughout the period 1969-1974, the Minister of Finance in his
speeches had continuously called attention to the fall in production,
especially of cash crops, because of his concern with balance of payment
problems.
	 Furthermore, during the same period, the Bank of Tanzania's
Operational Report continuously called for the need to reconsider the
export sector and to evolve an export policy.
	 In the 1972 NEC meeting
the problem of declining agriculture was discussed and the policy of
Politics is Agriculture was adopted to boost production. Thus Green's
explanations that 'critical data' was not made available cannot be accepted.
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In fact, according to the Constitution,the Party has access to all major
official documents.
	 Critical data was made available both in Parliament,
Cabinet and the NEC - the major decision-making bodies. But why was
there no strategic re-thinking?
	 We shall consider this problem separately
later on, since it has relevance to the major pre-occupations of the thesis.
The major problem with the work of Green and his co-writers is their
continuous tendency to deflect attention from crucial problems in Tanzanian
development.
	 Mistakes in policies are rapidly acknowledged and downgraded,
thus de-emphasising their cruciality.
	 An additional objection relates
to the distinction made between the 'micro efficiency' of policies, "that
is, the allocative efficiency of measures as tested against consumer-
sovereignty criteria", and the 'macro-efficiency' of policies, which is
"their effectiveness in furthering the particular goals adopted by the
Tanzanian Government" (Ibid: ix).
	 This distinction implies that mistakes
entailing high economic costs are acceptable to the extent that they
further social and political goals of the government.
	 This way of
evaluating policies both implies that economic maximisation is of
secondary importance and serves to absolve policies from critical re-
examination in the light of their economic consequences.
I would conclude that both the radical dependency and the pragmatic
dependency views have failed to offer us an adequate explanation of the
Tanzanian experience.
	 Though different, their methodologies attempt to
avoid coming to grips with crucial development problems.
Evaluation of the Internal and External Constraints explanations 
We saw that official explanation for the 1974/75 fall in agricultural
production was explained in terms of the drought conditions which prevailed
in Tanzania from 1973/74 period.	 But as we have seen the rate of growth
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of agricultural production was already in decline before the drought
had begun.
A study conducted at the request of the Ministry of Agriculture,
Food and Co-operatives found that the rate of growth began to fall
after 1967 and 1968. 	 The study Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania 
stated "there are strong reasons to believe that internal pricing and
marketing policies both on export and domestic products also are
presenting serious obstacles to growth" (Krisel et alia, 1970: 1).
In the case of export commodities such as
cashewnuts and oilseeds, returns to farmers
have been 15-20% lower than they would have
been under previous marketing institutions
and their margins.
(Kriesel, 1970: 1)
In the light of the above, it is plausible to argue that had there been
no drought, Tanzania would still have to spend foreign exchange to import
food.
Another argument which has been used in the official external
constraints case is poor world prices for cash crops. 	 But while figures
for export crops show a declining long-run trend, world market prices
for all export prices rose between 1971 and 1974, some booming in 1974.
Yet the volume of exports of cotton and sisal, Tanzania's main export
commodities, did not increase signficantly, with four of the nine leading
exports showing lower volumes in 1972 compared to 1967. 	 The years of the
drought and villagisation, 1973 and 1974, were poor in terms of production
for all but tobacco and tea (Resnick, 1981: 128). 	 This argument also
supports Ellis' conclusion concerning coffee and cashewnut production that
world prices cannot account for the poor performance in agricultural
production.
If we accept the argument that internal policies were largely
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responsible for the crisis of 1974/75, then we must question these
policies.
	 I shall pose two questions to illustrate my point.
	 We saw
in Chapter Six that one of the major aims of the 'political' policies
was to lessen dependence on foreign influences. And as Jamal noted in
1969, one of the surest ways to achieve this was by avoiding balance of
payments deficits, which would lead to heavy foreign debts. The question
is, then, why were exports not encouraged?
	 The second question, which
is indirectly related to the first, relates to equality.
	 We saw in the
previous chapter that equality and improving rural living standards were
strong themes underlying most policies - but why then were prices paid
to the producers kept so low for so long?
	 The maintenance of low
agricultural prices not only negated the social aims but also affected
the economic aims of reducing dependency since the stagnation of exports
led to a balance of payment crisis.
The basic argument here, once again, is that the policy-making
arrangements of 1969-1974 excluded the careful consideration of the
economic implications of policies, encouraging a concentration on purely
'political' aspects.
	 This approach has also been noted by Hyden.
Hyden (1979: 6), for instance, saw that the mode of policy-making had
the following features.
	 Firstly, the first feature of the policy-making
style was to maximise as many social values as possible through policies
which serve to mobilise new resources for their very achievement. Secondly,
policy-makers decided without first having obtained full and detailed
knowledge of possible consequences of their decisions.
	 Full understanding
of what can be done or cannot be achieved with existing resources was
not sought as a precondition for making a policy. The third feature of
the policy-making style was the unwillingness of policy makers to use the
past as a source of guidance for the future.
	 In Beyond Ujamaa (1980)
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Hyden states that policy-making based on a political market (as opposed
to an economic market) "are essentially social or political ... they do
not carry any objective economic values ... There is no emphasis on
efficiency" (Hyden, 1980: 30).
	 These characteristics of policy-making
were evident in all the three organs of the state.
	 Each organ for
different and complex reasons explained at length in Chapter Six, gave
greater emphasis to social and political goals than to economics.
The question raised earlier of why there was no "strategic re-thinking"
in response to the initial signs of the crisis to come can also be explained
in these terms.	 Those who expressed most concern about economic problems
and who might have led such a re-examination of policies (Minister of
Finance Jamal, Bank of Tanzania) were in a clear minority in this period.
CONCLUSION 
In concluding this chapter I would put forward the argument that
the economic problems of Tanzania culminating in the balance of payments
crisis of 1974/75 were mainly the result of internal factors, which
weakened the economy's capacity to cope with adverse external conditions.
These in turn aggravated the economic problems even more by exposing the
extreme weaknesses of the various sectors.
I would argue further that the 'political' policies pursued between
1969-1974 were misguided in the sense that they failed to consider economics
as inputs into policy-making. 	 As we saw in this chapter, the outcomes
of these policies were the destabilisation and weakening of productive
processes, the opposite of what had been hoped for.
	 (An acute observer
such as Jamal, for instance, had anticipated the results as far back as
1969 as his speeches illustrate).
	 This served to negate the very
political aims of the Party.
	 The 'political' nature of the policies
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came to negate the economic aspects of development and because they
created more problems and difficulties for the masses as well as for
the economy, this in turn defeated the political objective of alleviating
social problems.
	 A more enlightened and sensitive leadership might
have interpreted 'political' to include the consideration of economics
and thus have evolved different policies to achieve similar political
goals.
But misguided policies themselves need to be explained. We saw in
Chapter Six that all three organs of the state - for different practical
and theoretical reasons - adopted and pursued a 'political' approach
towards development.
	 This homogeneity explains why misguided policies
- were pursued consistently in Tanzania, at least up to 1974.
	 The Government
compromised its traditional concern for economic growth, while the
Presidency abandoned its role as a mediator between economic needs and
requirements and political demands.
	 Policy-makers at the Party, while
sensitive to social problems, lacked an elementary knowledge of how the
economy worked as well as to the nature and role of policies. This
weakness among Party members at policy-making levels was further
encouraged by the institutional arrangements for policy-making, which
separated formulation from implementation.
These two features, the attitudes of Party members and the
institutional context, explains why further 'political' policies were
pursued by the Party during 1974 and 1975, which was a period of immense
economic strains.	 The next chapter will examine these measures, as well
as how the homogeneous outlook on development of the three organs of the
state began to fall apart under the impact of chronic economic crisis.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PARTY SUPREMACY AND CHRONIC ECONOMIC CRISIS, 1974-1982
In the last chapter we saw the consequences for the development
process of an approach to policy-making which downgraded economic issues.
The policies formulated by the three organs of the state during 1969-1974
had ambitious social and political objectives but they lacked economic
consistency and, as a result, weakened the economy's capacity to cope
with exogenous factors. 	 Public sector expansion was weak because it was
not built upon sound economic grounds; agricultural production stagnated;
and by 1974/75, Tanzania faced both food and foreign exchange crises. On
this basis I have argued that the policies pursued between 1969-1974 were
responsible for weakening the economy's capacity to cope with adverse
external conditions.
In this chapter I shall develop two major themes.	 First I shall
examine how the homogeneous approach towards development held by the three
organs of the state during the early 1970s broke down as the result of the
1974/75 crisis.	 I hope to show that the 1974/75 crisis had important
effects on the Government. It led the Government to resume an active
role in policy-making on a de facto basis, and within Government circles
a more production-orientated view of development began to reassert itself
over the 'political' view. Meanwhile, the Party, I hope to show, continued
to make policies based on a 'political' approach towards development. These
policies related mainly to trade and redistributive measures, reflecting
the Party's traditional concerns.
	 Once again, therefore, the situation
during the period 1975/76 - 1982 reflected the contradictory co-existence
of two views of development at the decision-making level in Tanzania.
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Unlike the situation of the 1960s, however, the Government and the Party
continued to make policies regarding different sectors of the economy
based on their own view of development. 	 The two organs of the state
were not so much debating policies, but rather each organ was going a
different way in different areas.
	
The President, the third policy-making
institution, resumed his fluctuation between the two views of development,
depending now mainly on the severity of the foreign exchange crisis at a
given moment.
Second, I shall examine the second major crisis which began in 1979
and will review the different explanations which have been offered. The
discussion will relate mainly to the external versus internal constraints
issue.	 I shall argue that the external constraints argument for the
crisis is misleading and an inadequate basis for understanding Tanzania's
second crisis.	 Indeed, as the crisis became progressively more extreme,
both the Government and the Party modified their positions to accept that
internal factors were equally responsible for the crisis. 	 But I shall
propose that this unity is fragile concealing contradictory approaches towards
solving the crisis.	 Thus,- I shall propose, Tanzania is not merely facing
a foreign balance crisis; rather the latter is an indication of more
serious problems affecting the whole economy.	 Each sector of the economy
is pervaded by intense problems, only some of which may be attributed to
foreign-exchange problems. In fact, a healthy foreign exchange situation
would only conceal and prolong the weakness within the economy.
	 A crisis
of this magnitude, I shall argue, can only be explained in relation to the
internal structures and processes of development.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR POLICY-MAKING 1975-1982
We saw in Chapter Six that in 1975 Party Supremacy was formally established
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in Tanzania.	 Furthermore, in addition to the Party's constitutional
rights to formulate policies, it had in the process, also gained con-
siderably more powers, especially from the Mwongozo of 1971. These powers
extended from the supervision and control of all Government agencies to
the issuing of guidance pertaining to the implementation of policies.
By 1975, as a result, it appeared to many observers that the Government
lacked rights, duties and even a role in society.
Nyerere was aware of this problem, as the following speech illustrates:
It is quite possible that when some Tanu
leaders talk about the supremacy of the
Party they do not want there to be any
distinction between the Party and the
Government, that the Party should involve
itself directly in performing the functions
of administration. We might be thinking
that if the Party performed these functions,
it would become more powerful. However,
this is not true for should the Party assume
these functions, it would atrophy.
(cited in Mwansasu, 1979: 175)
According to Mwansasu, Nyerere sought to correct this view (that the Party
should absorb Government functions) and "the new constitutional amendment
reflects his judgement that the two institutions must be kept distinct
and separate, with the party being supreme but not interfering directly
in the activities of the Government" (Mwansasu, 1979: 175).	 The new
clarification of Party-Government relations was explained in a Party
document entitled Chama Kushika Hatamu (1975) (Party Supremacy). It is
also pertinent to note that this document redefined the Regional Commissioners'
roles.	 Up to 1975, their posts had involved responsibilities to both the
Party and Government, but in 1975, they became responsible primarily to the
Party (Chama Kushika Hatamu, 1975: 2).
Wecan therefore see the President intervening at the policy-making
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level to reassert the rights and duties of the Government under the concept
of Party Supremacy. 	 This clarification by the President of the role of
the Government seems to be a modification of the 1971 Mwongozo aims and
objectives of the Party and its relationship to the Government. In 1975
Nyerere was arguing for the two organs of the state to remain quite
distinct from each other.	 This was an implicit recognition of the need
to have both organs in society; but more important, I would argue, was
Nyerere's realisation that government was very essential. 	 As he stated,
"It is possible for a country not to have a Party; but you cannot have
a country without a government. 	 Never!	 Such a Government could be
socialist or capitalist, good or bad, but it will have to be there" (cited
in Mwansasu, 1979: 176).
Once again we see here the President as an independent policy-making
institution, intervening to maintain a balance between the Party and
Government.	 This role of the Presidency has remained an important
balancing influence between the Party and Government relations. 	 As Head
of both organs of the State and sitting in both the higher level policy-
making decisions, the President is aware of problems from both side and
has the power to allow Government to modify policies to meet implementation
problems.	 This role of the Presidency was continuously stressed to me as
a positive and necessary factor in Government-Party relations (interview
with Government official, July 1981). 	 This role of the President may be
lost with the new Party proposals (1980) to change the constitution and
create two separate Heads for the Party and Government (CCM, 1980: 53).
Important changes also took place in the mid-1970sin the organisation of
the Party.	 Tanu had av3Qa.\{ secretariat and the major co-ordinating
mechanism linking the Party with the Government was the President in his
capacity as head of both organs.
	 This co-ordination greatly improved
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following the establishment of Chama Cha Mapinduzi in 1977.
6hama Cha Mapinduzi has established a Secretariat with five
Standing Committees which are responsible for the major socio-economic
activities in the country.
	 This allows the Secretariat to deal in a
more serious way with the problems and activities of the different sectors
of national life.
	 The Party Secretariat commissions research into
specific issues, most of which are conceived from practical problems
originating from villages, districts, regions or the national level, for
instance, from parastatals and other institutions.
The Party Secretariat attempts to investigate each problem in depth
and attempts to look at the problem from various angles.
	 This is often
done by inviting the actors concerned for interviews and consulting the
relevant data from all sectors of the economy.
	 The Secretariat then
sends its recommendations to the Central Committee, which has a mandate
to make decisions.	 Those recommendations which need policies are then
forwarded to the National Executive Committee for action (interview with
member of Party Secretariat, July 1981).
	 My interviews suggested that
the new division of functions between the Secretariat and the Central
Committee may lead to a better understanding of problems, which may in
turn improve policy-making.
	 This has also been enhanced by the educational
backgrounds of the members of the Secretariat, who represent the newer and
more technocratic element in the Party.
The NEC on the other hand, is still dominated by politicians who
lack a professional training.
	 This feature of Tanu appears to be carried
on at the CCM NEC.	 My interviews suggested that there is a potential
conflict between the CC and Secretariat on the one hand and the members
of NEC on the other.	 The latter, especially the former TANU vanguards,
felt that the CC was trying to usurp the powers of the NEC. Secretariat
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members, on the other hand, felt that the proper procedure was for
policies to be passed from the Secretariat and CC to the NEC. This
stemmed from the belief that "debates of the vanguards have only the
power of convictions" (interview with high ranking Party official, July
1981), and that there was "a higher rate of failure of platform policies"
because the full implications of such policies could not be fully considered
within a debate forum. (interview with Party official, July 1981).
The Party in its CCM phase has thus recognised the need for research
as a prelude to policy-making. 	 This means that development policies are
to be undertaken on a more systematic basis. 	 One outcome of this method
is TIJA (1980), a policy on Productivity. A second positive aspect, derived
fro} the creation of the Secretariat, is a new recognition of the need
to co-ordinate policy-making activities with the Government. 	 Again, the
policy of Tija was a product of such liaison (interview with members of
Party Secretariat, July 1981). 	 The problem of co-ordination between the
Secretariat and the Cabinet for instance is greatly facilitated if a Member
of the Cabinet in charge of one of the strategic ministries is also a
member of the Central Committee.	 Problems from both sides of the roles
can be aired on a more 'equal' basis (interview with members of Party
Secretariat, July 1981).
Despite these promising changes, however, during the years 1974-82
there were still fundamental differences between Government and Party views
of development and approaches to policy-making. 	 The former, again, because
of its institutional functions as an implementor and caretaker of the
national economy, considered implementation problems and capacity as inputs
into policy-making.	 As the 1974-5 crisis began to take its toll, this
factor led it to adopt once again a view of development in which production,
private capital and labour discipline were stressed. 	 The Party on the
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other hand, as a political institution, continued to see human and
political mobilisation as factors capable of overcoming objective
constraints.
GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES: EMPHASIS ON PRODUCTION
The economic crisis of 1974/75 undermined the influence of the
supporters of the dependency thesis within the Government and strengthened
the previous minority viewpoint which has consistently stressed problems
of production.	 I shall call the latter the production	 group. Another
result of the crisis was that Government began to take a more active and
aggressive approach towards policy-making on a de facto basis in an attempt
to expand production.	 The most dynamic supporters of this approach during
this period were the Minister of Industry, Msuya and the Minister of Finance,
Wei.
As soon as the food crisis was over in 1975 attention was focussed
on the need to expand manufacturing production.
	 The aim was to reduce
the shortages of consumer goods which were being experienced as well as
to mobilise local capital to invest and expand production.
	 The period
has become known as the 'liberalising period' in Tanzania's development.
We shall consider the various measures which were introduced by the
Government in an attempt to improve the economic situation.
Encouragement of private capital 
The most important measure during this period was the open encouragement
to private capital which was given by Government and the President. The
Minister of Industries as well as the President toured private and state
industries in a bid to boost	 production.	 A meeting of private manu-
facturers was called at the Diamond Jubilee Hall in 1977 to discuss their
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problems.	 This was the first meeting of private capitalists since 1967.
The Reional Commissioners also attended the meeting.
The outcome of the meeting was the policy of De-confinement which
meant that private capital could by-pass state-owned agencies when they
ordered their imports.	 The policy of De-confinement was meant to ease
and speed up the bureaucratic process, thus allowing private capital a
freer hand to expand production. 	 It was facilitated by the favourable
conditions of foreign exchange which existed during 1976/77 as a result
of the coffee boom.	 We shall consider in greater detail the policy on
Private Capital and that of De-confinement in the case studies in Part III.
Labour discipline and monetary rewards 
By 1975 the policy of Mwongozo had been brought to a halt by the
Government and there were attempts by Government to re-assert discipline
in factories and work places. 	 Nyerere argued that "It is now quite clear
that we have to take a stronger stand against any lack of discipline"
(Nyerere, 1975: 21).	 New legislation was also being prepared which aimed
to establish disiplinary committees, consisting of management, employees
and Party members in industries and factories.
	 The responsibilities of
the committees would include dismissals and premature retirement, as well
as rewards (wage increases) related to productivity (Economist Intelligence
Unit, 1978, 4: 2).
Mtei, the Minister of Finance in the Third Five Year Plan (1977-1981)
also stressed that previous plans had failed through inefficiency and lack
of hard work.	 There was to be more emphasis on discipline and stricter
accounting methods.	 He also suggested that earnings should be based on
work done.	 Effort was to be rewarded, and such measures would also be
extended to peasants via producer prices (Economist Intelligence Unit,
1978, 1: 2).	 In the same budget speech, Mtei stated that a study of
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incentives to increase production was to be undertaken by government and
also a /study of export promotion (Ibid).
	 In the 1978/79 development
expenditure allocation, priority was given to directly productive
activities, mainly industry (which received 29% of total expenditure),
and economic infrastructure (37%), with emphasis on transport and communi-
cations.	 The social infrastructure, defined as water supply, education,
health and the new capital and defence, came third, with some 20% of the
total (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1978, 3: 3).
We can therefore see that the first major economic crisis of 1974/75
was taken very seriously by Government and led to a serious re-consideration
of the approach which had guided the 1969-1974 policies.	 Government also
took-a more active part in policy-making. 	 Thus, there was a reassertion
of economic considerations in the measures passed by the policy-making
bodies in Tanzania during this period.
Other measures taken have been described as follows:
Primary school fees have been reintroduced
and other benefit taxes or alternative costs
recovery mechanisms are under consideration
... In an effort to improve parastatal efficiency,
the Government closed down a loss-making
transport parastatal, dismissed redundant
workers in several parastatals, and closed
loss-making public butcheries, with the return
of this activity to the private sector.
(World Bank, 1977: xxvii)
PARTY'S POLICIES - TRADE AND REDISTRIBUTION MEASURES.
The policy of villagisation created the need to make available basic
amenities to the villagers (interview with high-ranking Party official,
July 1981).	 The Party responded to these problems in the following way.
In late 1974 the Party passed the policy of Universal Primary Education
(UPE), and in early 1975, the policy of Universal Rural Water Supply (URWS)
was brought forward by the Party from its original target (set by the
role in fo i ii procurement was pass to the National Killing Corporation (NPIC),
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Government) of 1991 to 1980.
	 These measures invariably increased
Government's expenditure.
Dissolution of the cooperatives, 1976 
It is difficult to trace exactly which organ of the state was
responsible for the dissolution of the co-operatives. 	 Government
officials stated quite clearly that it was the Party which dissolved the
Co-operatives, while the Party officials I interviewed stated equally
categorically that the decision was made in the Government and then merely ,SJPNi:
to the Party for ratification.	 This situation is perhaps explicable
in terms of the ambiguous location of the Prime Minister's Office in this
period, the then Prime Minister being a high-ranking Party official as
well as head of the Government.
The decision to dissolve the Co-operatives in 1976 was facilitated
by a number of factors.	 First, the growing inefficiency and corruption
of a number of co-operatives led to a situation where the producers were
not being properly served.	 Second, the villagisation process had disrupted
many of the primary societies, and third, the 1975 Village Act had designed
the new villages to be self-reliant in the sense that they were to serve
their own marketing needs. With the dissolution of the co-operatives, their
ration Miduka, 1976
Another im rtant policy pass was the	 ration Ma.duka, intr*ouced11)
by the Prime Minister in y 1976. The o*licy called for the closure of
governments
	
	 areas, w hile to the urban areas private sh
private retail 
the
shops
rural
and their replacement by shops run by the
n
mould replac.-o by state shops. Party of 	 in the r oin§	 anrif	 di
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to implement the policy as soon as it was announced by closing down
private shops.
It would appear from these policies - universal primary education,
universal rural water supply, dissolution of the co-operatives and
Operation Maduka - that the Party was implementing policies which were
mainly geared to social problems; and that the issues of timing and
of economic constraints were still of secondary concern. 	 This would
indicate that the Party had remained very consistent in its way of formu-
lating policies and that the first economic crisis did not have a major
effect on the Party activists' pattern of thinking.
I can conclude this section by stating that the Party and Government
were adopting opposing policies.
	 While the Government responded to the
economic crisis by evolving policies aimed at stabilising production and
encouraging private capital while minimising recurrent costs, the Party
was pursuing policies in other sectors of the economy which increased
recurrent expenditure, curtailed the role of private capital and de-
stabilised production through changes in marketing and trade. This would
force me to conclude that the Party and Government were not operating in
a consistent fashion but were pursuing policies which were contradictory
and opposed.
This conclusion is at variance with arguments such as those of
Raikes (1976) and Lofchie (1978) that the state was 'liberalising' or
adopting capitalist policies in this period. The formulation of the problem
in terms of 'liberalising' is misleading in more than one way. First, the
period of 'liberalising' also saw the Party promote its view of development
based on the control of trade, which was completed with the take-over of
the retail trade.	 Second, the idea of liberalising conjures up ideas
of capitalism, thus concealing the fact that socialist policies must also
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consider economics in development.
ECONOMIC CRISIS II: FIRST REACTIONS
The period starting in 1979 was again a critical period for Tanzania.
The second major economic crisis occurred only four years after that of
1974/75 and it was also manifested in severe balance of payment problems.
The following table illustrates the balance of trade position in the years
immediately preceding the crisis.
TABLE 8.1 
Trade Data ($ millions)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Merchandise
Exports 363.6 399.2 372.9 490.0 546.7 473.6
Merchandise
Imports 437.8 660.4 670.0 555.4 648.4 1006.1
Balance
of Trade -74 -261.1 -297.1 -65.2 -101.7 -532.5
Source: IMF, September 1980, quoted in Agency for International
Development, 1980).
The balance of payments crisis affected Tanzania's import capacity. 	 For
instance, the estimated volume of imports other than foodgrains and
petroleum in 1979 was 16% lower than in 1978 and only 3% higher than six
years earlier in 1973 (World Bank, 1980: 86).
As already stated in the Introduction, a severe balance of payments
crisis for an economy such as Tanzania's has repercussions on all socio-
economic sectors, because practically every sector of the economy is
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dependent to some degree on imported inputs or on transportation, which
required imported fuel 	 For instance, shortages of trucks, railway
wagons and diesel fuel, affected the collection of agricultural produce
in the 1979 harvet (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1979: 4).	 The following
-	 A
report from the Bank of Tanzania summarises the situation as regards
manufacturing:
In 1979, the manufacturing sector performed
rather poorly as compared with 1978. 	 Most
of the industries registered declines in output
due to inadequate supply of imported inputs,
and to some extent due to interruptions in
supply of water and electricity. Further,
transportation and other infrastructural
bottlenecks continued to affect	 industrial
production adversely ....
(Bank of Tanzania, 1979: 9)
The situation led to extreme shortages of basic consumer necessities for
the majority of the population, aswellasto rocketing prices as a result
of black market. This economic situation was discussed at the Party
Annual Conference of 1979.
Party's discussion of the problem of shortages of goods 
At the 1979 Party Annual Meeting, the Chairman, President Nyerere,
in his opening speech, drew attention to the acute problem of scarcity
of goods which was being experienced and he called for a programme of
ouc
action. But he also pointedlithat:
... people hoard sugar, soap, maize,
that is seen as the root of our problems.
It is not. Our problems are a reality.
(CCM, 1979: 10-12)
And:
We complain and we blame the implementors
that certain things are not well implemented.
Whenever I listen, when there are scaricities
you say it is due to implementation.
(Ibid)
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Although the President was attempting to direct attention to problems
of production, members of the Party saw the problem of the scarcity
of goods in relation to distribution and the exploitative role of the
traders.	 This is evident in the following discussion by the veterans
of the Party.	 Siyovelwa, a Regional Commissioner and member of the NEC,
commented on the problem of scarcity of goods in the following manner:
It is true that there are scarcities, the
little that is available our colleagues
(the businessmen) have decided to use for
their benefit. It is unfortunate that
necessities, which are needed by the
peasants, are involved.
... Mr. Chairman, if you hear that we have
taken steps to curb them, do not think that
we are merely against them.
(CCM, 1979: 15)
This view received support from another Party veteran, Ngombale-MWiru,
another Regional Commissioner and a member of the National Executive
Committee of the Party. He called for more control at the lower levels,
i.e. at the level of retail trade.	 He argued that as long as "individual
business men exist ... the problem of scarcity of goods will be rampant".
What was needed, he argued, was a socialist base:
What we need is a socialist base, and this
has to be production. We believe that shops
established by productive Ujamaa villages
will be firm and prosperous.
(CCM, 1979: 48)
Another Party member, Wasira backed up the argument that the shortages
of goods were caused by traders:
There is a group of middlemen. These people
make sure that the little available is not
in circulation and if it is, it is exorbit-
antly priced.
(CCM 1979: 51)
-311-
The discussion on scarcities of goods in terms of distribution
probleMs and the role of private traders appears to reflect a rather
' resistant tendency in the Party.	 It is interesting to note that as
late as 1979, at the height of the economic crisis, Party activists were
still viewing shortages of goods in terms of distribution and traders,
rather than in terms of production. If we compare this discussion with
the 1963 NEC discussion of "the problem of food shortages in the country"
(see Msekwa, 1977: 28), we can see how remarkably consistent the Party's
view of development has been throughout the period.
This does not mean that the Party did not discuss problems of
production.
	 As we saw, the policy of Politics is Agriculture was the
result of such discussions.
	 The problem of declining agricultural
production was also discussed in the meeting of 1979.
	 Siyovelwa, for
instance, saw the way to increased production in producing more ploughs:
Maybe, this is the opportunity to take up
the Party's call to stop depending on
tractors and use ploughs instead.
(CCM, 1979: 15)
Meanwhile Ngombale-Mwiru'saw the solution in terms of increasing the role
of state farms. He argued that:
There is a chance to establish government
or state farms.
	 Public farms are socialist.
Secondly, we should train people who will
serve socialism at a village level. Third,
we should research on methods to make
agriculture successful. Our villages are
bound to stagnate due to lack of sufficient
expertise ... Now can't we get our agri-
cultural officers from the youth in our
villages?
(CCM, 1979: 48)
The methodology of these discussions is again similar and characteristic
of Party discussions.
	 There was a tendency to avoid discussion of the
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causes of agricultural decline or reviewing systematically the policies
affecting agricultural production. Rather, ideas were put forward
without any form of evidence as policy solutions.
Reversal of Government's policies 
The acute problems of foreign exchange and scarcities of basic
consumer goods brought the Party back again to the fore in policy-making.
The Party introduced the policy of Re-confinement (1979), thus reversing
the Government's policy of De-confinement. 	 The Party's policy of
Re-confinement had two major aspects to it.	 First, the policy meant
that private capital would have to import their requirements via the state
agencies.• In other words, they would no longer by-pass the state agencies
as they had done under the policy of De-confinement. The second aspect
of the policy related to manufacturers.
	
Manufacturers would have to sell
their products to the State Regional Trading Companies for their ultimate
disposal to the consumers.
The policy of Re-confinement thus aimed at curtailing private business
at two levels: at the level of production and at the level of wholesale
and retail trade. 	 In the case of the former, the Party hoped to stop
the outflow of foreign exchange which was occurring under the policy of
De-confinement. In the case of the latter, i.e. control of wholesale and
retail trade, the Party hoped that if distribution were controlled at both
levels by state agencies and a quota-system was used to distribute goods,
then these mechanisms would ensure that "the little that was produced
would reach the people" (interview with Party official, July 1981).
Heated debates took place between the Party and Government over the
policy of Re-confinement; Government ministries such as Industry and
Finance, opposed the idea of re-confinement. Both Ministers argued that
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the problem of shortage of goods was the result of production problems
and that control of distribution would not be successful under conditions
of scarcity: rather it would merely increase expenses for the regional
trading companies (this is discussed further in the case study on Internal
Trade).
But the Party found a strong supporter for the policy of Re-confinement
in the Minister of Trade, Kaduma, who was also, unlike the two productionist
Ministers of Industry and Finance, in the Central Committee of the Party.
Kaduma implemented the policy of Re-confinement, which had been initiated
by the Party.	 Finally, the production - group's arguments were defeated
as the severity of the balance of payment crisis of 1979/80/81 developed
and necessitated even tighter control of limited foreign exchange. In
other words, the conflict between the two views of development was made
irrelevant by the enormity of the second crisis.
ECONOMIC CRISIS II: CONFLICTING EXPLANATIONS
With the onset of the second major period of economic crisis, the
debate about Tanzanian development policy has increasingly moved away from
academic social-science circles to the multilateral agencies and the
Tanzanian Government itself. We have seen that, traditionally, the most
• strategic ministries as well as the Bank of Tanzania have always taken
a production	 view of development and of the causes of balance of payments
problems. In 1979-1980, the Government in its reaction to external
criticisms did not revert to a 'political' view of development but did rely
heavily on external constraints arguments.	 We shall begin by examining
Government's explanation of the crisis.
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Official explanation of Tanzania's crisis 
The official explanation of the Government on the crisis of 1979-
1980/81 emphasised external constraints.	 Such factors as weather
conditions,_falling prices for agricultural exports and rising imported-
goods and petroleum prices, reduced the country's capacity to earn
foreign exchange while increasing the import bill. 	 These factors were
further aggravated by the collapse of the East African Community and the
War with Uganda which involved the country in more financial burdens
(Nyerere, 1980; Malima, 1980).
The following Memorandum written by the Minister of Finance on
August 18, 1980, clearly illustrates the Government's position. After
the impact of the first oil-price increase in 1974:
... a series of other events beyond our control
placed further strains on the economy,
especially on the balance of payments. The
sudden collapse of the East African Community
created major dislocations, necessitating
considerable unplanned re-allocations of
personnel as well as domestic and foreign
exchange resources to shore up and rebuild
the vital transportation and communications
sector. More recently, the invasion of our
territory and our consequent conflict with
the former Ugandan regime has had a high cost
in domestic resources, foreign exchange and
disruption of production. At the same time,
like all non-oil developing countries, Tanzania
has been affected very adversely by the further
steep rise in oil prices as well as by the economic.
slowdown and rapid inflation in the major
countries.
(cited in US Agency for International
Development, 1980: 49)
The Memorandum stated that the external factors outlined above affected
internal development:
With the increasing shortage of foreign
exchange, restrictions on payments for
imports as well as for certain services
-315-
and transfers were tightened ... In
general, therefore, imports declined in
relation to GDP, and the resulting
shortages of raw materials and inter-
mediate goods led to substantial under-
utilisation of industrial capacity and
considerable disrepair of infrastructure
facilities. Thus, while the external
payments situation became increasingly
difficult, the growth of most economic
sectors slowed and pressures on prices
intensified.
(Ibid)
The official explanation of the crisis, then, stressed exogenous factors.
The argument was that a series of events beyond the control of the
Government were responsible for the crisis. In other words, had they
not occurred, Tanzania's economic performance would not have been in
such a critical situation.
Multilateral Agencies' explanations of Tanzanian economic crises 
Multilateral aid agencies on the other hand have explained Tanzania's
two economic crises in relation to problems of production; that is, they
have focussed primarily on the structure and performance of the domestic
economy.	 According to a World Bank Memorandum:
... the underlying weakness are of a
more long-term nature and related primarily
to the structure and performance of the
domestic economy. These include declining
export volumes, disappointing growth in the
monetized and productive sectors, and poor
maintenance of existing capital stock and
infrastructure, especially in agriculture
and transport.
(World Bank, 1981: 1)
The World Bank also saw that policies were major contributory factors
towards declining production. 	 In relation to the decline of agricultural
production, the report stated:
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The general direction of the Government's
post-Arusha agriculture strategy has
tended to emphasise the transformation
of the institutional structure of rural
development (through the formation of
villages and increasing public involvement
- in the sector) over measures designed
• to improve agricultural production directly.
(Ibid)
In relation to the poor performance of the manufacturing sector, the
Bank Memorandum stated that:
This poor growth performance does not indicate
any slackening of the investment effort (the
gross investment ratio has remained
commendably high at more than 20% of GDP), but
rather reflects the low return on investment
in Tanzania which has been a major concern
for a number of years.
(Ibid)
A recent USAID report entitled Tanzanian Development Performance 
and Implications for Development Assistance (1980) also focussed attention
on internal factors as the cause of poor performance. It viewed the
Tanzanian economy as a crisis-prone economy, which, if not remedied,
would be unable to cope with adverse exogenous factors. The report
specifically blamed policies. 	 Thus:
Public intervention in economic activity
e.g. price setting, the patterns of
public investment, substitution of public
for private enterprises in transportation
and distribution, have had the effect
of substantially reducing economic efficiency
without significantly improving well-being
through greater equity.
(Ibid: 1)
In relation to the problems of cash crop agriculture, the report pointed
out:
Export crop producer prices have declined
in real terms and relative to food crops,
while marketing costs and export taxes
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have increased disproportionately.
Overall, pricing policy has caused
serious misallocation and major deficits
in the National Milling Corporation.
The NMC deficits have in turn contributed
to inflation which, in combination with
, declining export volumes, has weakened
• the Tanzanian international trade position
and made the economy more susceptible to
adverse international changes such as oil
price increases.
(Ibid: iii)
The theme oi these explanations is that because of the weaknesses within
the domestic economy (chiefly as a result of policy deficiencies) the
Tanzanian economy was unable to cope with external problems.
External or Internal explanations of the crisis 
The external conditions which the official explanation emphasised
did have adverse effects on the economy. For instance, the estimates
of the budgetary cost of the war with Uganda was at $500 million (US Agency
for Development, 1980: 20) and "over 2000 million shillings ($245 million)
had to be spent on projects arising from the breakup of the East African
Community" (Malima, 1980).	 In addition, Tanzania's terms of trade fell
by 20% during this period (US Agency for Development, 1980: 22). 	 The price
of petroleum imports rose to an estimated $172 million, or 16% of total
imports (World Bank, 1980: 87). 	 This meant that Tanzania had to assign
a larger proportion of her export earnings merely to pay for fuel, as
against her needs for capital and intermediate goods and other requirements.
But at the same time, the explanations offered by the multilateral
agencies are also valid.	 We might argue that both the external and
internal explanations are correct, and that they are not contradictory
because they focus attention on different aspects of the economy. 	 Such
an argument may be correct but it is necessary to go beyond this and
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question the methodology of the external constraints explanation as an
approach to development problems.
The methodology of the external constraints argument has similarities
with certain forms of the dependency thesis. 	 The 'external' is expected
to be harmonious and ideal for 'internal' policies to function properly.
The external world includes for this purpose, world market prices, the
policies of neighbouring countries and environmental factors, such as
weather conditions. If external conditions become adverse in any manner -
politically, economically or meteorologically - then internal policies are
expected to fail in achieving their goals. There are certain problems
with such a methodology.
First, it means that what is examined and regarded as problematic .
is the external world and not internal policies; but what is examined
and relied upon for development purposes, is beyond the control of the
Tanzanian authorities.	 While what is left unexamined is within its own
control.	 Such a methodology is obviously self-defeating. 	 As Nyerere
rightly acknowledged in 1967 "it is useless to complain that we are poor
or that world prices are low for this is like complaining that there are
no rains" (Tanu, Mwanza, 1967: 40).
Second, the methodology expects the external to be stable, or at least
predictable.	 The external world is supposed to 'fit in' with domestic
policies.	 But this assumption has been and is likely to remain unrealistic.
Finally, one might ask: if policies are not evolved to cope with the
external world in the above sense, what then are policies for? The external
world will always be problematic and the success or failure of policies
must surely be assessed in terms of their success in coping with external
shocks, by minimising their impact on socio-economic and political life.
We can therefore conclude that the methodology of the external constraints
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arguments is flawed because it idealises the development process in a
way that diverts attention from the most pressing policy issues.
But why did the Government adopt the external constraints explanation
of the crisis and apparently abandon its production
	 view of development?
Two reasons account for this change.
	 First, it appears that there was an
instruction from the Party to the Government specifically to reject
criticisms which implied that Tanzania's socialism hactfailed (interview
with Party official, July 1981).
	 This was apparent in the article
published by African Confidential in July 16 1980 entitled, "Tanzania:
An End of the Dream", which argued that the present economic crisis had
been the result of Tanzania's socialist policies.
	 The Government of
Tanzania answered at length, arguing that Tanzania's policies were being
criticised, not because they had failed to serve the people, but because
they were succeeding.
	 This success, it stressed, is "the real threat
to the enemies of Tanzania, who would like Tanzania to fail so that they
can use its failure as another example of the impracticality of socialism"
(Daily News, 1980).
	 Second, the external constraints argument which
Government has used can also be seen as a useful tactic in dealing with
external agencies.
Acceptance of role of internal factors 
As early as1980 Nyirabu, the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania,
went contrary to the official explanation by stressing that internal
weaknesses were major contributory factors to the crisis. In this speech
to the Economic Society of Tanzania, Nyirabu stated that:
... the present economic situation has not
arisen from causes of recent and external
origin only but is a culmination of the
weakness in our system aggravated by these
causes (external).
(Nyirabu, 1980: 5, emphasis added)
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And:
we would have been in a better position to
absorb the shocks originating mainly outside
the country, if our economy itself was in
a healthy condition.
(Ibid: 3)
By 1981 it would appear that both the Party and the Government had
modified their explanations and come to accept that the economic crisis
Tanzania was facing was the result of both external and internal factors.
These views were outlined in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
publication (1982) "National Economic Survival Programme for 1981 and 1982"
and the Party's Mwongozo wa CCM (1981). 	 Since the explanation for the
crisis in the two documents are similar I have summarised them together.
Both documents argued that the crisis Tanzania was experiencing
was not unique to Tanzania and that other non-oil-exporting countries of
different political philosophies were also experiencing a similar crisis.
Both documents identified as causes increases in petroleum prices, increases
in the prices of other imports and declining export prices. The example
given in each of the document was that "whereas in 1972 we needed about
5 tons of tea to be able to purchase one tractor, in 1981 17 tons of tea
had to be exported in order to purchase the same tractor" (The National
Economic Survival Programme, 1982: 1; CCM Mwongozo, 1981: 20).
Both documents also acknowledged that internal factors contributed
to the crisis.
	 These were adverse weather conditions, the war with
Idi Amin; and the decline in output and productivity in various productive
sectors and services (NESP, 1982: 2; CCM Mwongozo, 1981: 21/22).
	 The
Party doucment further stated that another major internal weakness was
that as a nation Tanzania did not fully utilise the Government, Party and
People's capacity to find solutions to economic problems (CCM Mwongozo, 1981:
31).	 We can therefore conclude that by 1981 there was acceptance by both
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organs of the state that internal factors including those pertaining
,
mainly to production were contributory to the crisis.
These documents also show that there is now a greater degree of
co-ordination between the two organs than in the recent past.
	 The
Policy on Tija (1980) which was a product of both Government and Party
efforts, also indicates that by 1980 the Party had accepted the principle
of material incentives as a reward in work. This is definitely a change
from the 1969-1974 period when the Party relied mainly on ideology and
mobilisation, best exemplified in Mwongozo, to increase production. Tija
is a recognition also of individual as opposed to collective incentives.
This change also illustrates that policy-makers are capable of
re-interpreting socialism according to new needs and demands, and that
Tanzania's ideology is not static.
In sum, we might say that by 1980 the Party had moved and modified
its position slightly to accommodate Government's priorities and elements
of its view of development.
CONCLUSION 
The period from the end of the first crisis to the beginning of the
second crisis brought about a series of reversals and counter-reversals of
policies.	 Towards the end of the 1970s, Party and Government were pursuing
different policies in different sectors of the economy; but as the full
depth of the economic crisis began to be appreciated the two organs of the
state came together to accept that internal factors were partly responsible
for the crisis.	 These included the decline in the productive sectors of
the economy. I would argue, however, that this unity was fragile, concealing
contradictory approaches towards solving the crisis stemming from the under-
lying difference between Government and Party views of development.
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CONCLUSION TO PART II
The analysis of Part II has been able to document and explain the
complexities of the Tanzanian development experience from 1967 to 1982
based on an understanding of the tripartite system of Government, Party
and President.
	 We saw in Chapter Five how the Party's position and view
of development was strengthened as the result of the Arusha Declaration
and the 1965 Interim Constitution; but the Government was able to
intervene to stop the Arusha Declaration from becoming too 'political'.
The Government's success was mainly due to the President who had not
completely abandoned a view of development which recognised the importance
of economic constraints understood in conventional terms. It was on this
basis that I argued that the Arusha Declaration was not an act but rather
a process - each organ of the state was able to intervene at different
stages of the process to assert its particular view of development.
	 As
the various organs' interests and views of development differed, I argued
that the 'state' was not functioning as a 'homogeneous' entity. The
President attempted to maintain both a political and a 'theoretical'
balance between the Government and the Party.
This situation, however, changed between 1969 and 1974 (Chapter Six).
The President and Government adopted a 'political' approach, which in turn
had begun to include new ideas about ideology and mobilisation as instruments
for bringing about socialist transformation.
	 Although the intellectual
origins of these 'political' approaches differed from one organ to another,
nevertheless, there was a common underlying element in the new pattern of
development thinking: economics was de-emphasised in favour of political
goals. On this basis, I argued that the real revolution in Tanzanian
development policy occurred between 1969-1974 and not with the Arusha
Declaration in 1967.
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The consequences of these policies for the development process, and
in particular the crisis of 1974-75, were examined in Chapter Seven.
	 A
critical re-examination was made of both the 'radical' and the 'pragmatic'
dependency interpretations of the Tanzanian situation, and both were
found inadequate to explain the Tanzanian experience. The external and
internal constraints arguments were also examined and the former did not
stand up to a serious re-examination of its implications. On this basis,
I argued that internal policies were responsible for the crisis because they
weakened the economy's capacity to cope with adverse economic conditions.
By downgrading economic factors in development, politically-orientated
policies created social problems for the masses, which in turn compromised
the political aims of Tanzanian socialism.
In the final chapter of this Part, I looked at the period following
the first major economic crisis. I argued that the crisis forced the
Government to abandon its 'political' approach to development and to
revert to its traditional concern for economic growth as the basis of
development.
	 This shift in Tanzanian development policy has come to be
known as the 'liberalisation' period.
	 But I showed that this categoris-
ation is misleading, because the Party at the same time was continuing
to formulate policies based on a 'political' approach in different sectors
of the economy, notably in trade.
	 As the 1979 crisis became more extreme,
the debate over the validity of these two views of development became
submerged as the two organs in their different ways attempted to cope with
the crisis.
*	 * * *	 *	 *	 *	 *	 *
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Throughout Parts I and II I have attempted to show that the neo-
Marxist -radical approach has failed to offer an adequate explanation
of the Tanzanian development experience.
	 The thesis that policies
were aborted because they conflicted with the class interests of the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie has not been supported.
	 Second, the assumption
that the state in Tanzania is a homogeneous entity used by the class in
power to further their class interests has not stood up.
	 My analysis
has shown that there are conflicts between the two main organs of the
state, that this conflict is reflected in different views of development
and that this has a decisive effect on the shape of Tanzanian development
policies.
	 We have also seen how policy measures were undertaken
which proved to be counter-productive to the class interests-of those in
power.	 Third, I have attempted to show that the dependency approach
which most radical writers used in analysing Tanzania's development
experience was misleading; it led to the identification of a false
problem, while deflecting attention from real ones.
Equally Green's position that policies failed because of implementation
problems and adverse exogenous factors is untenable.
	 This position has
been rectified by Hyden's insistence that the Tanzanian development
experience can only be understood in terms of faulty policy-making. But
Hyden's explanation falls short of relating the Tanzanian experience to
its political-institution context, and his analysis of policy-makers
attitudes is problematic in various ways.
	 Why have conventional economic
considerations played such a secondary role in Tanzanian development -
despite pronouncements to the contrary?
	
Will the acceptance of 'internal
factors' as contributory to the latest economic crisis lead to the adoption
of common policy-solutions by Party and Government, or is the conflict of
views of development between Party and Government still alive and well
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beneath a facade of agreements?
In order to understand the development experience of Tanzania in
the recent past as well as to answer these questions about the future,
we have to understand the types of relations that have characterised
Party and Government. 	 Most writers on the Tanzanian scene have ignored
the conflict within trerelationship and, in particular, have ignored the
consequences for developmental processes of the 1965 Interim Constitution.
As I have attempted to establish throughout the thesis, we can only under-
stand Tanzania's development experience by reference to the view of
development held by the policy actors themselves and, in turn, to the
political-institutional context of policy-making. 	 Herein lies the source
of destablisation in Tanzania's policy-making and implementation.
Institutional arrangements created the situation whereby the Party
could formulate policies taking into consideration only 'political' factors
on the basis that the economics of implementing the policy was the
responsibility of Government. 	 They also created the situation whereby
each organ of the state could blame the other for economic problems
or policy-failures.	 Thus representatives of the Party could argue that
the right policies had been formulated but failed because of bad imple-
mentation, while members of the Government could argue that implementation
problems were the result of faulty policy-making. These two contending
types of explanation have to a certain degree found support in the various
authors, depending on their ideological affinities. But the consequences
of policies and the pattern of implementation problems would strongly
indicate that institutional factors have a strong bearing on this experience.
In Part III of the thesis I have chosen three case studies - the
policy on Private Capital, the policy on Internal Trade and the policy on
Rural and Agricultural Development - to illustrate in more specific terms
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the types of problems which emerged as a result of an institutional
arrangement which separates policy-making from policy implementation.
I shall continue tracing out the themes first explored in Part I and II,
namely that of the conflict between the two organs of state, the approach
incorporated in the different policies, and their theoretical and
empirical validity as elements of a development strategy.
	 We shall see
the same themes through the analysis of specific policies rather than
from the broad perspective of Party and Government relations.
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PART III 
CASE STUDIES: POLICIES ON PRIVATE CAPITAL, INTERNAL
TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL AND	 RURAL
DEVELOPMENT 1967 - 1982.
The purpose of the case studies is to provide further empirical
evidence on the Tanzania development experience in relation to these
themes - the relationship between the Party and Government, the views of
development held by the Party and Government, and the socio-economic
effects on the development processes of policies which do not give
sufficient weight to economic constraints. 	 These issues will be
analysed from the point of view of the policies themselves and in relation
to the tripartite system of the Party, Government and the President.
In each case study I will show how the policy advocated by each of
the three organs of the state, in the period 1970-1982, was determined
by the beliefs and understanding of the policy-makers themselves. (This
will dispel the neo-Marxists explanations that policies can be understood
in terms of the class interests of those in power).
	 Secondly, in each
of the case studies, I will investigate whether there was a conflict between
the Government and the Party. 	 This situation would account for seemingly
contradictory policies.
	 Thirdly, I hope the case studies will illustrate
empirically the extent to which problems were generated as a result of
policies which consistently ignored economics.
	 This would not only account
for the crisis-prone economy
	 of Tanzania, but also provide an answer to
Green's form of analysis, namely that the problems Tanzania has been
experiencing are merely the result of implementation problems.
	 This
empirical evidence should also provide an answer to the radicals' arguments
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that more'political' policies are required in creating socialist development.
In/addition, I hope that the three case studies will provide useful
insights into how policy-making directly bears on implementation, and into
the connection between the conception of policies and their consequences.
-
These two factors cannot be separated and isolated in different compartments.
Problems develop and assume their own development momentum in the development
process.	 Reversal of policies or even modifications cannot reverse the
situation.	 Rather a more complex situation is created demanding more
difficult solutions.
Finally, since the creation of Chama Cha Mapinduzi in 1977 which
replaced Tanu, there has been far more research conducted by the Party
Secretariat on development issues and a more mature approach manifested
in their willingness to co-ordinate and discuss problems with the Government,
parastatal agencies etc.
	 In addition, the second economic crisis, in
1980/81, led many Party officials to accept and re-consider the necessity
for production in development.
	 Nevertheless, despite these positive
changes, it is still possible to argue that there remains a basic conflict
between the Party's view of development and the Government's.
	 This would
indicate that views of development held by policy-makers exert
	 a con-
siderable influence on how problems are conceptualised and policy-solutions
derived.	 I would argue that a resolution of the conflict is a prerequisite
for development-stability.
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CHAPTER NINE 
,
THE POLICY ON PRIVATE CAPITAL
The policy on private capital is important because it has impli-
cations for all the most strategic economic sectors of the country. These
are the agricultural, manufacturing, transport and commercial sectors.
As we have already seen it was over the role of private capital that the
difference between the Party and the Government was most acute.
The analysis in Parts One and Two of the thesis showed that there
existed contradictory attitudes towards the role of private capital in
Tanzania.	 Despite immense opposition from the Party activists (1962-
1966) the Government continued to encourage the role of private investment
and in 1963 adopted the policy of FIPA.
	 The Government was not prepared
to give in to Party demands on the issue of private capital because it was
closely related to its objective of attaining rapid economic growth.
In 1967, however, the President nationalised foreign capital, though
he resisted the Party activists' demands to nationalise local capital.
On this basis, I argued that the President was operating within conventional
ideas of develdpment because he still recognised the importance of economic
constraints On development.
	 This position also accounted for the Government's
success at curtailing further nationalisation.
	 In the policy statement
'Public Ownership in Tanzania' (1967) the Government, by categorising the
different forms of manufacturing activities in relation to the different
types of ownership, was logically able to argue that private capital was
required in Tanzania.
However, between 1969 and 1974, the conventional view of development
was replaced by a political approach to development.
	 One of the consequences
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of this view of development was the rapid expansion of the public sector,
which cfame to replace private capital as the generator of growth.
	 But
private capital continued to expand.
	 By 1975 private investment still
constituted a quarter of the nation's monetary fixed investment (World
Bank, 1977: xxiv).	 Again between 1976-1979 private capital was subjected
to contradictory pressures.
	 The Government encouraged it in the area of
production, while the Party discouraged it in trade.
How can we explain this contradictory attitude towards private
capital?	 Does or does not the 'state' want private capital in development?
This chapter will attempt to look into the Party's and the Government's
policies towards private capital, paying particular attention to the period
1969-1982.
	 The aim of this chapter is to establish the proposition that
the continuing conflict between the Party and the Government has destabil-
ising influences on the development process.
	 I shall also argue that this
conflict can be located in the manner in which the Party and the Government
formulate their policies.
	 The Party's continued rejection of private
capital is based on political and ideological considerations while the
Government's is based on the recognition that additional capital and skills
are needed to develop the economy.
	 These differences can be further traced
to the institutional arrangement of policy-making in Tanzania.
THE PRIMACY OF POLITICS IN DEVELOPMENT: 1969-1974
The conventional view of development 
We saw in Chapter Six how the conventional view of development became
a minority view in official circles, and was replaced by a political
approach towards development, which had emphasised, for different practical
and theoretical reasons, the expansion and role of the state sector in
development.
	 Although the conventional view of development was in a
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minority, nevertheless it was able to exert a limited degree of influence
because-it was held by members who controlled the financial institutions,
and who were most concerned with monetary matters, repayments of debts,
and economic growth.
	 The influence of the conventional view of develop-
ment was strongly reflected in the area of private investments. This view
argued that the Arusha Declaration allowed for the role of private capital
in certain sectors of the economy and as a result the 1963 FIPA Act was
not repealed.
As a result of this definition, the Minister of Finance, Jamal, in
his guidance to the National Bank of Commerce (NBC), was able to argue
that if a privately run business contributed to the economy, then the NBC
could consider it for credits:
... If an efficient privately run economic
enterprise producing goods or services for
the public is threatened with reduction or
withholding of bank facilities so that the
banking system meets the requirements of
publicly owned but irresponsibly run enter-
prise or enterprises, then this cannot be
called construction at all, least of all
socialist construction.
(Mwase, 1974: 15)
Jamal's argument for the support of private capital is illustrative of his
concern with economic growth and economic contribution. 	 But when the
National Bank of Commerce (NBC) adhered to the principle of commercial
viability as a criterimfor issuing loans and credits to the private sector,
it was criticised.	 As the General Manager of the NBC, Nsekela stated in
June 1974:
... The NBC continues to lend to the private
sector. We are frequently told that this
constitutes assisting and encouraging
capitalism and hence runs contrary to the
declared goals of socialism.
But a unilateral decision by the NBC to cease
-332-
lending to the private sector would achieve
nothing but chaos. So it is the Central
Bank which dictates the rate of socialisation
of the means of production, subject at all
times to skilled manpower constraints, and it
would be presumptious of the NBC to attempt
to dictate this rate - particularly when
official policy in any case guarantees a role
- a limited one but nevertheless important
role, for the private sector.
(cited in Mwase, 1974: 19)
But political pressures continued to be exerted during the period
1969-1974 on both the financial institutions and the parastatals in the
manufacturing sector, to discriminate against private capital and to
favour ujamaa villages, the co-operatives or state-organisations. (inter-
view with high ranking Government official, July 1981).
	 This political
situation affected the financial state agencies, who were no longer sure
of their position vis-a-vis the private sector.
	 For instance, the
Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) wanted clarification over its position
vis-a-vis the private sector. It wanted to know whether it could make
loans or participate in joint enterprises with private capital.
	 TIB wrote
to the Minister of Finance for clarification but the latter did not respond
(interview with senior Government official, July 1981).
	 According to my
source of information, the political climate that existed made it difficult
for the Government to encourage private investments in Tanzania.
	 Any such
decisions had to be checked to see if they conft)rme.cf.
	
political
requirements, which were not precisely spelt out.
	
Some officials in the
Government were not prepared to commit themselves lest they were considered
to be promoting capitalism.
	 As a result, many decisions relating to the
investments by the private sectorwere neglected and not acted upon (interview
with senior Government officials, July 1981).
Parallel to this, however, was the action taken by the Government
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itself to control foreign capital.	 Although the 1963 FIPA Act was not
repealed, nevertheless, foreign capital was subjected to further forms
of control during the 1970s.	 First, all companies paid a corporate tax
of 45% of net profits.	 In addition, companies paid a withholding tax
of 15% on profits remitted to foreign countries, and 20% on management
and licence fees.	 In 1972 the Specified Companies Act was introduced
which, among other restrictions, empowered the Minister of Finance to
limit the dividends of the Specified Companies if he considered it to be
in the national interest.	 Secondly, the Specified Companies were also
required to submit their annual cash flow budget to the Minister of Finance
and he could require them to invest money in Government securities (Neers,
1974).
In addition, the Government established the Tanzania General
Superintendence Company, (1972) in co-operation with a Swiss Company,
to check over-pricing and other forms of manipulation which were often
exercised by foreign capital. 	 For instance, the Swiss Company inspected
the shipment of goods into Tanzania in order to check that qualities,
quantities and prices were correct. 	 And in 1971 a revision of existing
management contracts took place - all new management contracts had to be
approved by the Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC).
On the basis of these measures, Neers argued that the Tanzanian
Government did not want foreign capital in the country. But most of the
measures passed by the Government described above were passed during the
1970s and reflected the strong anti-foreign capital attitude held by the
dependency-propounders within the Government. 	 On the other hand, the
policy on the Specified Companies was passed by the Ministry of Finance
(a traditional supporter of private capital). 	 This Act, however, was a
reflection of its concern and responsibility to conserve foreign exchange
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during the 1971 mini crisis rather than a general hostility towards
foreigrr.capital.
	 However, these measures reinforced the belief both
inside and outside the country that Tanzania did not want foreign capital
(Neers, 1974).
But industries based on private capital, notably local capital,
continued to grow - thus in 1966 there were 438 manufacturing establish-
ments, out of which 392 or 89.5% were privately owned, and only 46 or
10.5% were public; in 1972 there were 497 manufacturing enterprises out
of which 405 or 81.5% were private and 92 or 18.5% were public
(Russallia, 1978: 22).	 Thus, despite the political hostility which
existed during the period of the primacy of politics, private capital
expanded.	 The growth was haphazard in the sense that there was no
official policy to encourage or direct it.
According to an interview with a long established local financier,
the situation was extremely difficult for local investors despite the
official policy of allowing private capital in certain industries.	 An
investor had no forum to assist him. 	 The co-ordinating mechanism between
the Government and private capital had died a natural death after the Arusha
Declaration and the Chamber of Commerce was ineffective. 	 This situation
was further aggravated by the personal attitude of key-figures, such as
the principal secretaries of the ministries or even individual ministers.
Some of them accepted private capital investments and were helpful, others
were hostile or refused to act on decisions, thus frustrating private
investors.	 In addition the different financial institutions and the
different ministries all worked with different criteria for evaluating
private investments, so that the private investor was often subjected to
different pressures and demands (interview, August 1981). 	 It was extremely
difficult in such a situation to know what were the rights and duties of
-335-
private investors.
THE LIBERALISATION PERIOD
The ecOnomic crisis of 1974/75 and the failure of the parastatals
to generate surpluses created the right conditions for the Government
to adopt a more agressive policy of encouraging private capital. The
minority view within Government circles became more outspoken and dominant.
A meeting of private businessmen was called in Dar es Salaam on 8 October,
1977 to discuss problems of production.	 The meeting was chaired by the
Regional Secretary, CCM.	 Both Party and Government officials were
invited. Private capital voiced the following complaints:
1. Overdraft facilities to private capital wevavery limited.
Thus expansion of private manufacturers was very slow
because they had to expand by utilising profits which
in a normal commercial system was considered to be the
most expensive way of financing expansion.
2. Foreign exchange allocation was very small, especially
for raw materials and machinery needed to produce goods
for home consumption, and in particular for export .
3. Travel allowances for private businessmen to visit their
business contacts, to go on conferences, study tours etc.
were very hard to come by. Travel allowances to Government
servants and parastatal employees were almost automatic,
even if such trips would not help production or improve
export markets, so much so, that a number of these
trips had come to be termed 'shopping sprees'.
4. The Foreign Branch of the National Bank of Commerce was
very slow in processing Letters of Credit and remitting
funds to the Principals.
5. There was much interference in the management of industries
by political decisions and a lot of manhours were lost on
meeting dignatories, ngomas, sports, bands, peoples militia
meetings, processions, workers education etc.
6. The worker was over-protected by the Security of Employment
Act and Clause 15 of Mwongozo while the Manager was not
protected, not even listened to, and was just left in the
cold.
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7. Both the Party Branches, NUTA Branches and Workers
Councils are concerned with worker-i'rights and do
These complaints ended with the following statement:
In general, the private businessman is everywhere,
but wherever he goes and whatever he does, he receives
prictically no help. He has to fight all the way and
always comëslast,Tne Government comes first, then
the Parastatals, and last of all, the Private sector.
Private business has no friends and we may even wonder
whether the Income Tax man likes the private business
man, although, comparatively, the private businessman
contributed substantially to the income of this nation.
(BIT Private Capital Problems 1977)
The type of complaints given by private capital also illustrated the
contraints under which it was operating and reflected its ambiguous
situation in Tanzania's development.
After the meeting at Dar es Salaam the Government adopted the
policy of De-confinement, which meant that private capital could by-pass
state-owned agencies in their procedure to import goods from abroad.
The Government's aim was to boost production and alleviate the shortage
of consumer goods, which was being experienced in the country.	 The
main supporters of this position were the ministries of Finance and
Industry.	 It is worth noting in passing that although various ministries
were affected by the economic crisis of 1974/75, it was only these two
ministries which attempted to re-examine policies as a means of finding
solutions to the crisis.
Throughout 1978-1979 the Minister of Industry, Msuya, continued to
mobilise and encourage private investors to invest in production
The Minister said, 'members of the Chamber
of Commerce or prospective industrialists
in Tanzania were invited to explore the
possibilities of partnership with the District
Development Corporation. 	 Also that regional
,
. not want to concern themselves with production .
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authorities would be too willing to
assist in the identification of investment
..,	
possibilities for joint ventures.
(Daily News, March 3, 1978)
Other measures which were taken by the Minister of Industry to encourage
_
private capital included the decision to decentralise the authority to
issue licences to private investors in the region.
	 Previously, such
authority came from Dar es Salaam.
	 Thus when the Minister presented
his ministry's estimates for 1978/79
	 Parliament, he said that he was
going to introduce new legislation under which regions would be given
powers to issue licences for the setting up of medium and small industries
in districts and villages with effect from 1978/79. (Minister of Industry,
June 30, 1978).
	 In addition, the Ministry of Industries published two
booklets A Manual for Investors in Tanzania (1980) and A Handbook for the 
Promotion of Industrial Projects (1980). 	 According to the Daily News 
(5.7.1980) the booklets are intended to attract private capital and
defined an investor to include local or foreign governments, institutions,
companies and individuals wishing to invest capital, management or technical
skills in the country".
The policy of encouraging private capital received support from the
third policy-making organ, the President.	 Nyerere went on a tour of
industries in 1977 in Arusha and Dar es Salaam and called on the Party and
the Government leaders to help the development not only of public institutions,
but also of private ones.
	 Nyerere stated:
All said private companies to a great extent
have taken a bold and leading position in
providing import substitutes where otherwise
the recent foreign exchange restrictions would
have been hard. And certainly, one of the
major reasons why the closure of the border
with Kenya has not at all been felt here, is
because all but a few of the goods we used to
buy from them are now manufactured locally.
(Daily News, October 28, 1977)
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In 1979 the President elaborated on the policy of private capital
in Taniania's development. He stated that the Public Ownership Policy
(1967) of the Arusha Declaration allowed the role of private capital
in development.	 Thus:
Plan to monitor private firms 
Mwalimu said that the Arusha Declaration defined
the place of the private sector in the country's
economy.	 He said he was, therefore, not worried
about the existence of private industries as such,
as long as there was committed Party membership
and leadership.
Mwalimu wondered whether the Party leadership
was very clear on this issue. He said he was
not sure whether all Party leaders knew that
private investments were deliberately allowed
in some areas where presently public partici-
pation was either not possible or called for.
(Daily News, November 6, 1979)
We could therefore argue that from 1976 onwards the Government, and to a
considerable extent the President, viewed private capital as a positive
economic force contributing to the well-being of the economy. 	 More
specifically, the Ministry of Industry took measures to promote its
development in the country.	 Also the President related the role of
private capital to the Public Ownership policy of the Arusha Declaration.
THE SECOND ECONOMIC CRISIS
The libèralisation period was brought to an end by problems of
foreign exchange.	 The effects of war expenditure and adverse terms of
trade were aggravated by the liberalisation of import restrictions in
1978 (US Agency for International Development, 1980: 22). 	 The total
effect was another severe balance of payment crisis. 	 In addition
according to a Government source, the policy of liberalisation had not
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been properly worked out.	 There was no form of mechanism to assess
the amount of foreign exchange that was sent out to buy imports and
the actual production that was taking place (interview with senior
Government official, July 1981). 	 The loss of foreign exchange forced
the Party to intervene at the level of policy-making and initiated the
policy of Re-confinement, which was implemented by the Minister of Trade,
Kaduma.	 This policy of Re-confinement meant that private capital was
subjected to control at two levels. 	 First at the level of production
where it had to order its import requirements through the state agencies.
Second, at the level of distribution which meant that private industries
had to sell their goods through state-owned agencies. 	 This policy will
be considered in greater detail in the second case study.
But it is also true to say that the Party has neverrrlada a statement
supporting or even clarifying the Government's position on the role of
private capital.	 Indeed, it appeared that many Party officials were
concerned about the call to encourage private capital in development. 	 A
research paper on private capital by a research unit
within	 the Party, expressed concern over the growth of the private
sector.	 Basically, the paper showed that private capital had increased
despite the Arusha Declaration, and that this policy was contrary to the
ideology of socialism and self-reliance. 	 It argued that the Arusha
Declaration position in relation to private capital was ambiguous, and
that there was a need for a clearer policy on private capital. It argued
that private capital was the source of capitalism and exploitation, and
that such a policy could create problems for the policy of Ujamaa. 	 The
paper stated that it was time to fight the development of capitalism and
exploitation, lest its development should undermine the policy of socialism.
The paper was sent to the Central Committee for further deliberation
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(based on interview with well placed sources, July 1981).
A$ the second economic crisis continued to develop, and economic
problems became more serious and acute, it became more urgent for Government
to seek clarification on the role of private capital vis-a-vis the
different sectors of the economy. 	 In May 1980 a National Executive
Committee seminar was held at Arusha.	 A number of issues were discussed,
among them was the policy on private capital. 	 Some members voiced
concern over the state of agriculture and argued that there was a need to
promote individual capitalists into investing in the agricultural sector.
While the Minister of Industry called for the mobilisation of private
capital in the manufacturing sector, the President did not commit himself
on agriculture (interview with Party officials, August 1981). 	 The idea
of 'strategic retreat' was used by members at the seminar to support their
arguments for private investment in the economy. 	 The argument was
	 that
it was sometimes necessary for socialism to take a step backward in order
to leap forward.
The Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, Professor Malima
(1980a) gave a paper entitled 'Private Capital' at the NEC seminar in Arusha.
Professor Malima was also a member of the Central Committee and he was
also the Secretary of Planning at the Party's Central Committee, a position
he held as a result of his ministerial responsibilities. Theoretically,
therefore, Professor Malima was in a better position to co-ordinate both
ministerial and Party affairs.
The tension from this dual position was reflected in his paper on
private capital.	 On the one hand, the paper argued that there was a
need to expand all industries, including private ones, and make them all
part of the national development plans.	 On the other hand, the paper
illustrated the hostility towards private capital which stemmed from the
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ideology of socialism.	 Malima attempted to combine these contra-
,
dictory-demands by arguing for the control of private capital, which
implied, however, that private capital should continue, albeit temporarily.
Malima_argued that there was a need to strengthen Tanzania's policy
of self-reliance and socialism, and that it would be necessary to make
the state-owned sectors of the economy more powerful than the sector
based on private capital.	 The paper then pointed to the various dangers
which were posed by the existence of a growing private sector. 	 First
the need and necessity to make the state-sector more powerful than the
sector based on private capital, because the paper argued that "we can find
ourselves creating a situation whereby ants would eat into our foundations,
leading to the collapse of our house, and thus allow the private sector to
become more powerful" (Malima, 1980a: 2).	 The second type of problem was
the competition which was created as a result of allowing the private
sector to co-exist with the state sector. 	 But when problems occurred in
the latter, people preferred to disband the state sector (Ibid: 19).
The paper also showed the type of dangers that could develop from
having the Party infiltrated by capitalists.	 First by criticising the
policy of ujamaa.	 Such criticisms could divide the Party on crucial
policy grounds.	 Second, capitalists could act as 'god-fathers' to party
officials.	 Third, there was the danger of some leaders of the Party,
Government and Parastatals associating themselves with capitalists (Malima,
1980a: 18,19,20).
After having pointed out the political dangers emanating from
private capital, the paper then outlined various proposals of how to deal
with private capital.	 These ranged from the possibility of nationalisation,
to the need to control and monitor the private sector and the discrimination
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of resources in favour of the state agencies (Malima, 1980a: 24). 	 But
the pa0r accepted the existence of private capital in the economy. It
stated:
In general to allow the existence of
private capital is a temporary measure.
This step should not be seen as an
attempt to destroy the policy of Ujamaa.
As far as the agricultural sector is
concerned, the private sector should not
be allowed to function there at all.
Likewise trade/commerce should be in the
hands of the state.
The time has come to fight capitalism and
exploitation and their temptations, other-
wise, the roots of capitalism will continue
to expand and spread.
(Ibid: 28)
There were certain similarities between Malima's paper and the CCM
research paper	 on private capital.	 Both expressed antagonism
towards the growth of private capital and both emphasised the political
dangers that could be derived from such a situation. 	 But while the CCM
research paper was implicitly arguing for the total abolition of private
capital in Tanzania, Malima's paper was arguing for a 'strategic retreat'
to allow private capital to continue, as a temporary measure, in certain
defined areas of the economy but under conditions of supervision. 	 This
was no doubt a move to accommodate economic constraints.
According to my source of information, Malima's paper was unable to
convince either the production-lobby	 within the Party and the Government
or the ideology-orientated group within the Party. 	 The latter were not
convinced by Malima's arguments for a 'temporary compromise' with capitalism,
which they viewed as politically unacceptable.	 Malima's paper was rejected
by both sides (interview with Party official, August 1981).
Indeed, the recent CCM document, Mwongozo wa CCM, 1981 appears to be
a direct criticism of the production-group 	 within the Government and the
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Party: ,
Today capitalist tendencies have grown
more in the country than in the period before
the Arusha Declaration because even though
the public sector has increased the inability
to fight it has allowed capitalism to expand
and infiltrate the public sector. That is why
capitalism has dared to come out into the open
to slander socialism, to confuse some of the
leaders and to try to convince us to change
our policy.
(CCM, 1981, Mwongozo wa CCM, 52: 39)
The Party's position on the policy of private capital is derived from two
important factors.
	
First, its view of development; this has been
influenced by the ideology of socialism, which has become an important
input into policy-making.	 Second, by the institutional arrangement of
policy-making which enabled the Party to formulate policies taking into
consideration only 'political' factors.
The following interview conducted by the author with senior Party
officials illustrates very clearly that the Party does consider ideology
as crucial in Tanzania:
Socialising the economy is equated with
socialism.	 There is an acceptance that
policies may be wrong, because not enough
research was done, but a belief that
socialism is the correct policy and that it
is superior to capitalism.
(interview with high ranking Party
Official, August 1981)
A discussion with the Party Economic Committee of the Secretariat also
focussed on the same issue:
The Party's Policies are going to be
-344-
socialism, to control the commanding
heights of the economy. Not only for the
sake of ownership but also to ensure that
no exploitation takes place.The State
has to control the wealth ofi\ country.
(interview with Party officials,
July 1981)
The Party's position on private capital has been influenced by
its understanding of the ideology of socialism. 	 This understanding,
however, has been further consolidated by the institutional arrangement
for policy-making, which does not consider implementation problems as
inputs into policy formulation. 	 Thus
The problem of capacity would take place
during implementation ...
(interview with senior member of
the Party and a Regional Commissioner
July 1981).
This view of the Party, that implementation problems are extrinsic to
policy-making, was also supported by a Government official.
	 Thus
Politics is supreme ....
Political decisions come first ...
If we wait for economicsthen
politics goes out of the way ...
(interview with senior Government
official, July 1981)
We can see that certain members of the Government have accepted the principle
that policy formulation should be based essentially on 'politics', because
\Dr.In5 irtt
it was believed that
	 considerations of economics into policy-making
iN
would negate the political aims of the country.
	 But) as we have already
seen in this case study3 this interpretation of 'politics' may not be shared
by either the President or the production-group within the Government.
The President's position in relation to the role of private capital
can be understood thus;
	 Nyerere's understanding of socialism, especially
during the period of economic crisis, has become increasingly pragmatic
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in the sense that he has stressed the need to consider the Tanzanian
,
situation.
	
Thus (Daily News, July 30, 1981 - Promote socialist thought -
Nyerere) the President, as CCM Chairman, urged the Party's ideological
colleges to continue their role of promoting socialist dialogue, encouraging
freedom of thought and discussion. 	 Nyerere however also stated:
In our free thought we must never become
mere receptacles for foreign ideologies.
We must become masters of our own destiny,
digesting and analysing ideas in the context 
of the situation obtaining in the country.
(Daily News, July 30, 1981,
emphasis added)
This, he explained, did not mean rejecting ideas from other people. People
must learn from the social systems of other countries in order to evolve
a socialist, just and democratic society in the country.
I would argue that the President's understanding of socialism differs
from the Party's in the following sense:	 Nyerere, in stressing that the
Tanzanian situation should be considered in the formulation of Tanzania's
ideology of socialism, implies that the concrete problems of Tanzania must
be taken into consideration and that the ideology of socialism should not
be conceptualised, as for instance Marx and Engels did in 19th century
European conditions, because problems of development are different. This
interpretation of socialism also enhances the President's institutional
role as a mediator between the Party and the Government. It is within
this context that we can understand the President's support for private
capital and his insistence that the policy of Public Ownership was still
valid.	 This interpretation of Tanzania's socialism, however, is closer
to the position he had held in 1967 at the time of the Arusha Declaration
than to the one he held between 1969-1974.
We could argue that the President and the Government take into
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consideration economic constraints in formulating their policies, but
,
the Party has remained firm in its insistence on considering constraints
as extrinsic to policy-making.	 This situation accounts for the
ambiguous situation of the role of private capital in Tanzania's develop-
ment.	 For instance, no mention of private capital was made in the Third
Five Year Development Plan (1976-1981).
	 As the Minister of Planning and
Economic Affairs, Malima (1980a: 16) stated, "Our -development plans have
been prepared as if the private sector does not exist".
	 The uncertainty
of the role of private capital is further illustrated in the long term
Development Plan (1981-2000) which states:
As regards production, by the year 2000
more than 70% will have to be produced by
the public sector. However, to achieve
this, we have to know where we are now so
that we can devise the means of achieving
the above goal.	 Furthermore, before the
commencement of the fourth Five Year Plan,
the Party will have charted the role the 
private sector will play in an economy 
heading for socialism.
(Long Term Plan, 1981-2000: 26,
emphasis added
I would argue that this uncertainty is harmful for development
because it restrains the Government from planning and co-ordinating
the activities of private capital, especially after the development
experience of 1969-1974.	 Various studies have shown the need for
private capital in Tanzania's development.	 Two such major studies were
from the East African Management Institute which had been commissioned
by the Tanzania Board of Internal Trade.	 Thus:
What is lacking is the encouragement for a
limited private enterprise in the transport
sector, as exists in trade and industry.
(EASMI, 1978: 4)
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And:
It is recommended, therefore, that the BIT,
in cooperation with NDC and other interested
government bodies, take positive steps to
encourage foreign investment in selected
industries.
r
(EASMI, 1979: 68)
But a government Circular No. 2 of 1980 from the Prime Minister's Office
stated that state financial firms and other state agencies must serve
public firms first.	 It warned that violation of the directive by any
of the state bodies would be considered as an act of sabotage against
efforts to build socialism and would not be tolerated (Daily News,
March 20, 1980). 	 It is difficult in the prevailing conditions of un-
certainties, to know whether this official statement was of a long-term
a_
policy significance, or whether it was oqshort term nature to assist
the Government in coping with the crisis.
The uncertainty is also harmful because it creates conditions
for such malpracticeSas corruption, and the tendency for private capital
to invest in projects with a high and fast return, but which require
very little investment in the economy.	 This uncertainty has also affected
policies in other areas of the economy, as we shall see in the two case
studies on internal trade and agricultural policies.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of this case study on private capital in Tanzania we
can conclude, firstly, that the state in Tanzania is not homogeneous as
radicals have assumed.
	 Secondly, that the difference between the two
organs of the state cannot be understood in terms of class interests, but
only in terms of their conflicting institutional demands and their views
of development.	 The Government's attitude towards private capital is
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determined by its concern for economic growth, especially after the
failure of the state sector to produce growth, and by its institutional
obligation to consider implementation and capacity as factors in policy-
solutions.	 The Party's attitude, on the other hand, is determined by
the ideology of socialism, and the institutional arrangement for policy-
making, which enables the Party to formulate policies on the basis of
'political' factors alone.	 These two opposing stands appear irreconcilable
since they are located, in the final analysis, in the different instit-
utional functions and responsibilities of the two organs of the state.
However, this conflict has destabilising effects on the development process.
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE POLICY OF NATIONALISATION OF THE INTERNAL
TRADE SYSTEM: 1967-1982
The policy of nationalisation of trade is another area which clearly
brings out the three themes of the thesis - the relationship between the
Party and the Government; the effects on development processes of policies
which failed to give sufficient weight to economic constraints; the views
of development prevailing in the different organs of the state.	 The
policy of nationalisation began with the limited nationalisation of foreign
firms after the Arusha Declaration (1967). 	 They had been mainly involved
in the import-export business.	 The policy intensified and led to the
nationalisation of local capital. involving both wholesale trade (1970)
and retail trade (1976).	 By 1981 the internal trade policy had become
comprehensive, stretching from the nationalisation of the wholesale, sub-
wholesale and retail trade, and covering the whole of the distribution
system from the importers at the national level to the consumers in the
remotest villages.	 It also included the policy of Confinement (1967),
which meant that the state agencies (the confinees) were given monopoly
to import certain goods as well as to sell certain items.
Such a gigantic network of state control. stretching from the level
of production to that of distribution, had also become an integral aspect
of the Tanzanian economy.	 In its aim to eliminate the private trader.
the Party was willing to go far in its attempt to control the distribution
networks of trade.	 This case study will illustrate the basic problem
through the analysis of the conflict between the capacity of the economy
on the one hand. and on the other. the way in which policies were
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formulated which continuously imposed increasing demands on
	 fragile
and over-stretched human, physical, social, capital and infrastructural
facilities.	 The exposition of this conflict will illustrate that
Tanzania's policies and their problems cannot be understood in terms of
either the class-analysis explanation of the radicals or the implementation
explanation of Green.	 Rather, the Tanzania development experience has
to be understood in relation to the specific manner in which policy-makers
formulated their policies.
During each policy review in this case study, several problems of
policy-making and implementation have recurred. 	 The clearest and most
appropriate way to demonstrate this is to look into it thematically - from
the point of view of the different levels and aspects of the trade system -
so that we can follow each policy and the types of problems generated step
by step.
	
This approach will also enable me to relate the formulation
and implementation of policies to the political-institutional arrangements.
It will illustrate empirically how each initial policy created the conditions
for another policy-solution, leading to the creation of more complex problems
in development.
The chapter will be divided into two major sections.
	
The first part
will examine the policy of nationalisation of trade from 1967-1980, paying
particular attention to the most important policy decisions which were,
the Arusha Declaration which nationalised the foreign import-export firms
(1967), the Presidential Circular which led to the nationalisation of the
wholesale trade (1970), the policy of Operation Maduka which led to the
take-over of retail trade (1976) and the Prime Minister's Circular 1/80
on retail trade.	 The analysis of these policies will seek to show their
concrete effects for the development process.
The second section of the chapter will examine the policies of
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De-confinement (1977) and Re-confinement (1980).
	 These will be discussed
within the context of the economic crisis.	 These policies illustrate
the Party's and the Government's views of development and the relation-
ship between_these two organs of the state. 	 A dimension which appears
more forcefully in this chapter (in both the two sections) is the adoption
of the Party's approach to policy-making by certain Government ministries,
which since 1980 has created a more complex situation in the understanding
of Party and Government relations.
	
While the conflictual dichotomy
between Party and Government is still valid (in terms of their views of
development and institutional arrangements for policy-making and imple-
mentation), in recent years this conflict appears to have permeated each
organ.
MAJOR POLICY-DECISIONS 1967-1982
The creation of the State Trading Corporation (1967) 
We saw in Part One that the Government's policy was to maintain
private activity in commerce. 	 The study on internal trade by the
Economist Intelligence Unit (1962) has also demonstrated that internal
trade in Tanzania based on the private trader was cheap and efficient,
considering the vastness of the territory with poor infrastructural
facilities and the low purchasing power of the majority of the population.
We have also seen how the Party activists had criticised this policy and
had pressed for /1-s replacement by the co-operatives. 	 In the early
1960s the Government partly gave in to these Party demands and there was,
as a result, a rapid expansion of the co-operatives. 	 By 1966, however,
the co-operatives were in dire financial problems.
In 1967 following the Arusha Declaration policies, foreign capital
was nationalised.	 Firms included were Smith McKenzie, Bauman, Dalgety,
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Intrata, Wigglesworth and Tom.	 These firms had been mainly involved
in the export-import business.	 The State Trading Corporation (STC)
was created to take over the functions of the foreign export-import firms.
What kind of problems did the policy-making style of the Arusha Declaration
have on the State Trading Corporation?
Like other major parastatals that were formed
in the wake of the Arusha Declaration, the STC,
of necessity was created virtually overnight.
The nationalised companies had trading policies,
procedures, systems and management practices
that varied substantially.	 And to streamline
these diversities into an active homogeneous
entity required a lot of time and brain work
which we could not afford at that time.
(Mwapachu, 1974: 2)
By 1968 the SIC had managed to dissolve all the nationalised companies and
establish the divisions between the various kinds of merchandise as a
means of rationalising the import trade. 	 These divisions were: General
Merchandise, Groceries, Agricultural Machinery and Technical, Textile,
Shipping and Export Marketing. 	 But even this attempt at systematising
the import trade was inadequate:
The SIC which had been re-born was but a
conglomeration of diverse business operations
and when this structure was adopted it was
clear from the start that it would be short-
lived.	 Again, the set-up was diffuse,
responsibilities and authority were not
clearly demarcated and management systems were
rudimentary.	 Indeed, it was at this time,
that the SIC began to experience operational
problems.
(Mwapachu, 1974: 2)
And:
In addition to the nebulous structure this was
a period of uncertainty on the part of the
worker. Both Managers and ordinary workers
started to feel that the ground was moving
under their feet and in the absence of properly
conceived organisation structure, working
relationship and operational systems, each
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worker, in order to preserve his image.
clung tenaciously to his old ways, work
methods and operational system's. 	 There
were others, who left.
	 Some of the staff
who left were highly experienced people.
the majority of whom came from the accounting
area.	 As a result of both these factors
the operational performance of the corporation
was dangerously coming to a breakdown.
(Mwapachu, 1974: 3)
Thus the problems of organisation and manpower began to affect the operations
of the Corporation.	 As a result of operational and organisational problems,
the STC called the McKinsey Consultants, who were then re-organising the
National Development Corporation, to study the problems of the STC and
offer recommendations.
The Presidential Directive on the wholesale trade (1970) 
Meanwhile, before the State Trading Corporation had time to assimi-
late the McKinsey report and to reorganise itself properly, in February
1970 a Presidential Directive nationalised wholesale trade.
This decision gave the SIC additional tasks, thus instead of its
initial export-import responsibilities, the STC had the additional tasks
of distributing goods nationally:
Compounding these difficulties have been
the Government's directive of February 1970
to take over import and wholesale trade
throughout Tanzania ....
... the decision by the Government to direct
the STC to replace 400 private importers, 400
private wholesalers and some 4,000 sub-wholesalers
came at a critical time of the Corporation's
history.
(SIC, 1971: 2)
The SIC was unable to cope with these new responsibilities and it was
soon experiencing severe operational problems, which in their turn, affected
the consumers.
	 Thus between 1970 and 1971 there was a public outcry at
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STC inefficiency.	 Members of the public were experiencing problems
in obtaining such essential items as maize mill flour, wheat flour,
rice, cooking oil, milk, medicine, sugar, spare parts etc. (Parliamentary
Select Committee, 1972: 2).
As a result of the public outcry, a parliamentary Select Committee
was appointed to investigate the problems of the STC.	 The Committee
found that there was no system of accounting, no form of co-ordination
existed between the STC headquarters and its branches in the regions.
and finally, the STC had no idea of the needs and requirements of the
consumers.	 The Committee pointed to problems of manpower, godowns and
infrastructure as obstacles which hindered the smooth operations of the
STC.	 It recommended that the SIC be decentralised (Parliamentary Select
Committee, 1972: v: vii).
The State Trading Corporation in turn pointed to various factors
which impinged on its operations.	 First, a national trading agency. with
responsibilities for imports and wholesale functions. needed to possess a
vast knowledge of both the foreign and domestic market conditions, to enable
it to plan and organise its work systematically. 	 But the SIC lacked
such knowledge because it did not possess adequate manpower. 	 This problem
was explained by the STC in the following manner:
SIC business is very complex and requires
trained personnel if part of the current
marketing problems are to be solved.	 One
salesman cannot sell the full range of het-
erogeneous product lines held by a Branch
and to all its varied private and commercial
customers. SIC sells technically complex
products, thousands of lines constantly
unrelated lines.	 The stock list is constantly
growing. This means salesmen of various
experience have therefore to be sought. and
these are not easy to find.
(SIC. 1971: 9)
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Thus the complexity of the STC functions was made more difficult by
the abience of qualified personnel 	 Despite the various attempts
made by the STC at crash training, on-the-job training etc., the problem
was not solved.	 Short-term training could not be a substitute for
experience.	 As a result an inexperienced and relatively young manpower
was pushed to man a demanding sector of the economy.
Undoubtedly. therefore, one of the major
weaknesses of the STC right from its
inception was the low calibre of the staff
compliment.
(Mwapachu, 1974: 4)
Poor manpower was soon manifested into operational problems thus:
Contrary to what we had expected, operational
problems which were dramatically manifested
in varying forms such as poor information flow
and the resulting lack of management information
upon which to evaluate performance, shortages in
the midst of overstocks, scarcity and misuse of
finance, low moraleof staff, high labour turnover,
and the increasing line of STC overdraft and
foreign exchange utilisation were some of the
other signs of STC inefficiency ...
(Ibid)
In addition. the STC suffered from capital and funds shortages. 	 No
provisions were made by the Treasury to enable the STC to accomplish
the policy of nationalisation of trade programmes:
So far the STC has received nothing from
Government to aid it implement the trade
socialisation exercise takeover. This has
resulted into the Corporation being unable to
properly plan its finances 	 In the absence
of sufficient funds generated from its own
corporations the STC has at times therefore been
forced to finance its capital expansion programme
from the National Bank of Commerce overdrafts
which is inappropriate. Unless Government is
going to inject funds in SIC in the form of
equity capital the financial viability of the
Corporation will continue to be at stake as SIC
cash flow will not warrant servicing of a big
loan, simply because it is trading on a very small
gross margin.
(STC, 1971: 15)
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Shortage of funds made STC a risk enterprise to other state institutions
and financiers in Tanzania:
To such institutions it would appear that
the SIC is in somewhat a precarious
, financial position where at any time
Treasury could demand payment and the
Banks could reduce or recall funds advanced
on overdraft.	 It would appear that to
conduct business dealings with the SIC
involves the acceptance of considerable
risks.
(SIC, 1971: 16)
Another problem (which also affected the STC efficiency) was transport.
STC had to move merchandise over distances averaging 300 miles from its
central godowns in Dar es Salaam, but there were inadequate numbers of
railway wagons, and an inefficient road transport system. 	 Furthermore,
lack of storage facilities even in Dar es Salaam, made it difficult for
the SIC to clear goods from the port, which in turn increased its
demurrage charges.	 Godowns were often sub-standard and led to the
deterioration of goods as well as to losses.
Finally, the STC General Manager pointedli that the responsibility of
fulfilling the policy of socialisation of trade did not rest with the SIC
alone:
What possibly has not been fully appreciated up
to this stage is the fact that the attainment
of the socialisation objective is not only an STC
matter but actively involve other relevant bodies
like the National Bank of Commerce, the Bank of
Tanzania, the 'Investment Bank', and the Treasury.
It is, therefore, their duty just as is STC''s in
implementing the programme in declaring the total
funds each has that can be allocated to the SIC
periodically, both fixed and working capital.
Because without knowing about this, how can the
STC realistically draw its plans?
(STC, 1970: 17)
Five years later in 1971 after its creation, the State Trading Corporation
collapsed.	 The Corporation had over Tsh 45,000 million as liabilities
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as at 31st January 1978 (BIT, 1978).
	 Green (1980: 14)
conceded...that the collapse of the SIC contributed to the mini-crisis of
1970-71.
Explanations offered for the failure of the STC 
Green saw the failure of the State Trading Corporation mainly as
the result of implementation, brought about by the McKinsey Consultant
recommendations (Green, 1980: 14). 	 It is true that the highly centralised
structure of the STC which the McKinsey Consultants had advocated was
unsuitable for Tanzania; but the recommendations were based on the
assumption that infrastructural facilities and manpower were available,
at least to a certain degree, to maintain a state organisation with
nation-wide responsibilities. 	 The fact that these inputs were absent
in the first place cannot be blamed on a foreign consultant, who was
anyway, invited by the Government. 	 Green's attempts to reduce the failure
of the STC to	 'foreign consultants' is an attempt to deflect attention
from the examination of policies.
Another explanation for the failure of the SIC has come from Resnick
(1981).	 Although Resnick emphasised the types of economic problems which
afflicted the SIC, nevertheless, he still maintained that the failure of
the STC was the result of class-interests.	 Thus:
Internal class, structural and institutional
contradictions created special difficulties
for the SIC in its attempts to reorganise the
trading sector in such a way as to suit the
needs of the country's socialist goals and
economic needs, as well as for its efforts
to get out of trouble subsequently.
(Resnick, 1981: 254)
Resnick offers no evidence of how the class interests of the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie, for instance, could have benefit ed from the collapse of
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the State Trading Corporation.
I h'ave argued and have empirically demonstrated that the nature of
policy-making with its characteristic tendency to exclude the consideration
of economic constraints created and accounts for the implementation
problems of the STC and its subsequent failure. 	 This explanation appears
to be supported by the STC, as the following passage illustrates:
The SIC management would merely wish to
• reiterate here that within a period of four
years the Corporation's import and wholesale
trade has grown from Shs 300 million in 1967
to Shs 600 million in 1971, representing a
100% growth.
No organisation anywhere placed with such an
objective before it and having had to grow
its activities throughout without a breathing
space to consolidate itself could really
escape meeting the difficulties as those the
STC is today facing.
(SIC, 1971: 2)
The President also accepted that the manner in which policies were
passed contributed to the problems of the STC.
	 At the Tanu National
Conference in Dar es Salaam in 1971, Nyerere stated:
It is hardly surprising that the SIC has
experienced more problems than any of the
other public enterprises. At no time have
we given the STC time to consolidate its
existing operations before instructing it
to undertake new tasks.
A leisurely progress towards socialisation of
trade has been impossible because the necessity
to rationalise the whole distribution system,
and the need to reduce the period of business
uncertainty have all required quick action.
(cited in Mwapachu, 1974: 10)
Thus the characteristics of the policy-style were explained by the President
as politically necessary.
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The creation of a new trading system 
The Government was deeply concerned about the problems and subsequent
failure of the STC.
	
A high level bureaucrat, Apieyo, was sent to the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry to investigate the problems and his
recommendations were submitted in the form of an ECC paper to the Cabinet.
The latter, in turn, was able to instruct the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, to find a way of restructuring the STC. 	 An inter-ministerial
Committee was formed which was composed of an implementation committee
and a task force.
	
Its recommendation was forwarded to the Cabinet
(interview with senior Government official, July 1981).
The recommendation of the inter-ministerial committee called for
the STC's diverse functions to be divided according to the different
product-lines.	 It also recommended that the STC be decentralised.
This was to allow the branches in the regions to exercise greater control
of their activities and facilitate efficiency and co-ordination of their
business.	 The inter-ministerial committee also gave detailed analysis
and breakdown of the economic inputs which would be required to facilitate
the programme of the nationalisation of import-export and wholesale
business.	 For instance, it recommended that a total sum of Tsh 87 million
would be required to fulfil the policy of socialisation of trade (STC
n.a. [1972]: iv).
Between 1973 and 1974 the STC was decentralised and reorganised
into Six Importing Companies and 18 (later 20) Regional Trading Companies.
The functions of the former were to import merchandise in relation to their
specialisations.	 The latter were to serve as wholesalers in the regions.
In 1973 the Board of Internal Trade (BIT) was set up to link the six
Importing Companies and the Regional Trading Companies. 	 The BIT's role
was to supervise and co-ordinate internal trade affairs as well as to
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conduct research and to deal with policy-issues relating to internal
trade gerferally.	 The BIT was also responsible, on behalf of the RTCs
and the Importing Companies, for the negotiation of loans and discussion
of policy-issues with the different ministries and financial institutions.
Thus although the RTCs and Importing Companies were autonomous in their
everyday business activities, they were linked in matters of policy to
the BIT, which was in turn responsible to the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry.
The new trading structure thus attempted to avoid the problems
of the STC derived from its highly centralised structure. It allowed
for the autonomy of the regional trading companies in their business
activities and allowed for the specialisation of knowledge to develop with
the creation of the importation compAnies. 	 At the same time, it imposed
a unified national structure by integrating these diverse companies into
the BIT.
Old problems in new trading system 
But the new trading system was still afflicted by the same problems
as those of the defunct State Trading Corporation.	 One such problem was
the shortage of capital.	 Thus:
The new trade system also is still forced
to exist with a weak capital structure having
neither equity nor loan capital for any of
the specified companies. In this respect the
companies are mere replicas of their
predecessor.
Attempts to get fixed capital from the Treasury
to strengthen the capital bases of the companies
have so far proved fruitless. We are therefore
forced to continue relying on overdraft with the
attendant high interest rates.
The majority of the companies have an inadequate
fixed assets portfolio to support their volume
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of business and this will continue to
hamper their operating efficiency until
the necessary capital is made available.
(BIT, n.a.[1976]:7)
The problem of equity capital was again emphasised in the 1975 General
Managers Convention meeting, which decided that:
Till the Treasury has been able to provide
suitable equity for the companies it would
not be possible for the companies to pay
dividends out of the earnings since these
are tied up in stocks.
(BIT, 1976a)
Shortage of funds for the BIT companies hindered their development; thus:
Lack of adequate funds to invest in fixed
assets such as godowns, transportation
facilities and the working capital has had
tremendous adverse effects on the efficiency
and expansion of the system.
Almost all the trading institutions in the
public sector are operating without equity
capital and therefore placing heavy reliance
on the bank overdraft facilities. BIT group
of companies account for about 50% of the
total bank lending to trade sector. This
situation is not only insufficient but also
very expensive to the trading system in terms
of financial charges that accrue to overdraft
facilities.
(BIT, n.a. [1979]: 10)
Another problem was in manpower. The inter-ministerial Committee
had recommended that the BIT system required over 900 qualified and
trained personnel to make the system work.	 But there was no such manpower
available in Tanzania. 	 Thus:
Non-availability of skilled manpower is
yet another problem facing the BIT
distribution system. We are all aware that
the failure of several co-operative societies,
the STC and recently NATEX were all among
other things, due to lack of skilled manpower.
The importance of this fact cannot be over-
emphasised.
(BIT, n.a. [1979]: 9)
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A similar story was seen in other areas. For instance, the inter-
ministerial Committee recommended that the trading system would require
nearly 626,000_sq. ft. of additional godowns in Dar es Salaam, and up-
country to support the full control of wholesale trade, while the
Regional Trading Corporations' and Districts' wholesale shops would need
225,000 sq.ft.	 But funds for the construction of storage facilities
and wholesale shops in the regions were not forthcoming:
BIT should ensure that finance for warehousing
projects is obtained from the government since
many companies are facing acute problems in
this area.
(BIT, 1976a)
Lack of proper storage facilities created and led to other problems:
There has been considerable stock losses
due to damages, pilferages, in addition to
the high overhead costs arising from the need
to have more godown personnel, extra rental
and other administrative costs. Moreover,
the inadequacy of the storage space often is
responsible for some of the shortages of goods
experienced in the regions and in the districts.
(BIT, n.a. [1979] 9)
Another area was in transportation.	 The BIT commissioned the East
African Management Institute, EASMI, to conduct a study on transportation
problems besetting the new trading system. 	 The EASMI report stated:
The number of vehicles and capacity of the
RTC road fleet is not sufficient to provide
good transport facilities for movement of
the RTC goods to districtSand villages. Either
the number of vehicles is insufficient or lack
of spare parts is causing shortages, inadequate
and irregular deliveries of goods. The RTCs
vehicles are normally fully loaded going out from
the RTCs, but only occasionally having a return
load.
	
Low utilisation of the capacity affects
the cost of operations.
(EASMI, 8.4.8: 1978)
And:
The shortage of goods in the regions, districts
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and villages is a result of insufficient
transport facilities and inadequate supply
from manufacturers.
(Ibid, 8.4.14)
Finally, the report found that the average number of people served by a
typical RTC was 725,000 or 5% of the total population when transposed
to the whole country.
	
Thus an insignificant number was actually serviced
by the RTC.
To conclude this section, the pattern of implementation problems
that was experienced by both the STC and the new trading system under
BIT strongly indicates that they were the result of faulty policy-making.
As I have emphasised throughout the thesis, a policy-making style which
excludes the considerations of economic factors is bound to create
implementation problems. This point is illustrated particularly by the
experience of BIT.	 Although the inter-ministerial committee had worked
out the breakdown of the economic inputs required for the implementation
of the nationalisation policies, nevertheless, the mere 'planning' of
these resources did not guarantee their availability. 	 This would strongly
indicate that establishing new bureaucratic organisations with new ideas
is no substitute for basing policy-making on available resources. 	 In
the next section we shall see a similar pattern of implementation problems
occurring when four years later retail trade was 'socialised'.
More 'Political' Policies: 1976 
Although the new trading system was facing difficulties and problems,
nevertheless additional 'political' decisions were taken in 1976 which
increased the functions of the trading system towards breaking point. The
first was the decision to dissolve the Co-operatives. 	 Some of the functions
which the Co-operatives were involved in, such as the distribution of staple
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foods, which included, cooking oil, beans, maize, wheat flour, kerosine
oil etc.,/, were passed on to the BIT trading system. These new functions
were an additional burden on the RTC, as the following passage illustrates:
... and to the extent that these items
are the basic necessities for the
ordinary consumer, the RTCs unlike
hitherto are now handling very sensitive
products. Any failure on the part of the
RTCs will be felt almost instantaneously
by the common man. To be able to distribute
all these items to the numerous distribution
-outlets demands a very high degree of skill
and competence.
(BIT, 19766:2)
The second decision which aggravated the new BIT trading system was the
policy of Operation Maduka which 'socialised' retail trade. This policy
is important for various reasons, which will become apparent but also
because it set the motion for the complete control of internal trade.
It is therefore necessary to digress and consider the context of the
policy of Operation Maduka, before we look into the problems of imple-
mentation which faced the new trading system.
The policy of Operation Maduka was passed by the Prime Minister, Kawawa
who was implementing a general Party directive of 1974, which had stated
that villages should open their own shops.	 As a result, the actual
decision in 1976 did not have to be referred to the Party (interview with
Party officials, July 1981). 	 As soon as the policy was announced by the
Prime Minister, Party activists throughout the country began to implement
it by closing down private shops.	 This was done, however, without first
ensuring that there were alternative forms of shops to cater for people's
needs.	 One region, for instance, closed down 40 private shops and stated
that the business once handled by these shops would be taken care by three
Ujamaa shops (BIT, 1976c: 1).
	
This situation created immense problems
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and tension for the general public. 	 Private shop-keepers, especially
in the regions, refused to restock their shops and allowed their goods
to run down.	 The President, the third policy-making organ, intervened,
and with the words "Stop it" (Daily News, May 23, 1976), brought the
process of closing down private shops to a halt. The President explained:
The Party policy is to open co-operative
shops and not to close down private shops.
Private shops will die a natural death when
sufficient co-operative shops run by
competent people are opened.
(Daily News, May 23, 1976)
The President also warned that closing down private shops at random without
opening others to replace them would cause the government to suffer losses
in revenue and would result in genuine complaints from the public (Ibid).
The President's intervention at the level of policy-making was therefore
meant to stop the creation of more complex problems from emerging. His
strategic position as a balancing force between the Party and the Government
was illustrated by his intervention.
The Prime Minister's Office, in turn, issued further clarifications
on the implementation of Operation Maduka. 	 Part of the guidelines called
for the need to ensure that shortages of commodities and consumer goods in
the urban and the rural areas were averted in the implementation of the
programme.	 It affirmed that "in urban areas with a large population, it
would be necessary to take cautious steps before closing down privately
owned shops" (cited in BIT, 1976c:1). 	 Likewise, in the villages where
ujamaa shops did not satisfy consumer demands, "private shops should be
allowed to operate as systems and plans are being developed to start
ujamaa shops" (cited in BIT, 1976c:1).
But despite this clarification, "some of the regional and district
leaders have gone ahead to implement the operation without advice or
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guidance from the Ministry of Trade" (Ibid: 2).	 In addition, the
confide4e of many shop-keepers, especially in the rural areas, had been
undermined and many allowed their stock to run down.
BIT reaction to the policy of Operation Maduka 
The reaction of the Board of Internal Trade to the policy of Operation
Maduka was summed up in a press release. 	 The press statement condemned
the steps taken by some of the regions to close down private retail shops
without any form of preparation and stated that "if this trend is not
immediately arrested not only would it defeat the objectives of the
operation, not only will it bring about untold hardships to the people,
but would also frustrate and impair our industrial productions and our
struggling economy".
	 The statement continued:
But if there is need for these national
institutions to take over these private
shops now, the Board of Directors have
proposed that there is also need to see
whether the institutions have the
business capability to do so.
It has been observed that some leaders in
the districts and regions have taken up
this matter without giving thought to its
attendant intricacy and expertise necessary
to make the programme a success.
(BIT, 1976c:2)
The statement by BIT pointed to the necessity of considering the capacity
of the national institutions in policy-making.
The second major problem which the statement pointed to was the
worsening of the state of internal trade because
mills and parastatals are stuck up with
goods now piling up in the godowns. The
reason is that the private traders and
merchants, who are the majority, do not
want to buy any more stock since they do
not know when their shops would close down
(BIT, 1976c:3)
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The statement pointed to the possible disruptive effects of the policy
generally:
... there is a big danger that the people
would be affected by being deprived of this
essential service and also the factories in
the country would face difficulties due to
failure to dispose of their production.
This problem is even more manifest when
considering the poor financial and inadequate
expertise of the institutions supposed to
take over private business. Also there is
a danger that the villagers would not get
their essential needs in the event of the
closure of the private owned shops without
a reasonable alternative.
(BIT, 1976c:3)
The above statements by BIT therefore called attention to the weakness
of the state trading institutions and problems that could-be generated
arising from inadequate access to retail facilities. 	 In other words,
the BIT was attempting to bring problems of capacity to bear at the level
of policy-making.
But the disruption of retail trade, especially in the rural areas,
had already occurred and the process could not be reversed.
	 Under these
new conditions it became necessary to see that village shops were increased
as well as turned into viable enterprises. 	 In 1977 a committee composed
of the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Trade, the Board of Internal
Trade and the Co-operative College, Moshi, was formed to study the problems
faced by the village shops. 	 Their report may have played a crucial role
in influencing the 1980 Prime Minister's Office Circular on retail trade.
The report found that there was a downward trend in business in
villages.	 The major causes which were identified for the poor state of
the village shops were lack of skilled shopkeepers and accountants, and
low capital.
	 Many village shops could not buy enough assorted goods to
last for a reasonable length of time, which could have reduced their
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transportation costs.	 The general shortage of essential commodities
was alsO another serious problem affecting the viability of village
shops.	 Finally, the villagers did not understand the benefits of having
a village shop because, among the reasons given, the prices of goods
from a village shop did not differ from that of a private shop. 	 The
committee also found that the villagers were afraid of losing the money
they had invested in the village shop and that there were no procedures
on how the profits were to be distributed.	 Another acute problem faced
by the village shops was that of book keeping. 	 The report suggested
that training of both book-keepers and shop-keepers should be undertaken,
bank loans to village shops should be made available, and it recommended
that a sum of Tsh 20,000, as initial capital, should be made available
to each village shop so as to ensure its financial viability (PMO, 1977).
The Prime Minister's Office responded to the investigation by the
committee on village shops by setting up a crash course for village shop-
keepers and accountants.	 The task was immense. There were 6,117 village
shops and 1,274 co-operative shops. 	 The aim was to have a shop in each
village and at each place of work by 1980.	 These village shops were
expected to give services to approximately 13,000,000 villagers, who were
living in 7,631 villages (PM0, 1980a: 1). 	 The problem was to train the
manpower required for village shops and a programme was drawn up phased
over three years up to 1981/2 for the 720 places a year that were, available
for such courses.	 Furthermore, a sum of Tsh 10,753,725/- a year was to
be put aside each year for the training programme. 	 The minimum require-
ment for the applicants of shop keeper and accountant was Std. VII (complete
Primary Education) (Ibid: 3). 	 As a result, there was a vast activity
geared to the training of village shop management.
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The Prime Minister's Circular 1/80 
06;the)pasis of this programme the Prime Minister's Office (PMO)
issued a Circular 1/80 on retail trade, which stated among other things
that "the sector of internal trade should be in the hands of mass controlled
instrument (that is, villages and co-operatives)" (Ibid: 1). 	 In relation
to retail trade, the 1980 Circular stated that from henceforth, essentials
would be sold to:
a] village shops
b] Workers Co-operatives
c] Co-operatives under the super vision of the
association of the Party
d] Co-operatives in town streets
e] through the Board of Internal Trade's agents
f] religious organisations.
The Circular also gave deadlines for the closure of private shop-keepers.
Thus:
- in the villages by March, 1981
- in small towns by April, 1982
- in towns by April, 1983
(PM0 Circular 1/80: 1)
Thus we can state that by 1980 the Prime Minister's Office had accepted
that private trade was to be totally phased out in Tanzania and that
measures were undertaken to create alternative forms of retail outlet.
The Ministry of Trade and the Board of Internal Trade were expected by
the Prime Minister's Office to take over the functions of retail trade.
According to a further directive from the Prime Minister's Office, "they
were required to provide guidance and expertise to the villages in the
planning and opening of Ujamaa shops together with ensuring an adequate
and smooth flow of goods to the shops by way of preferential allocation
of goods and provision of physical facilities" (PM0, 1980b: 1).
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And:
RTCs are also expected to train the shops
personnel in the area of retail management
as well as seeing that the shops are following
effective control systems and procedures. So
as to discharge this function most expeditiously
the RTCs will have to open retail shops in the
Regional and District Headquarters and where
necessary in the wards that will serve as training
schools for the people running the ujamaa shops.
(Ibid: 7)
The BIT trading system was therefore expected to expand from regional
level to districts and ward levels to meet the requirements of the policy
of Operation Maduka.
The 1980 Circular on retail trade issued by the Prime Minister's
Office was based on the assumption that, if the obstacles creating the
unviability of village shops were removed through educational training,
access to capital etc., then there would be no reason why the policy of
Operation Maduka could not be successfully and systematically implemented.
The Prime Minister's Office's sphere of action was in removing these
obstacles and to this end, a programme of action was evolved. On the
basis of these planning projections, it issued the 1/80 Circular that
private trade would be phased out within the time limits given. It is
worth noting in passing that the Government did not sabotage 'radical'
policies, on the contrary, it made available resources for their imple-
mentation.
In a paper (1980) commenting on the Prime Minister's Circular, the
Olt&
Board of Internal Trade pointedlthat it appeared that "the basic
consideration is the speed of implementing this objective given the limited
ourmc	 RTCs') disposal and the rather insurmountable environmental constraints
associated with this exercise in the present circumstances". 	 The paper
warned that:
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We have to learn from the failures of
SIC and NATEX in the inherent dangers
of going too fast into new spheres of
experience, proper planning and development
of effective and efficient system and
procedure.
(BIT, 1980: 2)
The BIT paper pointed to the dangers of expanding the state trading
system without proper manpower:
The burden of staffing the tarafa (divisional)
branches leave alone the current shortage
of skilled and experienced manpower at the
district level, will put a big strain on
the country's limited manpower resources.
(BIT, 1980: 2)
The paper then repeated all the problems which hindered large-scale
trading operations in Tanzania. 	 These were the shortage of warehouses,
shops and offices; and the absence of banking facilities, insurance,
post and telephone services.	 These problems were particularly acute in
remote areas of the country.	 The paper commented thus:
What possibly has not been fully appreciated
up to this stage is the fact that the
attainment of the set objective is not only
a BIT system matter, but actively involve other
relevant bodies, NBC, Treasury, and other
financial institutions. It is therefore their
duty, as is ours in implementing the programme
by giving financial support to BIT and RTCs.
And:
The government together with other public
institutions will have to play a key role
in providing basic infrastructure where it
is lacking particularly telephone links,
electricity, banking and reliable roads ...
An equally important requirement is premises
for shop operations, storage and residence
and the necessary lorries and vans with which
to transport goods to different locations.
(BIT, 1980: 4)
-372-
The paper concluded that:
Implementation of this programme is fraught
- with environmental and internal constraints.
(Ibid: 7)
It would be pertinent to note that the Board of Internal Trade, the main
implementing agency of the internal trade was not consulted on the Prime
Minister's Circular.
Meanwhile, a 1979 survey undertaken by the Department of Ujamaa and
Co-operatives in the Prime Minister's Office to assess the training
programme of the village shop-keepers and accountants, found that by 1980
there were:
5,800 villages without an appointed
trained book-keeper.
(PM0, 1980e:29)
The survey also found that:
A total of 2,128 of those (2,284) trained
by the Prime Minister's Office during
recent years were not working in village
shops at the time of the survey.
(Ibid: 33)
Among the reasons given were that shop-keepers had been trained for
villages which had no shops, some shops had been discontinued, and short-
training had neither 'created confidence among the village leaders nor
made the people capable or interested in the jobs" (Ibid: 34).	 The
report concluded that:
A lot of money invested in the training
of village shop-keepers has been lost -
at least temporarily.
(Ibid: 34)
In addition the report found that it was difficult to find candidates
with a complete primary education of standard VII, who would qualify as
entrants for the training programme. 	 Furthermore, the five weeks
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training did not appear to be sufficient to turn a person into a good
book-keeper, capable of keeping even a simple financial statement.
The survey recommended more training to enable book-keeping become a
tool of management (Ibid: 75). 	 Thus the managerial problems facing
national institutions were by 1980 extended to villagers.
This part of the chapter devoted to major policies leads to three
conclusions.	 First, in regard to internal trade jssues the Prime Minister's
Office adopted a more forceful 'political' approach, which brought it
closer to the Party's way of formulating policies.	 This was especially
true, as we have seen, of the policy of Operation Maduka (1976). Although
the Circular 1/80 on the implementation of Operation Maduka attempted to
consider implementation problems and evolved a programme for solving -
them, it failed to consider other problems, which fell outside the mini-
sterial responsibilities of the PM0. 	 This problem would have been avoided
had the Board of Internal Trade been consulted.	 As a result, these two
policies created immense additional problems and responsibilities for the
trading structure, at a period when the general economic conditions in
the country were far from stable.
These two tendencies - the poor co-ordination and the tendency not
to consider implementation - are not 	 new and strange phenomena in the
conduct of the Government. 	 We saw in Chapter Six (The Primacy of Politics
in Development 1969-1974) how the Cabinet was considerably weakened as a
mechanism for the co-ordination of policies and that it had changed its
methods of policy-consideration from a collective form of decision-making
based on research to the tendency where policies became identified with
particular personalities or where policies were adopted because they
appeared to be a 'good idea'.	 Thus the examples given in this chapter
are a further illustration of this tendency but are now seen from the
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perspective of individual ministries, rather than from that of the Cabinet
as a whole.
My second conclusion is that all the three major organs of the state,
that is, the President, the Government and the Party, have, in the course
of furthering the aims of the nationalisation of internal trade, failed
to give due consideration to implementation problems. 	 This was because
each organ of the state considered its policies 'political', which meant
that they did not have to include the consideration of implementation
problems.	 The latter were thought of as outside the responsibility of
policy-makers.	 This accounts for the familiar pattern of implementation
problems leading to policy-failures.
Third, the above characteristics of policy-making introduced
destabilising processes into the trade sector and into the development
process generally.	 Although the President intervened to maintain a
balance when the process generated by one policy became too extreme to
be coped with by another organ of the state, nevertheless, it was often
almost impossible, even by Presidential decree, to reverse the consequences
of a policy once it had been set in motion.
SCARCITIES OF ESSENTIALS 1976-1982 AND THE SEARCH FOR POLICY SOLUTIONS
The second major section of the chapter will consider the period
1976-1982 paying particular attention to the policies of De-confinement
and Re-confinement.	 The discussion of these policies will be situated
within the context of the continued economic problems in Tanzania.
Tanzania experienced widespread shortages of goods throughout the country
during and after the economic crisis of 1974/75.
	 As soon as the problem
of famine was averted, the Party was able to concentrate its attention
on the problem of scarcity of consumer goods. A meeting was called by
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the Economic Sub-committee of the Central Committee in November, 1976,
which was also attended by the members of the Board of Internal Trade.
.	 ,
The meeting was held in Mwanza.	 The Economic Sub-committee saw the
problem of shortage of goods essentially in terms of distribution
problems although it accepted that there was low production. It emphasised
the argument that the little that was available should be equally dis-
tributed to all and called for a procedure which would equally distribute
goods to all the people without any form of favouritism. It proposed a
system of quotas based on regional requirements. 	 Products which were
to be controlled were basic items such as textiles, flour, rice, cement,
corrugated iron sheets, salt, cooking oil, etc.	 It also emphasised its
support for controlling retail trade (Tanu, 1976: 3-7).
The problems of scarcities of goods continued unabated throughout
1977.	 Again, the Economic sub-committee of the Tanu Central Committee
called another meeting between 3-5 January, 1977, which was to discuss
barriers to the smooth operation of distribution and the shortage of
essential items in the country. 	 The objective of the meeting was to find
immediate solutions to the problems of distribution. 	 This meeting was
attended by different parastatals involved in production, trade and other
economic activities.
The chairman of the meeting was also the chairman of Tanu's Economic
Sub-committee, so that his views can be taken as a good indication of the
general attitude of the Party. 	 The chairman argued that a number of
public corporations had slackened their vigour in offering efficient
service to the public and that the practice of distributing goods without
proper analysis of the market conditions accounted for the confusion in
this area of the economy.	 In addition, the lack of co-operation and
co-ordination among the institutions dealing with the different sectors
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of the economy, such as production, distribution, transportation and
the Pride Control Commission, were largely responsible for the 'pathetic'
situation in the distribution of trade. 	 He also stated that poor
management and transport bottlenecks were responsible for the inefficiency
within this sector (BIT, 1977).
However, a persistent cause to the problem of scarcities of goods
was traced to the problem of poor production. 	 For instance, the Board
of Internal Trade pointed to the problems affecting the distribution
system, such as insufficient domestic production of essential commodities,
problems of transportation and warehouse facilities. 	 The representative
for textile production stated that the demand for all types of textiles
in 1977 was estimated at 395 million metres, but the mills were able-to
produce only 93 million metres.
A similar problem affected the sugar industries. 	 Thus the General
Manager of the Sugar Development Corporation admitted that sugar production
had been overtaken by rising consumption demands. 	 Whereas in 1975/76
the demand for sugar was put at 140,000 metric tons a year, the plants
were able to produce only 63.4% of their capacity of 95,674 tons, due to
the drought, breakdowns of the machines caused by the lack of spare parts,
poor transportation and limited raw material inputs, namely sugar cane.
In relation to the cooking oil shortage, it was discovered that no one
knew the demand for it in the country. 	 Cement production was well
below demands	 Cn 1976 the factory produced only 241,000 tons instead of
340,000 tons, which was its production capacity.	 Problems besetting this
industry were again cited as shortages of spare parts, water and machines,
machine breakdowns and lack of transport facilities.	 In relation to the
shortage of salt, the State Mining Corporation stated that the production
of salt was 41,000 tons while demand was put at 60,000 tons (BIT, 1977).
-377-
The problem of shortage of goods was thus explained by those
involved in their production in terms of low domestic production. This
in turn was explained as a result of the shortage of major inputs, such
and
as spare parts r\ breakdown in water sk.kly15 . The Party, however, appeared
to circumvent the problems of production because it continued to stress
distribution problems and brought measures to control the distribution
networks of trade.
	 Thus in 1977 a CCM directive No. 27 stated that
internal trade should be well planned, especially on distribution, and
that constant price changes should be avoided. In 1976 the Party recommended
that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry should be split into two
separate ministries.	 The aim was to enable the mounting problems in
the trade sector to be dealt with separately and properly; but this
decision also indicated that the Party was viewing the problems within
the trade sector in isolation from the problems of production.	 As we
shall see later, the separation of these two ministries, created immense
problems of co-ordination of policies between trade and industry, especially
since the two Ministers were at loggerheads with each other.
Meanwhile, the Government, especially the production-orientated
group, stressed the need to expand production and mobilise private capital
to invest in production. 	 The President supported the production-lobby df
theGovernment. This was the 'liberalisation' period. 	 The business
community was asked to put forward their complaints at a meeting held at
the Diamond Jubilee Hall on 8th October, 1977. 	 The meeting was chaired
by the Regional Secretary of the Party, CCM. 	 In this meeting, the
business community pointed to how the policy of Confinement affected the
production process:
- Confinees (state agencies) were not ordering
enough material or machinery and they were
-378-
not systematic in their ordering. This
tended to disrupt production.
- Confinees did not do enough market research before
_they imported goods or machinery.
- Confinees did not order sufficient goods to meet
production targets of the various manufacturers.
They also refused to endorse licences for the
importation of such goods by the manufacturers
even when the state agencies did not have them
in stock or on order.
- The profit margins made by the Confinees on machinery
• and materials were too high thus making production
costs more expensive.	 This in turn made manufactured
goods uncompetitive on the external markets.
- No business ethics were followed.
(BIT, 1977a)
Thus the manufacturers argued that the policy of Confinement affected
production in a number of ways. 	 Low production in turn created the
problem of scarcity	 of goods.	 In response to complaints about the
effects of the policy of Confinement on production, the President then
directed all Regional Party Secretaries throughout the country to hold
discussions with leaders of the manufacturing industries on the types of
problems being faced by the industries. 	 The Regional Secretaries were
directed to submit their reports to the President. 	 In nearly all the
meetings held throughout the country, the performance of the existing
system of importation and distribution of goods through confinees (state
agencies) were seen as the major cause of the poor performance of the
industries.
As a result of these reports, the President held a meeting in which
among others, the representatives of thekrade, Industry, Treasury, the
Board of Internal Trade and the Bank of Tanzania, attended to discuss the
problems, brought forward by the manufacturing sector.	 The outcome of
this inter-ministerial consultation was the creation of a committee under
-379-
the leadership of the Treasury. 	 The latter was directed to prepare
an ECC paper on how the importation and distribution system could be
re-organised so as to increase the efficiency of local industries. The
FCC paper was prepared and discussed by the Cabinet, which agreed to the
policy of De-confinement, which meant that local industries would by-pass
the confinees when they imported their requirements. 	 As a result of
this decision, an Implementation Committee was set up to effect the policy
of De-confinement (interview with high ranking Government official, July
1981).
The policy of De-confinement 
The policy of De-confinement was defined to include the following
aspects:
- All the manufacturing industries were to be permitted
to import their raw materials and spare parts without
passing through the existing confinees.
- The raw materials manufactured locally were to be sold
directly to the consuming industries.
- All imported consumer items, except raw materials and
spare parts, were to be imported and distributed
through the state agencies.
- Local industries which were able to distribute their
products directly to the market were to be free to do
so, however, bearing in mind that the BIT could intervene
to ensure equitable distribution throughout the country.
(BIT, 1978a)
The major concern voiced by the Board of Internal Trade over the policy of
De-confinement was that it would lead to financial losses by the National
Trading Corporations since the policy would reduce their business volume.
The BIT also pointed to the dangers of foreign exchange flight (interview
with Government official, July 1981).	 It appeared, however, that since
the problems of production were viewed as most critical and there was
-380-
availability of foreign exchange as the result of the coffee boom -
the policy of De-confinement was implemented.
As anticipated by the BIT, the policy of liberalisation led to the
flight of foreign exchange.	 Green (1980: 107) for instance states that,
"the impact on the balance of payments was drastic:foreign-exchange
reserves fell rapidly and without respite".
	
This problem, however, was
also aggravated by the Uganda War and adverse terms of trade. 	 The policy
of De-confinement also led to the loss of profits by the National Trading
Companies (BIT, 1979).
	 Finally, with the removal of state control
goods vril nra: freely circulated nd were consumed mainly in the urban areas.
Since demand still surpassed supply, goods failed to reach the regions,
or if they did, exorbitant prices were charged. 	 The following quotations
illustrate the situation:
Trader pays 3,500/- for Siha over-charging (Daily News, 7.7.1979)
Traders cheat on shirting materials (Daily News, 8.9.1977)
Mwanza traders under fire	 (Daily News, 6.1.1979)
These problems - outflow of foreign exchange, the losses of the parastatals
and the unofficial prices - forced the Party again into the fore of policy-
making.
The policy of Re-confinement: 1980 
The Party called a meeting of the state agencies involved in matters
of trade and foreign exchange as well as of production. 	 Among those who
attended were the BIT, the Ministers of Trade and of Industry. The aim
of the meeting was to discuss the problems of foreign exchange flight and
the scarcit	 of goods.	 There was an intense and heated debate between
the Minister of Trade, Kaduma, and the Minister of Industry, Msuya,
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The Minister of Industry argued that the scarcity of consumer goods
was the /Iresult of low production rather than of distribution problems.
Industries were not producing enough consumer goods to meet national
requirements._ He also argued that a policy of Re-confinement would result
in aggravating problems at the production level.
This position, however, was opposed by the Minister of Trade,
Kaduma, who argued that goods were not reaching the people and that higher
prices occurred because of lack of control at the distribution level. He
urged that the distribution system should be controlled in order to ensure
that the "little that was produced must reach the people".	 Kaduma, a
member of the Central Committee, was using the arguments proposed by the
seminar on trade-held by the Economic Sub-committee of the Central
Committee in 1976.	 The Party accepted Kaduma's arguments and initiated
the policy of Re-confinement.
In an interview conducted by the author with Party officials, I
asked whether the policy of Re-confinement was a reflection of the Party's
traditional hostility towards private capital. I was told that the decision
to re-introduce the policy was taken mainly as an attempt to stop the
foreign exchange flight, while that of the control of the distribution
outlets was made to ensure that the "little that was produced reached the
people" (interview with Party officials, July 1981). 	 Thus the decision
to reintroduce the policy of Re-confinement was based on social and foreign-
exchange considerations.
The Minister of Trade, Kaduma, implemented the policy of Re-confinement
on 1st March 1980 in relation to imports, and on 20th March 1980 in relation
to the redistribution of internally produced goods. The latter was to
ensure that goods were sold at the official prices (interview with Party
officials, July 1981).	 The policy of Re-confinement, which was implemented
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by the Minister of Trade, coincided with the Prime Minister's Circular
1/80, which, as we have already seen, called for the phasing out of
the private shop-keepers within a time-set period. 	 According to my
source of information, both the two agents of the Government had issued
and implemented the policies independently of each other. 	 Despite this
lack of co-ordination, however, both shared the common aim of furthering
the interests of socialism at the expense of the private trader. According
to my source, the Ministry of Trade was very pleased with the Prime
Minister's Circular because it enabled the former to 'link up' the policy
of Confinement to the Circular of 1/80, which called for the abolition of
private retail trade in the urban and the rural areas by 1983 and 1981/2
respectively (interview with senior Government official, July 1981). As
we shall see it enabled the Ministry to form a comprehensive new policy
on internal trade.
The need for the Ministry of Trade to 'explain' its new policies was
made more urgent and necessary because the policy of Re-confinement
aroused immense resentment both among the general public and other
government institutions.
	
It appeared that the Ministry of Trade, did not
consult or co-ordinate the policy of Re-confinement with other ministries
but chose to implement the policy single-handed. 	 As a result, the
Ministry of Trade found itself practically isolated from other ministries.
This in turn affected the implementation of the policy of Re-confinement,
since the aid and co-operation of other ministries and government agencies
were essential to its success.
Ideology as an input into policy-making 
The Minister of Trade, Kaduma, became strongly identified with the
policy of Re-confinement.	 Increasingly Kaduma began to explain the
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policy of Re-confinement in terms of the ideology of socialism and self-
reliance, thus attempting to illustrate an ideological continuity with
the policy of-the Arusha Declaration.
	
As a result, the policy became
increasingly viewed as a 'political' policy.
	 In a seminar organised
by the Tanzania Investment Bank and held at Arusha in 1980, Kaduma gave
a paper in which he argued that the compelling reasons for the policy of
Re-confinement were political (1980: 7) and that the policy of Confinement
has as its ideological basis the policy of socialism and self-reliance
which is amply elaborated in the Arusha Declaration (Ibid: 5). 	 Kaduma
stated that the meaning and implications of the Arusha Declaration on
tradewerequite clear, "that those trade functions related to import,
export and wholesale will be confined to organisations which will facilitate
for the workers and peasants to exercise their control and ownership"
(Ibid: 5).	 He argued that the policy of Re-confinement would allow
for professional specialisation to develop because it would be carried
out by specialised bodies, who would be equipped with the expertise,
experience and skills (Ibid: 5 & 10).
Kaduma appeared to be more concerned with maintaining an-ideological
consistency than In maintaining an economic consistency between the conception
of the policy and its capacity for implementation. 	 In his 1980/81 Budget
speech to Parliament, Kaduma said that the Arusha Declaration had stated
that external and wholesale trade were part of the 'commanding heights'
of the economy, which needed to be controlled by public parastatals; but
he argued that retail trade did not seem to have been clearly seen as an
important link with the wholesale trade, since it was left to continue in
the hands of individuals (Ministfy of Trade, 1980: 70). 	 The Minister
then illustrated the economic significance of the retail trade, which
included its capacity to generate wealth, but he argued, such wealth did
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not accrue to the nation, because retail trade was controlled by
private:Jraders who did not invest their profits in industries or banks.
It was therefore necessary to complete the take-over of the trade sectors
in order to have access to the profits, which would be invested in the
economy.	 Kaduma went on to explain that recent policies such as the
Prime Minister's Circular 1/80 w4 t meant to replace private trade and
allow for the surpluses derived from internal trade to be controlled
socially for the benefit of everyone:
... As I have already explained, this policy
aims at placing all trade undertakings in the
hands of the public parastatals. The sole means
to achieve this, is through the establishment
of a number of strong public-owned shops as
soon as possible.
(Ministry of Trade, 1980: 73)
He then stated that it was the responsibiliti 	 of regional, district and
village leaders to see that there were sufficient mass-owned shops in
their respective areas. "At a national level" he added, "we will no
longer issue licences to establish individual shops". 	 In relation to
the policy of the Re-confinement of products which were to be sold solely
to the state-owned agencies, the Minister stated that the "aim of this
procedure is to completely erase the private entreprenuer". (Ibid: 78).
Thus the new policy on Internal Trade aimed at eliminating the private
trader from retail shopsand from distribution levels.
A similar explanation of the new policy on internal trade was used
in an official publication of the Ministry of Trade entitled Sera ya 
Biashara ya Ndani (1980) which set out the argument that the new policy
of internal trade was a good policy, because,
... if we remove the national problems, of 
the lack of vehicles, bad roads, lack of 
capital etc., we can generally say that
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we have bodies that understand their 
duties.
(Ministry of Trade, 1980a:para. 16: 7)
The above passage succinctly illustrates a major argument of the thesis,
that policy-making in Tanzania excludes the consideration of national
problems.
The state of internal trade in Tanzania: 1980-1982 
The state of internal trade in Tanzania was best summarised by the
Board of Internal Trade:
The Tanzanian distribution system is beset
with a number of problems, namely the lack of
adequate physical facilities, skilled and
experienced manpower, finance to meet the
working capital requirements, the poor road
network in the country, low margins for
textiles and provisional items, political
and parochial overtones, black markets and
smuggling and shortage of essential items.
(BIT, na [1979]: 7)
The Ministry of Trade and the Party have responded to these problems
by bringing measures to bear at the distribution level.	 Thus new
regulations were brought to curb the private trader who was blamed for
the shortage of goods and the higher prices (Daily News, 7.1.1980;
29.1.1981).
	
One such control was the new Business Licencing Amendment
Bill, which sought to restrict the issuing of licences only to business-
men who had premises.	 This was an attempt to eliminate bogus business-
men, who were out to make a quick profit, a phenomenon which Shivji (1976: 84)
had already observed emerging in the business community. Another measure
was the Ministry of Trade's policy that no new licences would be issued
such
to private shops except in specialised fieldsxas those of spare parts,
pharmacies and garages (Daily News, 15.3.1980).
	 The objective of this
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new control was summed up as:
... to crack down on unscrupulous businessmen.
Ndugu Kaduma said rigorous enforcement of the
procedures would tremendously reduce and
possibly eradicate hoarding, black marketeering
and smuggling. He observed that if it were not
for a few greedy businessmen, scarce commodities 
would be conveniently shared among the people.
(Daily News, 17.2.1980, emphasis
added)
In 1981 the CCM Executive Council ordered the control of the
distribution of basic items. 	 This was to ensure that each region
obtained the quota allocated to it.	 Thus:
The NEC members in their analysis of the
cause of shortages, were satisfied that
although available goods would not satisfy
• everybody's needs, there was little effort
to distribute whatever was available
equitably.
(Daily News, 11.1.1981)
Thus by 1981 the Party finally accepted the fact that it was an impossible
task to satisfy national requirements of essential items merely by re-
organising the distribution system.	 This acceptance modified its goal
to that of equitable distribution of goods in the regions.
But despite the control of prices, quota systems, and control of
distribution networks, unofficial prices have continued to be charged for
basic items, putting them far above the reach of the ordinary man and
woman.
	
Jamal recognised the difficulty of controlling prices amidst
shortages when he stated in 1974:
There will always be a price which a buyer
will pay and a seller will accept - as long as
demand outstrips supply or availability of
consumer goods through production, controlling
prices at fixed levels will be a very difficult
task, almost impossible.
(EASMI, 1979: 1)
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Jamal's views have been proven correct by events.	 The explanation
given bY the Price Commissioner as to the weakness of the price control
would also support the argument that it is difficult to control prices
under conditions of scarcity—:
Extreme shortage of goods in the market
make enforcement of price control difficult
because the consumer who is our Price
Inspector number one becomes willing to pay
a price which is higher than the controlled
price. In view of this cases of over-
charging are not reported, efforts directed
at the enforcement of price control are
impaired.
(Mongi, 1980: 20)
The analysis of this section therefore illustrates that basically control
of distribution is ineffective in conditions of scarcity., which are
rooted in chronic problems of production.
The second part of this chapter has documented how policies were
formulated independently of consideration of implementation capacity.
Thus I would argue, problems that were generated from such a policy-
making style cannot be seen as mere implementation problems, but must
be related to the manner in which policies were formulated. 	 While this
approach towards policy-making characterised Government-Party relations
(because of the institutional division of functions based on the 1965
Interim Constitution), by 1976 it would appear that it had also been
adopted by the Government itself.
CONCLUSION
This case study, on the investigation of policies on internal
trade, ha($ highlighted a number of important issues which can help us
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understand the development experience of Tanzania. The case study
has delponstrated that the implementation problems of the STC and its
subsequent failure as well as those besetting the new trading system
under the Board of Internal Trade, were the result of faulty policy-
making.	 We have seen how two organs of the state (the President and
the Party) formulated major policies pertaining to the trade sector
without giving due consideration to the economic problems involved in
the implementation of the policies. 	 Between 1967-1976, a period of
only nine years, Tanzania's nationalisation of external and internal trade
was completed.	 Policies nationalising major areas of the trade sector
were taken after only a short intermediate period, increasing the burden
on the existing state trade organisation (1967, 1979, 1976).
It is difficult to see how rational men could pursue such a course
of action, when the evidence derived from each previous policy was so
evident.	 The thesis has offered two explanations. 	 First, institutional
arrangementsseparated the function of policy-making from that of imple-
mentation, creating the conditions whereby policy-makers wrongly believed
that the implementation problems were extrinsic to policy-making. 	 This
encouraged a reckless tendency where policy-makers could virtually ignore
certain kinds of national problems.	 This tendency was legitimised by
being conceived as a proper 'political' approach.
Thus the objective arrangement for policy-making permitted the
emergence of a subjective view of development, which removed any form of
restraint on the personal views of leaders.	 The persistent tendency of
the Party activists in insisting that the problems of scarcity of goods
was the result of distribution - despite evidence to the contrary -
deflected the energies of the Party from coming to grips with the real
and more complex problems of raising production and productivity. This
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situation in turn destabilised the development process, creating
problenis of implementation which the implementors were incapable of
resolving.	 -
A final word can be said about alternative interpretations of
the Tanzanian experience.
	
On the basis of the case study on internal
trade, we have seen that the implementation problems experienced by
the state agencies in the trade sector can be directly related to the
way in which policy-making has been undertaken in Tanzania. This means
that these problems cannot be seen as mere 'implementation problems'
in the manner of Green. 	 The 'implementation' problems faced by the
STC and the BIT were the result of faulty policy-making. Nor , on the
other hand, can the failure of these state agencies be explained in terms
of the class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 	 In fact, the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie had far more to gain from successful state
organisations than from weak and tottering parastatals. 	 It was surely
in its class interests to see that the state sector functioned profitably
and smoothly; the fact that it has failed to do so would indicate that
the problems confronted were beyond its class and institutional powers.
Finally, I would argue once again that the state in Tanzania is not homo-
geneous.	 Each organ of the state, and each agency within it, appears to
go its own way. The President, like Hercults, struggles to maintain a
balance between the two opposing organs. In this sense it is a mistake
to try and assign the state a uniform class character.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CASE STUDY: AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
We saw in the Introduction that the most distinguishing factor
about Tanzania socialism was its emphasis on rural development. This
policy received support from social scientists and aid donors such as
the International Labour Organisation and the World Bank. In particular,
Tanzania's development priorities were similar to that of a rising tide
of development theory in the late 1960s and 1970s which called for
development to be rural-based (Lipton, 1977, Schumacher, 1973).
But despite a seemingly correct approach to development supported
by political changes and administrative re-organisation l all orientated
towards developing the rural sector, the performance of the rural economy
has been persistently disappointing. 	 To recapitulate, within a period
of merely 12 years the following policy-changes have taken place:
1967	 Announcement of the policy of Ujamaa. The policy
was to be based on communal production, it was
to be voluntary and progressive farmers were not
to be excluded or discriminated against.
1969	 The Presidential Circular 1/69. It called for
the establishment of Ujamaa villages to be
compulsory and nationwide. 	 Positive discrim-
ination was to be given to ujamaa villages
vis-a-vis individual peasants/farmers.
1972	 "No future for capitalist farmers".
State and co-operative farming are the only
two forms that agriculture can now take in
Tanzania bound towards socialism, President
Nyerere told West Kilimanjaro settlers in
Moshi. Mwalimu said that there was no future
for individual large-scale farmers in Tanzania
(Daily News, 4.6.1972).
1971-72	 Limited operations moving peasants into
villages: Operations Dodoma, Chunya and Kigoma.
-391-
1973	 The President announced "To live in villages
is an order" (Daily News, 6.11.1973). The,
•	 policy of villagisation was undertaken
nationwide and it was to be completed bY+La.
end. 04 1q3-G•
1981	 "Nyerere - Largescale farmers are Welcome"
(Daily News, 6.6.1981).
How can we explain this succession of policy-changes?	 What have been
the consequences of policy-instability on the development process in this
strategic sector of the Tanzanian economy?
The chapter will be divided into four sections. At the risk of some
repetition, the first section will review the prevailing interpretations
Ujamaa, villagisation and agricultural development.
	 The second section
will examine the Ujamaa era, from 1967 to 1973. I shall use my approach
to advance an alternative explanation of the problems which faced the
policy of Ujamaa.
	 The third part will look into the policy of villagi-
sation and the fourth part will consider the agricultural sector from
1977 - 1982.
RECAPITULATION: MAJOR INTERPRETATIONS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
Explanations offered for the failure of Ujamaa 
We have seen in the Introduction that radical writers such as Raikes
(1975), Von Freyhold (1979), Shivji (1976), Coulson (1975) have attributed
the failure of the ujamaa policy to the class interests of the bureau-
cratic bourgeoisie.	 Musti's (1978) explanation quoted below echoes the
views of the radicals:
Despite pronouncements to the contrary, the
Ujamaa policy was never intended to be the
basis of a new development strategy for Tanzania.
'Socialism' only meant a different property
relation - state involvement - for the most
important economic enterprises in the country.
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Moreover, the state limited its inter-
vention to formal control, with no critical
appraisal of the ends of production or the
modes of production. Thus, after a number
of years of experience with 'socialism',
the Tanzanian economic structure remained
essentially what it had been at the time of
independence.
(Musti, 1978: 78)
Von Freyhold's Ujamaa villages in Tanzania (1979) is a detailed attempt
to explain the reasons for the failure of Ujamaa in Tanzania, and
therefore I shall review it at some length. 	 According to von Freyhold,
the failure of commulisation was the result of "inherent contradictions
between the revolutionary aims of the programme and its reformist form,
which eventually led to an impasse which could not be surmounted" (Von
Freyhold, 1979: xii).	 She further argues that ujamaa (communalisation
of peasant production) was not only possible in Tanzania but provided
an ideal framework for agricultural development. 	 Communalisation of
production would enable the peasants
to establish more direct contacts with each
other and with economic and political
institutions in town and thus recapture control 
over their lives and their productive process.
(Ibid: 27, emphasis added)
Communalisation would enable peasants to regain their autonomous life-style
and make them self-reliant.
Von Freyhold goes on to document the different methods that were
used to implement ujamaa., ranging from the 'stick' to the 'carrot'.
But, "there were just not enough sticks and carrots around to sustain
the villages that had been created" (Ibid: 50). 	 Other government forms
of assistance such as the Bwana shambas, rural development assistants,
Tanu secretaries, ward executives and teachers, all failed. 	 Meanwhile,
wealthy village leaders and richer farmer/peasants opposed communalisation.
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But the poor peasants themselves were also not willing to
commun'alise; for "most people in most villages their private farms
still remained their primary focus of interest" (Ibid: 83). 	 Finally,
however, the state, that is, the bureaucrats, sabotaged ujamaa by forming
an alliance with the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the World Bank, who
favoured export production and individual small-scale producers. Ujamaa 
was changed from a revolutionary concept to a tool serving the class
interests of the bureaucrats.
	
Thus:
Eventually the bureaucracy managed to turn
the slogan of Ujamaa into a tool which would
be used for its own purposes. Workers could be
told that their wage claims were illegitimate
because the nation needed the funds for
socialist reconstruction of the countryside
and that compared to the peasants they were
selfish individualists. 	 The unemployed could
be collected and sent back to the villages to
build ujamaa. Kkjaks and peasants who stood
up to oppose certain bureaucratic measul and
orders could be told that they obstructed
ujamaa and in the end even the subordination of
the peasantry under a new authoritarian
bureaucracy that reached down to the village
level could be legitimised in the name of
Ujamaa.
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 120)
Many of the weaknesses of the radical explanations discussed in the
Introduction are also reflected in Von Freyhold's analysis of the policy
of Ujamaa.	 Von Freyhold's approach is to contrast an ideal version of
development with an empirical reality. First, her idea of the potential
benefits of communalisation is not based on any study of the socio-economic
reality and capabilities of poor peasants in Tanzania. In fact, often
enough, her own empirical data contradict her assumptions. For instance
she notes:
Most of the village members were not used to
any conscious planning and had no idea of how
their private experiences on their small farms
could be of any use to a larger enterprise
(such as a communal farm).
(Ibid: 84)
And:
And:
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Democratic planning was something the ordinary
villagers were not yet capable of, mainly
because they had no ideas about development
strategies.
(Ibid: 85)
To some extent the absence of financial control
could be blamed on the low level of education
of leaders and villagers. In some villages even
the leaders were illiterate and in the majority
of the villages most members would not have been
able to read a simple financial statement.
There were some programmes to train a few
villagers in book-keeping but most villagers
would have had to wait for years to have any
of their members trained. Villagers did not
know what kind of records they should keep
and in some of the more remote places they even
lacked Stationery for recording anything.
(Ibid: 87)
It is extremely difficult to see how, under these conditions, communalisation
could have been a viable organisational structure for poor peasants.
Communalisation is a very complex form of organisation and creates heavy
demands for organisational skills.
There are two further ways in which von Freyhold proceed g-by contrasting-
reality with an ideal situation. 	 She argues that the failure to implement
socialism was the result of Tanzania's failure to eliminate links with
international capitalism, and that related to this was the failure to
create political cadres who could mobilise the peasantry.	 We have already
seen in the Introduction that the dependency ideas/arguments of the
delinking of the economy from international capitalism failed to stand
up to a serious re-examination. 	 On the second point, von Freyhold writes:
The first step towards a transformation of
the state economy and the peasant economy
would have had to be a political change, a
change putting workers and peasants in power.
But instead of embarking on the task of
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political mobilisation from which such a
change might have resulted, the Party
intellectuals who supported the policy of
'socialism in the countryside' were urging
the peasants to communalise within the
existing political and economic structure.
•-
n
(1979: 121)
The suggestion that political cadres would have been more successful in
implementing the policy of Ujamaa is not supported, however, by evidence.
An intelligent guess can be made that the problems of implementation -
the shortage of technical assistance, infrastructural problems, problems
of co-ordination between the different agencies, the lack of capacity
within the poor peasantry themselves - would not disappear merely because
of the creation of 'political cadres'.
We can therefore see that von Freyhold's approach to analysing the
failure of Ujamaa is extremely idealistic.	 Once we have questioned her
assumptions (which her excellent case material helps us to do) then very
little evidence remains either for the thesis of class-sabotage of Ujamaa 
or for the viability of Ujamaa as a development policy. On this basis I
would argue that her well-researched book fails to give an adequate
explanation for the failure of ujamaa.
We saw in the Introduction that a second type of explanation of
Tanzania's radical policies has come from pragmatic dependency analysis
such as Green.	 Green has argued that Tanzania's policies are correct
but that they have experienced problems at the level of implementation.
I have already criticised Green's approach which views problems as extrinsic
to policies. Suffice it to restate my argument, that implementation
problems must be anticipated by policy-makers because failure to do so
is likely to defeat the political and social aims which inspired the
policy in the first place.
A third type of explanation for the failure of Ujamaa comes from
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Hyden (1980).	 Hyden's major argument is that the policy failed because
of itKown intrinsic deficiencies as a policy of development. Briefly
summarised, the policy failed to meet the needs and requirements of the
Government, especially its need for agricultural growth. 	 Secondly, the
Party's offer of free social services and other amenities to the ujamaa 
villages reduced the Government's effectiveness in making the peasants
produce more.	 Thirdly, policy-makers assumed a peasant capacity far
beyond what the peasants were really capable of (Hyden, 1980: 109).
Hyden's explanation of the failure of Ujamaa is more convincing
than the others. But how could a major policy such as Ujamaa ignore
such fundamental aspects of development? 	 How could policy-makers overlook
the problem of providing effective incentives to peasant producers? Why
did policy-makers over-estimate the capacity of peasants and their own
capacity in the implementation of the policy?	 These are some of the
questions which Hyden's book has raised but to which he has not provided
satisfactory answers. I would argue that we can only understand why
crucial factors pertaining to the policy of ujamaa were not given
sufficient consideration by examining the institutional relationship
between the three organs of the state and their practice of formulating
policies. Herein lies the simplest explanation of the failure of Ujamaa 
in Tanzania.
Academic explanations for the policy of villagisation 
We have seen in the Introduction that most academics were shocked
by the massive physical relocation of peasants into village settlements
and by the methods that were employed in implementing this policy. Radical
writers have explained villagisation in terms of the class interests of
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in controlling peasant production.	 This
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argument has been summarised by Coulson (1977: 95) as follows:
Finally, a set of arguments deriving from
Shivji (1976) and put forward in different
ways by Boesen (1976) and Leonard (1976)
claim that the object of villagisation is
for the officials to control peasant
production and thus achieve control of all
the means of production in the country.
In Boesen's analysis, as in Coulson's
of 1975, there are two antangonistic
classes, the peasants and the bureaucrats,
with the bureaucrats unable to produce
themselves and thus dependent on getting
production out of the peasants. Leonard
adds a third class, the kulaks, or emerging
African capitalist farmers and small
businessmen.	 In his view collective
agriculture is the only alternative to
kulak production if peasant agriculture is
to be expanded in scale and ultimately
raised to a higher technical level.
Qu.)(4_0k. cks
Thus villagisation was the class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.
The latter have to control peasant production in order to obtain surplus
to develop the economy.
Lofchie (1978), however, argues that villagisation, with its
emphasis on block as opposed to communal production, signified the
abandonment of socialism. 	 As Lofchie states, "Villagisation without
socialism is, in effect, the current policy" (1978: 451). 	 This change
was brought about by the failure to achieve ujamaa because of peasants
resistance and the resulting famine. Thus:
Following the agrarian crisis, Tanzania
embarked upon a process of gradual economic
1ib4isation.	 The roots of this policy
can be dated as early as the Fall of 1974,
with the decision to de-emphasise collect-
ivism as a goal of the villagisation
programme and, thereby, to make individual
farming a fundamental institution in the
rural sector.
(Lofchie, 1978: 458)
Lofchie's argument which sees villagisation as a form of liberalisation
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is not entirely opposed to the one advanced earlier. 	 Both rest on
the argument that socialism has been abandoned, but for different
reasons: in-the former case because of the class interests of the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, in the latter because of policy deficiencies.
The third type of explanation for villagisation has come from
Hyden (1980).
	 Hyden explained the policy of villagisation as an attempt
by the Party and Government to capture the peasantry. 	 Villagisation
of the peasantry created a situation where both Government and Party could
intervene more easily in terms of providing social services, and achieving
the political and economic integration of the peasantry into the wider
structure of society.	 Hyden argues further that increasingly Tanu has
used policies based on a 'political market-place' as the principal forum
for interaction with the peasants. (Hyden, 1980: 131). 	 Other major
policies following the political-market method were the dissolution of
the co-operatives in 1976, the policy of Operation Maduka 1976, and the
replacement of District Councils with the decentralisation system (1972).
According to Hyden, the removal of these agencies also removed petty
capitalists, petty bourgeoisie and petty traders from interacting with
the peasants, making them interact directly with Party and government
agencies.	 Further, the Party now dealt with the peasants on the basis
of 'operations' and 'campaigns'. 	 Although such an approach might appear
to be more authoritarian, nevertheless, Hyden is optimistic about the
achievements of policies based on a political market:
There is little doubt that in spite of
bureaucratic high-handedness and other
excesses, the new policy measures were
successful in some respects. People have
by and large accepted their new locations
of domicile and production. Production
has also increased in many villages, although
it is too early to say how far this can be
attributed to villagisation and the other
policy measures taken during this period.
(Hyden, 1980: 152)
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There are certain similarities among the different explanations
offereij on villagisation.	 There is an acceptance that villagisation
will enable the bureaucratic class to control peasants more effectively
and that this will lead to greater production as well as to increased
surpluses.
But there are certain problems. First, all these explanations
assume, once again, that the 'state' was acting as a homogeneous entity
and that the policy was a rational attempt by the 'state' to control
the production of peasants. 	 These explanations are in fact premised on
assumptions similar to those made by Nyerere and the Party, namely, that
villagisation would enable the state to give social amenities to peasants
and thereafter improve the production process. 	 Both these assumptions
assume the availability of material capacities, which in practice proved
to be lacking. Coulson (1977: 94) has posed a serious question which
is significant at this point: Why did the Government (in the policy of
villagisation) create impossible demands for services which it must have
known it could not fulfil?
Flyden's answer to such questions that the policy was based on a
political-market, which is defined in such a way as to relegate economic
consequences to secondary importance. 	 This form of interpretation leads
in the final analysis to a rationalisation of faulty policy-making. Today,
in the 1980s; many of the policies based on the political-market such as
the djssolution of the Co-operatives (1976) and the disbanding of the
District Council system (1972), are now being re-introduced. It is
difficult to explain these policy changes without critically re-examining
the political-market concept. A better approach is to differentiate between
the organs of the state, and pursue the different views of development
prevailing in these organs. 	 Thus in line with the approach taken in
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Parts One and Two, I propose to examine the various policies adopted for
the agticultural sector in relation to the policy-making institutions.
As in the previous chapters, this approach will enable me to pursue
in more specific terms, the themes broadly documented in Parts One and
Two, that there are conflicts of views and interests between the three
organs of the state; that policy-failures are frequently the result of
faulty policy-making; and that faulty policy-making results from the
way the various organs of the state formulate their policies. These
themes constitute an alternative explanation of the types of problems
and the policy-changes that have been experienced in this sector.
As in the other case studies, I shall argue that the problems within
this important sector of the economy can be traced to the conflict and
institutional relationship between the three organs of the state, that
is, the Presidency, the Party and the Government. 	 I hope to show that
in terms of their views on agriculture, the President and the Party were
closer than either of them was to the Government.	 The policies formulated
by the first two organs failed to incorporate the Government's needs,
problems and priorities.- However, the effects of failure on-agriculture
were intensified, especially in the 1970s, by the conduct of the Ministry
of Agriculture, whose effectiveness appears to have been greatly reduced
by poor leadership.	 It compromised its principles on economic growth.
A more dynamic leadership might have been able to offset the effects of
the Party and the President's approach to development. ' Yet most of
the neglect in the agricultural sector can be traced to this period.
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THE UJAMAA ERA
We saw in Parts One and Two that Tanzania had a tripartite system
of policy-making, involving the Government, the Party and the President.
These three-organs of the state had different priorities and concerns,
all of which affected the agricultural sector. 	 I showed in Part One
that the Government's view of development saw economic growth as a pre-
condition to development. 	 The policy of the Ministry of Agriculture
(MOA) was to encourage the development of the 'progressive farmers' and
maintain commercial farming because of their important contributions to
GDP.	 In relation to the subsistence peasants, Government relied on trade
and market incentives to integrate them into commodity production (Plans,
1961-63; 1964-1969).
However, superimposed on this view, was another approach sponsored
mainly by the President. 	 In 1962 Nyerere called for a policy of rural
development based on village settlements (Hansard, 1962, Col: 7). 	 This
view of development was aimed at bringing the subsistence peasants living
in scattered homesteads, who constituted the majority of the people, to
live in village settlements so that modern social welfare services could
be made available to them.	 Nyerere's view of development incorporated
re-distributive concerns and the re-organisation of peasant settlements.
Running concurrently with the President's and the Government's views
of development was another view articulated mainly by Party activists.
This focussed on marketing relations and had implications for the agri-
cultural sector because of the close relations, in more than one way,
between production and marketing.	 As we saw in Part One, the Party
activists pressed for the replacement of private traders by state agencies
and the co-operatives.
The Government (1963-1966) attempted to deal with these two major
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views without abandoning its own concern over economic growth. Thus
in refation to the President's idea of village settlements, which was
supported by the World Bank in the form of the 'transformation' approach,
the Government created a Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water
Development which became responsible for the early villagisation programme.
In addition, a Village Settlement Agency was created to initiate pilot
settlements.	 In relation to the Party's pressures and demands, the
Government in 1962 created the National Agricultural Produce Board, which
was given a monopoly over maize marketing, and in 1963 gave into the
demands for the rapid expansion of the co-operatives. 	 As a result,	 the
total volume of produce handled by the co-operatives grew from 145,000
tons- in 1960 to almost 500,000 tons in 1965 (World Bank, 1977: vi:-22).
By 1966, however, these two major politically motivated policies
were in difficulties.	 The village settlement schemes were abandoned.
And in relation to the co-operatives, the Government was forced to intervene.
In 1967 some 16 unions were taken over directly by the Government (World
Bank, Ibid: 23).	 By 1966 it was evident that policies which were
motivated by purely political pressures and which ignored -economic
considerations were creating immense development problems. On the other
hand, government agricultural policies, which were not politically
interfered with, were proving successful and were maintained until 1968.
These apparent lessons of agricultural policy-making in the 1960s were
overlooked by policy-makers, however, in the creation of the One Party
State; as we have seen, the Constitution separated the powers to formulate
policies from those of implementation and vested them in different organs.
This created the context in which the Party could formulate policies taking
into consideration only 'political' factors while the 'economics' of the
policy was considered the responsibility of the Government.
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The Arusha Declaration, 1967 
The policy of Ujamaa (1967) initiated by the President and passed
by the Party-called for peasants to live together cultivating land
communally as a way of raising their standard of living as well as of
generating more agricultural output. 	 It would also enable the Government
to give services to the ujamaa villages.	 In 1967 the President was
against private commercial farming but he was not against the 'progressive
farmers'; as a result, the Government came to rely even more heavily on
the progressive farmer for economic growth.
	 As I argued in Part One
Nyerere was operating at this stage within the framework of conventional
ideas which saw economic growth as essential to development.
The Presidential Circular 1/69 on Ujamaa 
But two years later Nyerere changed his position vis-a-vis the
progressive farmers, who now came to be considered as obstacles to
ujamaa.	 Secondly, Nyerere argued for a frontal approach in the imple-
mentation of the policy of Ujamaa Vijinini.(1969-1974).	 Thirdly, the
Party became the main agent for impleMenting it. This policy is crucial
because it displaced totally the Government's concern for economic growth.
Why did the President change his mind? 	 I posed this question to a
close confidante of Nyerere. 	 According to the interviewee, the President
changed his mind and introduced the Circular because the policy of Ujanaa 
was not being seriously implemented between 1967-1969.
	 The initiative
was mainly left to local party functionaries who lacked support from
national institutions (interview with high ranking Government official,
July 1981).	 The Circular was an attempt to create an institutional
structure at regional, district and national levels which would assist in
the implementation of the programme. As we saw, the President gave a high
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priority to socialist organisation at the expense, if need be, of
agricdltural production.	 This was the period of the primacy of
politic $ in. development.
The Government (consisting mainly of the production-orientated
group such as Jamal, Msuya,Helleiner, for instance) warned the President
against a frontal approach to implementing iliamaa and advised him that
individual small-scale peasant farming was more efficient (Pratt, 1972: 424).
But the timing of Presidential Circular 1/69 also coincided with a
deteriorating condition in the agricultural sector. 	 By 1969 it was
already apparent to the Government that there were grave problems mani-
fested in falling agricultural production and marketing problems (Kriesel
report, 1970).
	 Like the 1966,Presidential Enquiry into the Co-operatives,
the Kriesel Report (1970) stated that the problems of the co-operatives,
which were affecting marketing and which in turn affected production,
were because:
... societies and unions were hastily formed
and necessarily manned by untrained and
inexperienced staff. Marketing costs per
unit have risen substantially and some
services have deteriorated.
(Kriesel Report, 1979: 1)
And:
A growing disrespect for law and regulations
within the country because of the inability
to cope with widespread violations. This
development can have serious implications
beyond the marketing system.
(Ibid: 21)
The Presidential Circular 1/69 thus introduced a new dimension into the
problems of the agricultural sector.	 The policy of Ujamaa was only
incorporated into the 2nd Five Year Plan after the President had insisted
and had rejected the first draft, which had made no mention of ujamaa 
farms (Coulson, 1977: 25). I would argue that, in order to guarantee
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production, the Government introduced the idea of state farms in the
1969-074 Plan.	 The Government's reluctance to incorporate the
policy of Ujamaa into the Development Plan has often been viewed as
exemplifying class opposition to the policy. 	 MUsti (1978: 35) for
instance, argues that the introduction of state farms represented "a
lack of confidence in the development of the ujamaa villages only two
years after their conceptualisation". But I would argue that the
Government's cautious attitude towards ujamaa in 1969 was warranted,
given the types of problems which the agricultural sector was already
experiencing and the implementation capacity of the Party and Government.
As we shall see later, it was precisely these factors which created
problems at the implementation level.
In concluding this section we might say that the 'state' was
failing to act as a homogeneous entity in a number of ways. First, the
Presidential Circular 1/69 did not address itself to the prevailing
agricultural conditions, which were a concern for the Government. It
gave greater stress to rural development aspects than to production.
Secondly, it discriminated against the progressive farmers, upon whom the
Government was dependent for marketed output, before viable alternative
forms had been established, and finally, it came at a period when the
agricultural sector was already experiencing problems and instability.
These problems show that the President and the Government especially
those who were concerned with the conventional view were operating at
cross purposes; their interests, their priorities and their understanding
of development problems were different.
We shall now turn to the type of institutional arrangements which
were created for the implementation of the policy of Ujamaa.	 We shall
find that the unresolved conflict between the President and the Government
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was reflected in the implementation of ujamaa as both organs of the
state emphasised their own priorities and views of development.
Institutions and the implementation of Ujamaa 
The institutional arrangements for the implementation of Ujamaa 
were the product of the 1969 Presidential Circular, which created the
organisational structures whereby all three organs of the state - the
Present, the Party and the Government - were to be involved in the policy.A
First, the Presidential Circular 1/69 led to the creation of a whole new
ministry, the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development.
After 1972, this ministry was re-organised to form the Prime Minister's
-According to the Circular, the Ministry was to be a guide in'
organising the villages, assuring the provision of social services and
assisting villages to organise their production around the ujamaa 
principle (Nyerere, 1969). 	 Secondly, the Ministry of Development Planning
was responsible for integrating the ujamaa policy into the general economic
policies of the nation (see 1969-1974 Plan) and to provide micro-plans
for development.
Thirdly, the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for providing
technical assistance and consulting services. It also ran its own
programmes on the problems of ujamaa villages and on agricultural
techniques (MUsti, 1978: 74). 	 These new functions were in addition to
it traditional ones of overseeing crop production, extension and provision
of inputs for specific programmeg productive investments and the co-
ordination of marketing.	 These formed the Government agents for assisting
Ujamaa development.
There was also, however, a Presidential Planning Team which was
directly responsible to the President. The group consisted of five
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experts - in agriculture, co-operatives, land planning and hy&aulic
development, and an economist - guided by a Tanu official at the regional
level (Musti, 1978: 68).
The third organ was the Party.
	 We have already seen that the
policy of Ujamaa was taken up by the Party in 1967 and that by 1969 the
Party was also responsible for implementing it - because it was a
political policy (Daily News, 25.9.1969).
	 The Party came to assume three
functions: elaborating the general political line, participating in
the implementation of policy even at the administrative level, and
mobilising the masses.	 The key figures in implementing the policy of
ujamaa were the Regional and District Commissioners. 	 Their responsibilities
included that of co-ordinating the operations of administrators in their
regions, assuring the implementation of national policy and controlling
the lower Party levels (Musti, 1978: 66). 	 However, they were in a position
to call on both Party and Government officials in their regions to prepare
and implement the programme.
We can therefore see that all three organs of the state were involved
in various degrees in the implementation of the policy; this is an
indication that the policy of Ujamaa was taken seriously enough by policy-
makers to warrant institutional re-arrangements.
Two views of development - rural development and export production 
The unresolved conflict of interests between the President and the
Party on the one hand, and the Government on the other, created a situation
whereby two tendencies in development policy were running concurrently
in Tanzanian agriculture between 1969-1974.
	
On the one hand was the
President's and the Party's policy of socialist rural development which
prohibited the employment of labour, while on the other was the Government's
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emphasis on export production and individual peasant enterprises
(with "..a market in hired labour).
The President and the Party:	 Under the new institutional arrangements
the Party was the main mobiliser and implementor of Ujamaa. 	 The
Regional Development Fund, with 20 million shillings, was put at the
disposal,
	
of the Regional Commissioners for financing the initial
overhead expenses of the ujamaa villages. 	 Mobilisation of the peasantry
to go Ujamaa during this stage was characterised by 'commandism'
(Finucane, 1974; 	 Raikes 1975; Von Freyhold 1979; Coulson 1975).
As a result, the number of new villages created from 1969 to 1971 grew
to 2500 with more-than one-million inhabitants. By December 1973 the • -
number passed 5600 with two million inhabitants equal to 16% of the
Tanzanian population (Musti, 1978: 51).
	
Government agencies, especially
financial institutions, were directed to favour ujamaa villages in terms
of credits and inputs. McKinsey's (1974) report, however, states that
for 1973-1974 the entire state budget including the funds of the TRDB
amounted to 1855 million = shillings, of which only 96 million or 5% went
for ujamaa (cited in Musti, 1978: 64).
Most of the funds used to finance Ujamaa development were seldom
distributed according to economic criteria.	 There were political pressures
emanating from the Party at national, regional and district levels for
funds to be pushed into Ujamaa activities;	 politics prevailed over
economic and technical judgements. As Hyden states:
Ujamaa politics was tantamount to a deliberate
neglect by most Party decision makers of
criteria such as efficiency, feasibility
and viability.
(Hyden, 1980: 112)
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The modest level of Government support of such decisions with funds,
credit's and inputs cannot be taken as an indication of sabotage of the
ujamaa policy if we consider the meagre resources available in the
country.
Large-scale capitalist farms in Iringa and Arusha were taken over
and given to peasants. 	 As Hyden states, "Tanzania's socialist policies
after 1967 definitely reduced capitalist forms of production in the rural
areas. Failure to acknowledge this means overlooking one of the
achievements of ujamaa" (Hyden, 1980: 122).	 Various writers showed
how richer peasants were attempting to control 'ujamaa villages' by
assuming leadership or by declaring their farms ujamaa in the hope of
obtaining-the benefits of cheap fertilisers and credits. ' They also
fraternized with the bureaucracy ( Sender, 1974; Raikes, 1975;
Van Velsen 1973).
	
This shows the difficult situation under which
'capitalist' and progressive farmers were operating.
Between 1969-1972 various 'operations were undertaken, emphasising
living in villages (Operations Rufiji in 1969, Dodoma in 1971, Kigoma and
Mara in 1972). -According to an interview with a Party official these
operations were geared to solving specific problems:
Each of these regions had specific problems
such as floods, famine and migration which
necessitated solutions. Party had to find
solutions to these problems.
(interview with high ranking Party
official, July 1981)
But solvingthese specific-problems on the other hand, through villagisation it
created other social problems, such as the need for education, water and
health facilities.	 To this end, the 1971 Party National Congress had
directed the Government to ensure that water should be made available
to the people by 1990 and that schools and health facilities should reach
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the population by 1980. (interview with senior Party official, July 1981).
'Thus we see here that the President and the Party were pursuing
their policies of rural development which incorporated diverse elements
of communal production, re-location of the population in village
settlements and re-distributive measures.
Government:	 The Government, on the other hand, was continuing with
its traditional policy of emphasising cash crop production and cultivation
by individual peasants and farmers. This policy was also supported by
the World Bank.	 According to Von Freyhold:
Of the Tsh 2015.6 million which the World
Bank (IDA and IBRD) had offered to Tanzania
until the end of the Second Five Year Plan
(1975), about 40 per cent was earmarked for
agriculture.	 Of this, two thirds was to
be used for the promotion of export crops,
one-sixth for livestock development and the
remainder for sugar development and some
mixed projects.	 Until the end of 1975
there was not a single project investing
in the production of basic foodstuffs.
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 108/9)
The parastatals involved with agricultural development also showed a
preference for exports:
Between 1964/5 and 1974/5 the state and the
parastatal enterprises allocated a total
of Tsh 964 million to agricultural development.
Of this 45 per cent was spent on export crops,
26 per cent on livestock, 18 per cent on sugar
but only 2 per cent on cereals and other basic
food crops.
(Ibid: 109)
It has been argued that Tanzanian bureaucrats,as well as the World
Bank, favoured individual peasant smallholders as opposed to communal
production in terms of credits, extension services and other inputs.
Thus for instance:
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Of the seven main agricultural programmes
designed by the World Bank after the Arusha
Declaration (tea, tobacco, cotton, sugar,
, cashew nuts, maize, Kigoma 'integrated
project') there has not been a single one
- which was exclusively or primarily directed
towards communal farmers. The World Bank
- has preferred to deal with block farms or
• individual farmers.
(Von Freyhold, 1979: 111)
Writers sympathetic to Ujamaa as a radical programme of socialist
rural development have explained Government emphasis on export production
in terms of class interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (Von Freyhold,
1979; Musti, 1978).	 For instance, Von Freyhold states that:
The state in Tanzania was in the hands of a
class which did not support the self-
organisation of the peasantry ... Self reliant
development could not take place within this
context because the creative potential of the
peasantry remained submerged under kulak and
bureaucratic hegemony.
(1979: 108)
Radical writers, such as Coulson (1977), Von Freyhold (1975) and Musti
(1978) have also explained the limited material support given to Ujamaa 
by government as an indication of their class bias.
	 But as Hyden states,
"Virtually, all studies on Ujamaa production conclude that productivity
on the communal farm was considerably below that on the private farms"
(Hyden, 1980: 119).
	 Also,repayments of debts to the TRDB has been more
successful with private peasants for export crops than with peasants
producing food crops (Ibid: 112).
	 If communal production had proven
economically viable and profitable, the Government would have financed
it since as Musti recognises, "The major advantage of the villages in
Kilimo's eyes was the possibility of reaching more peasants at lower costs"
(Musti, 1978: 75).
	 What most of these writers ignore is the Ministry
of Agriculture's priority towards agricultural output and the need for
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foreign exchange in the developmental processes.
	 Secondly, their bias
towards individual small-scale peasant production was because it was
more efficient._ The Government's responsibilities and priorities were
defined in terms of economic parameters relating to costs, efficiency,
and output, and this forced it to favour individual peasant production.
We can therefore see that the organs of the state were pursuing their
own policies and priorities in agriculture independently of each other.
Attempts at institutional co-ordination between the Government, on
the one hand, and the President and the Party on the other, in implementing
ujamaa were also not successful.
	 All three organs were implementing
ujamaa in their own ways and according to their own institutional roles.
For instance, in relation to the MOA:
The support of Kilimo - a key ministry in the
Ujamaa process was less than brilliant.
Most of its investment went for the state
farms whose performance was disastrous.
Moreover Kilimo never bothered to rethink
its approach to agricultural development in
regard to the ujamaa sector. That approach
remained the provision of modern inputs and
agricultural techniques without regard for
new organisations of production, new modes
of production.
(Musti, 1978: 75)
The Ministry of Development Planning failed to provide a strategy of
integrating ujamaa into a national concept of development (Ibid: 71), while
the Ministry of Rural Development failed to achieve its aim because
"there was only a limited number of officials assigned to the ministry
for the purpose of co-ordination and they lacked a methodology to guide
them" (Musti, 1978: 73).
The failure of institutional co-ordination cannot be explained
in terms of class interests but only by reference to the conflict between
the policy of Ujamaa and Government's concerns and responsibilities. It
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is extremely difficult to see how Government could have effectively
participated in implementing ujamaa when, first, it was outside its
jurisdiction because it was a political policy, and, second, the whole
thrust of ujamaa as it was conceptualised was contrary to ministerial
responsibilities.	 Thus the institutional failure of co-ordination
derives from the conflict in views of development between the President
and the Party on the one hand and the Government on the other.
The emergence of two problems and two solutions 
The divergence of interests and priorities between the organs of
State became manifested in two diverse problems - that of economic growth
and rural organisation.
	 This in turn came to determine two different-
	 -
solutions.	 We shall first consider the problem of agricultural production
and how the three organs attempted to deal with it.
Declining agricultural production 
As Table 11.1 shows, between 1967 and 1972 the performance of the
agricultural sector was very uneven.
	 Apart from tobacco (flue-cured),
tea and cashewnuts, the major export crops did poorly.
	 In relation to
the food crops, there was a marked decline in maize purchases in 1971/72
and both wheat and rice purchases advanced unsteadily.
The problem of declining production was discussed at the Party
Annual Conference of 1972 held in Iringa from 15-20 May 1972.
	 The Party
adopted the policy of 'Politics is Agriculture'.
	 No mention was made
of communal production (THQ C/T 10.3.1.2. Mkutano wa Hamashauri Kuu ya
Taifa, Min. 11/72, Siasa ni Kilimo).
	 The aim of the policy was to
combat declining production.
	 As a result, there was a shift in emphasis
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from communal to block farming. According to Von Freyhold:
By 1972 there was already a government directive
advising the regions to promote block farms
rather than communal farms.
(Ibid, 1979: 112)
At the 1973 Tanu Conference the President drew attention to the
problem of declining production.
	 He emphasised the need for increasing
cash crops because of foreign exchange requirements. He also emphasised
the need for expanding production in order to finance social services.
Nyerere stated:
There is no such thing as 'free' education,
'free' medical services, 'free' water supply.
There is no such thing as 'free' agricultural
advice, 'free' planning services, 'free'
defence or 'free' administration.
(Nyerere, 1973)
The view of development expressed by Nyerere on this occasion was very
similar to the view of development held by the production-group within the
Government.
	 By 1973 Nyerere was accepting the fact that the implementation
of ujamaa should not disrupt cash crop production:
Also caution must be exercised in order
to avoid a drop in production, because the
nation as a whole cannot afford to lose any
of the annual contribution which these areas
now make to our foreign exchange through the
sale of cotton, coffee, tea or tobacco etc.
(Daily News, 24.9.1973)
In 1973, unlike	 1969 to 1972, Nyerere was giving great emphasis to economic
considerations, because problems of declining production especially of
cash crops were becoming serious.
What is important to note is that between 1972 and 1973, the three
organs of the State ape together so to speak, in response to the
increasing crisis in the agricultural sector, in order to cope with the
problem.	 This led to policy shifts, from the earlier emphasis on communal
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production to block farming and the acceptance of individual-based
production in the cash-crop areas.	 The need for the organs of state
to respond homogeneously to problems was referred to by the President
in the same speech in 1973, when he stated:
For if we are to carry out our intentions of
development, Government and Tanu should be
separate only as the arms and legs of a body
are separate. If a load to be carried from one
place to another, then body, arms and legs, all
have to work together. So it should be with
People, Tanu and Government. None can be
thoroughly effective in its own task without
activity from the others.
(Nyerere, 1973: 22)
The attempts at co-ordination of policies between the elements of
the tripartite system between 1972-73 were in any case short-lived. 	 As
in the case of Ujamaathe Party and President adopted the policy of
Villagisation against the advice of the Government. 	 In doing so, these
two organs of the state re-asserted the rural development aspects at
the expense of the Government's priority of economic growth.
What is surprising, however, is that there were no attempts at
price review by the Government, Party or the President. This was despite
two important facts.
	
First, the Kriesel Report (1970) had pointed to the
declining purchasing power of the peasants; and second, the tripartite
system of policy-making was after a long time operating homogeneously.
As Lofchie states, "Tanzania's decision to maintain a low producer price
for maize as late as 1972-3 defies easy explanation" (1978: 466). I would
argue that the failure to increase producer prices is a reflection of the
weakness of the Ministry of Agriculture during this period. It compromised
its traditional principle of economic growth by ignoring the role of price
incentives in production.
	 This illustrates that the adoption of a more
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homogeneous approach through the tripartite system is not a guarantee
of a correct solution.
VILLAGISATION
As the agricultural sector was experiencing problems in production
and marketing, the progress of ujamaa development was also coming to a
standstill by 1973.	 Nyerere was concerned with the slowing pace of ujamaa 
and decided on the policy of Villagisation, that is, the re-settling of
all peasants into villages.
The aim of the policy was again determined initially by re-distributive
considerations.	 Villagisation, it was argued, would enable the government
to provide services and to improve peasants' living standards. It would
also improve their productivity.	 The idea of villagisation was again
very similar to Nyerere's ideas expressed in 1962 and partially imple-
mented between 1969-1972 in the various 'operations'. 	 These ideas
incorporated two major elements, the re-organisation of peasants and re-
distributive measures nationally.
At the National Executive Meeting of the Party in 1973 Nyerere
presented the idea of villagisation and argued that it was possible to
separate the issues of "living together" from that of "working together"
on a communal farm, and that these two issues could be tackled in different
stages.	 According to Msekwa:
The NEC discussed and accepted the President's
submission, and directed that it should be
implemented throughout the country.
(Msekwa, 1977: 64)
As a result the policy of Villagisation was adopted. The Daily News 
(23.8.1974) explained the policy in the following way:
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Those who think they can avoid living in
such villages are deluding themselves.
Those who try to resist going into such
villages are also fighting a lost cause.
Every Tanzanian peasant will have to move
and live in such villages.	 Anyone who
refuses will be taken there by force. On
this there will be no half measures.
(cited in Taberi, 1975: 95)
Within a span of merely three years the relocation of Tanzania's
peasants in village settlements was achieved. 	 As Nyerere stated, "there
are about 13,065,000 people living together in 7,684 villages" (Nyerere,
1977: 41), and:
This is a tremendous achievement. It is an
achievement of Tanu and Government leaders
in cooperation with the people of Tanzania.
It means that something like 70 per cent
of our people moved their homes in the space
of about three years.
(Ibid: 42)
According to Green et alia (1980: 93) the Government was against the
policy of Villagisation because of the problems already occurring in the
agricultural sector as analysed in the previous pages. "On the whole
(the decision was taken against) technical advice, especially that of
agricultural and local Government officials" (Ibid, 1980: 93).	 This
indicates that the President and the Party were again setting aside
Government priorities and production problems in the formulation of
policies of development.
It would appear that the Government had no funds for the Villagisation
because there was no allocation in the budget for this purpose. -To carry
	 -
out the operation, funds had to be cut from other sources. 	 The Government
did not mobilise people or the militia. It was a very unpopular policy
in Government circles (interview with senior Government official, August 1981).
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Economic crisis 1974/75 
The policy of villagisation was implemented when various types of
agricultural production were already declining, and it is argued that
the policy aggravated the shortages of food during the 1974/75 famine.
Various studies have documented this. 	 For instance, Fivawa and Matango
(1977) showed that 55% of the inhabitants in the district of Tarime
attributed the fall in production in their area to the forced villag-
isation while 44% blamed the drought (cited in Musti, 1978: 60).
As a result of the famine, we saw that Tanzania had to import
food grains draining her foreign reserves, which was further aggravated
by the sharp rise in the price of oil and higher prices for other imported
goods.	 By the. end of 1974 Tanzania's foreign reserves were virtually
exhausted (Lofchie, 1978: 455).	 Under these conditions it is extremely
difficult to accept Hyden's contention that policies based on a political-
market are effective.
	
On the contrary, I would argue on the basis of the
above analysis, that policies of development which exclude considerations
of production, growth and timing, are bound to aggravate rather than
minimise the problems which may arise from natural disasters and/or events
in the international economic system.
The foregoing observations suggest an answer to Coulson's question
as to why Government created impossible demands for services which it must
have known it could not fulfil.	 At one level the answer is simple -
the Government did not create these demands; rather they were created by
the President and the Party.	 But this leads us to a second question. Why
should the President and the Party have created impossible demands for
services when they must have known that they would be difficult to fulfil?
In fact, we have already seen that Nyerere was quite aware in 1973 about
the financial implications of expanding social services, and of the
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connection between production and the funding of social services. This
question,can only be answered as follows.	 As we have seen Nyerere's
view of development has always been rural-development orientated; he
believed that re-distributive policies would create development, in other
words that people would work harder if the 'state' provided for them.
He also believed firmly that peasants in nucleated villages would be able
to produce more efficiently, and thus in one stroke the measure would
solve both agricultural and rural development problems. 	 It is hard to
avoid the conclusion that, as on previous occasions, the President allowed
his personal convictions and enthusiasm to get the better of his perception
of the objective constraints.
•	 .Why did the Party then fail to consider Government problems of
economic growth? 	 In an interview with a member of the Party Secretariat,
I asked whether the discussions on villagisation at the NEC took into
consideration problems of production.	 The Party official answered that
the NEC had instructed that villagisation should wait until after harvesting
so as not to destabilise production - but that Party officials in the
. regions began to implement the policy immediately. 	 I also asked a high
ranking Party official whether due consideration was given to the amount
of finance that would be required to fund social services in the villages.
He answered that the logistics of getting people into villages was the
primary concern, and the economics were to be considered later (interview
with Party officials, July 1981).
These interviews illustrate two major points. 	 First, the NEC was
aware of the need not to destabilise production but the Party lacked the
capacity to control and discipline its own leaders in the regions. Matango,
(1971), for instance, referred to this problem when he stated that in some
regions not enough guidelines were given to militiamen. 	 Second, the
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institutional arrangements for policy-making once again enabled the
Party to make a major policy decision without giving due consideration
to the implementation capacity of the Government. 	 (We shall see later
that the other policies for the rural sector such as the dissolution of
the co-operatives and Operation Maduka followed a similar pattern).
The Village Act, 1975 and more political policies 1976 
The problems which faced policy-makers after the villagisation
programme were immense.	 There was an urgent need for basic social
amenities, and to this end, the Party passed the policy of universal
primary education and universal water supply. 	 Furthermore, since the
villages had been artificially created, it was necessary to create
structures which would enable socio-economic activities to take place in
them within defined parameters.	 In 1975 Parliament passed the Village
and Ujamaa Act, which conferred legal status and powers on the village,
enabling it, for instance, to obtain credits from financial institutions,
to sell crops to the Crop Authorities and to enforce bye-laws vis-a-vis
the villages.
The Act also provided for the constitution of a village assembly
consisting of all persons aged 18 years and above, and a village council
to be elected by the village assembly. 	 The village council was empowered
to do "all such acts and things as are necesssary or expedient for the
economic and social development of the viallage". It could plan and
co-ordinate economic and social activities of the villagers. Five sub-
ma
committees, namely, finance A planning; production and marketing; education,
culture and social welfare; works and transport; security and defence,
provided the structure for organising developmental activities.
The aim of the Village Act was to make the village a multi-purpose
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co-operative, with the Village Council (led by the Chairman and Secretary)
undertaking and performing various actions on behalf of the villagers.
The Act was designed by members oqUjamaa and Co-operative Department of
the Prime Minister's Office, though instructions for it had come from the
Party (intervLew with Government officials, August 1981).
	 It appears
that the main preoccupation of the designers was to create a distributive
arrangement which would eliminate the need for primary and secondary
co-operatives, which, as we have seen, were experiencing problems. It
was believed that an arrangement which evolved out of the village itself
(by-passing the Unions and primary societies) would be more efficient than
the previous co-operatives, because it would leave the producer with more
income. It was these-ideas and beliefs which structured the•design of
the Village Act 1975; and as a result, although the Co-operative Unions
and primary societies were still in existence, no mention of them was made
in the Village Act.
Meanwhile, the above ideas appear also to have been shared by a
Government Task Force which was appointed by the Prime Minister's Office
in May 1976 to identify the problems faced by the co-operatives in
providing adequate crop purchasing services.
	 The Task Force argued that
the co-operative structures were inappropriate to the new changes in
Tanzanian rural society.
	 The existence of primary co-operative societies
was considered incompatible with the Villagisation programme and the
Village Act, which had made villages into primary marketing units (Marketing
Development Bureau, 1977).
	 As a result, Kawawa, the Prime Minister,
dissolved the co-operatives in May 1976, and a new structure of crop
marketing was instituted.
	 This was designed to improve economic efficiency
and peasant incomes while bringing marketing into line with the new
political and social goals.
	 The functions of the primary co-operatives
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were taken over by the village, acting as a multi-purpose co-operative,
while the- functions of the dissolved Co-operative Unions were passed to
national institutions, which were the District Development Corporations,
Regional Trading Companies, the parastatal crop authorities and the
National Milling Corporation. 	 In the same year (1976) the Prime Minister
Kawawa passed the policy of Operation Maduka, which led to the phasing
out of private retail trade which were to be replaced by co-operative
retail trade (see case study on Socialisation of Trade).
Thus within a period of merely three years (1974-1976) the peasants
of Tanzania were plunged from one intense form of instability, fear and
insecurity to another, which touched the most crucial and sensitive areas
of human existence --the physical destruction and relocation of their..
homes and the unfamiliarity of the new farming environment, the horrific
experience of hunger and the threat of famine,ctwilhe dis-organisation of
marketing and distribution networks for their crops and the disruption of
retail shops for access to such basic items as kerosene, sugar and salt.
)-(-- Such disorganisation in the rural economy can only be rationally
explained by the-conflicting-policies and priorities of the three organs
of the state and by the institutional 	 arrangement for policy-making
which allowed the President and the Party to exclude the Government in
the formulation of development policies.
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THE STATE OF AGRICULTURE:	 POLICIES 1977 - 1982
The conflicts which characterised policies towards the agricultural
section in the Villagisation phase have continued to be evident during
the most recent period; but there are also significant points of
agreement between the three organs of the state.
	 Nyerere's position
changed and moved closer to that of the Government as the economic crisis
became more serious during 1979/80/81.
Before we consider the different policies of the three organs of
state it may be fruitful to recapitulate the significance of the agri-
cultural sector and the 'social groups involved in production.
	 The -
following summary from the World Bank is adequate:
Agriculture continues to dominate the Tanzanian
economy, accounting for 50% of GDP and more than
80% of export earnings. About 90% of Tanzania's
population lives in rural areas, with approximately
2.25 million farm families grouped together into
8,000 villages.
Smallholder farmers contribute about 75% of
Tanzania's agricultural export earning and more
than 80% of the value of marketed cereal
production.
Private large scale farming produces some 25% of
coffee, 90% of tea, 50% of sugar and sisal, most
wheat and part of maize and milk production still
comes from private estates representing export
earnings or import savings at present prices of some
US $80 million annually.
	 It also employs some
90,000 persons and carries its activities largely
independently of Government services.
(World Bank, 1974: 1: 6)
Besides the smallholder farmers, and large-scale farmers, there are
also state farms run by parastatals.
	 There are also block farms which
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were organised mainly by the Party under the Villagisation campaign.
Thus the,agricultural modes of production are fairly diversified.
Policy Agreements: The virtues of Largescale Production 
The three organs of the state appear to have reached some agreement
on three specific points pertaining to the agricultural sector. The first
is the indispensibility of raising production (both of food and of cash
crops).	 We saw how in the period of the primacy of politics (1969-1974)
agricultural production was de-emphasised in favour of socialist organ-
isation.	 In recent years, the President and the Party have gone out of
their way to emphasise the need for increased agricultural production.
The Party has identified four major roles for the agricultural, sector:
production of cash crops for primary processing; production of food crops
and dairy products for domestic consumption; production of cash crops
to generate foreign exchange; and "a strong agricultural sector to act as
the backbone for industrial take-off and technology" (Daily News, 17.7.1980).
The Party has also accepted the principle that productivity should
be materially rewarded, as evidenced by its new policy of Sera ya Taifa 
ya Tija, Mapato na Bei (1980).	 Thus another area of contention between
Government and President/Party has been removed.
The third area where there appears to be agreement is on the new
emphasis placed on large-scale farming as opposed to peasant production.
The recent approach of both Party and Government towards the agricultural
sector has been to emphasise large-scale farming based on =dem forms of
technology.	 We shall explore this in greater detail when we consider
individually the approaches of the different organs of the state.
There are numerous agencies participating in the agricultural
sector.	 They include the Party, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Prime
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Minister's Office, and the Parastatals. 	 There are presently over a
hundred parastatals which are directly concerned with agricultural
production (World Bank, 1981: 12).
	
The Prime Minister's Office is
mainly responsible for rural development activities, while the Party has
increasingly participated in the activities of agricultural production,
in planning crop targets for regions and recommending certain crop
choices for village production.	 What are the policy responses of these
organs of the state? 	 Particular emphasis will be given to the Party,
the Government/MOA and Nyerere but references will also be made to the
Prime Minister's Office.
We know that institutionally, the Government/Ministry of Agriculture
does not formulate policies. 	 The following interview shows the position
of the Ministry of Agriculture/Kilimo in terms of policy-making.
Kilimo does not discuss policies
we merely implement policies.
Why?
Kilimo has not done any forms of research
on effects of policies as far as agriculture
is concerned.
Why?
Ujamaa and Villagisation were placed under
the Prime Minister - they were not placed
under Kilimo.
(interview with senior Government
official, August 1981)
However, despite the above (institutional barrier to policy-making) there
is increasing evidence that the Government is in favour of large-scale
farming as the basis for the modernisation of agriculture.
This can be seen in the policy paper of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)
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entitled Agricultural Mechanisation Policy (1979). 	 The paper attempts
to situate a policy of mechanisation within the political approach to
rural development called for by the Party and the President. 	 The paper
begins by stating:
Fundamentally, Tanzania's development focusses
on rural development with agriculture as the
basis. The aims of development are 1] social
and economic equality both individual and regional
2] self-reliance; 3] social and economic trans-
formation of people and production methods.
(M0A, 1979: 2)
Nevertheless, agricultural mechanisation is defined to include the use
of "tools, implements, and machines operated by human, animal or mechanical
power to carry out all activities related to production and harvesting,
handling and processing of agricultural production" (M0A, 1979: 1). This
broad definition of mechanisation enables all categories of agricultural
producer to be incorporated into the programme.
The policy paper is guided by a high degree of economic rationality.
It states that "further investment in tractors and power equipment by
public institutions will only be encouraged where such institutions have
developed the capability to efficiently utilise their existing inventory"
and that "the introduction and support of mechanical power at village
level will be undertaken only after measures to ensure efficient use are
taken" (MOA, 1979: 7).	 This is an attempt to avoid the types of waste
that occurred under early mechanisation policies.
The policy paper also makes provision for credits. The paper
states:
Credit will be made available on appropriate
terms to those providing necessary services,
whether public or private e.g. machinery hire
services, machinery manufacturers, machinery
dealer/distributors.
(M0A, 1979: 11)
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A similar principle is applied to the village community, which will
have to hire its mechanical power requirements. The aim is to have a
mechanisation co-operative, which would then hire out its services to
other villages.	 The policy aims to form mechanisation co-operatives
at village level, then progressing upwards to form the Agro-Mechanisation
Centre at the national level (Dagg, 1980).
The second major innovation which has been brought into agricultural
development by the Ministry of Agriculture in the recent period is the
Crop Monitoring and Early Warning Systems Project (1980).
	 This is an
attempt to predict harvests and hence avoid a repetition of the 1974/75
famine experience, which took the Government and Party administrations
by surprise.
The main aim of the project is "to provide advance information and
assessment to Government on crop production, stocks, supplies and
utilisation of food grains for all the Regions of mainland Tanzania"
(Kilimo, 1980: 1).
	
It involves a complex process of data gathering
on various food crops, their growth', planting dates, incidence of pests,
diseases and local adverse weather conditions. These data are collected
on a monthly basis and allow the project to evaluate the forthcoming
harvest on a qualitative basis. 	 This project illustrates the Ministry's
emphasis on high level technology,and in turn indicates that the
Decentralisation system, which was supposed to co-ordinate information,
has not been very successful in this area.
We can therefore see that the MOA's recent policy towards the
agricultural sector is to emphasise a 'modernisation' approach, favouring
large-scale production, mechanisation and use of advanced technology.
This emphasis is not necessarily opposed by the Party.
	 The Party has also
emphasised large-scale production. 	 For instance, in its recent publication
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Mwongozo wa CCM 1981 the chapter entitled "Agricultural Revolution in the
village Is the first priority" outlines the Party's policy for bringing
about changes in the agricultural sector. It emphasises large-scale
farming (CCM, 1981: 80) and stressed the use of mechanisation, which
includes the use of ploughs, modern implements and tractors (CCM, 1981: 84).
Like the Ministry, the Party states that "the aim of the Party is to
transform peasant hoe reliance to ploughs and tractors" (CCM, 1981: 85).
We can therefore conclude that both Party and Government are pursuing
a modernisation approach to agricultural development which favours large-
scale production as opposed to small-scale peasant production.
Policy Conflicts: Communal versus Private Large-scale Production 
Although both organs of the state favour large-scale farming, there
is, however, a conflict over how to achieve it.
	 For instance, in
interviews conducted with Kilimo officers it became clear that there was
resentment against policies which prohibited large-scale farming based
on private capital.
	 It was pointed out that private capital was allowed
to invest in industry but that it was not allowed to invest in agriculture
where it was equally needed.
	 A clear policy on private large-scale
farming was needed, argued Kilimo officers.
The need for private large-scale farming has become more acute,
especially since state farms and estates have not proven successful.
Between 1980 and 1981 the Party was forced to intervene in a number of
farms run by cash-crop authorities and under the authority of Kilimo to
investigate problems of declining production and loss of funds as a result
of mismanagement (interview with Party officials, July 1981).
	 Several
state farms such as NAFCO have also incurred losses.
It appears that the Ministry of Agriculture has also failed to
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maintain good husbandry conditions in both state farms and areas of
peasanOarming.	 Most of Tanzania's major export crops have been
afflicted by dAsease because of bad husbandry.
	 For instance, the weevil
in sisal "has now become so widespread in East Africa that its exterm-
ination is now virtually impossible" (Mlingano Report, 1980: 1).
	 The
report explains:
Although potentially devasting in effect the
presenveof the sisal weevil in the sisal
estates has been a subject of some neglect 
in the last 10 years.
A survey carried out in 1976 by members of
A.R.I. Mlingano revealed the lack of responses
to the presence of the weevil and to practical
insecticidal control.
Work on sisal weevil control has been in
progress only since January 1980 after a gap 
of 8 years. 
(Mlingano Report, 1980)
Lack of good agricultural husbandry has also affected peasant-based
crops, such as banana; thus,"since the year 1977 banana weevils and
nematodes pest population appear to have increased abnormally" (Maruku
Annual Report, 1979/80).
	 Meanwhile, cashewnut crops and coconut trees
have also been affected by disease (Cashewnut Authority, 1980; National
Coconut Development Project, 1980).
	 These reports indicate that the
Ministry of Agriculture failed, over a long period, to maintain good
husbandry methods in both state farms and peasant-based cash crop
production, which, together with other problems, led to decline in
production.
The Party policy, on the other hand, does not favour private large-scale
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farming.	 The Party calls for large-scale farming based on state farms
and co-operative farms (CCM, 1981: 82), and "socialist agriculture" is
given the first, priority (Ibid: 88).
	 The CCM document states that:
The potentiality of the large communal
production farm exists - provided there is
the will, planning and proper leadership.
(CCM, 1981: 83)
The belief and conviction that peasants are capable of producing more
on a communal basis was re-affirmed in an interview by a Regional
Commissioner, who argued that peasants, if properly mobilised, educated,
organised and given the necessary assistance (in terms of material and
leadership inputs) were capable of increased production (interview with
Regional Commissioner, July 1981).
	 This conviction was shared by members
of the Party Secretariat whom I interviewed. Thus:
Party believes that Tanzania has the capacity
to produce more ... peasants have the capacity
to generate foreign exchange ... problems of
bottlenecks such as transportation etc. are
the failure of parastatals, such as NMC.
Peasants can put effort if the Party calls.
(interview with Party officials,
July 1981)
The President's position in agricultural policy-making is crucial
and, as I have already argued, his position can often tip the balance
between Government's need for economic growth and the Party's policy of
socialist organisation.	 For instance the following interview illustrates
the important role the President plays vis-a-vis Party and Government
relations.
Professionals are not given enough time
- no resource allocation. Policies are not
tested at all.
Most problems emerge as a result of dead-line
given by the Party and also because policies
are difficult to implement.
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Policy makers cannot take into account
implementation problems. The President
is aware of implementation problems through
- the Cabinet, the ECC and is in a position
to bend certain policies from the Party so
that they can fit in with implementation
problems.
(interview with senior Government
official, July 1981)
This role of the Presidency explains the contradictory type of statements
which the President has issued, for instance, between 1979-1981, reflecting
the types of pressures to which he is subjected. 	 Between 1979-1980/81
Nyerere has given contradictory statements, which reflect the types of
pressures to which he is subjected.	 We shall consider the major
statements he has given:
Ujamaa here to stay, says Mwalimu 	 (Daily News, Nov. 3, 1979)
"People who think Tanzania will change her cherished
policies of Socialism & Self-Reliance because of the
current economic difficulties are wasting their time".
"We shall never change", President Nyerere declared in
Dar es Salaam yesterday.
Ujamaa will be built in stages - Nyerere 	 (Daily News, May 7, 1980)
"The road to socialism is full of setbacks
and at times it is necessary to retreat in
order to advance further.	 Retreat is part
of a strategy for consolidation".
Large-scale farmers welcome - Nyerere 	 (Daily News, June 6, 1981)
"Tanzanians were free to engage in large scale
farming, provided they did not encroach upon
established villages in the country".
The President's contradictory statements reflect the dilemmas
of building a socialist country in a context of chronic economic crisis.
They reflect his intermediate position vis-a-vis the Party and the
Government.	 Nyerere's statement that private large-scale farming is
welcomed was meant to appease the Government's concerns in regard to
agricultural development; but there is no indication that the Party
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accepted the President's pronouncement, since the question of private
large-scale farming was not included in the CCM Mwongozo, 1981, which
was published later.	 If anything, the CCM Mwongozo remained antag-
onistic towards private capital in the economy (CCM, 1981: 52).
We can therefore conclude that while there is a broad agreement
between the two organs of the state on the need for large-scale farming
(as opposed to small-scale peasant production) and on mechanisation,
there is a conflict between the methods of achieving these aims.
	 The
Party believes that peasants are capable of large-scale communal/co-operative
production if properly mobilised, organised and assisted by both the Party
and the Government.	 The Government, on the other hand, feels that private
capital would be a cheaper and more productive way to achieve large-scale
production, especially after the experience of 1969-1974.
Although the Government has not come out directly with the argument
that peasants are not capable of large-scale production, nevertheless,
evidence from rural development experience would indicate that this is so.
We shall now consider this evidence, which comes mainly from the Prime
Minister's Office.
Problems of large-scale communal and co-operative activities 
We have seen that the Party's policy in relation to the agricultural
sector is to have socialist organisation, that is, to promote large-scale
farming based on peasants' communal and co-operative production. Agri-
cultural production should therefore be ujamaa production. The CCM
Mwongozo, 1981 outlines the methods of achieving large-scale communal
production by peasants. It states that the Party would be obliged to do
two things.	 First, it would have to educate peasants in agricultural
husbandry and ensure that Government had proper plans for procuring
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agricultural inputs cheaply for the peasants (CCM, 1981: 84).
	 Secondly,
the Party would have to ensure that there was a programme of planned
work which would build up discipline and fadilitate work responsibilities
as well as professionalism. (CCM, Ibid: 87).
	 The Party emphasises
mobilisation, organisation and education as methods of bringing about
an agricultural revolution.
	 Education is considered essential by the
Party because large-scale farming requires knowledge of management
principles (CCM, 1981: 89).
It would appear, however, that the Party's policy of large-scale
production based on village/peasant communal efforts has not taken
sufficient account of the specific types of problems besetting village
society.	 Although the policy acknowledges the need for education for
management, it is precisely in educated manpower that village economy is
most deficient.	 For instance, the majority of village chairmen have
less than Standard VII education, secretaries have a better education
up to Standard VII but only 3.5% have more than Standard VIII.
	 Village
shop-keepers are also deficient in education; 42% have less than Standard
VII (PMO, 1980e: 12-20).
Various attempts to bring into the villages functional officers
such as the Bwana Shamba, livestock officers and other district personnel
(Fortman, 1978: 18) and the appointment of village management (1977)
were designed to rectify these deficiencies at the village level. This,
however, meant that Government had to subsidise village manpower by
sending in officials, thus increasing bureaucracy and recurrent expenditure.
The Prime Minister's Office undertook to train members of the Village
Councils, and for 1978/79 the goal was to train 89,772 members of the
Village Councils.
	 But the programme had to be abandoned"because of the
war and the resultant freezing of the programme funds" (Linjewile, 1979: 11).
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The absence of managerial skills at village level was a major
contribuary cause to the problems of the Village Act, 1975, which was
its failure to _take adequate account of management capacity of peasants.
The main preoccupation of the PM0 in designing the Act was to create an
arrangement for distribution which would by-pass the primary and secondary
co-operatives, which were acting as 'middle-men' to the peasants. The
Act envisaged that a system would evolve out of the villages themselves
which would operate at a lower cost than the previous co-operatives.
The Village Council would be responsible for crop procurement, and would
sell crops to the Crop Authorities as well as negotiate loans with the
TRDB.
The Village Act was structured in such a manner that literacy,
education and management skills became crucial factors in development;
yet these were precisely the factors which were usually absent at village level.
As a result, villagers were unable to conduct their collective business
efficiently, the major item being crop procurement.
	 Records were badly
kept, and it was difficult to maintain a simple financial statement
(interview with senior Government official, August 1981).
	 Finally, those
who were trained often ran away from the village, and short-term training
courses did not prove very successful (PM0, 1980d:75).
	 Finally, a lack
of stores, safes, scales, lorries and roads, limited the effectiveness of
villages in doing their own procurement. (MDB, 1977).
	 The failure to
consider peasant capacity and facilities available in the villages came
to negate the raison detre of the Village Act, which was to enable
peasants to handle their crop procurement.	 The Village Act also aggravated
problems for the Ujamaa na Ushirika Department as the following passage
from its Head illustrates:
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The passing of the Village Act in 1975 had
tremendous adverse effects on the ability
and performance of our Department (PMO
Ujamaa na Ushirika) to provide the necessary
management assistance to the co-operative
movement ...
I would venture to say that the Department,
in respect of the size of its personnel
population and the skills available to it,
(only about 800 of them had the necessary
training and work experience in the areas of
management and accountancy) was not quite
prepared to respond effectively to the needs
. for management assistance of a tremendous
large number of village co-operatives expected
to be registered under the Act. At the risk
of appearing apologetic, it must be stated that
we were destined to fail.
(Linjewilla, 1979: 18)
Thus it would appear that the designers of the Village Act in the Prime
Minister's Office, Department of Ujamaa na Ushirika,'overlooked' its
own Departmental's capacity in implementing the Act.
	 These two instances
indicate that the Prime Minister's Office (Department of Ujamaa na Ushirika)
had during this period adopted a 'political' approach to rural development.
From these experiences, I can argue that the Party's policy of
emphasising large-scale production based on peasant communalisation/block/
co-operative efforts would create demands on resources which are scarce
at the village level (such as managerial and organisational skills); and
would incur greater costs for the Government through subsidies.
	 For
instance, Vail (1975: 30) estimated that it would cost between $25-30
million which constituted 28-33% of the MOA's budget for the Second Five
Year Plan period to provide each of the 4,920 villages existing in 1972
with one tractor and related equipment.
	 Since that time, the number of
villages have increased, inflation has tripled and Government resources
haledwindled.
	 Finally, there is no evidence that the Party itself has
seriously considered and evaluated its own capacity to sustain over a
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long term period large-scale peasant communal production - without
having to resort to coercion, which is a politically unacceptable method
of mobilisation, and can have repercussions if maintained over a long
period.
The conflict between the Party and Government /MOA over agricultural
policy has been reflected recently in changes relating to the institutional
framework of rural development.
	 As we have seen, the Prime Minister's
Office was responsible for rural development, and a special department
was created in 1969 entitled 'Ujamaa na Ushirika' which offered services
and research on problems of rural development. It also provided training
facilities for diverse activities. On the other hand, the Party was
responsible for implementing ujamaa through mobilisation.
In 1981 the PM0 adopted the policy of community development and
came out in favour of co-operatives, two policies associated with the
'modernisation' ideas in operation in Tanzania between 1962 and 1966.
The policy of Ujamaa, on the other hand, was sent to the Party for imple-
mentation.	 Why?
Ujamaa is a national policy and it is only
fair that it should come under the hegemony
of the Party.
(interview with PM0 official,
August 1981)
Thus what appears to be happening is that the Government/PM° has reverted
to a modernisation approach towards rural development, while the 'political'
approach promoting socialist organisation has been returned to the Party.
As in the case of agricultural policies proper, the Government/PM° and
the Party are now pursuing different policies in a parallel way.
This separation of policies is meant to increase the accountability
of each organ of the state and to make it possible to assess progress of
problems more clearly.
	 This would indicate either that the conflict
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which has characterised Government/Party relations has now become
acceptable, or that the differences are irreconcilable, so that diverse
policies of development have to be allowed to co-exist.
We can conclude this section on recent policy-making for the rural
bn3—
sector that the conflict between Party and Government is still evident;
the former is still calling for agriculture based on socialist organ-
isation of large-scale farming by peasants, while the Government would
prefer to have large-scale private farming. 	 In Government circles it
is believed that it would be more difficult to achieve large-scale farming
based on socialist organisation of peasants because both the peasants
themselves and the Party and Government lack the capacity to sustain the
management of large-scale socialist farming.	 Nyerere has modified his
position to allow large-scale private farming, but there is no evidence
that his pronouncements were taken sufficiently seriously by the Party
as to lead to policy modifications.
As a result of these conflicts, there are diverse policies running
concurrently in the agricultural sector. But the contradictionswhich
this situation would otherwise have created have been muted by the economic
crisis, as all the organs of the state in their different ways are on the
defensive.
Writers as different as Lofchie and Von Freyhold have tended to
explain recent Tanzanian policies by merely referring to one trend in
policy-making, arguing on this basis that Tanzania has abandoned
socialism.	 As I have attempted to show, however, two different types
of policies are being pursued independently of one another by two organs
of the state, namely, conventional modernisation-type policies (pursued
by the Government) and the socialist organisation of agricultural and
rural development (pursued by the Party).	 This creates a more complex
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situation in development, as well as in understanding the state, than
Lofchie,and Von Freyhold allow.
The co-existence of these diverse policies in such a crucial
sector as agriculture indicates a broader conflict between Party and
Government as-to the types of solutions that are required to solve the
country's economic problems.
	
This conflict, as I have argued, can be
traced partly to different conceptions of development. The Party's
view of development has always been distribution-orientated and has
relied more on human mobilisation to achieve results.	 But it is also,
I have argued, a result of the 1965 Interim Constitution which allows
the Party to formulate policies taking into consideration only political
and social variables; here lies the root of an approach to development
which does not take into consideration implementation problems or
capacity.	 On the other hand, the Government's view of development has
been influenced over the years by problems of implementation, and it
has evolved its own policies on a de facto basis to solve them.
	 The
political-institutional arrangements thus explain to a large extent,
the contradictory and problematic character of development policy in
Tanzania.
CONCLUSION 
The strains derived from the conflicting views of development of
the three organs of the state, the President (rural development), the
Party (marketing), and the Government (economic growth) have been reflected
in the instability experienced by the agricultural sector in Tanzania.
Although the Government,in the early 1960s, attempted to keep
these issues separate as a way of safeguarding its priority of economic
growth, by 1966 the agricultural sector was already experiencing problems
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as a result of 'political' policies. This situation was further
aggravated, first, by the new institutional arrangements which removed
policy-making from the Government's sphere of responsibility and vested
it in the Party; and, second, by the increasing adoption of a 'political'
approach to development by the President and the Party (1969-72).	 The
Government became progressively weakened, with the consequence that its
first priority, economic growth, was downgraded in favour of socialist
rural development.	 The effects of this on the agricultural sector was
intensified by the poor leadership provided by the Ministry of Agriculture
during the early and mid-1970s.
Beginning in 1972 the problem of sustaining economic growth began
to be widely appreciated once again. 	 The three organs of the state
'came together' so to speak in an attempt to cope with the problems of
declining production, leading to policy shifts from communal to block
farming and to tolerance of individual farmers.	 Nevertheless, soon
afterwards the President and the Party adopted the policy of Villagisation,
setting aside once again Government's problems and concerns regarding
the agricultural sector.
Further 'political' policies were passed in 1976, which destabilised
distribution and marketing networks in the rural areas.
	 These were the
policies of Operation Maduka and the dissolution of the Co-operatives,
which increased the disorganisation in the rural society.	 An attempt by
the Prime Minister's Office to regulate socio-economic life in the villages,
the Village Act 1975, failed because the designers overlooked the limited
managerial capacity of the peasants.
In the 1980s the agricultural sector has been torn apart by inter-
locking problems of production, marketing, lack of retail facilities,
transportation, and village organisation, in the context of the general
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economic crisis of the country. 	 All three organs of the state have
once again 'come together' in a bid to increase production. 	 But the
appearance of unity and stability conceals conflicting policies, which
have been relegated from the political arena onto the development process.
The Party and Government are each developing their own 'projects':
the Government (Ministry of Agriculture, and the Prime Minister's Office)
are adopting a modernisation approach to agriculture and rural development
based on private capital while the Party continues to emphasise socialist
organisation.	 The President has resumed his traditional role of alter-
nating his support from one organ to the other, depending on whether he
speaks as Head of Government or Head of the Party.
	 This shows that the
conflict between the theory of socialism and the existing objective capacity
of the economy has not yet been resolved in Tanzania.
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FOOTNOTE 
,
1. The MinistrY of Regional Administration & Rural Development 1969;
Decentralisation and the creation of the Prime Minister's Office,
1972.
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CONCLUSION TO PART III
The analysis of the three case studies - on the policy of private
capital, on internal trade and on agriculture and rural development - has
confirmedthe broad outlines of my analysis of development policy-making
in Tanzania under the tripartite system. It has also documented com-
plexities which were only hinted at in Part I and II.
Part III has confirmed the crucial role of the relationship between
the Party and Government. 	 In each of the case studies, we saw how there
was a basic conflict between the Party and Government's position. This
difference, I argued, was traceable to the views of development held in
these two organs and to their institutional functions. 	 The Party's
approach to development was greatly facilitated by the institutional
arrangements for policy-making, which enabled the Party to continue up
to the 1980s to consider implementation problems as extrinsic to policy-
making.	 The consequences of this approach for development were empirically
demonstrated.	 Briefly summarised, development problems became aggravated
creating destabilising effects on the development processes. 	 The Party
and Government were working at cross-purposes; the former's policies
expanded the need for manpower and recurrent expenditure, while the latter
was trying to minimise their expansion.
	 Each organ was going its separate
way, emphasising its own policies in particular areas of the economy.
The Government adopted a 'political' approach to development (1969-
1974) relegating the production-minded group to a minority status.
	 This
affected the three policies analysed because economic growth was compromised
during this period. However, when the production-orientated group became
dominant once again during 1976-1982, their effectiveness was curtailed
because certain ministries, notably the Prime Minister's Office and the
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Ministry of Trade, persisted with a 'political' approach in matters
pertaining to rural development and trade. At this level, the Government
ceased to function as a unitary entity.
Superimposed on these trends is the determining influence of the
Presidency.	 The President often played a strategic role because he could
tip the balance between the Party and the Government by alternating his
support from one organ to another.
	 This role of the President was evident
in all the three case studies.
	 Thus in 1967 the President was closer to
Government's position on the issue of private capital (Public Ownership
policy), on internal trade - when he opposed the nationalisation of the
wholesale and retail trade - and on agriculture, when he allowed and
-supported progressive farmers though he was against large-scale individual
farming.	 Between 1969-1974, the President changed his position on all
three issues.	 Again, between 1976 and 1982 the President modified his
position on two crucial issues, the role of private capital in development
and large-scale farming in agriculture, which brought him closer to
Government's position. I would argue that the President tends to come closer
to Government's position during periods of economic crisis and reverts to
the Party's position when the crisis has been overcome. While this role
allows him to maintain a 'balance' or 'unity' between the two opposing
views of development, as well as creates flexibility in policies, it also
created instability in development.
These three elements were evident in various degrees in all the
three case studies. At the same time, each policy-sector bears the imprint
of one organ of the state more heavily than the others. 	 Thus the
influence of the Government, notably of the conventional view of development
and the production-orientated group, is most evident in the policy on
private capital.
	 Except in the period 1969-1974 (during the primacy
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of politics), the President supported Government's position.	 The Party
never supported the Government's position on the role of private capital,
and it has remained consistently antagonistic to private capital.
The influence of the Party has been most strongly experienced in
internal trade. " As we saw in Parts I and II, internal trade was one
of the traditional preoccupations of the Party. 	 The Government did not
favour the Party's policy of the nationalisation of the wholesale trade
(1970), which was supported by the President.	 But neither the President
nor the Government supported the Party's policy of Operation Maduka (1976),
which 'socialised' retail trade.
The President's influence has been most decisive in the agrarian
sector.	 The President has shown a continuous and persistent tendency
to give priority to rural social organisation at the expense, if necessary,
of economic growth.
	
In this he has received support from the Party.
The Government did not favour the policies of Ujamaa or Villagisation
but was powerless to stop them.
These findings illustrate that development policy-making in Tanzania
is an extremely complex process, which cannot be reduced - to a single factor
- be it class interests, or the President's personality.	 The tripartite
system and the beliefs and understandings of the policy-makers play an
important role in the formulation of policies, though one organ's view
and emphasis may assume particular importance in a given sector or at a
specific time. This situation allows for conflicting policies to be
pursued in parallel, and for one type of policy to assume dominance while
the other remains latent, to be revived at an appropriate time.
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CONCLUSION
The main task of this thesis has been to offer a new explanation
of the Tanzanian development experience since 1962. I began by
rejecting the Class analysis and dependency approach of the radicals
as well as Green's 'pragmatic dependency' approach and the official
Tanzanian Government explanation with its heavy emphasis on exogenous
factors.	 The thesis has also extended Hyden's work by offering an
explanation of why policies which were self-evidently mistaken or counter-
productive were persistently pursued.
The new explanation which has been offered combines an analysis of
Tanzania's political institutions in terms of a tripartite system of
policy-making and an analysis of the aims and ideologies of the policy-
makers.	 Thus the thesis has examined development policies within a
political-institutional context by differentiating between the organs of
the state - the President, the Party and the Government.
	 This approach
has enabled me to explain each policy in relation to the organ sponsoring
it, and to examine its overall consequences for the development process
in terms of the view of development, priorities and institutional functions
of that organ.	 This approach has also enabled me to explore the often
complex interrelationships of the tripartite system, presenting a more
comprehensive understanding of the Tanzanian policy-making system and its
effects on the development process. 	 The thesis has examined the period
1962 to 1982.	 I examined two historical periods, 1962 to 1966, and 1967
to 1982. The transition between these periods is important because of the
change in the institutional arrangements for policy-making.
	
Prior to
1965 the Government formulated policies and implemented th
atnna QCL
With the introduction of the Interim Constitution, he Party
1416(3)
ormulated
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policies and the Government implemented them.
	 However, I argued that
despite this institutional arrangement, Tanzania had in practice a tri-
partite system under which the President, the Party and the Government
each influenced policy-making to a significant extent.
	 This situation
created a very complex situation in policy-making, which was further
aggravated by the different priorities and views of development prevailing
in the different organs of the state. 	 Also, the institutional division
of labour between policy-making and implementation introduced a destab-
ilising effect on the development process.
The chronological chapters of the thesis pursued three themes -
the relationship between the Party and the Government, the views of development
held in the three organs of the state, and finally, the consequences of
a 'political' approach for the development process. 	 In addition, three
case studies - on private capital, internal trade, and agriculture and
rural development - were analysed in terms of the three themes.
The analysis in Part I, 1962-65, showed that the state in Tanzania
was not homogenous; there was a conflict between the Party and the4
Government and the President was sandwiched between them. 	 This situation
created instability in terms of policy-making because all three organs
continued to formulate policies.	 On this basis I argued that Tanzania
had a tripartite system of policy-making. 	 One of the major concerns of
the 1965 Interim Constitution was to find a working relationship between
the Party and the Government, which indicates that the conflict between
the two organs of the state was recognised as a serious political problem.
• The conflict between the Party and the Government was expressed
in two opposing views of development. On the one hand was the Party's
activists' view of development which called for immediate re-distributive
measures and for increased state control of the economy. More specifically,
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Party activists pressed for Africanisation and for a rapid expansion of
the co-operatives to replace the Indian traders; and they were against
investments by private capital.	 The Government on the other hand evolved
policies which were based on the encouragement of private capital in
major sectors of the economy.	 Government's major priority was to achieve
a faster rate of economic growth. 	 Private investment was viewed as
essential given the limited capital, manpower and technology that were
available to the Government.
The co-existence of these two views of development created uncertainties,
especially vis-a-vis private capital. Between 1963 and 1964 the Government
modified its position to accommodate the Party activists' pressures and
demands.	 The Government incorporated limited re-distributive measures
into the development programme, giving in to the Party's demands on the issue
of Africanisation and on the expansion of the co-operatives; but it held firm
on the issue of private capital and proceeded to pass the FIPA Act to protect
foreign capital in the eventuality of nationalisation. 	 These measures
failed, however, to appease the political demands of the Party activists.
The President's support for the Government's position did not prevent him
from supporting the Party's position also, and in this way, both organs
could identify their positions with the President's and use the latter's
speeches to counteract the policies of the other.
Finally, Part I of the thesis examined the outcomes of the policies
which were passed between 1962 and 1966. It was argued that policies that
were not politically interfered with had a high degree of success, while
those which were implemented as a result of political pressures were already
creating problems by 1966.	 Politically motivated policies undermined
the conditions for the successful achievement of Tanzania's fundamental
political goals.
The 1965 Constitution recommended that the Party be able to continue
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formulating broad political guidelines of a policy nature while the
National Assmb1y continued with its legislative functions. This created
the conditions in which, in later years, the Party assumed resbonsibility
for policy-making while the Government remained
responsible for policy-implementation.
	 I argued that this arrangement
introduced a destabilising element into the development process because
it created a wedge between the conception of policies and the practical-
ities of their implementation.	 This problem was analysed in the second
part of the thesis.
Part II looked at the period 1967:-1982 drawing again on an under-
standing of the interrelationships between the Government, the Party and
the President.	 The tripartite system became more complex during this
period, and this was reflected in the analysis of major policies of
development.
	 The complexities of these relationships as well as the
changes that occurred over time within each organ were analysed and their
influences on policies investigated and documented.
In Chapter Five I argued that in the formulation of the policies of
the Arusha Declaration, the Party, the Government and the President were
not functioning as parts of a homogeneous entity.
	 Each organ of the state
had different priorities and concerns which it was able to bring to bear
on the making of policy at different stages of the process.
	 The analysis
did not find any evidence that the class in power was formulating policies
to further its own class interests.
	 On the contrary, we saw that the Party
and the Government were operating at cross-purposes.
	
In Chapter Six,
'The Primacy of Politics in Development 1969-1974', I showed how, for the
first time, the three organs of the state adopted views of development
which had a common underlying theme, giving greater emphasis to political
goals than to present economic constraints.
	 The influence of these diverse
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but convergent intellectual traditions was with reference to the Five
Year Development Plan 1969-1974 as well as to the major policies passed
during the period.
	 A new dimension which added complexities to the
Party-Government relationship was the change within the Government. In
this phase the most influential sectors of the Government adopted a
'political' approach to development, relegating the conventional view to
a minority status.
	 Thus the Government's view of development and its
working methods were no 1onger4homogeneous as they had been during 1962-
1966. I argued on this basis that the real revolution in Tanzania's
approach to development occurred between 1969-1974, and not with the
Arusha Declaration as is commonly assumed.
In Chapter Seven I examined the outcomes of the 'political'
policies and the resulting policy changes. I argued that the political
policies were misguided because, failing to consider economics as inputs
into policy-making, they weakened the economy's capacity to cope with
exogenous factors.	 In Chapter Eight I looked at the period following the
1974/75 crisis and argued that the Government and the Party were once again
operating at cross-purposes. I documented this by tracing out the
contradictory policies which were pursued between 1976 and 1982.
	 With
the economic crisis, (1974-75), the Government began once again to emphasise
economic growth, the need to reduce recurrent expenditure and the encourage-
ment of private capital in productive sectors.
	 The President supported
the Government in this. 	 The Party, on the other hand, continued with its
traditional concern to replace private capital by co-operative shops in
internal trade.
As the second economic crisis continued to deepen, all the three
organs of the state once again attempted to come together to solve the
crisis, but this unity was fragile, concealing conflicting policies and
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strategies.	 These conflicts became more apparent in Part III, which
looked into individual policy areas in terms of interactions of the
tripartite system.
Part III again pursued the three themes of the thesis, and the
evidence presented confirmed their importance. Each of the case studies
illustrated that there was a strong conflict between the Party and the
Government.	 This conflict was made more complex by the role the President
played in relation to specific policies.	 Thus in the case study on
private capital, the President was closer to Government's position than to
the Party's during 1976-1982; though during 1969-1974, the President had
been closer to the Party's position.
	 In internal trade, the President
supported the Party's demands for nationalisation of wholesale trade in
the 1970s but neither the President nor the Government supported the
Party on the policy of Operation Maduka in 1976. 	 The policies on rural
development were distinguished by the fact that they were mainly initiated
by the President; the Party supported the President but the Government's
support was lukewarm.
Finally, the case studies also provided empirical data to illustrate
how the problems of implementation which were experienced were related to
faulty policy-making.	 The practice of formulating policies without
reference to economic considerations, I have argued throughout, leads to
policy-failures.	 In Tanzania in the 1970s this practice aggravated
development problems and weakened the economy's capacity to cope with
exogenous shocks.
This thesis has sought to reinterpret the Tanzanian development
experience. It has not attempted to provide solutions to the many problems
it has raised. On the other hand, I hope my analysis has provided a
framework within which it will be possible to begin a discussion of the
way forward towards better development policy-making in Tanza.
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APPENDIX ONE
:
Dates of Interviews 
Interviews with Party officials occurred on:
1 July 1981
4 II II
13 II II
14 II
15 II II
16 II II
21 II II
24 II II
25 II II
27 II
28 I I II
18 August 1981
19	 "	 "
20	 "	 II
Interviews with Government officials
18 June 1981
+red on:
13 August 1981
22 June II 14 II II
23 II 15 II II
26 I I 17 II II
2 July I I
3	 II 11
6	 II II
9	 I,
10	 II
II
11
16	 II II
22	 II II
23	 II II
29	 II II
30	 II II
12 August
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